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More than thirty years after the European Court of Justice has confirmed that 
professional sport is covered by the Treaty, the application of EC law to sporting 
rules is still a matter of dispute. Apart from being a significant branch of business, 
professional sport also has special socio-cultural qualities, making it sit uneasily 
within the predominantly economically orientated Community law system. 
This work examines. the application of EC law to sporting measures, identifying the 
limits of Community intervention. In this context, special attention is paid to the 
sports bodies' legal autonomy. Furthermore, it is analysed to what extent the unique 
characteristics of sport warrant preferential treatment or even a reference to sport in 
the Treaty. On the basis of existing case law under Article 39 and 81 of the Treaty, a 
legal framework for dealing with sporting measures is developed, defining different 
categories of sporting rules under EC law. Thereby, the economic and social 
characteristics of sport are considered, examining how sporting interests may be 
taken into account under the Treaty. Subsequently, the suggested approach is tested 
on the example of the football transfer system, namely the 1997 and the 2005 FIFA 
transfer regulations. 
Professional sport has particular characteristics that warrant special treatment under 
EC law. However, although the Community has finally recognised these sporting 
qualities, it has so far failed to provide a convincing legal basis to deal with sport 
accordingly. As a result, sporting rules have been treated on a case-by-case basis, 
leading to legal uncertainty. The suggested approach applies a sporting "rule of 
reason" under Articles 39(1) and 81(1), exempting measures that guarantee the 
proper functioning of sporting competition and/or protect sport's core values. As 
demonstrated in connection with the football transfer system, this approach ensures 
compliance with the Treaty whilst paying attention to sporting interests. 
The example of sport illustrates that over the years EC law has found its way into 
areas of social and cultural interest it was originally not designed to deal with. Thus, 
the mainly economically orientated Community legislation is often lacking the 
required flexibility, a problem that for the time being may only be remedied by the 
Court. However, in the future involvement of the Member States may be needed for 
the Community to be able to take care of social issues appropriately. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The football transfer system, anti-doping legislation, nationality restrictions in team 
sports, selection rules for international tournaments - these are only a few examples 
of sporting measures that were challenged under EC law in recent years. However, 
although the European Court of Justice confirmed that professional sport is covered 
by the Treaty more than three decades ago, it was not until the infamous Bosman' 
judgment that the sporting community realised the full consequences of this verdict. 
Since then, EC law has found its way into many different areas of sporting life and in 
some cases gave rise to drastic rule changes, significantly altering the face of sport in 
Europe. Considering the extent to which European law_ has penetrated the sports 
business, not even the most fundamental sporting rules seem to be safe from 
Community intervention and many feel that the European Union endangers sport's 
core values. Thus, sports related decisions by the Court and Commission have often 
been met with heavy criticism by sports fans and officials. 
The main reason behind the controversies surrounding the application of EC 
law to sport lies in its dual nature: unlike other economic activities, professional 
sport not only constitutes a significant branch of industry, but also has a very 
important social, cultural and educational dimension. Taking into account that the 
mainly economically motivated Community law leaves little room to pay attention to 
socio-cultural issues, tensions seem inevitable. Moreover, sports bodies are generally 
reluctant to accept outside regulation, believing that owing to their inside and expert 
knowledge, they are best suited to looking after their own affairs. 
Thus, when the application of EC law to sporting rules is analysed, the two 
main questions arising are: Firstly, to what extent may sporting interests be taken 
into account under the EC Treaty and secondly, how far may sports bodies invoke 
their legal autonomy to escape Community intervention. Although the Court and 
Commission have offered some guidance on these questions in the past, they have so 
far failed to develop a consistent approach to sporting matters. Until now, issues have 
been solved on a case-by-case basis, making it very difficult to pre judge the 
Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Association and Others v. Bosman 
and Others [1995] ECR I-4921. 
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outcome of pending cases. Still, it has to be welcomed that the Court has expressed 
its willingness to pay attention to sporting values and has shown a tendency to 
respect the sports bodies' legal autonomy to a certain extent. Having said that, the 
special treatment of the sports sector has regularly not been backed up with the 
necessary legal argumentation or - as has been the case in the Court of First 
Instance's decision in Meca-Medina2 - the Court reaches the right decision, albeit 
following a debatable reasoning. 
Thus, the main aim of this thesis lies in developing a consistent approach to 
sporting measures under EC law. In this context, the difficulties surrounding the 
application of EC law to professional sport shall be highlighted and the limits to 
Community intervention defined. On the other hand, it shall be outlined on the basis 
of existing case law and the Commission's decision-making practice under which 
circumstances and on which grounds sport requires special treatment and where 
preferential treatment is unwarranted. Subsequently, the developed approach is tested 
on the example of the football transfer system, namely the 1997 and the 2001/2005 
FIFA transfer regulations. 
Summarising, the thesis follows the structure set out below: 
In the first chapter the economic relevance of the sports sector is highlighted, 
explaining why professional sport has attracted the attention of the Community in the 
first place. Then it is established that sport has certain socio-cultural functions in 
European society, which distinguish it from other economic activities. Having 
pointed out that these sporting qualities are worth protecting, the history of sport in 
EC law is outlined in order to gain an insight in the Community's approach to 
sporting matters. 
Even though it is widely accepted that professional sport is principally 
covered by EC law, arguments for a Treaty exemption exist. Hence, the limits to the 
application of EC law to sporting rules are assessed, examining whether there are 
loopholes allowing sport a general or at least partial immunity from the Treaty. 
Thereby, special consideration is given to the question of the sports bodies' 
2 Case T-313/02 Meca-Medina & Majcen v. Commission [2004] 3 CMLR 60. 
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autonomy, in which context the scope of the human right of freedom of association is 
outlined. 
Having analysed the special characteristics of sport and the limits to the 
application of the Treaty, the case for a reference to sport in the Treaty is presented. 
Thus, it is questioned whether the peculiarities of sport warrant an exemption from 
EC law. Then the option of including a protective reference to sport in the Treaty is 
assessed, before moving on to the new article on sport in the Constitution for Europe. 
Ultimately, alternative options to inserting a reference to sport in the Treaty are 
outlined. 
The second chapter is dedicated to the football transfer system, explaining its 
purpose and historical development. Subsequently, the general application of the 
provisions on free movement to sporting rules is examined, followed by the special 
consideration of the post-Bosman transfer system. Analysing the Court's approach to 
sporting matters under Article 39(1) of the Treaty, it emerges that Bosman has 
introduced a sporting "rule of reason", which allows the consideration of sporting 
interests. While this has to be welcomed, it is submitted that the Court's case law 
concerning sporting measures lacks consistency, resulting in legal uncertainty. Thus, 
a more consistent approach to sporting rules under Article 39(1) is outlined, 
establishing different categories of sporting measures. 
With regard to the personal scope of Article 39, the issue of nationality 
restrictions in European team sports is raised, taking into account the recent 
developments on the subject. Finally, it is explained why Bosman marked the start, 
rather than the end of Community intervention in the football transfer system. In this 
context, it is questioned whether the Commission's objections against the 1997 FIFA 
transfer regulations were in fact merited, critically analysing them under the 
provisions on the free movement of workers. 
Sporting measures can not only constitute a restriction to free movement, but 
are suitable to distort competition. However, considering the special features of 
sport, the application of Article 81 to sporting rules poses various problems. Firstly, 
according to economic theory, professional team sports follow mechanisms different 
from usual market conditions, which has given rise to demands for a sporting 
exemption in EC competition law. Secondly, the strictly economically orientated 
3 
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anti-trust law leaves little room to pay attention to sport's socio-cultural functions. 
Having said that, it is submitted that the Court's case law in Wouters may offer a 
solution to this conundrum. Thus, the effect of Wouters on the application of Article 
81(1) to sporting measures is assessed; in particular, different categories of sporting 
rules are identified, trying to define a consistent approach to rules adopted by sports 
bodies under EC competition law. 
Ultimately, the principles suggested above are applied to the post-Bosman 
transfer rules. Having given an overview of the different markets on which the 
product (football) may be sold, it is examined whether the 1997 transfer regulations 
posed a restriction on competition, also examining the possibility of an exemption 
under Article 81(3) of the Treaty. Thereby remaining restrictions for out-of contract 
players and regulations applying to players still in contract, which may distort 
competition in different manners, are differentiated. Additionally, it is briefly 
examined whether transfer rules may be caught by Article 82 of the Treaty. 
In the last chapter, the 2001 compromise between the Commission and the 
footballing bodies on the transfer system is presented. Following that, the 2001 and 
2005 transfer regulations are critically analysed under Article 39, as well as EC 
competition law, trying to establish whether they mark an end to the discussions 
surrounding the football transfer system in EC law. 
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1. THE APPLICATION'OF EC LAW TO SPORT 
1.1. IS SPORT DIFFERENT? 
In the history of the European Union, few incidents have caused such a public outcry 
as the European Court of Justice's judgment in the Bosman case ten years agog. 
Whereas Community competence in "classical" economic matters such as 
agriculture, the internal market or fishery has always been more or less accepted, 
many EU-citizens found it hard to understand that the Court should be able to rule on 
sport -a subject that was not only traditionally thought of as non-economic, but also 
considered to fall under the jurisdiction of the autonomous sports bodies. As the 
following extract from The Sun demonstrates, many football supporters could simply 
not accept that the European Union should have the "right" to interfere with "the 
beautiful game": 
"Once Luxembourg was a two-bob country only known for its radio station. And the 
fact that it once let in nine goals against England. Now a judge in the European Court 
in Luxembourg endangers our national game with his ruling that the transfer system is 
against European law. This euro madness will drive smaller clubs out of business or 
force them to merge. It will make football a paradise for players and agents - and hell 
for the fans. Who gave Europe the right to take football away from us? "2. 
More than ten years after Bosman, the application of EC law to sport is still a matter 
of dispute. Although the effects of Bosman have not destroyed football as many had 
feared and nowadays the majority of fans would not want to miss the possibility of 
new players from all over Europe being brought into their club "on a Bosman", the 
reluctance to accept Community intervention still exists. Only recently, the case of 
the Belgian club SC Charleroi, which is suing FIFA for damages after their star 
player Abdelmajid Oulmers, was injured whilst on international duty for Morocco, 
has once again fuelled the debate over the application of EC law to internal sporting 
Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Association and Others v. Bosman 
and Others [1995] ECR I-4921. 
2 The Sun, 21.9.1995, cited by Greenfield, S. & Osborn, G., "Contract and Control in the 
entertainment industry: dancing on the edge of heaven" (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 1998), p. 
22. 
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rules. Thus, one may wonder whether sport is indeed "different" from other areas of 
Community competence, hence requiring favourable treatment or whether its claim 
to special legal status is without substance. However, before assessing the limits to 
the application of EC law to sporting rules, it is necessary to determine on which 
grounds sport is considered to fall under the scope of the Treaty in the first place. 
1.1.1. Community Competence in Sporting Matters 
When analysing the Treaty, one notices that there is no explicit provision which 
would enable the Community to act on sporting matters3. As it is an important 
principle in EC law that Community activity is limited to the powers conferred upon 
it by the Treaty4, sport falls under the scope of EC law only in so far as there is a 
legal basis for Community competence in the Treaty. The provision empowering the 
Community to rule on sporting issues can be found in Article 2 of the Treaty, which 
states that "the Community shall have as its task [... ] to promote throughout the 
Community a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic 
activities". Thereby included is the establishment of an internal markets and of a 
system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted6. Thus, as far 
as sport may be considered as an economic activity in the sense of Article 2 of the 
Treaty, the Community may implement and apply legislation intended to regulate the 
economic side of sport. 
A prime example for the economic relevance and ongoing commercialisation 
of professional sport is the explosion in value of broadcasting rights within the last 
few decades: whereas broadcasters paid approximately £ 53 million for the Olympic 
Games in Moscow 1980, the rights to the 1992 games in Barcelona were sold for 
£ 337 million, augmenting to a value of £ 793 million for the transmission of the 
2004 Olympic Games in Athens7. In Europe, the commercialisation of sport is most 
prominent in football, where the German Kirch Media Group bought the television 
However, it should be noted that the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, signed on 29 
October 2004 in Rome, includes a reference to sport, OJ 2004 C 310/1. 
° EC Treaty, Article 5. 
EC Treaty, Article 3(1)(a). 
6 EC Treaty, Article 3(1)(g). 
7 Source: http: //www. olympic. org/uk/organisation/facts/revenue/broadcoast uk. asp. 
6 
rights for the World Cups in 2002 and 2006 for an equivalent of £ 1.5 billion, only 
famously to file for insolvency shortly after. On a national level, the British 
broadcasting company BSkyB has secured a deal with the English Premier league 
worth £1 billion, lasting for three seasons as from season 2004/059, while the 
Scottish Premier League has accepted a£ 32 million offer from Irish satellite 
company Setanta for the live broadcasting rights for the seasons 2004/05 to 
2007/0810. 
The economic dimension of football is underlined by the fact that nowadays 
clubs are professionally run businesses earning enormous sums from selling 
merchandise" and are even featuring on the stock market 12. The professional 
services firm Deloitte & Touche estimate in their 2003 Annual Review of Football 
Finance that the turnover of English First Division/Premiership clubs had increased 
seven-fold in ten years to £ 1.132 million in 2001/02. However, as the respective 
figures for 2003/04 show, it appears that the growth rate is slowing down (the 
revenue achieved by Premiership clubs in 2003/04 totalled to £ 1,326, up 6% on 
2002/03 (£ 1,246), which signifies the lowest rate of growth since the Premiership's 
foundation). On a European level, the aggregated income of the "big five" European 
Leagues (England, Italy, Spain, Germany and France) was said to be E 5.8 billion in 
2003/04, with the Premiership being top of the league, generating revenues of nearly 
¬2 billion, followed by the Italian Serie A with revenues of E 823 million less. 
According to Deloitte & Touche's rich list for 2003/04, the world's wealthiest 
football team, Manchester United, generated revenues of E 248 million, ahead of 
Real Madrid (E 226 million), AC Milan (E 212 million) and Chelsea FC 
(E 208 million). Compared to season 2002/03, where Manchester United was not 
only the most profitable football club with a£ 175 million turnover and operating 
profits of £ 34 million, but the richest team of any sport in the world, followed by the 
, Source: http: //www. news. bbc. co. uk, "World Cup TV will be free", 26.2.2001. 
9 Source: Holland, P., "Sky won't sub-licence Prem TV deal", www. soccemet. com, 12.5.2004. 
Source: "SPL agree £ 32m Setanta TV deal", www. soccernet. com, 26.2.2004. 
According to the Deloitte & Touche 2003 Annual Report on Football Finance, English clubs 
generated £ 90 million from merchandising in 2002/03. 
12 As, for example, Borussia Dortmund or Juventus Turin; however, this leaves clubs open to the 
risk of take-overs, as the example of Malcolm Glazier, who after his take-over of Manchester 
United has now taken the club off the stock market, shows. 
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US Baseball team New York Yankees with revenue of £ 170 million, Manchester 
United achieved a record operating profit of £ 51.7 million in 2003/04. 
Sports such as football are an important tool in the advertising industry that 
enables companies to develop a high profile, positive image by sponsoring a big 
club13 or by using famous sport stars to promote their products. Thus, the last few 
years have witnessed the incorporation of sponsors' brands in stadium names, such 
as the Hamburger SV's AOL Arena, Leicester's Walkers Stadium or the curiously 
named Playmobil Stadium of the German 2. Bundesliga club Greuter Fürth14. In 
Austria, where sponsoring is arguably most prominent in Europe, the Bundesliga 
club FC Pasching has even sacrificed its team name for a sponsorship deal and is 
now called FC Superfund, whereas the 2. Bundesliga club Untersiebenbrunn has 
changed its name to SC Interwetten. com, only to be told at the beginning of season 
2003/04 that Interwetten. com does not intend to continue its sponsorship. Similarly, 
the example of Red Bull owner Dietmar Mateschitz who, after taking over his 
hometown's club Austria Salzburg, has not only changed its name into Red Bull 
Salzburg, but has also made the club abandon its traditional colours, shows that on an 
increasing number of occasions economic considerations precede the fans' interest. 
Considering the numbers on transfer spending in the last few years, the 
Commission's concerns about the football transfer system are hardly surprising 15 . 
According to Deloitte & Touche, in the 2000/01 season English clubs spent a record 
£ 423 million on transfer fees, a level which will most probably never be reached 
again, owing to the introduction of a new transfer system. However, after a 
substantial fall in 2002/03 (from £ 407 million in 2001/02 to f 203 million), the gross 
transfer expenditure has bounced up again to £ 414 million in 2003/04, which 
13 Manchester United, for example, have secured a£ 36 million four year shirt sponsorship deal with 
Vodafone as from 1 June 2004, source: http: //news. bbc. co. uk/lft&%usiness/3252120. stm, and a 
£ 303 million 13 year deal with Nike, source: http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/business/3151028. stm. 
14 However, when it comes to bizarrely named stadiums, surely non-league side Wilton Albion, 
whose Wincham Park was called The Bargain Booze Stadium for a few seasons, is top of the 
league. On a more serious note, one may also wonder about Arsenal's decision to accept 
£ 100 million for naming their new stadium the Emirates Stadium, "even though the word 
Emirates relates to a land far off and for the past few years has been associated with London rivals 
Chelsea", see Hadsley, N., "Named and Shamed", When Saturday Comes, December 2004, Issue 
214, p. 20. 
IS One only has to remember the £ 48 million world record move of Zinedine Zidane from Juventus 
to Real Madrid in 2001, the £ 37 million transfer of Luis Figo from Barcelona to Real Madrid in 
2000 or the 2002 UK record transfer fee of £ 29 million Manchester United paid Leeds United for 
defender Rio Ferdinand. 
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according to Deloitte & Touche is largely due to Chelsea's transfer spending of 
£ 175 million. 
1.1.2. The Special Qualities of Sport 
Having demonstrated the huge economic potential of the sports industry in general 
and football in particular, one would have thought that it is impossible to deny that 
sport is an economic activity in the sense of Article 2 and as such falls under the 
scope of the Treaty. The reason why there are still controversies about the 
application of Community law to sport, is its hybrid nature: unlike many other 
economic activities, professional sport is not only big business, but has also a very 
important social dimension. Before trying to analyse the "other" side of sport, 
though, it seems appropriate to determine what the notion of sport actually means. 
The only official definition of sport is to be found in Article 2(1)(a) of the Council of 
Europe's European Sports Charter, which defines sport as 
"all forms of physical activity which, through casual or organised participation, aim at 
expressing or improving physical fitness and mental well-being, forming social 
16 relationships or obtaining results in competition at all levelss 
Taking into account this definition, it is possible to define different functions that 
sport performs in our society: '7 
1.1.2.1. Educational Function of Sport 
Sport is widely considered to be an important instrument of education based on 
ethics of fair play, equal opportunities and reward for sporting merit. Active 
participation in sport is thought to promote a balanced personal development by 
helping young people to develop better social skills and show them how to fit into 
society. Those who have practised sport have developed a fighting spirit and a 
capacity for sacrifice, as well as self-respect and respect for others: all qualities 
which build a person's character and help him or her to progress through life. Sport 
is also an excellent way to teach young people positive values such as determination, 
16 The full text of the Charter is available at httpsJ/wcm. coe. int/ViewDoc. jsp? id=206451&Lang=en. 
17 See also "The development and prospects for Community action in the field of sport", 
Commission Staff Working Paper, DG X, Brussels, 29.9.1998, 
httpJ/www. europa. eu. int/conu /sport/doc/ecom/doc_evol en. pdf. 
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courage, tolerance, loyalty, friendship and team spirit'8. The important role that sport 
plays in education is emphasised by its popularity, illustrated by the fact that of the 
young people who are members of an association, 54 percent of them have joined a 
sports association19. 
However, talented young sports people are increasingly manipulated for 
economic purposes, which makes it necessary to introduce measures to safeguard 
their well-being and provide them with proper education and training. The European 
Union has recognised the potential of sport as a means of educating young people 
and declared 2004 as the Year of Education through Sport20. 
1.1.2.2. Public Health Function 
Without doubt, physical activity is one of the best ways to improve one's health. 
Practising sport on a regular basis is an effective means to prevent certain illnesses 
such as heart disease and cancer and can help to maintain good health and quality of 
life among the elderly. Sport not only supports the physical well-being of a person, 
but also improves mental health and can be used in the fight against depression. 
Moreover, sport is of fundamental significance for combating smoking and alcohol 
as well as drug abuse, which makes it even more important to support the sports 
associations in their attempts to eradicate doping in sport. 
1.1.2.3. Integrationist Function 
Sport is a way to forge links between people from different parts of the world or 
different walks of life21. It can also have a role to play in the binding of emerging 
nations and indeed international organisations. The European Union recognised this 
integrationist quality of sport early on, trying to use it to promote the idea of a 
Is Thus, in the Eurobarometer survey "Citizens of the European Union and sport", conducted in 
Autumn 2004 in the 25 Member States, 52 percent of persons asked were of the opinion that sport 
develops team spirit, followed by discipline (46 percent), friendship (38 percent) and effort (36 
percent). 
19 See the "The European Model of Sport" - Discussion paper for the Working Group, I European 
Conference on Sport, Olympia, 22.5.1999, available at 
www. europa. eu. int/comm/sportlaction_sports/dialogue/asssisesl999/assises base model_en. pdf. 
20 Decision 291/2003/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 February 2003 
establishing the European Year of Education through Sport 2004, OJ 2003 L 43/1. 
21 According to the already mentioned Eurobarometer survey, close to three in four European Union 
citizens (73 percent) view sport as a means of promoting the integration of immigrant populations 
by developing a dialogue between different cultures. 
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European identity22. The fact that sports not only brings people together on the 
playing field, but is also a major impetus for European integration is probably best 
illustrated by the Ryder Cup, on the occasion of which fans all over Europe cheer on 
a European golf team taking on a US selection. Not many occasions come to mind 
where citizens in the different Member States develop a sense of being European, as 
it regularly is the case when the Europeans win against their American opponents, 
with thousands supporting a European, rather than a German or French team. 
Besides, taking into account the enlargement of the European Union, sport as an 
activity that is overcoming national boundaries can help to build bridges between the 
old and the new Member States and accelerate European integration. 
1.1.2.4. Cultural Function 
When thinking of culture, sport might not be the first activity that springs to mind. 
Taking into account that more than half of the citizens in the European Union are 
actively practising sport on an amateur level23 and even more are following the 
coverage of professional sports, it becomes evident that sport plays a very important 
role in everyday life. One can think of very few other subjects that feature as 
prominently in television or newspapers and can instantly change programme 
schedules in a way that only a major crisis or disaster would. Even those who are not 
interested in sport or are hostile to it, "cannot escape its nagging presence, as an 
ongoing part of the background noise of contemporary culture"24. The cultural effect 
of sport can also be observed whenever a major international sporting competition 
such as the FIFA25 World Cup or the Olympic Games takes place, where people from 
around the world come together to support their teams26. Sport strengthens national 
22 See for example the 1985 Adonnino Report, whose recommendations were adopted at the 1985 
Milan European Council, "A People's Europe", (1985) 6 Bulletin of the European Communities, 
Suppl. 7/85. 
23 "Report from the Commission to the European Council with a view to safeguard current sport 
structures and maintaining the social function of sport within the Community framework", 
hereinafter referred to as the "Helsinki Report on Sport", Brussels, 10.12.1999, COM (1999) 644 
final, p. 3. 
24 Blake, A., The Body Language: The Meaning of Modern Sport (Lawrence & Wishart, London, 
1996), p. 11. 
2$ Federation Internationale de Football Association, being the international regulatory body of 
football. 
26 For example, a total of 1,165,192 people followed the games in the ten stadiums around Portugal 
during the 2004 UEFA European Championships, source: 
http: //www. euro2004. com/News/Kind=l/newsId=205918. html. 
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or regional identity by giving people a sense of belonging to a group and offers them 
the opportunity to put down roots. Although sport might not be as intellectually 
stimulating as literature, art or music, it features prominently in many areas of our 
society and its cultural significance cannot be denied. 
1.1.2.5. Social Function 
Probably the most important feature of sport in a non-economical context is its social 
dimension. Sport has an impact on modem society in various ways: firstly it is an 
excellent tool to integrate the physically or mentally disabled and promote their 
individual talents. Moreover, sport can be used to help young people from less 
favourable backgrounds and bring those who have lost their way back into society. 
Sport is one of the sectors most likely to generate employment for young people and, 
as such is mentioned in the Commission report on local development and 
employment initiatives27. Apart from that, it encourages people from different 
backgrounds to interact socially with each other and form relationships. The image of 
teams with players from different racial backgrounds and origins can also help to 
combat racism and xenophobia, as the example of the French national team in the 
World Cup 1998 shows28. Another feature of sport that cannot be underestimated is 
its function as a stress relief for many people, in so far as it works as a catalyst for 
aggression. 
1.1.2.6. Recreational Function 
Other than the above-mentioned social, educational and cultural benefits of sporting 
activity, sport is simply an important leisure occupation that provides entertainment 
for millions of people throughout Europe29. Not only is it the favourite pastime for 
lots of amateur athletes, but it offers recreation to many more who follow 
professional sport in their spare time. Sport definitely is one of the favourite leisure 
27 "First Report on Local Development and Employment Initiatives", DG V, Publications Office, 
ISBN 92-828-1751-2. 
28 Although world peace might not be achieved through sport, its symbolic value should not be 
underestimated. This has recently been demonstrated by the example of Bnei Sakhnin, who won 
the 2004 Israeli Cup Final and is the first team made up of Israeli Arabs and Jewish Israelis 
represented in the UEFA Cup. 
29 According to the 2004 Eurobarometer survey, 38 percent of the people asked declared they 
practise a sport at least once a week. 
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activities of the European population and considering the positive values of sport, it 
would be important to encourage even more people to take up a sporting activity. 
1.1.3. Professional Sport 
.. f 
Having analysed the different functions of sport, it seems as if its special features, 
such as the educational, social and health benefits, mainly apply to amateur sport. 
However, amateur sport and its positive impact on society are very much influenced 
by the professional sector. It is a well known phenomenon, for example, that 
professional sportsmen and sportswomen act as role models and that the success of a 
certain team or the occurrence of a special sporting event such as the FIFA World 
Cup or Wimbledon motivates especially younger people to start practising a 
particular sport. Besides, professional sport itself carries most of the depicted 
sporting values, demonstrating team spirit, determination and understanding between 
different races and cultures on a higher stage. What is even more important is the fact 
that in sports such as football, the associations, apart from being involved in the 
economic side of the sport, also fulfil a public task by redistributing funds from the 
professional clubs to the grassroots sector, helping to keep youth and amateur sport 
alive30. 
Thus, when the application of EC law to sport is assessed, it is necessary to 
understand the role that sports plays in our society and the huge importance it has for 
millions of people in Europe, who follow "their" team every day of their lives, often 
from a very early age. The special nature of sport as an activity that is not only of 
enormous economic potential, but also has a considerable social significance, 
differentiates it from other economic sectors. Sport operates in an independent and 
non-governmental environment and to apply the mainly economically motivated 
Community law may risk the socio-cultural and integrationist qualities of sport. 
30 For example, UEFA has announced that it will invest over £ 160 million of income generated by 
the European Championships in the grassroots sector, see UEFA press release "Euro 2004 benefits 
grassroots", 22.6.04; furthermore, UEFA has established a disability football panel in order to 
investigate the possibilities of promoting football for the disabled, see UEFA press release 
"Football for all", 11.2.2004 and launched a new grassroots programme to increase the mass 
participation of football in Europe, see UEFA press release "Grassroots programme starts", 
4.7.2003. 
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Once the need to protect the special characteristics of sport is principally recognised, 
the next step is to assess in what way and to what extent such considerations may be 
taken into account under the Treaty. To understand the Community's approach to 
sporting matters, however, it is necessary to outline the historical development of the 
European Union's relationship with the sports sector. 
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1.2. THE HISTORY OF SPORT IN EC LAW 
In view of the current debates surrounding the Community's role in sporting matters, 
it may surprise that when the Court confirmed the application of EC law to sport 
thirty years ago, the decision went more or less unnoticed. In the initial stages of the 
European Community, sport played a negligible role on the EC's agenda and it was 
only in the last decade that European law started to have a major impact on 
professional sport. Although grand-scale Community intervention has certainly been 
initiated by the decision in Bosman, it is mainly the ongoing commercialisation of 
professional sport which has attracted the attention of the European Union. 
1.2.1. Community Activity before Bosman 
The reason for the lack of Community activity in sport before Bosman lies primarily 
in the fact that for decades the main focus within the European Community had 
clearly been on economic, rather than social, matters and sport had been considered 
to be the latter. Although social progress and the improvement of living conditions 
are mentioned in the EC Treaty's preamble and Article 2, for many years the first 
and foremost goal of the Member States had been economic integration. Thus, social 
issues would usually only be tackled if they were considered to form an obstacle to 
the realisation of a common market31, an attitude that only changed in the nineties, 
when the balance slowly shifted in favour of socio-political integration. 
1.2.1.1. The Judgments in Walrave and Dona 
With regard to the sports sector, it seems as if sporting activity simply was not 
judged to be an area that interfered with the aims of the Treaty and consequently did 
not demand any Community action. Moreover, sport was widely treated as an 
autonomous sector that was best left to generate its own internal rules, which is why 
Community intervention was considered to be unnecessary. Eventually, the matter of 
European law in sport was brought before the European Court of Justice by two 
31 A typical example is the issue of equality between men and women, which was only included in 
the Treaty owing to concerns that Member States with stricter equality laws would be at a 
competitive disadvantage, rather than to protect women in the labour market. 
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Dutch sportsmen in 1974 and although the Court's verdict should have put the world 
of sport on high alert, the judgment was more or less ignored by sport's 
organisations, as well as the Community itself. 
In Walrave and Koch v. Union Cycliste Internationale32, two pacemakers in 
motor-paced cycling challenged a rule introduced by the sport's governing body that 
required the pacer and the cyclist in a team to be of the same nationality in order to 
be allowed to compete in the World Championships. As both of them acted as pacers 
for non-Dutch cyclists, they felt that they were impeded in their right to free 
movement. Upon a reference from the Arrondissementsrechtbank Utrecht, the 
European Court of Justice held that: "having regard to the objects of the Community, 
the practice of sport is subject to Community law only in so far as it constitutes an 
economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 of the Treaty"33 and added that 
any discrimination based on nationality was prohibited under Article 48 (now 39), as 
long as it referred to an activity which had the character of gainful employment. 
However, the Court continued that nationality discrimination may be permitted in 
sport teams and particularly in national teams, "the formation of which is a question 
of purely sporting interest and as such has nothing to do with economic activity"34, 
suggesting that such a case would not be covered by EC law at al135. In the case at 
hand, the Court left it to the national court to decide whether the pacemaker and the 
cyclist did or did not constitute a national team. 
The second occasion on which the Court had the chance to rule on a sports 
related case involved nationality-based restrictions in the organisation of Italian club 
football. In Dona v. Mantero36, Mr Mantero, Chairman of the Rovigo Football Club, 
had entrusted Mr Dona to undertake scouting duties abroad to find players for his 
team. After Mr Dona had placed an advert in a Belgian newspaper looking for 
players, Mr Mantero refused to reimburse his expenses on the grounds that, 
according to the rules of the Italian Football Association, effectively only Italian 
nationals were allowed to participate in games and claimed that Mr Dona had acted 
prematurely and should have waited for the end of the ban on foreign players. Mr 
32 Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch v. Union Cycliste Internationale [1974] ECR 1405. 
33 Ibid, at para 4. 
34 Ibid, at para 8. 
35 See also AG Lenz in Bosman, at pars 215. 
36 Case 13/76 Gaetano Dona v. Mario Mantero [1976] ECR 1333. 
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Dona replied that the provisions in question were invalid as they infringed the right 
of free movement. The Court affirmed its judgment in Walrave and held that 
discriminatory nationality rules in sport were incompatible with EC law, unless they 
concerned certain matches and foreign players were excluded for sporting reasons 
relating to the particular nature and context of such matches37. Having said that, the 
Court once again entrusted the referring national court to make the final decision, 
asking it to determine the nature of the matches at issue38. 
1.2.1.2. Commission and European Parliament 
Although the Court had clearly stated in both judgments that sport, when exercised 
professionally, fell under the scope of the Treaty and that discriminatory practices in 
sport were to be abolished, the other Community institutions took little notice. The 
Commission, for example, started negotiations with UEFA over nationality 
restrictions in European club football in 1978, two years after the decision in Dona. 
However, it took 13 years to conclude a non-binding "gentleman's agreement", 
introducing the "3+2" rule, a system that still put a limit on the number of foreigners, 
allowing three non-nationals plus two "assimilated"39 players on the pitch at a time. 
It seems very peculiar to say the least, that after years of negotiations, the 
Commission still allowed UEFA to keep nationality restrictions, completely ignoring 
the Court's previous judgments on the matter. It can only be assumed that the 
European Commission simply did not consider professional football as a significant 
economic activity; or, more likely, it was apprehensive of rocking the boat, of 
changing a well-established system and risking public outrage throughout Europe. 
The European Parliament in the meantime, tackled sporting matters in a few 
reports on issues such as sport and violence during the mid-eighties, namely the Van 
Raay Report40, which criticised restrictive practises in sport. Other Community 
activity was restricted to the 1985 Adonnino Report, adopted at the Milan Summit, 
that linked sport to the concept of a "People's Europe", recognising its integrative 
character throughout Europe. 
37 ! bid, at para 14. 
38 Ibid, at para 16. 
39 Players who had played in the country in question for five years without interruption, including 
three years in junior teams. 
40 Report produced by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights, A2-415/88. 
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The rapid commercialisation of sport in the nineties, combined with a desire within 
the Community to shift the balance from economic to socio-political integration, 
caused a change in the Community's policy. The Commission, in particular, started 
to pay more attention to sports issues, and brought out the 1991 paper "The European 
Community and Sport"41, in which it stated its willingness to apply Community law 
to the field of sport. For the first time, the Commission defined its overall approach 
to sports, emphasising the importance of a co-operative approach to sports policy. 
The adoption of this communication eventually led to the creation of the European 
Sports Forum, which provided a genuine floor for a permanent dialogue between the 
Commission and sports associates and has helped to improve relations. 
At approximately the same time, the European Parliament too, addressed the 
issue of sport with a resolution on the European Community and sport42, a reaction to 
the so-called "Larive Report" by the Committee on Culture, Youth, Education and 
the Media43. While it was acknowledged that the rules and activities of sports 
associations had to comply with Community law, the Parliament put a special 
emphasis on the social and cultural relevance of sport in the European Union. 
1.2.2. Bosman and Beyond 
Although there had been repeated signals that the Community intended to take 
sporting matters more seriously and EC law would be applied to sport when practised 
as an economic activity, Bosman came as a nasty and unexpected shock to most 
people in the world of sport. Especially the football governing bodies were 
completely unprepared for the effects of the decision, as they had remained confident 
that "the judgment would go with football, not with Bosman"44. Despite the fact that 
the decision was hardly surprising from a legal point of view (in particular as it went 
along with Advocate General Lenz's opinion delivered three months earlier), there 
41 "The European Community and Sport", Commission communication of 31.7.91, SEC(91) 1438. 
42 "EP Resolution on the European Community and Sport", A3-0326/94, OJ C 205/486,25.7.94. 
43 "EP Report on the European Community and Sport", A3-0326/94,27.4.94 (Part A) and 29.4.94 
(Part B). 
44 See Will, D., "The Federation's Viewpoint on the New Transfer Rules" in Jeanrenaud, C. & 
Kesenne, S. (eds) Competition in European Sports after the Rosman Case: Competition Policy in 
Professional Sports (Standaad, Antwerp, 1999), p. 9, who explains that FIFA and UEFA were 
"caught out" by the judgment, adding that it "did come as something of a bomb-shell [sic] to us 
and practically overnight we had to start re-thinking the future of football in Europe". 
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are very few cases in the Court's history that have attracted as much media interest 
and dispute throughout Europe as Bosman. 
The facts of the case are now well known, but deserve, owing to the 
judgment's importance, recapitulation: Mr. Jean-Marc Bosman was a middle-of-the- 
road Belgian football player who had been employed by the Belgian first division 
club SA Royal Club Liegeois45. In 1990, the club offered him a new one-year 
contract at a quarter of his previous salary, which Bosman refused to sign, with the 
effect that he was put on the transfer list. The transfer rules of the Belgian football 
association provided, in compliance with the UEFA guidelines, for a system where, 
every time a player moved to a new club, his previous club was entitled to a transfer 
fee. This transfer payment was calculated on the basis of the player's age and salary 
and was due irrespective of the fact that the player's contract had already expired. In 
SA d'economie mixte sportive de l'Union Sportive du Littoral de Dunkerque46, a 
French second division club, Bosman found a club that was willing to pay the agreed 
transfer fee, but RC Liege refused to release the player, doubting the French club's 
solvency. Since there was no interest from any other club and Bosman's contract 
with his old club had run out, he was not allowed to play during the 1990/91 season. 
As a consequence, Bosman started legal proceedings in the Belgian courts, claiming 
the rules governing the transfer system violated Articles 48,85 and 86 (now 39,81 
and 82) of the Treaty. 
The matter ultimately reached the European Court of Justice which, in line 
with its previous judgments on the matter, reaffirmed that sport fell under the scope 
of EC law when practised professionally. It then continued to hold the requirement of 
a transfer fee after a player's contract has been terminated to be in conflict with the 
rules on the free movement of workers, albeit not tackling the question of 
competition law. With regard to the other issue raised by Bosman during the 
proceedings, the nationality restrictions of the "3+2" system, which had previously 
been agreed with the Commission, the Court decided that this also infringed 
Community law. 
as Hereinafter referred to as RC Liege. 
46 Hereinafter referred to as US Dunkerque. 
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Of all the different sporting bodies, the football associations were particularly 
aggrieved that Community law was interfering with what they perceived to be their 
own affairs, to be regulated only by themselves. As Keith Cooper, director of 
communications for FIFA put it: "Football has always been remarkably successful at 
looking after its own affairs. It is difficult to understand why regulatory authorities 
feel they now have to become involved"47. The controversy around the Bosman case 
perhaps highlights the fact that the majority of European citizens had no problem 
with classical economic issues such as agriculture and trade of goods falling under 
Community competence, but found it difficult to accept that a decision of the 
European Court of Justice had the power to change the face of European football 
forever. 
1.2.2.1. The Amsterdam Declaration on Sport 
As a result of the shock delivered by Bosman and the belief that sport was, owing to 
its social importance, not a business like any other, many urged that sport should be 
given a legal base in the Treaty. The European Parliament in particular, took an 
interest in the matter and the Committee on Culture, Youth, Education and the Media 
drew up a report on the role of the European Union in the field of sport48. The so- 
called "Pack-Report", named after its German rapporteur, and the following debate 
in Parliament emphasised the cultural, social and educational dimension of sport and 
stated the need to recognise its specific nature within the European Union. In order to 
honour the special status of sport and to create a legal base to include sport in the 
budget, the Parliament called upon the Intergovernmental Conference launched in 
March 1996 to include an explicit reference to sport in the revised Treaty. 
However, despite the Parliament's endeavours and the lobbying by different 
sports organisations who had hoped to set aside the effects of the Bosman 
judgment49, sport merely appeared in the Amsterdam Treaty in the form of a non- 
binding declaration. It seems that the main reason for not incorporating an article on 
47 Financial Times, 23.1.1998, p. 2. 
48 Report on the Role of the European Union in the Field of Sport, (Pack Report), A4-0197/97, 
28.5.1997. 
49 See for example the statement of Marlis Rydzy-Götz, Secretary General of the European Non- 
Governmental Sports Organisations (ENGSO) at the public hearing "The EP -A sounding board 
for Europe's citizens" to express concerns and expectations in view of the Intergovernmental 
Conference 1996, available at www. europarl. eu. int/hearings/igc2/doc22_en. htm. 
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sport into the Treaty was concerns that this would open the door for other professions 
demanding an exemption, a situation that the Member States wanted to avoid at all 
costs. The declaration read: 
"The conference emphasises the social significance of sport, in particular its role in 
forging identity and bringing people together. The conference therefore calls on the 
bodies of the European Union to listen to sports associations when important questions 
affecting sport are at issue. In this connection, special consideration should be given to 
the particular characteristics of amateur sport. " 
Although the declaration does not grant the Community the competence to legislate 
on sporting matters, it acknowledges the socio-cultural and integrative qualities of 
sport and urges all European institutions to take sporting interests into consideration 
when acting upon other issues. Despite the fact that the Declaration seems "fairly 
banal"50 and is non-binding, it put sport firmly on the European Union's agenda. The 
Amsterdam Declaration represented the Member States' first serious response to 
Bosman and far from being an unimportant piece of "soft law", it has proved highly 
significant in the development of a more broad-based approach to sport in the EU. 
This is underlined by the fact that since the Amsterdam Declaration, each 
Council Presidency has discussed sport in some form. While the Luxembourg 
Presidency (July - December 1997) and the British Presidency (January - June 1998) 
tackled sport in conjunction with employment issues, the Austrian Presidency (July - 
December 1998) examined the question of sport on a broader basis, analysing the 
social role of sport and its status in the EU. On this occasion, the European Council 
expressed the view that the social function of sport could only be served through the 
current pyramid structures of international sports federations with monopoly 
regulatory power. The Vienna Council identified the need to protect those structures 
against threats stemming from the ongoing commercialisation of sport, and asked the 
Commission to "submit a report to the Helsinki European Council with a view to 
50 Henry, I. & Matthews, N., "Sport, Policy and the European Union: the Post-Maastricht Agenda", 
(1998) 3(1) Managing Leisure, p. 9. 
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safeguarding current sports structures and maintaining the social function of sport 
within the Community framework"st 
With this request, the Member States reaffirmed their approach to sporting 
matters laid down in the Amsterdam Declaration and emphasised that sport should 
also be tackled from a social, rather than a purely regulatory angle. In addition to the 
issue of the status of sport in Community law, the Austrian Presidency Conclusions 
were also significant for the beginning of an EU policy to combat doping in sport. 
1.2.2.2. A New Approach to Sport? 
In 1998, as response to the Amsterdam Declaration, the Commission published the 
staff working paper "The Development and Prospects for Community Action in the 
field of Sport"52, drawn up by the Education and Culture Directorate, which has since 
become a key institution in developing the European Union's sports policy. The 
paper acknowledged that Community action in the field of sport had not been 
following a co-ordinated strategy and intended to provide a framework for EU 
involvement in sport. The Commission initially emphasised the socio-cultural and 
integrative qualities of sport, but continued to stress its enormous economic potential 
and the danger caused by the commercialisation of sport. In this context, the paper 
reviewed the application of the Treaty to sport and called for Union action in areas 
such as sports broadcasting rights and competition policy. In order to deal with the 
two different faces of sport, a dual approach was suggested: while ensuring the 
implementation of EC law as far as the economic side of sport was concerned, the 
Community should try to integrate sports in different EU policies at the same time. 
Shortly after the working paper, DG X (as it then was) brought out the 
consultation document "The European Model of Sport"53, analysing the traditional 
pyramid structure of sports federations and emphasising the unique features of 
European sport. Again, the important social role of sport was pointed out, but the 
51 Austrian Presidency Conclusions, 11. and 12. December 1998, at para 95, available at 
http: //ue. eu. intlueDocs/cros_Data/docs/PressData/en/ec/00300-RI. EN8. htm. 
52 "The development and prospects for Community action in the field of sport", European 
Commission, DG X, Brussels, 29.9.1998, available at 
http: //www. europa. eu. int/comm/sport/doc/ecom/doc_evol_en. pdf; for a more detailed analysis see 
Parrish, R., "The Development and Prospects for Community Action in Sport", SLB (1998) 1(6), 
p. 12. 
53 "The European Model of Sport", European Commission, DG X, November 1998, available at 
http: //www. europa. eu. int/conun/sport/doc/ecom/doc consult en. pdf. 
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Commission also identified problematic issues such as the collective marketing of 
sports broadcasting rights and above all stressed the need to distribute money among 
clubs in Europe to guarantee a financial and sporting balance. In contrast to the 
situation in the US, European club sport was described to be governed by a system of 
promotion and relegation, supported by financial solidarity between the different 
levels. Attached to the consultation document was a questionnaire on the subject of 
the structure of European sport and the relationship between sport and television, the 
findings of which were used by the Commission to prepare the first Conference on 
Sport held in Assises, Greece in May 1999. In organising this conference, the 
Commission responded to the suggestion in the Amsterdam Declaration on Sport to 
give sports organisations a hearing before making any important decisions affecting 
sport and assembled the principal actors in European sport to discuss future 
developments. The participants in the conference urged the Union to respect the 
autonomy of sports organisations when applying Community law and emphasised 
the value of such organisations in developing the youth and grassroots sectorsa. 
1.2.2.3. Involvement of the Member States 
Shortly after the Assises Conference, the Sports Ministers of the EU held an informal 
meeting in Paderborn, Germany, where, amongst other things, the application of 
Community law to sporting matters was discussed. Thereby, the European 
Commission was invited to set up a working group composed of representatives of 
the Member States and of the Commission, which should tackle the question of how 
the concerns of sport could be taken into account under the Treaty55. The German 
Presidency Conclusions also suggested that the working group should establish a 
dialogue with sports organisations, underlining the fact that the Member States 
wanted to see sports policy on an EU level to develop in a more broad-based 
direction. However, although the Sports Ministers made clear that the relationship 
between sport and EC law should be clarified in order to ensure the preservation of 
the special characteristics of sport, they did not come forward with a suggestion as to 
sa Conclusions of the first European Union Conference on Sport, Assises, Greece, May 1999, 
available at http: //www. europa. eu. int/comm/sport/doc/ecom/assises_conclusions_en. pdf. 
ss Conclusions of the German European Council Presidency on the occasion of the informal meeting 
of the sports ministers of the European Union, 31.5. -2.6.1999 - "The Paderborn Conclusions", 
available at http: /www. europa. eu. int/comet/sport/doc/infor meet/paderborn_en. pdf. 
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how this should be achieved and left it to the Commission to propose such measures. 
Apart from that, the Ministers were demanding more Community action in the fight 
against doping in sport and also touched upon sport and employment as well as the 
issue of improving the portrayal of sport for the disabled in the media. 
The social approach to sport was significantly widened during the Finnish 
Presidency in the second half of 1999. In a meeting of the EU Sports Directors (these 
are the directors responsible for sports issues in the government offices of the 
Member States) the discussion on the social and cultural values of sport continued, 
highlighting the employment creating effect of sport, its impact on European youth 
culture and the contribution of sport to health56. More significant than the meeting of 
the Sports Directors, though, was the presentation of the Commission's "Helsinki 
Report on Sport"57 to the Helsinki European Council in December 1999. 
1.2.2.4. The Helsinki Report on Sport 
The Helsinki Report on Sport was the result of a widespread consultation process 
between the Commission and various sports organisations, most notably including 
the results of the First EU Conference on Sport in Assises. The Commission 
acknowledged the social, educational and cultural function of sport and pointed out 
that these values had themselves come under threat as sport had become more and 
more commercially valuable. As the Treaty contains no specific provisions on sport, 
it was noted "there can be no question of large-scale intervention or support 
programmes or even of the implementation of a Community sports policy". 
However, the Commission emphasised that the sporting sector was subject to the 
application of the Treaty like any other branches of economy and sporting 
organisations had to comply with the principles of the internal market and 
competition law. 
In this context, co-ordination measures at Community level were suggested in 
order to strengthen legal certainty in connection with sporting activities and to 
56 Sports Director's Meeting, Helsinki, 18-20.10.1999, Conclusions of the Presidency, available at 
http: //europa. eu. int/comm/sport/action_sports/helsinki/docs/b_sd99-conclusions_en. pdf. 
57 European Commission, report from the Commission to the European Council with a view to 
safeguarding current sports structures and maintaining the social function of sport within the 
Community framework, Brussels, 10.12.1999, COM(1999) 644 final; for a more detailed analysis 
see Parrish, R., "The Helsinki Report on Sport: A Partnership Approach to Sport", (2000) 3(3) 
SLB, p. 16. 
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support the social function of sport. The Commission believed that there was "a need 
for a new approach to questions of sport" which should endeavour to preserve the 
special features of sport in an environment of economic and legal changes. As a 
consequence, it recommended more consultation between the various protagonists in 
sport, which were identified as the Community, the Member States and the sporting 
organisations, and called for a more coherent view of sport on a global basis. 
Significantly, the Commission pointed out that the specific characteristics of sport 
had to be taken into account when applying Community law to sporting matters, in 
particular as far as the 'competition rules were concerned. With regard to the 
organisational structure of sport in Europe, it accepted the monopoly status of the 
different sporting federations as a necessary means to bring together all the sports 
associations and competitors of one discipline. It was also acknowledged that 
regulatory measures of sports associations necessary to enable sporting competition 
would generally not be in breach of Community law, as long as they were 
"objectively justified, non-discriminatory, necessary and proportional". 
The Helsinki Report on Sport shows that the protocol annexed to the 
Amsterdam Treaty, despite the criticism of it being too general and non-binding, did 
undoubtedly influence the Commission's approach to sport. The Report clearly links 
the need to regulate sport with its commercialisation, but at the same time identifies 
the necessity to treat sport differently in order to preserve its special features. Its 
significance as an official statement of the Commission's position on sporting 
matters and the resulting influence on the Community's sports policy should not be 
underestimated. Moreover, the Helsinki Report stresses that action at Community 
level alone will not be sufficient to protect the current structures and the traditional 
values of sport, and suggests deepening the co-operation between the EU and sports 
organisations. 
After the Helsinki summit, the debate on sport in the European Union 
intensified, becoming an issue throughout the institutions: the Commission tried to 
develop its approach by establishing an ongoing dialogue with the European sports 
federations58, while the European sports ministers continued their informal Council 
58 For example the Meeting between Mrs. Reding and the European Sports federations in Brussels on 
17 April 2000, http: //www. europa. eu. int/comm/sport/action sports/dialogue/dialogue en. htrnl. 
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meetings59. The Portuguese Presidency Conclusions in the first half of 2000, for 
example, deepened the discussion on the fight against doping and also debated the 
social dimension of sport, requesting the Commission and the Council to "take 
account of the specific characteristics of sport in Europe and its social function in 
managing common policies6o. 
1.2.2.5. The Judgments in Deliege and Lehtonen 
In the meantime, the European Court of Justice issued two more judgments relating 
to sport, clarifying the relationship between internal rules of sporting organisations 
and the provisions on free movement. The first case, Deliege61, concerned selection 
rules for international judo tournaments which put a limit on the number of athletes 
from a particular national federation, leaving it up to the national federation to 
nominate the judokas it considered best suited to compete. Ms. Deliege, a 
professional judoka who had repeatedly not been picked by the Belgian judo 
federation to take part in European tournaments, claimed that the systematic 
requirement of a quota and selection at national level constituted a barrier to the free 
movement of services. The Court pointed out that selection rules like those at issue 
inevitably had the effect of limiting the number of participants in a tournament, but 
acknowledged that such a limitation was inherent in the conduct of an international 
high-level sports event, which necessarily involved the adoption of certain selection 
rules62. Having established that it naturally fell to the tournament organisers and 
sports federations in question to lay down appropriate rules for selection63, the Court 
continued that the delegation of such a task to the national federations, which 
normally have the necessary knowledge and experience, was the arrangement 
adopted in most sporting disciplines and did not infringe Community law64 . 
59 For example the meeting in Lisbon on 10 May 2000 during the Portuguese Presidency. 
60 Portuguese Presidency Conclusions, 19 - 20 June 2000, available at 
http: //www. europa. eu. int/comm/sport/action_sports/historique/docs/concl_feira_20000620- 
sport. pdf. 
61 Cases C-51/96 & C-191/97 Christelle Deliege v. Ligue Francophone de Judo et Disciplines 
Associees ASBL [2000] ECR 1-2549. 
62 Deliege, at para 64. 
63 Ibid, at para 67. 
64 Ibid, at para 68. 
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The decision in Lehtonen65 came out two days after Deliege. Hereby, the Court had 
to deal with transfer rules set up by the Belgian basketball association, which 
prohibited a club from fielding players who had moved from a club in another 
Member State in matches in the Belgian championship, if the transfer had taken 
place after a specified date. Although the Court considered the transfer rules to 
constitute an obstacle to the free movement of workers66, it accepted that the setting 
of deadlines for transfers of players may be necessary to ensure the regularity of 
sporting competitions67 and recognised this sporting aim as a possible reason for 
justification. Both judgments, which will be dealt with in depth later on, are 
remarkable in the sense that they recognised the (limited) power of self-management 
and self-regulation granted to sport governing bodies under Community law and 
served as an indication of the Court's willingness to take into account the specific 
characteristics of sport when applying EC law. 
1.2.2.6. The Nice Declaration on Sport 
For many it seemed as if the Community had finally come around to taking the view 
that sport should not be dealt with like any other economic activity and its 
organisation was best left to the sporting federations in order to protect the traditional 
sporting values. Accordingly, the 9th European Sports Forum in Lille presented an 
ideal opportunity for the sports organisations to push ahead their efforts to have a 
reference on sport included in the Nice Treaty. The football governing bodies in 
particular hoped for a Treaty amendment in order to protect the football transfer 
system, which had come under scrutiny by the European Commission. Not only 
sports representatives, but also the European Parliament68 scented a second chance to 
have an article on sport included in the Treaty, after their hopes had been 
disappointed by the Amsterdam Treaty. 
However, the Member States decided against a protocol approach and merely 
annexed a declaration on sport to the Presidency conclusions of their meeting in 
65 Case C-176/96 Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry Namur-Braine ASBL v. Federation Royale 
Beige des Societes de Basket-ball ASBL (FRBSB) [2000] ECR 1-2681. 
66 Ibid, at Para 49. 
67 Ibid, at Para 53. 
68 See the draft opinion of the Committee on Culture, Youth, Education, the Media and Sport for the 
Committee on Constitutional Affairs on the Treaty of Nice and the future of the European Union; 
available at http: //www. eiiroparl. eu. int/meetdocs/committees/cult/20010410/435384en. doc. 
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Nice69. The declaration recapitulated the social significance of sport, pointing out the 
benefits of amateur and youth sport in European society and the important role of 
voluntary services in these sectors. Special attention was paid to the protection of 
young sportsmen and sportswomen in amateur, as well as professional sport. The 
European Council emphasised that the sports organisations' independence and their 
right to organise themselves should be recognised and added that the federation 
structure in European sport constituted the best way to guarantee the traditional 
sporting values and the solidarity between different levels of sport. In an economic 
context, concerns were expressed over the multiple ownership of sports clubs taking 
part in the same competition. Regarding the marketing of television rights, the 
European Council encouraged the distribution of revenues to lower levels, but did 
not tackle the question of collective selling agreements. Finally, the ongoing 
discussion on the football transfer system was mentioned. The European Council 
stressed the importance of a dialogue between the sports organisations, the 
Community and the Member States in order to ensure the compliance of the sports 
sector with EC law, as well as guaranteeing that the special features of sport are 
preserved. 
The Nice Declaration on Sport was a clear political signal that the social and 
cultural dimensions of sport should feature more prominently in national and 
Community policies. Furthermore, it recognised the independence of the sporting 
organisations, indicating that governing bodies would largely be left to manage and 
regulate their internal affairs, provided they comply with Community law. The 
declaration is also significant in the sense that it offered some guidance on pending 
disputes such as the football transfer system and multiple ownership of sports clubs 
and clarified the relationship between sport and Community law. Although the 
declaration adopted in Nice was a policy declaration only and did not set out to 
extend Community responsibilities, it is an important milestone in the development 
of an EU sports policy, as it hardened the soft law approach to sport that was started 
with the Amsterdam Declaration on sport. It is the first time that the Member States 
69 "Declaration on the Specific characteristics of Sport and its Social Function in Europe, of which 
account should be taken in implementing Common Policies", hereinafter referred to as "The Nice 
Declaration on Sport", available at 
http: //europa. eu. int/comm/sport/doc/ecom/decl-nice_2000_en. pdL 
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expanded their view on sport in such length, which emphasises the significance of 
sport on a European level and makes it seem unlikely that those responsible for the 
application of the Treaty will ignore the declaration70. 
Following the Nice declaration, sport continued to be the focus of discussion 
on a Community level during the Swedish71 and Belgian Presidencies72, one of the 
main topics being the co-operation with the World Anti Doping Agency (WADA). 
However, arguably the most significant event at the time was the breakthrough in the 
negotiations on the football transfer regulations in March 2001. In the last few years, 
the Community has been concentrating on the social dimension of sport, trying to 
find ways to utilise sport's beneficial effects on a European level. In particular, the 
important role of sport in education and youth policy has been highlighted, 
culminating in the declaration of 2004 as the Year of Education through Sport. Also, 
the Community has been intensifying its dialogue with sports organisations, as the 
recent consultation conference on 14-15 June 2005 between Commission officials 
and representatives from the European sport world on the fight against doping, 
volunteering in sport and the social function of sport shows73. In a different arena, 
the European courts have continued to shape the legal approach to sporting matters. 
The European Court of Justice issued two important judgments, Kolpak74 and 
Simutenkov75, on the issue of nationality restrictions, stating that in general athletes 
from associated countries may not be discriminated against. The Court of First 
Instance, on the other hand, confirmed the legitimacy of anti-doping regulations76, 
albeit applying a somewhat unorthodox approach, which is open to criticism. 
70 In this context see Blackshaw, I., "The battle for a sports protocol continues" (2002) 5(1) SLB, p. 
15, who points out that the Nice Declaration is "a powerful political statement of intent and one 
which, in my view, the Commission is likely to follow in the future". 
7' Summary of the Presidency, Troika Meeting of Sports Ministers in Stockholm, 8.2.2001, available 
at http: //www. europa. eu. int/comm/sport/doc/infor meetlb_troika20010208_en. pdf and the 
Presidency Summary of the Meeting of Sports Directors in Solna, Sweden, on 18-19 April 2001, 
available at http: //www. europa. eu. int/conun/sport/doc/infor_meet'solna200104_en. pdf. 
72 Summary of the Troika Meeting with the ministers of sport, Brussels, 12.6.2001, available at 
http: //www. europa. eu. int/comet/sport/doc/infor_meet/b_troika200107_en. pdf and Conference of 
the Sport Ministers of the 15 Member States of the EU, Brussels, 12.11.2001, Conclusions of the 
Belgian Presidency; available at http: //www. europa. eu. int/comm/sport/doc/infor_meet/min- 
20011112-en. pdf. 
73 See the conference report "The EU and Sport - Matching Expectations", available at 
http: //www. europa. eu. int/conmVsport/documents/workshop report_en. pdf. 
74 Case C-438/00 Deutscher Handballbund eV v. Maros Kolpak, [2003] ECR I-4135. 
75 Case C-265/03 Igor Simuntenkov v. Ministeno de Educacidn y Cultura [2005] ECR 1-2579. 
76 Case T-313/02 Meca-Medina & Majcen v. Commission [2004] 3 CMLR 60. 
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Considering the recent discussions on FIFA's rules on non-solicitation in connection 
with Chelsea's attempt to poach Ashley Cole and Charleroi's law suit against FIFA 
for damages because of their star striker's injury during international duty, it is 
guaranteed that the European courts will continue to be occupied with sports related 
cases in the future. 
1.2.3. Where Do We Go from Here? 
It seems as if the sporting associations have finally overcome the shock caused by 
the decision in Bosman ten years ago and realised that sport is not the law-free zone 
they assumed it to be. Considering the fact that 18 out of the 24 Directorates General 
in the European Commission deal with sport in one way or the other, it is evident that 
the European Union will continue to shape the face of European sport. The range of 
the EU involvement in sport now includes areas such as free movement of persons, 
goods and services, health and safety, competition policy, animals in sport, taxation, 
economic and monetary union, funding for sport and sport for the disabled". In 
return, the Community has also changed its approach to sport over the years: whereas 
sport was initially dealt with purely from an economic point of view, there is now 
more focus on the social values of sport and a consensus between the EC institutions 
that the special characteristics of sport have to be taken into account when applying 
Community law. However, it is still unclear how far the Community is willing to go 
with the special treatment of sporting matters and whether there will be exemptions 
from EC law in special circumstances where the core values of sport are at stake. In 
any case, the initiative has to come from the different sporting organisations, as they 
are in the best position to identify those special characteristics of sport that need 
protection. It is to be hoped that the ongoing dialogue between the Community and 
the sporting organisations, institutionalised in the annual European Sports Forum, 
will help to fill in the gaps and to develop a new approach to sporting matters that 
will ensure the preservation of important sporting values. The fact that 2004 was 
declared the European Year of Education through Sport with an allocated budget of 
77 See "The impact of European Union Activities on Sport", Study by Coopers and Lybrand for DG 
X of the European Commission, (1995)17 Loy. L. A. Int'l & Comp. L. ]., p. 245. 
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£ 7.5 million is an indication that the Community has finally realised the huge social 
potential of sport and is definitely willing to pay more attention to sporting matters. 
The most significant development in the relations between the Community 
and sport, however, is the inclusion of a reference to sport in the Constitutional 
Treaty which, provided the Constitution will eventually be ratified by the Member 
States, would grant the legal base to allocate funds for sports projects in the budget 
and may signify the beginning of a new chapter in European sports policy. 
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1.3. LIMITS TO THE APPLICATION OF EC LAW 
Today it is widely accepted that, following the European Court of Justice's 
judgments in Walrave, Dona and Bosman, sport is subject to Community law when 
practised as an economic activity in the sense of Article 2 of the Treaty. However, 
although the Court clarified that it will not put sport beyond the reach of Community 
law, as this would "diminish the objective character of the law"78, arguments in 
favour of a sporting exemption still exist. Thus, it is necessary to define the limits of 
Community law when applied to sport and to analyse whether there are loopholes 
which allow sport a complete, or at least partial, immunity from the application of 
the Treaty. 
1.3.1. Sport as a Cultural Activity 
Although the European Court of Justice has repeatedly rejected the idea of placing 
the whole sports sector outside the scope of EC law, the view that sport can best look 
after its own affairs and should be left unchallenged by law, is still widespread. The 
case for such an exemption from Community law is often based on the argument that 
sport is a major component of national popular culture and therefore falls under 
Article 151 of the Treaty. Article 151(1) calls upon the Community to "contribute to 
the flowering of the cultures of the Member States" and allows the Union to "support 
and supplement" actions of the Member States. Thus, the Community does not have 
the competence to regulate cultural activity. Moreover, Article 151(4) provides for an 
obligation on the Community to take cultural aspects into account in its action under 
other provisions of the Treaty. 
Although sport undoubtedly shares similar characteristics with culture, it may 
nevertheless be disputed that it indeed qualifies as a cultural activity in the sense of 
Article 151. The opinions are varied: whereas some argue that the differences are 
such as to warrant a distinction, pointing out that the "contribution to the 
development and consolidation of emerging nations in cultural terms came more 
78 Bosman, at pars 77. 
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through the intellectual pursuits of art, music and literature than sport"79, the majority 
of writers see sport as a part of our culture owing to its popularity and influence on 
modem society80. 
Although the founders of the Maastricht Treaty might not have had sport in 
mind when drafting Article 128 (now Article 151) on culture, sport undoubtedly has 
an immense cultural significance: a majority of people practise sport actively and/or 
observe it as spectators in the stadiums or through various forms of broadcasting 
coverage. No other event brings so many people from different cultures around the 
globe together, as the FIFA World Cup or the Olympic Games. Bill Shankley's often 
quoted belief that football is not just a matter of life or death, but much more 
important, may seem exaggerated to some, but for many avid football supporters the 
loss of an important match may well be considered worse than a death in the family. 
Naturally, there is a downside to sport in the form of violence, racism and 
sectarianism, but these phenomena only underline the cultural significance of sport 
as "a crucial component of contemporary society"81. 
However, even if sport is considered a cultural activity, the fact that Article 
151 does not offer a sufficient basis for Community competence does not 
automatically remove sport from the scope of EC law altogether. As has been shown 
above, sport not only has characteristics that link it to culture, but, when practised 
professionally, it constitutes an economic activity. In accordance with the aims of the 
Treaty, it is this economic nature that brings sport under the scope of Community 
law. Whenever a subject matter can be identified as an economic activity in the sense 
of Article 2, the fact it might touch upon areas which do not fall under the Treaty 
cannot be used as an argument that Community law does not apply. Consequently, 
the Court has confirmed Community competence in subject matters such as 
79 Gardiner, S., Sports Law, (2"d edn., Cavendish Publishing, London, 2001), p. 30. 
80 See for example Hargreaves, J., Sport, Power and Culture: A Social and Historical Analysis of 
Popular Sports in Britain, (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1986), p. 9; Scholz, R. & Aulehner, J., 
"Die `3+2'-Regel und die Transferbestimmungen des Fußballsports im Lichte des europäischen 
Gemeinschaftsrechts", (1996) 2 Spurt, p. 44; Gardiner, S. and Felix, A., "Juridification of the 
Football Field: Strategies for Giving Law the Elbow" (1995) 5(2) Marquette Sports Law Journal, 
p. 191, who argue that "the cultural significance of football is enormous" as "it is truly a global 
sport". 
81 Blake, A., op. cit, supra note 24, p. 11. 
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religion82, broadcasting83 or education84, based on the economic relevance in the 
particular cases. Apart from that, the possibility that a cultural matter may be touched 
upon under other Community competences has expressly been provided for in the 
Querschnittsklausel of Article 151(4). Thus, a total exemption of cultural matters 
from the application of the Treaty was obviously not intended. 
However, according to the wording of Article 151(4), the Community is 
under the obligation to take cultural interests into account whenever it deals with a 
cultural subject in its actions under another Treaty article. Given the cultural 
characteristics of sport, one could argue that owing to Article 151(4), sporting 
interests have to be taken into consideration when applying EC law, such as the 
provisions on free movement or competition law. Having said that, in Bosman the 
Court dismissed a limitation of Community competence by reason of the cultural 
nature of sport85. Thus, the Court held that where a case concerned the fundamental 
Treaty freedoms, it was not related "to the conditions under which Community 
powers of limited extent, such as those based on Article 128(1) [now 151(1)] may be 
exercised"86. 
The Court's reluctance to apply Article 128(4) [now 151(4)] as a legal basis 
to pay attention to sporting interests is arguably open to criticism. First of all, the 
Court overlooked that Article 151 not only governs the conditions under which 
Community powers in cultural matters may be exercised, but also limits Community 
action in areas of classical Community competence in so far as it contains an 
obligation to take into account cultural interests. Additionally, an interpretation of 
Article 151(4), which requires the Community to take sporting interests into account 
when acting under other Treaty provisions, would open up the possibility to deal 
with sporting matters in a more flexible way and preserve their special characteristics 
more effectively87. Thus, a chance to assess a case in its entirety would be provided, 
rather than having to make the effort of trying to divide the economic from the 
82 See for example Case 196/87 Steymann v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1988] ECR 6159. 
83 See Case 155/73 Sacchi [1974] ECR 409 and Case 52/79 Procureur du Roi v. Debauve [1980] 
ECR 833. 
" See Case 9/74 Casagrande v. Landeshauptstadt München [1974] ECR 773. 
85 Bosman, at para 78. 
86 Ibid, at para 78. 
87 See also Palme, C., "Das Bosman-Urteil des EUGH: Ein Schlag gegen die Sportautonomie? ", 
(1996) JZ, p. 240. 
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sporting aspects, an endeavour which proves to be quite impossible in most cases88. 
Such a reading of Article 151 would also give full effect to the Amsterdam 
Declaration on Sport, changing its soft-law nature to a legal obligation that would 
require the Community institutions to take sporting matters into account when acting 
upon any other areas of competence. The limits to this obligation could be found in 
the general Community principle of proportionality, which would ensure that the 
rules of the sporting associations did not go any further than what is necessary to 
achieve the sporting aim. 
The practical advantages of a more open interpretation of Article 151 may be 
demonstrated by taking the example of the nationality clauses at issue in Bosman, 
where such an approach might have allowed a compromise such as a 50 percent 
mark. This would still have enabled footballers to move to another club within the 
European Union, but at the same time would have taken into account the cultural 
aspects of football by ensuring that the fans are still able to identify themselves with 
their club, rather than envisaging the possibility of, say, an English club consisting 
solely of German players. 
1.3.2. The Amsterdam and Nice Declarations 
The Amsterdam and Nice Declarations on Sport have been argued to contain an 
obligation for Community authorities to take into account the special characteristics 
of sport when applying EC law. As pieces of soft-law, though, the declarations do 
not have any power to override relevant Community law; the call on the bodies of the 
European Union to listen to sports associations when important questions affecting 
sport are at issue and the general plea to take sporting interests into account when 
applying the provisions of the Treaty constitute a recommendation, rather than an 
obligation. However, the fact that the Court has referred to the Amsterdam 
Declaration in its decisions in Deliege89 and Lehtonen90 emphasises the Court's 
willingness to pay attention to the social and cultural values of sport. 
88 This was also an argument of UEFA in Bosman, which wrongly considered the difficulties of 
differentiating the economic from the sporting aspects as a reason for a total exemption of sport 
from EC law. 
89 Deliege, at para 42. 
90 Lehtonen, at para 33. 
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1.3.3. The Internal Rules of Sports Organisations 
One of the main arguments against the intervention of Community law in sporting 
matters is the alleged immunity of sports organisations' rules from external 
regulation. Decisions and statutes of sporting bodies are argued to form a separate 
legal system that has its own internal constitutionalism, operating a sporting rule of 
law. Thus, internal rules of sports organisations are claimed to fall outside the control 
of national or supranational law91. The supporters of such autonomy for sports 
associations plead that expert and inside knowledge is the best basis for effective 
regulation and that the interest of sport is best looked after by the relevant sports' 
governing bodies. External regulation by people who do not understand how a sport 
functions is thought to be less likely to be followed and to threaten the system of 
sport as a whole92. 
Before discussing these arguments in more detail, though, it is appropriate to 
examine the organisation of sport in Europe. The traditional structure of sports 
organisations in the Member States generally resembles a pyramid with a hierarchy, 
the foundation of which is formed by the clubs93. The clubs, which are mainly run by 
amateurs and unpaid volunteers, organise sport on a local level, offering everyone 
the possibility to practise sport and are also the starting point for young athletes who 
want to take up sport professionally. In contrast to the US model, where sport is 
much more commercialised, amateur and professional sport are closely linked at club 
level and even big clubs that are heavily engaged in professional competitions, play 
an important role at grassroots level. The clubs are usually members of the regional 
and national federations, which are responsible for organising and co-ordinating 
sport on a regional and national basis respectively. The national federations have a 
monopolistic position in so far as there is only one national federation for each sport. 
These federations are the top national authority in a particular sport, acting as a 
91 See Foster, K, "How Can Sport be Regulated", in Greenfield S. & Osborn, G. (eds), Law and 
Sport in Contemporary Society (Frank Cass, London, 2000), p. 267; see also Caiger, A., "Re- 
regulating Professional Sport in the European Union" in Caiger, A. and Gardiner, S. (eds), 
Professional Sport in the EU: Regulation and Re-regulation, (T. M. C. Asser Press, The Hague, 
2000), who claims that sporting rules establish a system of a "Lex Sportiva", analogous to the Lex 
Mercatoria. 
92 Ibid, pp. 278 - 279. 93 For a more detailed analysis see the DG X document "The European Model of Sport", op. cit. 
supra note 53. 
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regulatory body, as well as organising national championships. The national 
associations are members of the international sports bodies and are bound by the 
higher-ranking authority's rules. 
1.3.3.1. Total Autonomy for Sports Bodies? 
In professional team sports, a player concludes a contract with a club and is then 
granted a licence by the national association to play for this particular club. This 
licence expresses the fact that the player has joined the sports association and 
recognises the statutes and rules of the relevant national and international 
associations, including their disciplinary power. This system enables athletes to 
compete under standardised conditions by establishing rules that apply to all 
sportsmen and sportswomen in the same way and that are recognised by anybody 
involved in the sport. Even though it is undisputed that sporting competition requires 
a controlling body with regulatory power that lays down certain rules and enforces 
them, the sports associations have so far failed to come up with a legal base that 
would provide them with total immunity from legal supervision. One of the main 
arguments for the autonomy of sports associations is the extremely high degree of 
organisation within such bodies, featuring a well-developed pattern of globalised 
regulation that is claimed to make legal intervention from outside unnecessary. 
However, as has been pointed out by Weatherill, "the simple assertion of the 
adequacy of self-regulation cannot suffice; which industry would not make such a 
claim? "94. Besides, taking into account that the governing bodies in sport have 
substantial economic control over clubs and players, with the potential of threatening 
the livelihood of thousands of people involved in the business of sport, such power 
cannot be exercised unsupervised without the danger of grave injustice or financial 
damage. Being unelected and unaccountable, the governing bodies' power is 
absolute and they are able to control the market entry of new clubs to a sport or to 
regulate the market in players through the introduction of transfer systems. The need 
to control sports bodies and their internal rules is probably best illustrated by the 
Bosman case. In the absence of Community intervention, football's governing bodies 
94 Weatherill, S., "Do sporting associations make law or are they merely subject to it? " (1999) 13 
Amicus Curiae, p. 24. 
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would presumably have never abolished the old transfer system, whereby players 
such as Mr. Bosman could effectively be forced to give up their careers. 
The world of sport has repeatedly argued in favour of an autonomy for the 
sports governing bodies on the grounds that sport is best capable to look after its own 
affairs, failing to understand that even though self-government ensures a certain level 
of organisation within a sport and may well be more efficient and desirable from a 
sporting point of view, these arguments do not provide a sufficient legal base for a 
complete exemption of sporting rules from any legal supervision. 
1.3.3.2. The Legal Autonomy of Sports Associations 
Although the European Court of Justice has, particularly in its most recent decisions, 
affirmed the right to self-governance of sports associations to a certain extent, the 
legal base for the organisational authority of such bodies remains unclear. As the 
Treaty does not offer any guidance on the matter, it is necessary to examine whether 
secondary legislation can provide an answer. Albeit not being in force as yet, the 
only reference to matters of self-regulation and organisational authority of 
associations can be found in the Commission proposal for a Council Regulation on 
the Statute for a European Association95. According to Article 1 of the draft statute, a 
European Association would be defined as a permanent grouping of natural or legal 
persons whose members pool their knowledge or activities for a purpose in the 
general interest. Whilst it is stated that the European Association "shall be free to 
determine the activities necessary for the pursuit of its objectives", the association's 
organisational authority is limited by the "objectives of the Community, Community 
policy and the public policy of the Member States". This provision illustrates that the 
Community acknowledges a certain autonomy of associations that enables them to 
carry out any activity necessary to achieve their aims, but it makes clear that those 
activities will always be subject to control by EC law. Moreover, the association 
shall pursue its activities in accordance with the principles derived from its character 
as a group of persons. With regard to sports organisations, it has been argued that as 
a consequence only activities relating exclusively to sport may be carried out, which 
9S See Commission Proposals COM(91) 273/1 and 273/2 final, OJ C 99,21.04.1992 and amended 
proposals COM(93) 252 final, OJ C 236,31.8.1993. 
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would exclude activities pursuing business interests96. Together with the stipulation 
that profits from any economic activity may not be divided amongst the members, 
which would, for example, forbid the practice of distributing television revenues by 
the sports associations to the clubs, this means that sports associations usually do not 
qualify as a European Association in the sense of the draft statute. 
1.3.3.3. Freedom of Association 
The case for the legal autonomy of sports associations is generally based on the 
claim that the power of the sports associations to set internal rules can be deduced 
from the basic right of freedom of association. Thus, it is necessary to examine what 
the concept of freedom of association entails and to what extent it may be invoked in 
order to limit the application of the Treaty. 
1.3.3.3.1 Human Rights in EC Law 
The European Union does not (yet) have a legally binding catalogue of human rights 
and basic freedoms in the Treaty. However, Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European 
Union provides that the Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States, as general principles of Community 1aw97. The right of freedom of 
association is protected by Article 11 of the European Convention of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms98 and is also mentioned in the constitutions of nearly 
every Member State". Consequently, it is part of the Community legal order, a fact 
that has also been recognised by the Court in Bosman10°. Additionally, the freedom 
of assembly and of association is also mentioned in Article 12 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, proclaimed at the European Council in 
96 See Vieweg, K., "The Legal Autonomy of Sport Organisations and the Restrictions of European 
Law", in Caiger, A. & Gardiner, S. (eds), op. cit. supra note 91, p. 91. 
97 See Case 44/79 Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727, at para 15 and in particular the 
recent Case C-117/01 K. B. v. National Health Service Pensions Agency, [2004] ECR I-541, at 
paras 33-34, where the ECHR was applied directly for the first time. 
98 Hereinafter referred to as "ECHR". 
99 In respect of the old Member States see the constitutions of Germany (Art. 9 para 1), Belgium 
(Art 27), Denmark (§ 78), Finland (§ 10a), Greece (Art. 12), Ireland (Art. 40), Italy (Art. 18), 
Luxembourg (Art. 26), Holland (Art. 8), Portugal (Art. 46), Sweden (Chapter II, §§ 1 No 5,14), 
Spain (Art. 22); in Austria, the ECHR itself is part of the constitution, see B-VG BGBl. Nr. 
59/1964. 
100 Bosman, at para 79; see also Case 175/73 Gewerkschaftsbund [1974] ECR 917. 
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Nice in December 2000. As is commonly known, the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
has been integrated into the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe and 
although it does not (yet) have the full force of the law, it is the result of a consensus 
between the Member States and reflects their common legal tradition. Besides, the 
Charter could become binding through being interpreted as enshrining the general 
principles of Community law and has already been referred to by the Court of First 
Instance101 and on several occasions in the opinions of different Advocates- 
General'°2. 
Taking into account Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the scope 
of the basic right of association is determined by the ECHR. Similarly, Article 52 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union states in paragraph 3 that 
"in so far this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid 
down by the said Convention". Consequently, the level of protection of Human 
Rights in the European Union may not, in any instance, be lower than that 
guaranteed by the ECHR. 
1.3.3.3.2 Qualification of Sports Bodies as Associations? 
In the light of the ECHR, the term "association" presupposes a voluntary grouping 
for a common goal103, which includes political parties104, trade unions105 or hunting 
clubs1. Considering this, national and international sports federations undoubtedly 06 
101 See for example Case T-54/99 max. mobil Telekommunikation Service GmbH v. Commission, 
[2002] ECR 11-313 in which the Court based its judgment on Article 41(1) (right to good 
administration) and Article 47 (judicial review) of the Charter. 
102 See in particular AG Tizzano in Case C-173/99 The Queen v. Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry, ex parte Broadcasting, Entertainment, Cinematographic and Theatre Union (BECTU) 
[2001] ECR I-4881, at para 26, who considered the Charter as a "substantive point of reference"; 
also AG Alber in Case C-340/99 TNT Traco SpA v. Poset Italiane SpA and Others [2001] ECR I- 
4109, at para 94. 
103 Young, James and Webster v. United Kingdom (App. No. 7601/76) [1982] 4 EHRR 38. 
104 United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey (App. No. 19392/92) [1998] 26 EHRR 
121. 
105 Guradze, H., Die Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, (Vahlen Verlag, Berlin, 1968), p. 167; 
Nedjati, Z., Human Rights under the European Convention, (North Holland Publishing, 
Amsterdam, 1978), p. 198; Jacobs, F. & White, R., European Convention on Human Rights, 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002), p. 294; Council of Europe, "Short Guide to the European 
Convention on Human Rights" (Council of Europe Publishing, Strasburg, 1991), p. 93. 
1°6 Chassagnou and others v. France (App. Nos 25088/94,28331/95,28443/95), [2000] 29 EHRR 
615. 
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qualify as associations in the sense of the ECHR: sports regulatory bodies such as 
FIFA or UEFA are made up by people who share the same interest and have 
congregated to pursue a common goal - the advance of the interest of its members 
and of the sport in general, a fact which is illustrated by FIFA's motto "For the good 
of the game". However, on first sight the above mentioned regulations in European 
team sports, which provide that a player is not allowed to play for a certain club 
unless he has become a member of the national association in question and is granted 
a licence to play, do not seem to comply with the criterion of voluntariness. The issue 
whether groupings with compulsory membership may be qualified as associations in 
the sense of the ECHR has usually been discussed in connection with trade unions. In 
this context, a system whereby workers are required to become members of a 
particular union in order to be able to exercise their trade, is widely considered not to 
contradict the classification of trade unions as associations in the sense of Article 11 
of the ECHR107. 
1.3.3.3.3 Scope of the Basic Right of Association 
The right of association includes the right to choose whether or not to form, join or 
quit an association108. This basic freedom not only confers rights upon individual 
persons, but also grants rights to the association as such, protecting those activities of 
the association that relate to its common interest109. The protection of collective 
activities embraces the right to define the association's interests, the authority to 
establish rules to pursue these interests, to make use of these rules and to enforce 
them if necessary' 10. It also enables the association to give itself an internal structure, 
defining a system of representation and to choose the means necessary to fulfil its 
aim. However, in this context it is important to note that by joining the association, 
the member expresses his agreement with the common goal and recognises the 
107 See Jacobs, F. & White, R., op. cit. supra note 105, p. 295; Council of Europe Short Guide, op. cit. 
supra note 105, p. 91. 
108 Jacobs, F. & White, R., op. cit. supra note 105, p. 291; Council of Europe Short Guide, op. cit. 
supra note 105, p. 91, Nedjati, Z., op. cit. supra note 105, p. 198; Guradze, H., op. cit. supra note 
105, p. 162. 
'09 See Gramlich, L., "Grundfreiheiten contra Grundrechte im Gemeinschaftsrecht? ", (1996) 19 DÜV, 
p. 807; Guradze, H., op. cit., p. 163; Nedjati, Z., op. cit., p. 198. 
110 See Vieweg, K. in Caiger, A. & Gardiner, S. (eds), op. cit. supra note 91, p. 91; Vahrenwald, A., 
"Am I So Round with You as You with Me? ' The Bosman Case before the European Court of 
Justice", (1996) 7(4) EntLRev, p. 153; Röhricht, V. (ed. ), Sportsgerichtbarkeit (Boorberg Verlag, 
Stuttgart, 1997), p. 21. 
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association's regulatory authority. This means that the association has a legal 
personality independent from its members and the individual will of a single member 
and the collective will of the association do not necessarily have to correspond. 
In a sports context, freedom of association confers upon a sports body the 
right to set rules which it considers best suited to pursue its main interest, the 
particular sport in question. In relation to the individual sportsman or sportswoman, 
their voluntary decision to join the sports association includes the acknowledgement 
of the association's power to establish certain rules and make decisions in line with 
its statutes, such as disciplinary action 1 t. Still, it is evident that an associations' 
autonomy cannot be unlimited and its rules have to be subject to external control' 12 
1.3.3.3.4 Limitations to the Basic Right of Association 
Since fundamental rights are part of Community law "as guaranteed by the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedomss113, the 
limits to a basic right can be found in the text of the Convention. This is also 
acknowledged by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, which states in 
Article 52(3) that the meaning and scope, including limitation of rights that 
correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR, must comply with the standards laid 
out in the ECHR. According to Article 11(2) ECHR, restrictions may be placed on 
the exercise of the right to freedom of association if they are "prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public 
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals 
or for the protection of the rights and freedom of others". The European Court of 
Human Rights, building on the European Commission of Human Rights' case law, 
has established a threefold test in order to determine whether an interference with 
human rights is in accordance with the lawsla 
First of all, the limitation has to have a basis in national law, set by national 
parliaments according to the standards of a "democratic society". With regard to 
See Article 5(1) of the current FIFA "Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players" 
(hereinafter referred to as 2005 Regulations") which establishes that by registering with a national 
association to play for a certain club "a player agrees to abide by the Statutes and regulations of 
FIFA, the confederations and the Associations". 
112 See Pfister, B., "Sportregeln vor staatlichen Gerichten", (1998) 6 SpuRt, p. 224; Röhricht, V., op. 
cit. supra note 110, p. 22. 
113 EU Treaty, Article 6(2). 
114 See Jacobs, F. & White, R., op. cit. supra note 105, p. 202. 
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Community law, the fact that the Treaty has been signed or respectively accepted by 
democratically legitimated representatives of all Member States is sufficient for 
limitations prescribed by the Treaty to fulfil the standards of Article 11(2) ECHR. 
However, considering the fact that the European Parliament still does not have the 
full rights of a national parliament as far as legislative powers are concerned, one 
may question the quality of EC secondary legislation as being capable of setting 
boundaries to a basic freedom. Again, it can be argued that all Member States have 
passed legislation in line with the principles of a democratic society, accepting the 
legislative process set out in the Treaty. 
The second requirement for a restriction of a basic freedom to be in 
accordance with the ECHR is accessibility of the law at issue. Thirdly, the law must 
be formulated in such a way that a person can foresee the consequences, which a 
given action will entail. It may be assumed that these two requirements will usually 
not pose any problems as regards to limitations to basic rights brought about by EC 
law. 
Taking into account the reasons for which freedom of association can be 
limited according to Article 11(2) ECHR, the only one relevant to sporting rules is 
the protection of the rights and freedom of others, which includes any rights 
guaranteed by national or international law. It is important to note that although the 
members of an association have acknowledged the association's common goal and 
submitted to its organisational authority, the individual member is still an "other" 
person in relation to the association and has not automatically waived all personal 
rights115. Consequently, the right to self-regulation of sports bodies can be limited if 
the restriction is necessary in order to protect the right to free movement of 
individual athletes. Regarding the rules on competition law, it could be argued that 
Articles 81 and 82 ensure the proper functioning of the trade between Member 
States, protecting the property rights of those competing in the market and of the 
consumers. 
When deciding whether a limitation to the freedom of association is necessary 
in a democratic society, the European Court of Human Rights examines whether the 
interference corresponds to a pressing social need and does not go any further than is 
115 See Gramlich, L., op. cit. supra note 109, p. 808. 
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necessary to address the legitimate aim pursued. This test requires a balancing of the 
severity of the restriction against the importance of the public interest. However, the 
ECHR gives the contracting states a certain margin of appreciation when judging on 
the importance of certain rights and the necessity of a limitation. In case of the EC, 
this means that in case of a conflict between the freedom of association and a 
legitimate public interest such as the free movement of workers, there is generally 
room for discretion as to which right has more significance in a Community context, 
although a certain balancing of rights will always be required. 
This has been demonstrated in Schmidberger116, concerning the question 
whether a restriction of the free movement of goods, caused by a demonstration 
blocking a major transit route, may be justified under consideration of the freedom of 
expression and freedom of assembly guaranteed by Articles 10 and 11 ECHR. 
Having established that both the Community and its Member States are required to 
respect fundamental rights, the Court stated, "the protection of those rights is a 
legitimate interest which, in principle, justifies a restriction of the obligations 
imposed by Community law, even under a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the 
Treaty"117. However, the Court added that according to paragraph two of Articles 10 
and 11 ECHR, the exercise of these rights may be restricted, "provided that the 
restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interest and do not, taking 
account of the aim of the restrictions, constitute disproportionate and unacceptable 
interference, impairing the very substance of the rights guaranteed"" 8. The Court 
concluded that "the interests involved must be weighed having regard to all the 
circumstances of the case in order to determine whether a fair balance was struck 
between those interests"119, albeit acknowledging that the "competent authorities 
enjoy a wide margin of discretion in that regard"120. 
1.3.3.3.5 The Basic Right of Association in Case law 
It is significant that the Court, bar one exception, has never explicitly referred to 
freedom of association when judging on the compatibility of sporting rules with 
116 Case C-112/00 Schmidberger v. Republic ofAustria [2003] ECR 1-05659. 
"' Ibid, at pars 74. 
118 Ibid, at para 80. 
119 Ibid, at pars 81. 
120 Ibid, at para 82. 
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Community law. On the contrary, the Court emphasised in its first sports judgment 
that the legal autonomy of sporting associations cannot be used as an argument to 
prevent the application of the provisions on free movement to measures adopted by 
sports bodies 121. Although the Court allowed nationality restrictions in respect of 
team selection rules under certain circumstances, the exemption was, based on the 
unique nature and the context of matches between national teams, rather than on the 
basic right of association. 
In Bosman, the Court finally touched upon freedom of association, even 
recognising it as one of the fundamental rights that are protected in the Community 
legal order 122. However, it quickly rejected the possibility of the football associations 
invoking their freedom of association in defence of the transfer system, stating that 
the rules at issue "cannot be seen as necessary to ensure enjoyment of that freedom 
by those associations, by the clubs or by their players, nor can they be seen as an 
inevitable result thereof'123. The Court's dismissal of the sporting bodies' right to 
self-governance without any further consideration certainly did not offer the right of 
association the recognition it deserves as- a basic right protected by the European 
Convention on Human Rights, as well as Community law itself. 
In this context, the opinion of Advocate-General Lenz in Bosman is of. 
particular interest. Albeit detecting a conflict between the right to freedom of 
movement and the right of association, he rejected the idea of a balancing of rights, 
claiming that only an interest of the association that is of "paramount importance" 
could justify a restriction on freedom of movement124. Bearing in mind the 
significance of the basic right of association in the European Union, it would have 
been necessary carefully to analyse the relation between both rights in the particular 
case before deciding which interest deserves more protection, instead of, as a matter 
of principle, automatically granting the free movement of workers precedence over 
the right of association. 
In contrast to the Court and the Advocate-General, the majority of scholars 
treated the situation in Bosman as a clash between two rights of equal importance, 
12. Walrave, at Para 18. 
X22 Bosman, at Para 79. 
'23 Ibid, at Para 80. 
124 See AG Lenz in Bosman, at Para 216. 
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which required a balancing between the right of association and the freedom of 
workers. Thus, the Bosman judgment was heavily criticised in this respect'25. The 
Court was argued to have passed on the opportunity to clarify the scope of the right 
of association in Community law and was condemned for dismissing the relevance of 
this fundamental right without effectively considering a potential conflict with the 
Treaty freedoms 126. However, the latest judgments concerning the internal rules of 
sporting associations, despite not explicitly mentioning freedom of association, are 
pointing in the right direction in so far as the Court has expressed its willingness to 
acknowledge the autonomy of sports organisations to a greater extent. In Deliege, for 
example, the Court, having established that selection rules were inherent in the 
conduct of an international sports event, decided that it should be left to the sports 
bodies concerned to adopt the appropriate rules, as they had the required knowledge 
and experience. 
Having said that, one should also pay attention to the opinion of Advocate- 
General Alber in the Lehtonen case. After pointing out that sport cannot exist without 
fixed rules, he concluded that self-regulation was appropriate in principle and 
justified by freedom of association. In order to judge whether the transfer periods in 
question were in breach of Community law, the Advocate-General examined whether 
the rules constituted an unreasonable hindrance to free movement. Although this 
approach shows first signs of an evaluation of the conflicting rights in question, the 
Advocate-General's general conclusion that overt barriers to access cannot be 
justified by freedom of association in any case goes too far, as each different case of 
a clash of rights merits thorough consideration, weighing up the relevance of each 
right in the particular situation. 
125 See Gramlich, L., op. cit. supra note 109, p. 808; Imping, A., "Ausländer-Quote im Profifussball", 
(1996) 6 EWS, p. 197; Streinz, R., "Die Rechtssprechung des EUGH nach dem Bosman Urteil" in 
Tettinger, P. (ed. ), Sport im Schnittfeld von Europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht und nationalem 
Recht (Boorberg Verlag, Stuttgart, 2001), p. 46; Hobe, S. & Tietje, C., "Europäische Grundrechte 
auch für Profisportler" (1996) 6 JUS, p. 490; Schroeder, W., "Anmerkung zu Bosman" (1996) 5 
JZ, p. 256; Trommer, H., Die Transferregeln im Profisport im Lichte des Bosman -Urteils im 
Vergleich zu den Mechanismen im bezahlten amerikanischen Sport (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 
1999), p. 69; Scholz, R. & Aulehner, J., op. cit. supra note 80, p. 45. 
'Z6 See Gramlich, L., op. cit. supra note 109, p. 809; Streinz, R. in Tettinger, P. (ed. ), op. cit. supra 
note 125, p. 46; Röthel, A., "Anmerkung zu den EUGH Urteilen Deliege und Lehtonen", (2000) 
EuZW, p. 380; Schroeder, W., op. cit. supra note 125, p. 256. 
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Lastly, although not directly related to the question of legal autonomy of sports 
bodies in EC law, a recent case before the Court of First Instance, Piau v. 
Commission127 is worth mentioning in this context. In the case at hand, the Court of 
First Instance had to assess FIFA's rules on players' agents under EC competition 
law. Having established that the rules at issue "were adopted by FIFA of its own 
authority and not on the basis of rule-making powers conferred on it by public 
authorities in connection with a recognised task in the general interest concerning 
sporting activity (see, by analogy, Case C-309/99 Wouters and Others [2002] ECR I- 
1577, paragraphs 68 and 69)"128, the Court went on to state that "those regulations do 
not fall within the scope of the freedom of internal organisation enjoyed by sports 
associations either"129. Moreover, the Court of First Instance questioned FIFA's 
legitimacy to enact such rules, which touch on fundamental freedoms, claiming they 
did not have a sports-related object, but regulate an economic activity that was held 
to be peripheral to the sporting activity in question. Pointing out that the adoption of 
such rules by a private-law body, "cannot from the outset be regarded as compatible 
with Community law", the Court stated that the regulation of an economic activity 
concerning neither the specific nature of sport nor the freedom of internal 
organisation of sports associations, fell within the competence of the public 
authorities13o Ultimately, the Court considered that the question of FIFA's 
legitimacy to issue such rules was not the subject of judicial review in the case at 
issue and went on to assess the regulations on players' agents under EC competition 
law. 
The case is of special interest, as the Court has made clear that there are limits 
to the legal autonomy of sports bodies not only in so far as restrictions imposed by 
EC law are concerned, but also regarding the subject matter of rules adopted by such 
associations. It certainly is questionable whether sports bodies should have the power 
to regulate the economic activity of third persons, if such activity is not closely 
related to the organisation of the sport in question. On the other hand, it has to be 
considered that with the exception of France, no regulations concerning the activity 
127 Case T-193/02 Laurent Piau v. Commission [2005] 5 CMLR. 2. 
128 The Wouters case will be analysed below under point 5.1.3.1. 
129 Piau v. Commission, at pars 74. 
130 Ibid, at paras 77-78. 
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of players' agents are in place in the Member States. Taking into account that agents 
are nowadays involved in the vast majority of transfers and that in the absence of 
rules regulating their professional activity, players are in danger of falling prey to 
disadvantageous offers, it is submitted that FIFA should be entitled to provide the 
necessary protection for players and clubs where the national authorities have failed 
to do so' 31 
Be that as it may, as a principle, it is important to note that whenever an 
organisational rule of a sports association collides with a provision of Community 
law, a balancing of the different interests is required, judging on a case-to-case basis. 
However, in order to be able to take into account the interests of the sport 
associations, it is necessary for those bodies to establish which sporting aims in 
particular they consider as being vital for the existence of their sport. The Court has 
already acknowledged certain sporting aims such as maintaining a sporting balance 
between clubs and the development of youth sport as being legitimate. It is now up to 
the sports bodies to work together with the Community and reach an understanding 
as to which other sporting values should be recognised by EC law and may be used 
as a justification for sporting rules that are in conflict with the aims of the Treaty. 
Despite the fact that sports associations have a limited right to self- 
governance based on freedom of association, this does not mean that they stand 
above the law; sporting rules will usually attract the attention of Community officials 
when having an economic dimension. However, by establishing a dialogue with the 
EU and adhering to the principle of "good governance", sports governing bodies are 
able to minimise the risk of legal intervention. This includes the introduction of a 
democratic structure at all levels, transparency of governing standards and the 
avoidance of conflict of interest and of private gain from the exercise of sporting 
authority. By doing so, the governing bodies would probably not be able to prevent 
the application of Community law, but transparency and accountability of sporting 
131 On the other hand, it could be argued that the fact that the Member States have generally not 
implemented legislation regulating the activity of players' agents, implies that they simply do not 
feel the need to do so and thus, everybody intending to become a players' agent should be able to 
take up this profession without any further restrictions. However, it is submitted that the absence 
of national legislation on the matter stems from the fact that this subject is considered to fall in the 
sports bodies' competence, rather than the opinion that regulation is not required. 
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rules would definitely strengthen their position and return credibility to sports 
governance. 
1.3.3.4. The Principle of Subsidiarity 
A further argument for the immunity of rules adopted by sports organisations from 
Community law is based on the principle of subsidiarity, brought before the Court in 
Bosman by the German government. According to Article 5 of the Treaty, this 
Community principle entails that in areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
competence, the Community shall take action only if and insofar as the objectives of 
the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can be 
better achieved by the Community. The Court in Bosman did not accept an 
interpretation of the principle of subsidiarity that would lead to "a situation in which 
the freedom of private associations to adopt sporting rules restricts the exercise of 
rights conferred on individuals by the Treaty132 
When considering the rationale behind the subsidiarity principle, it becomes 
evident that it cannot be used as a valid argument to limit the application of 
Community law to sporting matters. The principle of subsidiarity is intended to 
restrict Community competences in order to ensure decentralisation and to guarantee 
that Community affairs are dealt with on the appropriate level, according to the 
subject matter. However, in the case of professional sport, the application of the 
Treaty is based on the fact that sport is practised as an economic activity, which 
means that it is a matter of exclusive Community competence. 
1.3.4. Sport as an Economic Activity 
Following the Court's sports judgments, sport comes under the scope of Community 
law when practised as an economic activity in the sense of Article 2 of the Treaty. 
Without doubt this includes professional sportsmen or sportswomen who earn a 
living by practising sport, but when it comes to semi-professionals and amateurs, it 
can sometimes be difficult to establish whether they are engaged in an economic 
activity. 
132 Bosman, at para 81. 
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The issue arose in connection with the Deliege case, where the Court had to rule on 
the professional status of a Belgian Judoka who claimed the selection rules of the 
Belgian judo federation to be in breach of Community law. In this context, the Court 
initially pointed out that the distinction between amateur and professional athletes 
has become less clear in recent years and well-known sportsmen and sportswomen 
nowadays regularly receive a significant income from sponsoring and advertising 
contracts, despite being ranked as amateurs by their sports federation. It continued to 
argue that the notion of economic activity in Article 2 defined the field of application 
of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty and thus should not be 
interpreted restrictively 133 Consequently, the Court held that it could not be left to 
the particular sports federation to determine whether an athlete is an amateur or a 
professional. The decisive factor is therefore not the classification by the sports 
associations in question, but whether the sportsman or sportswoman in question is 
practising sport as an economic activity 134 . 
According to the Court, an economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 
of the Treaty is defined as "the pursuit of an activity as an employed person or the 
provision of services for remuneration 135", provided that the work performed is 
"genuine and effective and not purely marginal and ancillarys136. Following that, a 
sportsman or sportswoman who is actually paid for practising'sport will always be 
engaging in an economic activity, whereas an athlete who merely receives 
reimbursement for travel or other expenses related to his or her sporting activity, 
would still be classed as an amateur. To clarify the difference between amateurs and 
professionals, the Court has added that athletes who do not receive payment for 
participating in tournaments, but have other sources of income through their sporting 
activity, such as grants or sponsoring agreements, will also be deemed to engage in 
an economic activity137 . 
133 Case 53/81 Levin v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1982] ECR 1035, at para 13. 
134 Deliege, at para 46. 
135 Deliege, at para 53, see also Case 196/87 Steymann" v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1988] ECR 
6159, at pars 10. 
136 Deliege, at para 54, see also Levin, at para 17 and Steymann, at para 13. 
137 Delfege, at para 56. 
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1.3.4.1. Amateur Sport 
The Court of Justice's statement in Walrave that "sport is subject to Community law 
only in so far as it constitutes an economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 of 
the Treaty"138, has been widely understood in the sense that "true" amateur sport, 
where sport is practised solely as a hobby without any economic background, does 
not fall within the scope of Community law at all. This point of view has found 
support between scholars139 and is shared by the Commission, according to which 
leisure activities are "in no way affected by the Treatys140. Having acknowledged 
that it can only act in respect of discrimination related to professional sports, the 
Commission did however stress the importance of sport in modern life and expressed 
its concern over nationality discrimination in the field of amateur sports, regarding it 
contrary to the spirit of a people's Europe'41. 
Up until now, in all cases concerning the validity of sporting rules under EC 
law, the Court exclusively had to deal with provisions applying to professional sport. 
While it is undisputed that in order to be protected by the Treaty freedoms, an 
individual would usually have to be engaged in an economic activity, it may be 
doubted whether the Court meant to exclude athletes who are not economically 
active from the scope of Community law alltogether. Support for this view can be 
found in Advocate-General Trabucci's opinion in Dona, who thought it possible that 
migrant workers and their family members might be protected from discrimination 
on grounds of nationality when joining a sports club in the host country to play as 
amateurs. Unfortunately, he declined to give an opinion on the matter, as the case in 
question was only concerned with the free movement of professional players 142 
138 See Walrave, at para 4; reaffirmed in Bosman, at para 73 and Deliege, at para 41; In Dona, at para 
12, however, there seems to be a difference in the German version of the judgment, where the 
"only" is missing, which gave rise to discussion between German writers, see Zuleeg, M., "Der 
Sport im Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht" in Will, M. (ed), Sportrecht in Europa (C. F. Müller, 
Heidelberg, 1993), p. 1; Streinz, R., "Die Auswirkungen des EG-Rechts auf den Sport", (1998) 1 
SpuRt, p. 6. 
139 See Klose, M., Die Rolle des Sports bei der Europäischen Einigung (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 
1989), p. 86. 
140 Answer to written question by MEP Müller, concerning discrimination on grounds of nationality 
in the matter of access to fishing waters for hobby anglers; OJ 1974 C 58/1. 
141 See answer to written questions by MEP Müller, OJ 1974 C 58/1 and by MEP Galle, OJ 1991 C 
63/43, regarding the requirements of the Royal Belgian Tennis Federation which discriminate 
against non-Belgian nationals. 







A basis for the protection of amateur athletes could arguably be found in Article 7(2) 
of Regulation 1612/68143 which shall ensure that migrant workers and specified 
family 144 are granted the same social and tax advantages as nationals of the 
host nation 145 Although the Court had initially interpreted the concept of "social 
advantages" quite narrowly, deciding that it related only to benefits connected with 
employment 146, it went on to adopt a broader approach "in view of the equality of 
treatment which the provision seeks to achieves147 and held all social advantages to 
be included, "whether or not attached to the contract of employments148. The 
rationale behind this provision is to encourage the movement of workers within the 
EU and facilitate their integration in the host country. In order to determine whether 
workers are entitled to a particular benefit in another Member State under Article 
7(2) of Regulation 1612/68, three factors are decisive: their status as a worker, their 
residence in the national territory and the suitability of the benefit to facilitate their 
'a9 mobility within the Community 
Considering the fact that more than half of EU citizens regularly practice 
sport, a high number of them in one of the 700 000 clubs existing in the European 
Union'50, it may be assumed that for a lot of migrant workers and their families sport 
is an important factor in daily life and they would want to join a sports club in the 
host country and compete for it. Excluding amateur athletes from competitions by 
reason of their nationality discourages them from joining a sports club and therefore 
makes integration in the host country more difficult, which has a negative effect on 
mobility within the Community. Consequently, amateur sports competitions should 
143 OJ 1968 L 257/2- 
144 According to Article 10 of the Regulation the family members who have the right to install 
themselves with a worker who is employed in another Member State, provided the worker has 
adequate housing available are: the spouse of the worker and descendants who are either under 21 
or dependent, and dependent relatives in the ascending line of the worker and spouse. Member 
States are also required to facilitate the admission of other family members who are either 
dependant on the worker or living under the worker's roof in the Member State of origin. 
However, Regulation 1612/68 will be replaced by Council Directive 2004138/EC, see point 3.3.2.3 
below. 
gas See also Streinz, R., op. cit. supra note 138, p. 6; Zuleeg, M. in Will, M. (ed), op. cit. supra note 
138, p. 6. 
iah Case 76/72 Michel S. v. Fonds National de Reclassement Handicapes (1973) ECR 457. 
147 Case 32/75 Fforini (nee Cristini) V. Societe Nationale des Chemins de Per Frangais (1975] ECR 
1085, at pars 13. 
148 Ibid, at para 13. 
149 Case 207/78 Ministere Public v. Even and ONPTS [1979] ECR 2019, at para 22. 
150 See the "Helsinki Report on Sport", op. cit. supra note 23, p. 3. 
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be opened to all EU citizens who work and live in another Member State and to those 
family members specifically listed in Regulation 1612/68. 
However, even if the right to join and compete for a club in another Member 
State did not constitute a social advantage in the sense of Article 7(2), it would still 
seem disproportionate that an EU citizen would be able to practise a sport 
professionally throughout the Community, but could be prevented from competing in 
an amateur competition in another Member State. Furthermore, most professional 
athletes have been members of amateur clubs for which they will have participated in 
competitions before turning professional. This means that a young athlete who is 
resident in another Member State and wants to take up sport professionally, would 
not be given the chance to compete for a club at an amateur level; this would make it 
very difficult to find a club which would employ him or her on a professional level. 
Given that nationality discrimination for amateurs may hinder a young athlete from 
becoming a professional (as which he would be protected by Community law), it 
could be argued that in such cases amateur sport may be caught by Article 39. 
Another scenario in which amateur sport could come under the scope of 
Community law are transfer restrictions, whereby clubs demand a reimbursement for 
fees incurred for the training of amateurs who are planning to move to a professional 
club. Undoubtedly, transfer fees for amateurs are capable of impeding a person's 
choice of profession, which means that amateurs on their way to becoming 
professionals should be protected by EC law in this respect 151 . 
Be that as it may, up to this date the Court did not have the chance yet to 
decide on a sports case involving amateur athletes. However, it only seems a matter 
of time until the first amateur sportsman or sportswoman will arrive in Luxembourg 
to challenge the rules of the relevant sporting associations 152. 
See also Schinike, M., "Anmerkung zu RA-Entscheidung-Nr 01/98 des Deutschen Basketball 
Bundes vom 20.5.1998", (1998) 5 SpuRt, p. 209; against, however the decision of the Amtsgericht 
Frankfurt from 10.11.97, Az 31 C 3138/97-23, which considered the requirement of a training 
compensation payment of £ 750 for a twelve year old player as legitimate. 
MSZ This could be sooner than expected: the Commission is currently investigating the case of a 
German national who has challenged a rule by the Spanish Football Association preventing him 
from playing in a Spanish amateur league. The Commission is said to be basing its investigation 
on the fact that the access to amateur sport may be considered as a social advantage in the sense of 
Article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68, see Friedmann, T., "EU-Sportrecht aktuell", (2005) 1 SpuRt, 
p. 18. 
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1.4. THE CASE FOR A REFERENCE TO SPORT IN THE 
TREATY 
Although the Court had confirmed the application of Community law to sport over 
20 years before Bosman, it was mainly after this decision that the issue of an 
inclusion of sport in the Treaty arose. However, it took almost a decade since the 
famous sports judgment of the Court of Justice until sport finally found its way in 
Article 111-282 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Although the 
reference to sport in the constitution is a significant development in the relationship 
between sport and EC law, it should not be forgotten that at this point in time the 
ratification of the Constitution by the Member States is far from being certain, to say 
the least'53. Thus, the fact that the constitution as signed in Rome in October 2004 
may never come into force means that the chapter of a sports article cannot be closed 
as yet and other options for a reference to sport in the Treaty might still be possible. 
1.4.1. A General Exemption for Sport? 
In view of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe that provides for limited 
Community competence on sporting matters, the possibility that the Member States 
would ever agree on exempting sport even partially from the scope of the Treaty is 
merely hypothetical' 54 However, considering that European sports organisations 
have strongly lobbied for years to have the sporting sector exempted from the Treaty, 
it shall be demonstrated why the Member States were right to reject such a 
proposition. 
Although general exemptions of specific subject matters are not unheard of in 
Community law, they are rare and should be interpreted restrictively. Examples are 
153 At the moment (December 2005) the situation looks rather grim, as referendums in France and the 
Netherlands have turned out negatively, while other Member States such as the UK have decided 
to postpone the planned referendums. 
154 In this respect see also the speech by Commissioner Viviane Reding, "2004 -A New Lease of 
Life for European Sport? ", delivered on 16.9.2003 in Monaco, SPEECH/03/411: "it is illusory to 
think that the Community dimension in sport can be made to disappear by including an exemption 
clause for sport in the future Constitution of the European Union. This subject was debated three 
years ago and none of the EU's Heads of State or Government wanted an exception to be made for 
sport. " 
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Article 39(4), stating that the rules on free movement of workers do not apply to 
employment in the public service' 55, or the exception for activities connected with 
the exercise of official authority from the freedom of establishment, provided for in 
Article 45 of the Treaty. Considering the economic significance of sport in Europe, it 
is commonly acknowledged that a complete lack of Community supervision over 
sporting rules is not an acceptable option 156 . 
Even a partial exemption of sporting matters from Community law (for 
example by adopting a Treaty article akin to the above mentioned Article 39(4) in 
order to render the provisions on free movement of persons and/or services 
inapplicable) would have highly undesirable effects. Taking into account that all of 
the Court's sports judgments to date were concerned with conflicts between the rules 
of sports associations and the free movement of workers or services, the significance 
of those Treaty articles in relation to sport is evident. A provision that removes sport 
from the scope of Article 39 would leave professional athletes largely without the 
protection of Community law, an effect that cannot be justified by the sport bodies' 
right to self-governance. 
Community law not only affects sport in connection with the provisions on 
free movement, but also when it comes to the application of competition law. Having 
said that, the Commission has made it clear that a general exemption from EC 
competition law for the sports sector would be considered as "unnecessary, 
undesirable and unjustified"157. However, following the example of the American 
baseball exemption'58 and the German § 31 GWB'59 which states an exemption for 
155 Examples for the narrow interpretation of the exemption in Article 39(4) are Case 149/79 
Commission v. Belgium [1980] ECR 1881 and Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum v. Land Baden- 
Württemberg [1986] ECR 2121. 
156 See for example the Resolution on the broadcasting rights of major sport events by the Committee 
of the Regions, COR 183/97 fm, 17-18 September 1997; see also speech Van Miert, K., "Sport et 
concurrence: Developpements recents et action de la Commission", Forum Europeen du Sport, 
Luxembourg, 27.11.1997, available at 
http: //www. europa. eu. int/comni/competition/speeches/text/spl997 _069_fr. 
html. 
t57 See speech Schaub, A., "EC Competition Policy and its Implications for the Sports Sector", World 
Sports Forum, St Moritz, 8.3.1998, available at 
http: //www. europa-eu-int/conmi/competition/speeches/text/spl998 0I 1_en. html. 
158 See the decision of the US Supreme Court, Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National 
League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U. S. 200,209 (1922), reaffirmed in Toolson v. New 
York Yankees, 346 U. S. 356 (1953) and Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U. S. 258 (1972). 
159 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen [Law against Restrictions on Competition], BGBI I 
1998/2521. 
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the central marketing of football television rights from national competition law, 
there have been demands for the insertion of a Treaty article excluding sport from the 
application of EC competition law. One argument for a provision is the protection of 
the social features of sport, feared to be threatened by the application of the 
economically orientated competition rules. The more significant basis for an 
exemption from competition law, though, is argued to be the unique characteristics 
of the sports market which are claimed to distinguish sport from other economic 
sectors, an issue which will be dealt with in chapter 5 on Article 81. 
When the status of sport in EC law is analysed, one is tempted to agree with 
the sports bodies that the European Union should pay more attention to the special 
features of sport and help to protect its social values by showing more flexibility 
when dealing with sporting issues. However, it has to be pointed out that it was only 
after sport turned into big business, a development initiated and pushed ahead by the 
sports sector itself, that the Community felt it had to get involved, as sporting rules 
acquired more and more of an economic dimension. Sport undoubtedly has special 
characteristics distinguishing it from other economic sectors; still, taking into 
account the vast amount of money involved in sports nowadays, so far the sports 
associations have failed to provide the evidence that the differences are as such as to 
warrant a general exemption from certain Treaty articles, or even from Community 
law as such 160. Despite the fact that there is room to argue that Community law is in 
danger of destroying the existing structures of sport, making it impossible for the 
individual associations to protect its social and cultural value, a removal of sport 
from the scope of the Treaty would definitely go too far. 
The Court 161 and the Commission162 have repeatedly pointed out that sporting 
rules intended to secure certain goals such as the promotion of youth sport or the 
balance between clubs may be accepted under Community law. Having said that, the 
claim that an evasion from the law is the only possible way to safeguard these goals 
is not convincing. Since there are other means to pursue what has been 
acknowledged by the Community as legitimate sporting aims, one should be very 
160 See also Vieweg, K., in Caiger, A. & Gardiner, S. (eds), op. cit. supra note 110, p. 105; Streinz, 
R., op. cit. supra note 138, p. 96. 
161 See for example Bosman, at para 106. 
162 The Helsinki Report on Sport, op. cit. supra note 23, p. 7. 
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wary of setting a precedent by excluding a whole business sector from the scope of 
European law. 
1.4.2. A Treaty Article on Sport 
In the past, different interest groups and institutions have called for the introduction 
of sport into the Treaty. Evidently, the views on the scope a sports article should 
entail differed significantly: whereas the sports organisations lobbied for an 
exemption of sport which would secure their right to self-governance and reverse the 
effects of Bosman, other institutions such as the European Parliament urged the 
Member States to create a legal base for taking into account the special features of 
sport when applying Community law to sporting matters. Additionally, there have 
been calls for an inclusion of sport in the Treaty which would allow the Union to 
carry out supporting and co-ordinating action, thereby opening up the possibility to 
allocate funds in the budget, without limiting the scope of application of the Treaty 
or interfering with the competences of the Member States. 
The European Union has slowly developed its attitude to sporting matters 
from a purely regulatory to a more socio-cultural approach, expressing a willingness 
to take into account the particular characteristics of sport when acting upon sporting 
matters. However, in the absence of a reference to sport in the Treaty and bearing in 
mind that both the Amsterdam and the Nice declarations on sport are not legally 
binding, it is evident that such special treatment of the sports sector has been difficult 
to justify. Hence, the European sports organisations 163, as well as the European 
Parliament'64 have demanded repeatedly to have sport included in the Treaty 165 . 
Moreover, at an informal meeting of sports ministers, which took place in Almeria in 
May 2002, eleven of the then fifteen EU Member States expressed their support for 
the inclusion in the treaties of an article on sport. Although it comes as no surprise 
163 See for example the UEFA brochure "A vision for European Sport: The case for a Sports 
Protocol", available at 
http: //europa. eu. int/futurum/forum_convention/documents/contrib/socio/0446_c_en. pdf. 
164 See EP Pack Report, op. cit. supra note 48 and the Draft Opinion of the Committee on Culture, 
Youth, Education, the Media and Sport on the Treaty of Nice, op. cit. supra note 68. 
'bs However, it should be noted that scholars have been divided on the issue, in favour of the 
introduction of a sports article: see Scholz, R. & Aulehner, J., op. cit. supra note 80, p. 47; against 
see Streinz, R., op. cit. supra note 138, (1998) 3 SpuRt, p. 96; Plath, K., 
Individualrechtsbeschränkungen im Berufsfußball (Dunker & Humblot, Berlin, 1999), p. 238. 
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that especially after Bosman the calls for a sports article increased, it should be noted 
that the issue had been a matter of discussion even before the judgment, for example 
in connection with the Maastricht Treaty166. 
The European Union is argued to have concentrated on professional sport as 
an economic activity and to have paid scant attention to the cultural, educational and 
social dimension of sport. This neglect is thought to stem from the fact that there is 
no explicit reference to sport in the Treaty that recognises the specific nature of sport 
and the autonomy of the sports movement 167. Such a provision would indeed clarify 
the competences in the sports sector on a Community level, whilst ensuring that the 
interests of sport are effectively taken into account when the Community is acting 
upon other subject matters. Although the European Union undoubtedly started to 
realise the social importance of sport, acknowledging that there are certain features 
of sport that are worth protecting, there is no overall concept in Community law as to 
how a conflict between sporting rules and the Treaty is to be resolved. Whereas it is 
evident that professional sport is an economic activity and as such cannot be 
exempted from EC law, it is nevertheless necessary to find a balance between the 
mainly economically motivated aims of the Treaty and the social and cultural values 
of sport. An explicit reference to sport in the Treaty could help to ease the tension by 
establishing a legal obligation that certain sporting interests have to be taken into 
account when applying Community law. Furthermore, the Amsterdam Declaration 
on Sport should be hardened by giving the sports interest groups the right to be heard 
in the preparatory stages of legislation which affects them or when other sports issues 
are at stake. This would not only enable the sports bodies to voice their concerns, but 
could improve communications with the European Union. A formalisation of the 
consultation process would strengthen the co-ordination between the Community and 
the sporting world and would help to identify problematic issues arising , in 
connection with the application of EC law to sporting matters and to find solutions 
that are acceptable for both parties. 
166 See "Aufstieg des Sports in die europäische Vertragsliga? ", Aktuelles Stichwort (1994) 6 SpuRt, 
p. 229; also, during the 1995 European Sports Forum in Brussels there was broad consensus 
between the sports representatives that sport should be recognised in the Treaty. 
167 See EP Pack Report, op. cit. supra note 48, point J. 
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The sports associations should be aware, however, that a reference to sport in the 
Treaty is more likely to serve as a foundation to widen Community competence, 
instead of narrowing it down. Thus, it is more likely that an article on sport would be 
introduced in order to regulate the sports sector rather than as an escape clause for 
top-class sport from EC law. This stands in contrast to the aims of the European 
sporting groups that demand a reference to sport in the Treaty in order to restrict 
Community involvement in Sport, particularly ruling out harmonisation 168. 
The fact that sport is not included in the Treaty is not only significant with 
regard to sports associations and their internal rules, but also when it comes to 
Community action itself. Without a reference in the Treaty, there is no legal base for 
sport to be allocated any funds in the annual budget, a fact that has been heavily 
criticised by the European Parliament throughout the years169. So far, sport has never 
been mentioned on its own merits but as a means of implementing other policies. In 
1997, for example, the Community budget included Article B3-305 which was 
devoted to a pilot programme entitled "Sport in Europe" with an allocation of what 
was then 3 million ECU in commitment appropriations to finance the Eurathlon 
Programme and to provide funds for developing sport for the disabled. However, this 
article was included in the chapter entitled "Information and Communication", 
indicating that sport was merely seen as a means of communication, rather than 
taking into account its full social dimension 170. This example shows that every year 
the European Parliament has to bring forward new arguments for the inclusion of 
resources for sport in the budget, trying to accommodate sport under existing articles. 
Hence, in order to develop an overall approach to sport that actively promotes sport's 
social and cultural side within the European Union, the Member States should grant 
sport a legal base to have it enclosed in the Community budget. 
168 See the statement of Marlis Rydzy-Götz, Secretary General of the ENGSO at the Public Hearing to 
the 1996 IGC, available at http: //www. europarl. europa. eu/hearings/igc2/doc22_en. htm. 
169 EP Pack Report, op. cit. supra note 48, point U; see also the EP discussion in the sitting of 
12.6.1997, point 7, "EU Role in Sport", speeches of MEPs Pack, Hawlicek, Larive and others, see 
http: //www. europarl. europa. eu/pv2/pv2? LISTING=AfficheTout&PRG=CALDOC&FILE=970613 
&LANGUE=EN&TP V=D EF#Title 10. 
170 In the budget for 2003, sport was represented under the title "Education, Vocational Training and 
youth", namely point B3-1004 "European Year of Education through Sport" and point B3-1026 
"Sport: Preparatory Measures for a Community Policy in the Field of Sport". Both points re- 
appeared in the 2004 and 2005 budget (point 15 0504 and 15 0503 under the title "Education and 
Culture"). 
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Having said that, it should be noted that a reference to sport in the Treaty may open 
up the possibility to allocate funds for certain sports programmes, but does not 
necessarily establish exclusive Community competence. As the Constitution shows, 
an agreement could be found on a sports article giving the Union the possibility to 
support and co-ordinate actions of the Member States, but the Member States are 
evidently reluctant to give up their legislative powers in sporting matters or to 
introduce an article which limits the application of the Treaty to professional sport. 
1.4.3. The Article on Sport in the Constitution 
Despite the fact that during both the 1996 and 2000 Intergovernmental Conferences 
the introduction of a reference to sport in the Treaty was considered, to the 
disappointment of many neither the Amsterdam nor the Nice Treaty contained a 
provision on sport; in both cases, the Member States opted for non-binding 
declarations instead. As a result, before the start of the 2004 Intergovernmental 
Conference sports officials were preparing for another attempt to secure a legal base 
for sport in the Treaty 171. However, considering the fact that the past two 
Intergovernmental Conferences, despite fierce lobbying from sports interest groups, 
as well as the European Parliament, had not chosen to include a sports article, it 
seemed unlikely that the Member States would reach a unanimous agreement on the 
introduction of a sports article this time. Moreover, in view of the more important 
issues at stake, namely the integration of the Charter for Fundamental Rights, the 
composition of the institutions and the decision-making procedures, one would not 
have expected that sport would be high on the Intergovernmental Conference's 
171 See the UEFA resolution calling for a legal framework for sport in the new Constitution, adopted 
at the 270' Ordinary UEFA Congress in Rome in March 2003, in this context the speech of 
UEFA's vice-president Per Ravn Omdal at the Congress is particularly interesting, as he stressed 
that "this is not about obtaining an exemption from EU or national law. We are not and should 
never be above the law. What we do need is a greater legal certainty", see 
http: //www. uefa. com/news/newsId=61737, printer. htmx; see also the contributions of the 
International Olympic Committee and the European Non-Governmental Sports Organisation, an 
umbrella organisation of national sports bodies, to the Convention preparing the 2004 
Intergovernmental Conference, see Parrish, R., "The Birth of European Union Sports Law", 2(2) 
2003 Entertainment law, p. 25. However, not all sports organisations seemed to have been in 
favour of a Treaty article establishing a legal base for Community action on the sports sector, see 
the speech by Commissioner Reding, op. cit. supra note 154, "... certain sports federations have 
sought to put pressure on governments in the hope that provisions are included in the Treaty with a 
view to reducing the EU's role". 
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agenda. Thus, it came as a surprise to many that the provisional consolidated version 
of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, as approved by the 
Intergovernmental Conference on 18 June 2004, included a reference to sport. 
The Constitutional Treaty mentions sport (and in particular its educational 
and social function) in Article 111-282; also, Article 1-17 includes sport among the 
areas in which the Union may take supporting, coordinating or complementary 
action. These provisions are as follows: 
SECTION 5 
EDUCATION, YOUTH, SPORT AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING 
Article 111-282 
1. The Union shall contribute to the development of quality education by 
encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and 
complementing their action. It shall fully respect the responsibility of the Member 
States for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems and their 
cultural and linguistic diversity. 
The Union shall contribute to the promotion of European sporting issues, while taking 
account of its specific nature, its structures based on voluntary activity and its social 
and educational function. 
2. Union action shall be aimed at: 
(a) developing the European dimension in education, particularly through the 
teaching and dissemination of the languages of the Member States; 
(b) encouraging mobility of students and teachers, inter alia by encouraging the 
academic recognition of diplomas and periods of study; 
(c) promoting cooperation between educational establishments; 
(d) developing exchanges of information and experience on issues common to the 
education systems of the Member States; 
(e) encouraging the development of youth exchanges and of exchanges of socio- 
educational instructors and encouraging the participation of young people in 
democratic life in Europe; 
(f) encouraging the development of distance education; 
(g) developing the European dimension in sport, by promoting fairness and openness 
in sporting competitions and cooperation between bodies responsible for sports, 
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and by protecting the physical and moral integrity of sportsmen and 
sportswomen, especially young sportsmen and sportswomen. 
3. The Union and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries 
and the competent international organisations in the field of education and sport, in 
particular the Council of Europe. 
4. In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this 
Article, 
(a) European laws or framework laws shall establish incentive actions, excluding 
any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States. They shall 
be adopted after consultation of the Committee of the Regions and the Economic 
and Social Committee; 
(b) the Council, on a proposal from the Commission shall adopt recommendations. 
Article 1-17: Areas of supporting, coordinating or complementary action 
The Union shall have the competence to carry out supporting, coordinating or 
complementary action. Such action shall, at European level, be: 
["J 
education, youth, sport and vocational training 
1.4.3.1. A Community Competence in Sport? 
It appears that the heads of state and government of the European Union have finally 
agreed to have a reference to sport inserted in the Treaty. However, provided the 
Constitution will be ratified by the Member States, what does this newly established 
Union competence in sporting matters entail? First of all, Article 1-17 makes clear 
that the Union shall only have the competence to carry out supporting, coordinating 
or complementary action. This does not provide for a legal base enabling 
harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States, a fact which is 
explicitly mentioned in paragraph 4(a) of Article 111-282. Nor will the new Article on 
sport grant the Union the right to interfere with the autonomy of the sports bodies. 
The most important effect of the reference to sport is definitely that it opens 
up the possibility to include sport in the budget and enables the Union to finance 
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projects in the areas referred to in Article 282(2)(g) of the Constitution172. Taking 
into account that sport has been inserted into the Treaty alongside education, youth 
and vocational training 173, the focal point of Union activity will obviously lie in the 
encouragement of the educational and social values of sport in European society. 
Hence, the new Article on sport will allow the Union to continue the development 
started by the European Year of Education through Sport. This includes the 
promotion of Community programmes with the aim to encourage young people to 
practice sport by enhancing co-operation between sports and educational institutions 
or to support voluntary work in the field of amateur sport. Moreover, the fact that the 
promotion of fairness and openness in sporting competitions and the protection of the 
physical and moral integrity of athletes is mentioned, offers a legal base to continue 
the battle against doping in professional and amateur sport. The reference to the 
European dimension of sport suggests that the Union has finally recognised the 
integrationist function of sport and it is possible to imagine that projects will be 
initiated with the view to use sports as a means not only to bring people from 
different Member States together, but also to further the integration of the socially 
disfavoured and the handicapped in European society. Apart from that, it has to be 
welcomed that co-operation between sports bodies is cited as an aim for Union 
action. Thus, the Union will hopefully establish a framework for a dialogue with 
European sports bodies in order to co-ordinate joint action on the field of youth and 
amateur sport or anti-doping measures; this may also help to start a process of 
reconciliation, improving the co-operation on other, more sensitive issues, such as 
the application of Union law to professional sport. 
Undoubtedly, the positive impact of the new sports article on European sport 
is considerable, as it finally enables the Union to finance sports projects and to 
develop a sports policy that promotes the social, cultural and educational benefits of 
172 However, in an open letter from June 2004, published on the Commission's sport website, 
Commissioner Reding has implied that it is not realistic to think that concrete support measures 
based on Article 282 will be in force before 2008/09 (that is, if the Constitution will indeed be 
ratified by the Member States), available at: 
http: //www. europa. eu. int/comet/sport/action_sports/article/docs/200407article-vr. pdf. 
173 The working paper on the Treaty does not offer much insight into why it was decided to add a 
specific reference to sport in Article 149 on education and youth, the Presidium merely comments 
that "it seems appropriate to do so [... ] as sport constitutes part of this wider area", see CONY 
727/03 "Draft section of part three with comments", p. 109, available at 
http: //register. consilium. eu. int/pdf/en/03/cvOO/cv00727enO3. pdf. 
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sport. However, the reference to sport in the Constitution has done nothing to remove 
the existing confusion surrounding the application of Community law to professional 
sport. Although paragraph 1 of Article 111-282 provides that the "Union shall 
contribute to the promotion of European sporting issues, while taking account of its 
specific nature, its structures based on voluntary activity and its social and 
educational function"174, this does not constitute an obligation to recognise sporting 
values when assessing sporting measures under EC law. This has been made clear in 
paragraph 2, where the possible areas for Union action are outlined. Evidently, the 
Member States feared that a provision granting sport preferential treatment under the 
rules on free movement or competition would be used as a get-out clause for sports 
associations and would set a negative precedent for other industries. 
Having said that, in a contribution to the Secretary-General of the 
Convention, a number of members and alternate members of the Convention have 
expressed their concerns about the fact that by reason of the economic developments 
in the sports sector and the approach adopted by public authorities, as well as 
sporting organisations, it may not be possible to safeguard the existing structures in 
sport or its social function 175. Additionally, it was pointed out that the recent 
multiplication of legal proceedings in the sport sector has been caused by legal 
uncertainty concerning the application of Community law to sport. Thus, the 
members of the Convention suggested mentioning certain objectives in the Treaty to 
define the scope of Community intervention, namely the recognition of the role and 
independence of the current structures of the European model of sport, the promotion 
of social and educational values, co-operation between public powers and the sports 
movement on all levels, the battle against doping and co-operation with third 
countries and international sporting organisations. 
Admittedly, less risks are involved in continuing the soft-law approach and it 
has to be emphasised that the principle that sport, when practiced as an economic 
174 It is interesting to note that the phrase "while taking account of its specific nature, its structures 
based on voluntary activity and its social and educational function" was not included in the first 
draft, but added at a later stage, see Documents from the Precidency the Delegations (CIG 81/04) - 
Meeting of Heads of State or Government, Brussels, 17 and 18 June, available at 
http: //ue. eu. int/ueDocs/cros_Data/docs/pressData/en/misc/81000. pdf. 
175 See CONV 478/03 "Contribution aux travaux de la Convention Europeennee sur la place du sport 
dans la future traite", 10 January 2003, available at 
http: //register. consilium. eu. int/pdf/en/03/cvOO/cv00478enO3. pdf. 
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activity, is covered by the Treaty must not be undermined. Still, one cannot help but 
wonder whether the Member States have missed an opportunity to clarify the 
existing insecurities over the application of EC law to sport and to ensure that 
sporting values are preserved and not endangered by Community intervention. 
1.4.3.2. A Protocol on Sport 
Despite the fact that it may be doubted whether the Member States will ever agree on 
a provision granting sport special treatment under Community law, it is still 
worthwhile to examine the available options for how such a venture could be 
realised. An alternative to including a reference to sport in the Treaty itself would be 
the annexation of a protocol on sport 176. The protocol idea is not new and has been 
used in connection with other issues, such as the Social and the Schengen Protocols, 
where the Member States were unable to reach an agreement on joint Community 
action and certain countries were allowed to opt-out. Other examples include the 
Maastricht Danish Second Homes Protocol, which provides an exemption from the 
Treaty freedoms, and the controversial Barber Protocol that was attached to the 
Treaty in order to limit the effect of the Court's judgment in the Barber case 177. In all 
those cases, the practice of annexing a "special interest" protocol allowing 
derogations from Community law to the Treaty has been heavily criticised178: 
whereas the Social Protocol was argued to set a precedent for a Europe "ä la carte", 
threatening the unity and cohesiveness of the European legal order 179, the Danish 
Second Homes Protocol has enabled certain industries to claim special status. The 
Barber Protocol, on the other hand, was criticised for undermining the Court of 
Justice's authority by trying to overrule the effects of a judgment. The above 
mentioned examples of protocols which were attached to the Treaty on different 
occasions give an indication how a sports protocol could be used to realise the idea 
of a Community sports policy. According to Article 311, a protocol annexed to the 
Treaty forms an integral part thereof, which would make it possible to use a Treaty 
176 EP Pack Report, op. cit. supra note 48, point K; see also the suggestion of MEP Doris Pack in the 
above mentioned EP discussion. 
177 Case 262/88 Barber v. Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group [1990] ECR I-1889. 
"g See Curtin, D., "The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces", (1993) 
30(1) CMLR, p. 44. 
179 Ibid, p. 52. 
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protocol in order to apply certain exemptions to sport. Thus, the Member States 
could take particular sports out of the scope of the Treaty, or except certain 
restrictive practices, such as the collective marketing of sports television rights. 
Following in the footsteps of the Barber Protocol, a protocol on sport could also be a 
welcome opportunity for those who wish to limit the effects of the Bosman ruling. 
However, it has already been pointed out that it is highly unlikely that the Member 
States would agree to grant sport major exemptions from Community law180. Having 
said that, the ongoing discussions about the re-introduction of nationality restrictions 
show that there are still isolated issues where the Member States might be tempted to 
find a political solution to accommodate certain peculiarities of the sports sector. 
1.4.3.3. Reference to Sport under Existing Treaty Articles 
1.4.3.3.1 Article 151 -Culture 
The third option of giving sport a legal base in Community law, besides a separate 
Treaty article or a sports protocol, would be to include a reference to sport under an 
existing Treaty article. Taking into account the previously mentioned cultural 
significance of sport, the obvious choice would be the addition of a paragraph 
comparable to Article 151(4) to the article on culture, establishing an obligation for 
the Community to take sporting matters into account when acting under other Treaty 
articles. In this context it is important to note that if sport is argued to be a cultural 
activity to which Article 151(4) already applies, an additional paragraph on sport 
would obviously be unnecessary. However, an explicit reference to sport in Article 
151 would settle the argument over the cultural nature of sport and ensure that its 
special qualities are protected. Besides, even those who deny sport any cultural 
characteristics, would have to admit that it is hardly in line with the idea of a 
"People's Europe" that culture is mentioned in the Treaty, while sport, which is the 
much bigger movement in Europe and arguably has a lot more significance in the 
lives of the majority of people, does not have any recognition in the Treaty. 
A reference under the existing article on culture would be an ideal 
compromise which recognises the cultural and social significance of sport, without 
180 In this context see Blackshaw, I., op. cit. supra note 70, p. 15, who doubts that "the political will 
or priority for a Sports Protocol exists". 
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granting the sports sector extensive exemptions. This solution has found broad 
support in the European Parliament, which has been trying for years to have such a 
provision incorporated in Article 151, whereas the opinions between scholars 
differlat. 
1.4.3.3.2 Article 39 - Free Movement of Workers 
When it comes to the application of the Treaty freedoms to sport, it will usually be 
the rules on the free movement of workers which cause a conflict between sporting 
rules and Community law. In connection with possible justifications for the football 
transfer system in the Bosman case, the European Court of Justice has accepted that, 
"in view of the considerable social importance of sporting activities", specific 
sporting interests, such as maintaining a balance between clubs, or the training of 
young players, are legitimate aims that may justify a restriction of the right to free 
movement182. However, although it has to be applauded that the Court has taken into 
account certain sporting interests, the scope for special treatment of sporting matters 
remains limited. Thus, there have been calls for the inclusion of sporting interests to 
the reasons of justification in Article 39(3) of the Treaty 
183. Such a clause would 
confirm that sporting interests may in principle be used as a justification for rules 
restricting the free movement of workers, albeit under the condition that the means in 
question do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the sporting aim. This would 
not only ensure that sporting interests are taken into account when applying EC law, 
but also improve legal certainty. However, in order to provide the sporting 
associations with guidelines as to which of their internal rules would be likely to be 
justified under Article 39(3), it would be necessary to clarify which sporting interests 
are considered as being legitimate under the Treaty. 
1.4.3.3.3 Article 81 - Cartels 
The application of the provisions on competition law to sport is still a very 
controversial area, a fact that is illustrated by the Court's reluctance to rule on the 
matter, despite repeatedly having had the opportunity to do so184. Although the 
i$' For. Scholz, R. & Aulehner, J., op. cit. supra note 80, p. 47; against: Plath, K., op. cit. supra note 
165, p. 240; Streinz, R., op. cit. supra note 138, (1998) 3 SpuRt, p. 96. 
182 See Bosman, at para 106. 
183 See for example, Plath, K., op. cit. supra note 165, p. 241. 
184 In this context, one need mention only the proceedings in Bosman, Deliege or Lehtonen. 
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special difficulties which arise in connection with the application of competition law 
to sport will be dealt with in depth later on, it is important to note at this point that it 
is unclear to what extent sporting interests may be taken into account under the 
mainly market orientated competition rules. Competition law generally does not take 
into account any social or public policy considerations and a distortion of 
competition may only be justified for economic reasons 185. Hence, particularly in 
connection with sport, the rules on competition law have been criticised for being too 
rigid and there have been demands to add a passage on sport to Article 81(3), 
allowing sporting interests to be considered when sports issues are examined under 
competition law186. It shows that competition law is the area in Community law, 
where it is most difficult to accommodate sport in its capacity as social, as well as 
economic activity. The opening of the conditions for exemption in Article 81(3) to 
sporting considerations by inserting a reference to sport would undoubtedly make 
sport sit more comfortably within the system of competition law, as its special 
characteristics could be taken care of and be protected. Although the Commission 
has issued certain guidelines indicating which practices relating to sport might be 
accepted under the rules on competition 187, undertakings acting in the sports industry 
are often faced with the uncertainty whether an agreement to which they are party 
falls foul Article 81(1) or, if so, might merit an exemption under Article 81(3) of the 
Treaty. Moreover, considering the new competition regime replacing Regulation 
17/62188, which empowers national competition authorities and courts to issue 
exemptions, it remains to be seen how Article 81(3) will be applied to sporting rules 
in the future. Owing to the fact that there is little case law available to guide the 
national competition authorities, it will be difficult to achieve a consistent application 
of Article 81(3). Also, it may be assumed that the national courts and competition 
authorities are probably more susceptible to public pressure and might be tempted to 
185 However, as will be explained in chapter 5, the new case law in Wouters has given rise to 
discussions as to whether social interests may be taken into account under Article 81(1). 
186 See for example, Plath, K., op. cit. supra note 165, p. 241. 
187 See for example press release IP/991133 "Commission debates Application of its competition Rules 
to Sports", 24.2.1999. 
188 Council Regulation No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 2003 L 1/1, replacing Council 
Regulation No 17 of 6 February 1962, First regulation implementing Articles 85 (now 81) and 86 
(now 82) of the Treaty, OJ 1962 13/204. 
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stretch the scope of Article 81(3) to accommodate sporting interests. Although a 
reference to sport under Article 81(3) would provide clarity in this respect, it has to 
be taken into account that such a clause would set a precedent for other industries 
arguing that they too support a socially important cause which is worth protecting. 
Also, considering the very narrow scope of Article 81(3) inasmuch as it is limited to 
economic grounds, it probably would be going too far to insert a reference to sport 
while other (possibly more important) social, cultural or educational considerations 
could not be raised in competition law proceedings. 
Another suggestion brought forward in' connection with the application of 
Article 81(3) to sporting matters is to adopt guidelines in a block exemption for 
certain agreements in sport 189. As is commonly known, the Commission has 
established block exemptions with regard to certain types of agreements containing 
particular terms when it has acquired sufficient experience with individual 
agreements in order to prevent a large number of applications for individual 
exemptions. In view of the considerable amount of sports cases that have been 
brought before the Commission in the past, a block exemption for certain agreements 
in sport, such as agreements relating to sports broadcasting rights or measures 
establishing a sporting equilibrium would be imaginable and could be a good 
solution to provide more legal certainty in the sports sector. 
1.4.3.3.4 Article 82 - Monopolies 
Although sports related issues will generally be more relevant to Article 81, it should 
be noted that the monopolistic organisation of sports associations in Europe might 
bring sporting matters under the scope of Article 82 of the Treaty. This has become 
particularly evident in connection with the discussions surrounding the establishment 
of a European Super League, comprising high profile clubs from national leagues 
around Europe. Additionally, the fact that sports associations have the absolute 
power to regulate the admission or exclusion from sporting competitions may be of 
relevance under Article 82. Again, it is questionable whether a reference to sport in 
Article 82 would be desirable, considering the precedent set for other industries. 
Also, it is important to note that Article 82 does not condemn monopolies as such, 
189 See "The Balance between the Game and the Money", appendix in Caiger, A. and Gardiner, S. 
(eds), op. cit. supra note 91, p. 350. 
69 
but only applies when the monopoly status on the market is abused. However, the 
recent example of SC Charleroi's challenge of FIFA's rule that clubs must let their 
players leave on international duty (but are not reimbursed for damages incurred 
through a player being injured whilst playing for the national team) shows that 
Article 82 may definitely play a significant role when sporting measures are 
assessed. 
1.4.3.3.5 Article 3- Community Activities 
Another suggestion of how to insert a reference to sport in the Treaty is the 
incorporation of sport in the list of Community activities outlined in Article 3 of the 
Treaty'90. Used in connection with Article 308, the "catch-all" article, this would 
enable the EC to act in sports matters if it proved necessary to attain one of the 
objectives of the Treaty. Acting unanimously, on a proposal from the Commission 
and after consulting the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers could take 
appropriate measures'91. This would improve co-ordination mechanisms at 
Community level and establish the necessary legal base to implement an EU sports 
policy that actively promotes sport and its socio-cultural values. However, such a 
strategy could also provide the Community with the competence to regulate on sports 
related issues, which might not be in the interest of the sporting associations or the 
Member States for that matter. Moreover, the addition of sport to the list of 
Community activities would not ensure sport being taken into account under other 
EC policies or grant sport any special treatment in Community law, both of which 
are the main demands for a reference in the Treaty by the sports bodies. 
190 See Parrish, R., "Sport and the Intergovernmental Conference" (1997) 5(1) SLJ, p. 32. 
191 EC Treaty, Article 308. 
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2. THE FOOTBALL TRANSFER SYSTEM 
2.1. ORGANISATION OF FOOTBALL IN EUROPE 
In line with the previously mentioned European model of sport', football is organised 
by a series of federations and associations, which form a pyramid structure. At the 
bottom level are the clubs, joined together in national associations. With the 
exception of the United Kingdom, where, for historic reasons, England, Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland have their own associations, there is only one 
association in each Member State2. At an international level, the national federations 
are all part of the Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), an 
umbrella association which regulates football worldwide. According to Article 1 of 
its statutes, FIFA is an association within the meaning of Article 60 of the Swiss civil 
code and is based in Zurich. Article 9 of the FIFA statutes allows the national 
associations to link up to continental confederations and on a European level, the 
national football federations have united in the Union des Associations Europeenes 
de Football (UEFA), an association governed by Swiss law and based in Nyon, 
Switzerland. UEFA, whose members include in particular the national associations 
of the Member States and the EEA contracting states, organises all European football 
competitions, as for example the European Championships, UEFA Champions 
League and the UEFA Cup. 
The pyramid structure ensures that each federation is bound by the rules of 
the regulatory bodies above, which means that the national organisations in Europe 
are subject to the provisions of both FIFA and UEFA. Since the different football 
clubs are members of the national associations in question, they too fall under the 
regulatory power of these two international bodies. Although the international 
governing bodies lay down ground rules for the organisation of the game, football is 
principally co-ordinated by the national federations, which supervise professional, as 
well as amateur football. However, in some countries such as England or Scotland, 
See the Commission document, "The European Model of Sport", November 1998, available at 
http: //www. europa. eu. int/conim/sport/doc/ecom/doc evol_en. pdf. 
2 See Article 1(3) of the FIFA Statutes, with the exception for the UK provided for by Article 1(4). 
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the highest division in the national league, e. g. the "Premier League" or the "Scottish 
Premier League" is organised by a separate legal body in addition to the national 
association and national competition is overseen by both. 
2.2. PURPOSE OF THE TRANSFER SYSTEM 
When examining the development and structure of the football transfer system, it is 
important to understand the reasoning behind the introduction of such regulations. 
Ever since the beginnings of professional football in the late 19`h century, clubs 
aimed to control the movement of players and their wages. The transfer system was 
invented as a mechanism to ensure that clubs were able to protect their most valuable 
assets, the players. A football team consists of a group of individual players, each 
with a different responsibility within the game. In order to build a successful unit, it 
is necessary for the club to know which players are available and to be able to work 
with them over a given length of time, without incurring the danger of losing a player 
whenever he receives a better offer from another club or disagrees with the manager. 
Having said that, it could be argued that this situation is no different to any other 
employment relationship and thus, national legislation on contractual stability and 
breach of contract would in fact suffice. Still, the world of football has repeatedly 
emphasised the special circumstances in the football business, which are claimed to 
require additional protection for the clubs. Apart from regulating the movement of 
players, the football transfer system was also introduced to achieve a re-distribution 
of resources in the football business. Thus, the transfer system was intended to 
establish a certain financial and sporting balance between the clubs by placing 
restrictions on the richer clubs' ability to poach players from smaller clubs, which 
could not match the bigger clubs' wage structure3. 
Despite the fact that the football transfer system has repeatedly been changed 
and more than hundred years have passed from its introduction to Bosman4, the 
arguments used to justify the transfer rules remained the same over the years. 
3 See McArdle, D., "One Hundred Years of Servitude: Contractual Conflict in English Professional 
Football before Bosman", (2000) 2 Web Journal, http: //www. 
webjcli. ncl. ac. uk/2000/issue2/mcardle2. htnl. 
4 Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Association and Others v. Bosman 
and Others [1995] ECR I-4921. 
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However, as commonly known, the Court did not accept that the transfer fees at issue 
in Bosman were vital to guarantee contract stability or a sporting equilibrium. Apart 
from not being convinced that the transfer rules were suitable to achieve the 
envisaged aims, the Court considered the transfer rules to be excessive, arguing that 
less restrictive means would have been available. 
However, even though the Court ultimately rejected the arguments put 
forward by the football associations to defend the transfer system, it generally 
accepted that certain sporting interests, such as the need to ensure a sporting 
equilibrium, may be considered under the provisions on free movement. Thus, it will 
be necessary to examine to what extent sporting interests may be taken into account 
under EC law and whether there may be circumstances under which the afore- 
mentioned sporting aims could be used to justify restrictions put on players by 
transfer rules. 
2.3. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOOTBALL TRANSFER 
SYSTEM 
2.3.1. England 
The development of the football transfer system over the last hundred years is best 
illustrated by the example of the English rules. Not only was the English Football 
Association the first to introduce transfer regulations, but English courts have been 
involved in disputes over the transfer of footballers from as early as the 1890s5. 
After the introduction of professionalism, the Football Association in 1885 
quickly presented a regulatory system which required all players to be registered 
annually with the FA. In the early years of professional football, players were 
engaged for a year at a time and could move freely at the end of their contracts. 
However, they were not allowed to change clubs mid-season, unless their present 
clubs and the Football Association agreed6. Although the requirement of registration 
5 See McArdle, D., op. cit. supra note 3. 
6 See Caiger, A. & O'Leary, J., "The End of the Affair: The Anelka Doctrine - The Problem of Contract Stability in English Professional Football" in Caiger, A. & Gardiner, S. (eds. ), 
Professional Sport in the EU. - Regulation and Re-regulation (T. M. C. Asser Press, The Hague, 
2000), *p. 199. 
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with the FA constituted the basis for the later transfer and retain system, it was only 
after the foundation of the English League in 1888 that out-of-contract players were 
restricted in their movement. The League's officials, concerned that big teams which 
were able to offer higher salaries would dominate the new competition, decided to 
put restrictions on the richer clubs' ability to recruit players from smaller clubs7. As a 
consequence, from the beginning of the 1893/94 season, once a player had registered 
with a club, he was only allowed to move if his club gave permission, even if the 
contractual relationship had expired. The registration (and therefore the player) 
became a commodity that could be traded between clubs and players were effectively 
bought and sold like cattle8. However, given the fact that the introduction of the 
transfer system could not prevent the domination of the English League by a handful 
of teams, the other clubs searched for additional means to ensure an even spread of 
talent and in 1901, a maximum wage of £4 per week was introduced. 
2.3.1.1. The Eastham Case 
Over the next 60 years, the transfer system experienced little change and it was only 
in 1963 that a player called George Eastham, with the help of the player's union, 
successfully challenged the transfer rules and the maximum wage limit before the 
English courts. At the time of the Eastham case9, the majority of players were still on 
annual contracts, running from 1 July to 30 June. At the end of the contract, a player 
would find himself in one of the following positions: the club simply renewed his 
existing contract, the club placed the player on a transfer list at a fee fixed by the 
club, the club released the player without asking for a transfer fee or the club decided 
to retain the player10. The system required clubs to produce a list at the end of each 
season, declaring which players were available for transfer and which players the 
club intended to retain for the following season. A player on the retain list had no 
right to demand a transfer, even if the club offered him a contract on less favourable 
7 See McArdle, D., op. cit. supra note 3. 
$ Morrow, S., The New Business of Football - Accountability and Finance in Football (Macmillan 
Press, London, 1999), p. 31; see also Harding, J., For the Good of the Game - The Official History 
of the Professional Footballers' Association (Robson Books Ltd., London, 1991), p. 2, who 
describes the situation of a footballer at the time as that of "a bonded slave, a chattel, no better 
than a piece of merchandise". 
Eastham v. Newcastle United Football Club Ltd. [1963] 3 All ER 139. 
10 See Osborn, G. & Greenfield, S., "Contract and Control in the Entertainment Industry: Dancing 
on the Edge of Heaven" (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 1998) p. 35. 
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terms. This meant that in case the player had rejected the offer, he could not sign for 
another club, unless the FA considered the offer to be too low. Players were allowed 
to petition to the FA with their reasons for requesting a move to another club, but if 
the FA refused to intervene, clubs could retain a player indefinitely. Consequently, 
even when the player ceased to be an employee of the club because he had been 
retained and rejected the offer of a new contract, the system prevented him from 
moving to another club. Similarly, a player on the transfer list could only take up 
alternative employment if he found a team willing to pay the transfer fee fixed by his 
old club. Since the clubs were under no obligation to pay a player's wages once the 
contractual relationship had ended, a lot of players had effectively no other, choice 
than to quit the game" t 
The court in Eastham considered the system as a restraint of trade, since it 
prevented a player from obtaining employment with another club at a time when he 
was no longer an employee of his old club and thus, did not receive any wages. 
Additionally, the court provided an interesting comment on the argument that the 
retain-and-transfer system was in operation in all of the world's professional leagues 
which was supposed to prove that those who knew best considered it to be in the 
general interest of the game: 
"The system is an employer's system, set up in an industry where employers have 
succeeded in establishing a united monolithic front all over the world, and where it is 
clear that for the purpose of negotiation the employers are vastly more strongly 
organised than the employees. No doubt the employers all over the world consider this 
system to be a good system, but this does not prevent the court from considering 
whether it goes further than is reasonably necessary to protect their legitimate 
12 interest" 
The decision led to a modification of the transfer system with the result that the 
maximum wage limit was abolished and a player was entitled to a free transfer if his 
club offered him a new contract on less favourable terms. Also, players on the 
See for example the case of Wilf Mannion, an English International whose club fixed the transfer 
fee at such an unrealistic price that he was unable to find a new club and left the game to sell 
chicken coops in Oldham; see the Evening Gazette, Special Edition, Saturday, 22 April 2000. 
12 Eastham v. Newcastle Football Club Ltd [1963] 3 All ER 139, at 150. 
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transfer list subsequently had to be paid and if a player felt the transfer fee had been 
set too high by his club, he could appeal to the FA and the matter went to arbitration. 
Despite the changes to the transfer system in England, the rest of Europe took little 
notice and most countries continued to use the old system until the Bosman case. It is 
ironic that had Bosman played for an English club, he would have been entitled to a 
free transfer since RC Liege offered him a new contract on worse terms than his 
previous one. Be that as it may, considering the rigorous restrictions that the transfer 
regulations put on the movement of players and the number of players who have 
been forced out of the game by clubs refusing to let them move at the end of their 
contracts, it is surprising that the system was not challenged earlier. 
2.3.2. The FIFA Transfer Rules 1953 -1997 
Having explained the organisation of football in Europe, it becomes evident that 
there are three different levels of representation - FIFA, UEFA and the national 
associations. In its capacity as the worldwide regulatory body, FIFA adopted rules 
controlling the movement of players from one national association to another as from 
1953. However, the different confederations were allowed to provide their own rules 
for the countries under their jurisdiction, whereas national associations were obliged 
to set up regulations for transfers effected within their jurisdiction. 
2.3.2.1. The 1953 FIFA Transfer Regulations13 
The 1953 FIFA transfer regulations provided for a system of players' registration, 
which still builds the basis for the existing transfer system. Each player had to be 
registered with a national association by which he was then granted the licence to 
play for a particular club. The power to decide on the status and licence of a player 
lay with the national associations and other associations, including FIFA, had to 
acknowledge this decision 14. An international transfer was only possible if the former 
national association had issued a transfer certificate, confirming that a player was not 
bound by any contractual responsibilities with a club and all commitments of a 
13 Last amended in 1986. 
14 Article I of the 1986 FIFA transfer regulations; in the case of regulations which have been 
amended several times, reference will be made to the articles of the latest version. 
76 
financial nature, including transfer fees, had been settled". Hence, no national 
association was allowed to register a player before it had received the international 
transfer certificate from his former national association16. 
2.3.2.2. The 1991 FIFA Transfer Regulations17 
The 1991 FIFA transfer regulations retained the requirement of an international 
transfer certificate. However, in the light of the proceedings in the Bosman case, 
FIFA introduced new rules, according to which the former national association could 
only refuse to issue the transfer certificate if the player in question had not fulfilled 
the contract with his old club or if there was a dispute over the player's transfer other 
than that of a financial naturell. In case the player's former association did not issue 
a transfer certificate within 60 days from the making of the request by the new 
association, the new association could issue a provisional certificate19. Alternatively, 
FIFA could order an association to issue a transfer certificate or adopt a decision, 
which would take the place of a certificate20. 
The 1991 transfer rules provided that if a professional player changed clubs, 
his former club was entitled to compensation for his training and/or development21. 
Regarding the transfer of an amateur player, as a result of which he lost his amateur 
status, his old club could demand compensation for his development22. However, the 
FIFA regulations additionally declared that disagreements concerning the amount of 
the transfer fee were not to have any influence on the player's sporting or 
professional activity. They also stated that in the case of such a dispute between two 
clubs, a transfer certificate could not be denied and the player was free to play for the 
new club as soon as the international transfer certificate had arrived23. If the two 
clubs in question could not reach an agreement as to the amount of the transfer 
compensation, the issue could be submitted to FIFA for a decision24. Apart from that, 
15 Article 12(5). 
16 Article 12(1). 
17 Last amended in 1994. 
Is Article 7(2) of the 1994 FIFA transfer regulations. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Article 14(1). 
u Article 14(2). 
23 Article 20(1). 
24 Article 16(1). 
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the FIFA rules allowed the confederations, such as UEFA to adopt their own 
regulations for settling disputes over transfer fees25. With regard to domestic 
transfers, the national associations were obliged to provide their own system in 
accordance with the FIFA regulations, subject to approval by FIFA26. 
2.3.3. The UEFA Transfer Rules 
2.3.3.1. The 1990 UEFA Transfer Regulations 
In May 1990, UEFA adopted a system of rules applicable to transfers between 
associations within its jurisdiction, entitled "Principles of Co-operation between 
Member Associations of UEFA and their clubs". Thus, players were granted the right 
to enter into a new contract as soon as the contract with the former club had 
expired27. Although the old club was still entitled to a transfer fee, the regulations 
stipulated that the national association the player was leaving, was obliged to issue 
an international clearance certificate as soon as it was notified of the transfer by the 
former club28. In case of a disagreement between the clubs regarding the amount of 
the transfer fee, the matter was referred to a panel of experts set up by UEFA, which 
would make a binding decision based on the player's age and gross income29. 
However, the transfer fee calculated by the board of experts could not exceed the 
maximum sum of CHF 5,000,00030. In addition to these provisions, the rules put a 
special emphasis on the fact that the business relationship between the two clubs in 
respect of the transfer fee "shall exert no influence on the sporting and professional 
activity of the player" and repeated that "the player shall be free to play for the club 
with which he has signed the new contract"31. Additionally, the national associations 
were urged to adapt their national transfer rules to the UEFA system as soon as 
possible. 
u Article 16(2). 
26 At paragraph 3 of the Preamble of the 1994 FIFA transfer regulations. 
27 Article 12 of the 1990 UEFA transfer regulations. 
28 Article 13. 
29 Article 14. 
30 Article 3 of the enclosure to the 1990 UEFA transfer regulations. 
31 Article 16 of the 1990 UEFA transfer regulations. 
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2.3.3.2. The 1992 UEFA Transfer Regulations 
After the events which gave rise to the Court's decision in the Bosman case, UEFA 
opened negotiations with the Commission in respect of its transfer system. As a 
result, a clause was included in every player's contract, allowing him to sign for a 
new club as soon as the contractual responsibilities with his former club had expired 
and permitting him to play for that club immediately32. Provisions to that effect had 
already been included in the 1990 regime and were reaffirmed in the "Principles of 
Co-operation between Member Associations of UEFA and their Clubs" that came 
into force on 1 July 1992. However, changes were made to the transfer fee 
calculation scheme of the UEFA board of experts, in particular the provision 
establishing a maximum amount was abolished. 
2.3.3.3. The 1993 UEFA Transfer Regulations 
The 1993 "Rules on the determination of compensation for transfers" were based on 
Article 16(2) of the 1991 FIFA transfer regulations, which provided the 
confederations with the authority to adopt rules concerning the settlement of disputes 
between two clubs with regard to transfer fees. Hence, the 1993 regulations were 
largely preoccupied with the lay-out of a detailed system for the calculation of 
transfer fees, establishing a calculation scheme similar to the provisions in the 
previous transfer regulations: in case of a dispute between clubs the matter was 
referred to a committee which would then calculate the transfer fee according to the 
player's age and income33. Apart from that, the UEFA regulations introduced a rule 
according to which all international transfers, including those between associations 
belonging to UEFA, were to be governed by the FIFA transfer rules. Additionally, it 
was confirmed that after the expiry of the contract with his old club, a player was 
free to sign with another club for which he was able to play with immediate effect34. 
When analysing the changes made to the football transfer system, it becomes 
evident that in the light of the Bosman case the football authorities tried to adjust 
their regulations in order to avoid a conflict with European law. The FIFA and UEFA 
transfer rules in force at the time when the proceedings at the European Court of 
32 See Bosman, at para 17. 
33 Article I of the 1993 UEFA transfer regulations. 
34 Article 2. 
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Justice began both stated that a dispute about the amount of a transfer fee could not 
prevent a player to move to another club. By separating the transfer fee from the 
transfer itself, the footballing bodies tried to establish that the transfer of a player 
happened independently from the requirement to pay a fee and the player's sporting 
activity was not affected by the transfer regulations. Thus, it was claimed that the 
transfer system did not create an obstacle to free movement, as a player was not only 
free to sign for another club upon the expiry of his previous contract, but could also 
immediately play for the new club, even if an agreement regarding the amount of the 
transfer fee had not been reached. However, despite the progress made from the 1986 
FIFA regulations, where an agreement over the amount of the transfer fee was 
necessary for a player to be able to play for another club, the transfer rules in force at 
the time of the Bosman judgment could not change the fact that the new club 
inevitably had to pay a transfer fee. As pointed out by Advocate-General Lenz, "no 
club which plans reasonably and cautiously is likely to be prepared to engage a 
player before the amount of the transfer fee is settled or it has at least made sure of 
the maximum amount it might have to pay"35. Consequently, the football transfer 
regulation were held to build an obstacle to the free movement of professional 
football players, since a player effectively could not move to another club without his 
new club having to pay a transfer fee, unless he had been released on a free transfer 
by his former club. 
2.4. THE FIFA TRANSFER REGULATIONS 199736 
Although the transfer system has been modified several times over the years, the 
most significant changes before the 2001 regime were made as a result of Bosman. 
As commonly known, after the Court's decision, the international football 
associations were forced to change their transfer system in such a way that EEA- 
nationals who had reached the end of their contracts were allowed to move freely 
between clubs in different EEA Member States. The new "Regulations governing the 
Status and Transfer of Football Players" came into force on the ls` of October 1997 
and considering all the excitement, it may surprise some that, compared to the FIFA 
35 AG Lenz in Bosman, at para 150. 
36 Hereinafter referred to as "the 1997 Regulations". 
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regulations in 1994, effectively only one paragraph had been altered. After the 
findings of the Court had been accommodated in the 1997 FIFA Regulations, the 
panic over the Bosman judgment slowly died down and most football officials and 
fans thought that this was the end of Community interference in the "beautiful 
game". Since out-of-contract transfers had only accounted for about ten percent of 
transfer revenue and domestic transfers were unaffected by Bosman, the impact of 
the changes to the transfer rules did not seem as drastic as many had feared. 
Moreover, clubs could still receive substantial transfer fees for the sale of players 
under contract, which resulted in clubs concluding long-term contracts with players. 
However, only a few years after Bosman, new difficulties arose for the football 
authorities, as Community officials had become aware of the sometimes exorbitant 
fees that clubs charged for mid-contract transfers and started to question what was 
left of the transfer system. As commonly known, this led to the 2001 "compromise" 
between FIFA and Commission, which will be analysed further below. 
Before examining whether the Commission's objections against the 1997 
FIFA Regulations were in fact merited, though, it shall be outlined how the transfer 
of a player from one club to another is actually conducted and how the legal nature 
of a transfer may be described. 
2.5. THE TRANSFER PROCEDURE 
Until the Bosman case, the legal nature of a player's transfer had always been 
defined as a contract between two clubs, linked by the requirement of a transfer fee. 
Whereas most writers classified the transfer of a player from one club to another as a 
sale37, whereby the new club pays the transfer fee in order to receive the transfer 
certificate for the player, others considered the transfer fee a compensation for 
training and/or development of a player38. However, after the Court's decision in 
Bosman, the system has changed in such a way that there are more and more 
transfers where there is no contact between the new and the old club. Thus, the legal 
37 See Westerkamp, G., Ablöseentschädigungen im bezahlten Sport (Dissertation, Münster, 1980), 
p. 75; Becker, U., Verfassungsrechtliche Schranken für die Regelung des Berufsfußballsports in 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Dissertation, Mainz, 1982), p. 123. 
38 See Westerkamp, G., op. cit. supra note 37, p. 76. 
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nature of a transfer cannot be based on the relationship between the two clubs. 
Presumably, the definition used by the Court in Bosman, describing a transfer as a 
factual, rather than a legal process, is the most adequate: "A transfer is defined as the 
transaction by which a player affiliated to an association obtains a change of club 
affiliation"39. 
After the changes made to the transfer system as a result of Bosman, 
international transfers were governed by the FIFA Regulations- for the Status and 
Transfer of Players 1997 and the so-called Circulaire No 616. Regarding the 
European associations, UEFA passed on the opportunity to establish its own transfer 
regulations, merely drawing up a calculation scheme to determine transfer fees in 
case of a dispute between clubs. Thus, the FIFA regulations also applied to transfers 
between European clubs. Additionally, an international transfer had to comply with 
the provisions of the relevant national associations. Under the 1997 FIFA 
Regulations, national associations were obliged to establish a system for transfers 
effected within their jurisdiction corresponding to the FIFA rules set out in §2 of the 
preamble. It is significant that Articles 14 to 20 of the 1997 Regulations, which 
determined the procedure for international transfers of players were not binding on a 
national level and the national associations were allowed to put a different procedure 
in place for domestic transfersao. 
When a player moved from a club affiliated to one national association to a 
club belonging to a different association, the transfer had to follow the procedure set 
out by the 1997 Regulations. Although the transfer rules have undergone a major 
change since, the rules concerning the technicalities of an international transfer 
essentially still apply today. First of all, a player must be registered with a national 
association to play for a club as either amateur or professional, depending on whether 
he has ever received any remuneration other than for actual expenses incurred during 
the course of his participation in or for any activity connected with football41. In this 
39 Bosman, at pars 6. 
40 In contrast, Article 1(3)(a) of the 2005 Regulations establishes that its Articles 2-8,10,11 and 18 
(status of players, reacquisition of amateur status, termination of activity, registration, registration 
periods, player passport, application for registration, loan of professionals, unregistered players 
and special provisions relating to contracts between professionals and clubs) have to be included, 
without modification, in the associations' national transfer rules. 
41 Articles 1- 4 of the 1997 Regulations; see also Article 5 of the 2005 Regulations. 
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context, it has already been stated that the classification of an athlete as either 
amateur or professional by sports bodies cannot determine whether he is engaged in 
an economic activity in the sense of Article 2 of the Treaty. However, comparing the 
definition of amateur in Article 2(1) of the 1997 Regulations and the Court's 
understanding of an economic activity in Deliege, it seems that a non-amateur as 
defined by FIFA will always be protected by the Treaty, whereas an amateur 
footballer will normally not be deemed to practise sport as an economic activity. In 
both cases, the dividing line is whether a person receives remuneration for playing 
football, not including expenses such as travelling costs42. Hence, when analysing the 
transfer system in the light of Community law, generally only the provisions 
regarding professional footballers will be relevant. 
Any player, whether amateur or professional, has to be registered with a 
national association in order to be eligible to play for a club43. Once a player is 
registered with a club affiliated to a national association, he may not be registered 
with a club from another national association, unless the latter has received an 
international transfer certificate issued by the national association the player wishes 
to leave. However, only the national association that the player wishes to join is 
entitled to request the international transfer certificate, not the player himself 5. As 
soon as the international transfer certificate has been received, the player is free to 
play for the club46. 
2.5.1. Transfer of Players Out of Contract 
Comparing the 1997 Regulations to the rules pre-Bosman, it becomes evident that, 
bar the adaptation of Article 14(8) of the 1994 FIFA transfer regulations, the system 
remained unchanged. The effects of the amendment of Article 14, however, were 
42 However, it should be noted that Article 2(1) of the 2005 Regulations provides that besides the 
requirement of being paid more than the expenses effectively incurred, a player is only deemed a 
professional if he has a written contract. Although this criterion will usually be met in the case of 
players regarded as workers pursuant to EC law, it cannot be ruled out that discrepancies occur 
due to a player not having a written contract despite the fact that he is actually paid in excess of his 
expenses. 
43 Article 6 of the 1997 Regulations; see also Article 5 of the 2005 Regulations. 
44 Article 7(1) of the 1997 Regulations; see also Article 1(1) of Annex 3 to the 2005 Regulations. 
as Article 8(1) of the 1997 Regulations; similar Article 2(2) of Annex 3 to the 2005 Regulations. 
46 Article 20(1) of the 1997 Regulations. 
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immense: whereas before, it had contained the requirement of a payment of 
compensation for training and/or development on every transfer, the 1997 
Regulations entitled any EEA-citizen transferring from one Member State to another 
to free movement on the expiry of his contract. The amended paragraph eight of 
Article 14 stated that: 
"This article does not apply to the transfer of a player who is a proven national of a 
country that is a member of the European Union (EU) or the European Economic 
Area (EEA)t471 if the transfer involves two national associations in member countries 
of the EU or the EEA and if the player's employment contract with his former club 
has validly expired from the point of view of both parties (that is, if the fixed period of 
contract has terminated or if both parties have mutually agreed either to curtail or 
rescind the contract with immediate effect)". 
After years of so-called "football slavery", the new Article 14(8) of the 1997 FIFA 
transfer regulations finally gave EEA-footballers the right to move freely at the end 
of their contracts. Having said that, it has to be emphasised that the exception did not 
apply to those cases where a contract between a player and a club had been 
terminated unilaterally, as Article 14(8) exclusively referred to the scenario whereby 
a contract had been terminated by either lapse of time or mutual agreement. 
Since Article 2(3) of the FIFA Statutes does not allow any discrimination on 
grounds of nationality, it was necessary to adjust Article 14(8) of the 1997 FIFA 
transfer regulations in such a way that the exemption would also apply to non-EEA 
players. Hence, in Circular No 616 from 4 June 1997, FIFA announced that, 
according to a decision of the FIFA Executive Committee, players who did not come 
from a Member State of the EEA, but were transferred within this area, were to be 
given equal treatment with EEA nationals as from 1 April 1999. In order to comply 
with this decision, an additional paragraph was introduced into Article 14(8) of the 
1997 FIFA transfer regulation, stating that the exception for EEA nationals would 
only apply to transfers concluded before 1 April 1999. Hence, after the set date 
effectively all out-of-contract players moving within the EEA were entitled to a free 
transfer. However, it is important to note that the requirement of a transfer fee still 
47 The text in italics does not apply to transfer contracts concluded after l April 1999, see the 
explanations regarding FIFA Circular No 616 below. 
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applied to transfers of players between national associations of which at least one 
was not an EEA Member State. 
2.5.2. Transfer of Players Still in Contract 
Whereas the current transfer system provides for the case of a breach of contract by a 
player, the 1997 Regulations did not allow a unilateral termination of contract. Thus, 
according to Article 12, a non-amateur was only free to conclude a contract with 
another club if: 
(a) the contract with his present club had expired or was about to expire 
within six months; or 
(b) the contract with his present club had been rescinded by one party or the 
other for valid reasons; or 
(c) the contract with his present club had been rescinded by both parties by 
mutual agreement. 
In Circular No 616, FIFA clarified that the unilateral termination of a contract by a 
player was considered a breach of Article 12(1) of the FIFA regulations, with the 
effect that the national association was entitled to refuse an international transfer 
certificate. Moreover, paragraph 2 of Article 12 stated that a player's new contract 
could not include any clause which would interfere with the proper completion of his 
existing contract and that a player who wished to enter a new contract within six 
month prior to the expiry of his existing contract, was permitted to sign only one new 
contract during that period. The most significant passage of Article 12, though, can 
be found in paragraph 4, which prescribed that: 
"A player may not be transferred during the period of validity of his contract unless 
the three parties involved - the club he is leaving, the player himself, the club he is 
joining - all concur. " 
This provision had the effect that a player who wanted to move to another club, but 
was still bound by the contract with his present club, could not escape this 
contractual agreement, unless the current club consented to a termination. This was 
also reflected in Article 7(2), providing that a national association could refuse an 
international transfer certificate if a player had not fulfilled the terms of his contract 
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with the club he wanted to leave. Hence, a transfer, even under payment of damages 
for breach of contract according to the applicable national law, was not possible 
under the 1997 Regulations. Further protection for clubs from illicit poaching of 
players by other clubs was provided by Article 13, which, subject to a fine of at least 
CHF 50,000, prohibited a club from commencing negotiations with a player still 
under contract, unless he had informed the other club first. 
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3. FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS - ARTICLE 39 
It has already been established that sport is subject to Community law when practised 
as an economic activity in the sense of Article 2 of the Treaty. Considering the 
substantial amounts of money involved in the transfers of professional footballers 
around Europe, it is evident that sporting rules such as regulations restricting transfer 
activity will, in principle, be caught by the provisions on the free movement of 
persons. However, whereas Article 39 of the Treaty was initially intended as an 
instrument against measures adopted by the Member States, in the case of the sports 
sector, it is usually examined in connection with provisions drawn up by private 
parties. 
3.1. APPLICATION TO PRIVATE PARTIES 
Usually, regulations adopted by private organisations are of a civil law nature and 
only have an effect between private parties. Consequently, there have been doubts as 
to whether the provisions on free movement may be applied to rules established by 
non-governmental bodies. The question of a direct horizontal effect of Articles 39 
and 49 has been brought before the Court primarily in connection with cases 
concerning the rules of sporting associations. In this context, the Court has confirmed 
that the provisions on the free movement of persons and services also apply to "rules 
of any other nature aimed at regulating in a collective manner gainful employment 
and the provision of services". According to the Court, the removal of obstacles to 
free movement would be compromised if the abolition of state barriers could be 
neutralised by obstacles resulting from the exercise of their legal autonomy by 
associations or organisations not governed by public law2. Another reason for the 
application of Articles 39 and 49 to rules of private parties is the concept of the 
"effect utile", which shall ensure the effective and uniform application of 
Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch v. Union Cycliste Internationale [1974] ECR 1405, at para 17; see 
also Bosman, at para 82; Case C-51/96 & C-91/97 Christelle Deliege v. Ligue Francophone de 
Judo et Disciplines Associees ASBL [2000] ECR 1-2549, at para 47; Case C-176/96 Jyri Lehtonen 
and Castors Canada Dry Namur-Braine ASBL v. Federation Royale Belge des Societes de Basket- 
ball ASBL (FRBSB) [2000] ECR I-2681, at para 35. 
2 See Walrave, at para 18; Bosman, at para 83; Deliege, at para 47; Lehtonen, at para 35. 
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Community law in the Member States. As in some countries working conditions are 
governed by national law, whereas in others they are determined by agreements and 
other acts concluded or adopted by private persons, such as collective bargaining 
agreements, the restriction of the scope of the freedom of persons and services to acts 
of public authority would create the risk of inequality in their application3. 
The example of the football transfer rules, which regulate the employment of 
professional footballers, shows that the direct application of the rules on free 
movement is necessary to protect the individual in relation to regulations established 
by private parties. From the perspective of a football player who tries to access the 
employment market, it makes little difference whether provisions hindering him from 
playing are adopted by a private or a public authority. A person wanting to play 
football professionally has no choice but to accept the regulations drawn up by the 
football associations; thus, owing to this diminished power of negotiation, footballers 
deserve direct protection by Community law, without having to rely on legislation by 
the relevant Member State. However, whereas the Court has applied Article 39 to 
rules of private parties that are aimed at regulating employment relationships in a 
"collective manner", there are debates as to whether the provisions on the free 
movement of workers should also be applicable to actions of individual employers4. 
It should be mentioned that the direct application of Articles 39 and 49 to acts 
of private parties regulating employment collectively has not been undisputed; some 
writers argue that the Court should have decided against a horizontal direct effect5, as 
it did in the case of Article 28 of the Treaty6. According to these academics, the 
obligation of the Member States under Article 10 to ensure that there are no obstacles 
to the free movement of goods? (including measures adopted by private parties), 
3 See Walrave, at pars 19; Bosman, at para 84. 
° See Craig, P. & De Burca, C., EU Law (3`d edn., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003), p. 703; 
however, the Court has confirmed that Article 39 applies to a rule by a private employer requiring 
a specific language qualification from all job applicants, see Case C-281/98 Roman Angonese v. 
Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA [2000] ECR 1-4139, at para 36. 
s See Streinz, R. & Leible, S., "Die unmittelbare Drittwirkung der Grundfreiheiten", (2000) 15 
EuZW, p. 464. 
6 See Case 311/85 Vereniging van Vlaamse Reisebureaus v. Social Dienst van de Plaatselyke en 
Gewestelyke Overheidsdiensten [1987] ECR 3801, at para 30. 
7 This obligation originated in a case involving protests by French farmers, trying to block 
agricultural imports from other Member States, Case C-265/95 Commission v. France [1997] ECR 
1-6959, at pars 32 and was confirmed by Case C-112/00 Schmidberger v. Republic of Austria 
[2003] ECR 1-05659. 
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equally applies to Articles 39 and 49. Thus, the interests of individuals suffering 
under restrictions set up by private parties would be protected by national law and a 
Member State which has failed to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty would be 
liable for damages. 
3.2. APPLICATION TO SPORTING RULES 
The Court's case law establishes beyond doubt that measures introduced by sporting 
associations are in principle subject to the application of Article 39 of the Treaty. 
Still, there are claims that the provisions on free movement offer room for a sporting 
exemption in EC law. Thus, the nature of sporting rules shall be examined, analysing 
in which cases the provisions on free movement may not be applicable. 
3.2.1. The Rules of the Game 
The first category of sporting regulations that are argued to fall outside the scope of 
Article 39 refers to what are commonly known as the "rules of the game", measures 
that regulate the manner in which sport is played and are of sporting interest only. 
Rules of the game are not covered by Community law as they are of an exclusively 
sporting nature and do not have an economic dimension. As pointed out by 
Advocate-General Lenz in Bosman, for example, it is indeed irrelevant for the right 
to free movement whether a football match lasts 90 or 80 minutes or whether two or 
three points are awarded for a wing. 
Commission officials have emphasised that rules of the game are not subject 
to the application of EC law, in so far as they are applied in an objective, transparent, 
and non-discriminatory manner9. However, this implies that if such sporting rules are 
applied in a non-objective and discriminatory manner, the Treaty may be applicable. 
Taking into account that the provisions on free movement exclusively refer to 
8 AG Lenz in Bosman, at pars 215. 
9 See "Report from the Commission to the European Council with a view to safeguarding current 
sports structures and maintaining the social function of sport within the Community framework" 
("The Helsinki Report on sport"), Brussels, 10.12.1999, COM (1999) 644 final, point 4.2.1.1; 
Speech Pons, J. -F., "Sport and European Competition Policy", Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 
New York City, 14.10.1999, p. 7; Speech van Miert, K., "Sport et concurrence: Developpements 
recents et action de la Commission", Forum Europeen du Sport, Luxembourg, 27.11.97, available 
at http: //www. europa. eu. int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp 1997_069_fr. html. 
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situations with an economic dimension, the Commission presumably has those cases 
in mind, where the application of mainly sports related rules has an effect on 
economic activity. For example, the provisions establishing in which cases red cards 
should be awarded constitute rules of the game and are not caught by the Treaty. On 
the other hand, the rule providing for the sanction following the award of a red card 
has an economic dimension inasmuch as it restricts a player's economic activity. 
Strictly speaking, in view of its economic effect, such a rule comes under the scope 
of the Treaty and therefore may not be regarded as a "rule of the game"; however, as 
pointed out by the Commission, in so far as it is applied in an objective, transparent, 
and non-discriminatory manner, it will generally not infringe the prohibition set out 
in Article 39. The somewhat imprecise diction of the Commission shows that there is 
a danger of confusing purely sports related rules with provisions which might have a 
purely sporting objective, but have an economic impact. As will be demonstrated 
below, it is important that sporting rules are assessed according to their effect rather 
than their objectlo 
3.2.2. National Teams - Precedent for a Sporting Exemption? 
The application of the Treaty freedoms to sporting matters becomes more 
complicated where measures are adopted for sporting reasons, but have an impact on 
economic activity. In this context, the Court's case law in Walrave and Dona 
regarding nationality restrictions in respect of selection rules for sport teams, has 
been interpreted in such a way that measures of a predominantly sporting nature are 
not covered by Article 39 of the Treaty, provided they have a merely incidental 
economic effect. 
In its decision in Walrave, the Court stated that there was a restriction on the 
scope of the provisions on free movement as regards "the composition of sport 
teams, in particular national teams, the formation of which is a question of purely 
sporting interest and as such has nothing to do with economic activity"". In Dona, 
the Court limited this proposition and held that foreign players could be excluded 
from "participation in certain matches for reasons which are not of an economic 
io See point 3.2.3.4 below. 
11 Walrave, at paras 8-9. 
90 
nature, which relate to the particular nature and context of such matches and are thus 
of sporting interest only, such as, for example, matches between national teams from 
different countries"12. In contrast to the Walrave judgment, the Court seemed to have 
realised that the composition of sports teams may well be influenced by economic 
motives and implied that in such a case the Treaty would apply. Taking into account 
the wording of the two decisions, referring to a "restriction on the scope", it is 
evident that the Court did not intend to justify the selection regulations under some 
sort of "rule of reason", but considered the provisions on free movement not to be 
applicable13 
Although it seems obvious that only Italians should be allowed to play for the 
Italian national team and Germans should be excluded from the Portuguese Seleccäo, 
the legal base for an exemption from the scope of EC law is not as easy to find as one 
would expect. Taking into account the immense economic significance of sports 
events where national teams compete against each other, such as the Olympic Games 
or the FIFA World Cup, it is difficult to argue that participation in such competitions 
does not constitute an economic activity, especially as the athletes will usually 
receive remuneration for taking part or are awarded winning bonuses 14. Thus, is it 
possible to deduct from Dona that sporting rules may fall outside the scope of Article 
39 even though they have an economic impact, provided they are purely motivated 
by sporting considerations? Analysing the wording of the decision, which limits the 
restriction of scope to selection rules regarding "certain matches" whereby foreigners 
are excluded for reasons relating to the "particular nature and context" of these 
games, it may be assumed that the Court did not intend to establish a general 
exemption for sporting practices purely motivated by non-economic reasons, but 
construed a rather narrow exemption, applicable to team selection rules only. 
12 Donii, at para 14. 
13 See also AG Lenz in Bosman, para 139; the Court in Bosman has been accused of having used 
inexact terminology in this respect, as it considered the Dona case law when examining whether 
the nationality restrictions at issue could be justified, see Weatherill, S., "European Football Law" 
in "Collected Courses of the 7th Session of the Academy of European Law" (Kluwer, The Hague, 
Netherlands, 1999), p. 354; however, it may be argued that the Court merely intended to 
emphasise that Dona did not apply to the Bosman selection rules, as they did not concern national 
teams. This view is supported by the fact that the Court had already cited Dona at an earlier stage 
whilst considering a possible exemption for sporting rules from the Treaty. 
14 See also AG Lenz in Bosman, at para 139. 
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In contrast, Advocate-General Cosmas in his opinion in Deliege concluded from the 
case law in Walrave, Dona and Bosman that certain sporting rules or practices do not 
fall within the scope of the Treaty, as long as they are justified by specific, non- 
economic reasons which relate purely to sport". The Court in Bosman, when 
examining the possibility of an exemption, interpreted Dona in such a way that it 
meant to exclude any sporting rules or practises justified on non-economic grounds 
which relate to the particular nature and context of certain matches from the scope of 
the provisions on free movement 16. However, the fact that Bosman did not expressly 
refer to rules or practices excluding foreign players from participation in certain 
matches cannot change the fact that the exemption is limited to measures concerning 
the special circumstances of certain matches, which will generally only include 
selection rules. Moreover, analysing the relevant case law after Bosman, it is 
noticeable that both the judgments in Deliege and Lehtonen referred to the wording 
7 of the Dona case, rather than stating an exemption including other sporting rules'. 
The Court has made it very clear that sport falls under the Treaty when 
practised as an economic activity, which means that only rules without an economic 
dimension, such as the previously mentioned "rules of the game" will escape the 
application of Community law. However, if there was an exemption for rules purely 
motivated by sporting reasons, the scope of such a restriction of the Treaty would be 
difficult to define. First of all, may any sporting rule be justified by non-economic 
reasons relating purely to sport, no matter how much it impedes free movement? 
Considering that rules which do not affect economic activity are not covered by EC 
law in any case, such an exemption would only be relevant if it included provisions 
by sporting associations having an impact on economic activities., Applying the 
approach suggested by Advocate-General Cosmas would have as a consequence that 
any rule motivated by reasons purely relating to sport may fall outside the scope of 
the Treaty, no matter how big an obstacle to free movement it might be. Besides, 
when a rule is capable of having an effect on economic relations, it will be very 
IS AG Cosmas in Deliege, at para 69; similarly AG Trabucci in Dona, p. 1345, who argued that even 
if sport is practiced as an economic activity, nationality restrictions could fall outside the scope of 
the Treaty, provided they are based on purely sporting considerations and proportionate to the end 
pursued. 
16 Bosman, at para 76. 
17 Deliege, at para 43; Lehtonen, at para 34. 
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difficult to establish whether it exclusively relates to sporting reasons, or whether 
economic considerations might have been involved. Thus, it can be concluded that 
such a restriction of the Treaty not only lacks support from previous case law, but 
would also be difficult to apply. Moreover, as will be demonstrated in connection 
with the justificatory test introduced by Bosman, a rejection of a sporting exemption 
does not mean that sporting considerations may not be recognised under the 
provisions on free movement, only that they are taken into account at a later stage. 
Returning to the issue of national teams, the question why the open 
discrimination against foreign players should not be covered by the Treaty, despite 
the economic significance of international tournaments, remains unanswered. In this 
context it could be argued that the fact that international competitions are not 
completely unrelated to economic activities cannot divert from their purely 
representative nature as an assortment of the best players from one country. This 
would mean that regardless of the enormous financial significance of international 
competitions, the crucial part is still the character as a tournament between 
representative teams from different countries. However, in line with the view 
proposed above, the objective behind a certain sporting rule may not prevent the 
application of the Treaty as such, even if it is purely motivated by sporting reasons. 
Thus, it is more appropriate to accept selection rules for national teams by reason of 
their sporting necessity, since the removal of such rules would automatically mean 
the end of international team sport in Europe18. If foreigners were allowed to play in 
national teams, their representative character would be lost, which would rob those 
teams of their "raison d'etre". The rationale behind the Treaty freedoms is to allow 
all EU citizens the same access to certain institutions, not to destroy those institutions 
altogether. 
On the other hand, the most simple and probably most logical approach to 
assessing selection rules for national teams is the "officious bystander" test, 
introduced by Advocate-General Warner in Walrave19: if it is supposed that an 
officious bystander had asked the founders of the Treaty whether they intended that 
the articles on free movement should preclude a requirement that, in a particular 
18 Regarding rules necessary for the functioning of sporting competition, also see point 3.2.3.2 
below. 
19 AG Warner in Walrave. 
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sport, a national team should consist only of nationals of the country it represented, it 
is more than likely that the answer would have been in the negative. Although this 
test has been criticised because it presumes the will of the founders of the Treaty 
without having definite proof °, it impresses through its simplicity and one cannot 
help but agree with Advocate-General Warner that the legality of national teams is 
simply dictated by "common sense"21. 
As a matter of interest it should be added that the Court in Walrave, as well as 
Dona has only mentioned national teams as an example of nationality restrictions in 
sport to which the Treaty does not apply. Although the exemption is construed 
extremely narrowly, one may wonder whether there are other possible scenarios, 
whereby foreign athletes may be prevented from participating in certain matches for 
non-economic reasons, which relate to the particular nature of such matches and are 
of purely sporting interest. Although it is highly unlikely that the football 
associations are going to introduce such restrictions in club football, it could be 
argued that a rule, according to which players of a certain club have to be born or 
raised in the club's region, would not be caught by the provisions on free movement, 
as long as it applies to nationals and EU-foreigners alike. The introduction of such a 
rule would bring club football back to a position where the different clubs actually 
represent a certain region within Europe, which would make it easier for fans to 
identify with "their" club22 - reasons which are not motivated by economic 
considerations, relate to the particular nature of football games as matches between 
two teams representing a certain town or region and are of sporting interest only. 
20 See for example Plath, K., "Individualrechtsbeschränkungen im Berufsfußball' (Duncker & 
Humblot, Berlin, 1999), p. 78. 
21 See AG Warner in Walrave. 
u At a time where Chelsea has made history by becoming the first English club to start a game with 
a formation not including a single British player (26.12.1999, away against Southampton) and 
Arsenal has even played a game without any British players on the pitch or on the bench 
(14.2.2005, home against Crystal Palace), many football fans wish back the "good old times" of 
teams like the legendary 1967 European Cup winning "Lisbon Lions" of Celtic, who were all born 
within a 30 mile radius of Parkhead. 
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3.2.3. Non-discriminatory Rules - the Market Access 
Approach 
In Bosman, the Court acknowledged for the first time that Article 48 (now 39) of the 
Treaty prohibits rules constituting an obstacle to the free movement of workers, even 
if they do not discriminate on the basis of nationality23. Thus, the Court extended its 
case law regarding the interpretation of the provisions on the free movement of 
goods24 and services25 to Article 39, stating that "provisions which preclude or deter 
a national of a Member State from leaving his country of origin in order to exercise 
his right to freedom of movement therefore constitute an obstacle to that freedom 
even if they apply without regard to the nationality of the workers concerned 926. 
However, there have been claims that the transfer system in Bosman should 
have been treated in analogous fashion to the measures at issue in Keck and 
Mithouard27 and hence, did not infringe the principle of free movement of workers28. 
As commonly known, the decision in Keck constituted a reaction to the abuse by 
commercial traders of Article 30 (now 28) as a legal instrument to contest 
indistinctly applicable measures by Member States. Revising its earlier case law, the 
Court held that non-discriminatory measures concerning selling arrangements did not 
come under the scope of Article 30 (now 28), "so long as those provisions apply to 
all relevant traders operating within the national territory and so long as they affect in 
the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of those 
23 See Bosman, at para 95. 
24 See Case C-120/78 Rewe-Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de 
Dijon) [1979] ECR 649. 
25 See Case C-275/92 HM Customs & Excise v. Schindler [1994] ECR 1-1039, at para 43. 
26 Bosman, at pars 96. 
27 Cases C-267-268/91 Keck and Mithouard (Criminal Proceedings against) [1993] ECR 1-6097. 
28 For example the arguments by UEFA and URBSFA brought forward in the proceedings to the 
Bosman case, see Bosman, at para 102; another argument against the application of Article 39 to 
the transfer rules at issue in Bosman has been raised by Daniele, L., "Non-Discriminatory 
Restrictions to the Free Movement of Persons", (1997) 22(3) ELRev, pp 191 - 200, who takes the 
view that Article 39 should be interpreted by analogy with case law regarding Article 29, meaning 
that indistinctly applicable measures relating to the "export" of persons or services do not fall 
within the scope of the Treaty. The issue was addressed by AG Lenz in Bosman, at pars 207, who 
dismissed a restrictive interpretation of Article 48 (now 39) by reason of the case law concerning 
Article 34 (now 29), stating that "rather the case law on Article 34 would have to be reconsidered 
instead" and referred to AG Jacobs' analogous conclusion in Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments 
BV v. Minister van Financien [1995] ECR 1-1141, at para 52 on the applicability of Article 59 
(now 49). 
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from the Member States"29. Supporters of the transfer rules at issue in Bosman 
argued that the transfer regulations affected all football transfers in the same way, 
regardless of a player's nationality and the national associations between which he 
was transferred. As the transfer system was generally applicable, non-discriminatory 
and did not create an advantage for the national market, it was claimed to create a 
situation comparable to the selling arrangements in Keck30. The Court, by analogy 
with earlier case law concerning the free movement of services31, rejected this view 
with the argument that the transfer regulations in Bosman had to be distinguished 
from the rules on selling arrangements that applied exclusively within the territory of 
a Member State, as they directly affected players' access to the employment 
market32. Leaving aside the question whether Keck may be relevant in connection 
with non-discriminatory measures not affecting access to employment in other 
Member States33, it has to be welcomed that the Court rejected the Keck analogy in 
the case of the Bosman transfer rules and adopted the market access approach, which 
protects trans-frontier free movement of workers as such, instead of merely granting 
the right to equal treatment. 
Having emphasised that the transfer rules at issue came under the scope of the 
provisions on the freedom of workers, the Court in Bosman went on to apply Krausaa 
and Gebhard35, introducing a test comparable to the "rule of reason" approach in 
Cassis de Dijon. Thus, it was established that even measures restricting the access to 
the market in another Member State did not necessarily breach Article 39, provided 
they pursued a legitimate aim compatible with the Treaty, were justified by pressing 
reasons of public interest and fulfilled the requirement of proportionality36. In respect 
of the transfer rules at issue, the Court recognised that "in view of the considerable 
social importance of sporting activities and in particular football in the Community, 
the aims of maintaining a balance between clubs by preserving a certain degree of 
29 Bosman, at para 16. 
30 See for example Scholz, R. & Aulehner, J., "Die `3+2'-Regel und die Transferbestimmungen des 
Fußballsports im Lichte des europäischen Gemeinschaftsrechts", (1996) 2 Spurt, p. 47. 
31 Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments BVv. Minister van Financien [1995] ECR 1-1141. 
32 Bosman, at para 103; see also the opinion of AG Lenz in Bosman, at paras 205-207. 
33 In this context, see point 3.4.2 below. 
34 Case C-19/92 Kraus v. Land Baden-Württemberg [1993] ECR I-1663. 
35 Case C-55/94 Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995] 
ECR I-4165. 
36 Bosman, at para 104. 
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equality and uncertainty as to results and of encouraging the recruitment and training 
of young players must be accepted as legitimate"37. Although the transfer system was 
ultimately held to fall foul Article 39(1) of the Treaty, Bosman constituted an 
important decision for sport, as the social significance of sporting activities was 
acknowledged by the Court for the first time. Thus, the Court accepted certain 
sporting interests as legitimate aims, which opened up the possibility to justify a 
measure restricting free movement for sporting reasons. 
3.2.3.1. The Market Access Criterion in Case Law - Deliege 
After Bosman, the Deliege case proved to be the first opportunity to test the market 
access approach in relation to indistinctly applicable sporting measures. In contrast to 
the Bosman transfer regulations, the selection rules adopted by the Belgian Judo 
Federation were considered not to determine the conditions governing access to the 
labour market by professional sportsmen38. The decision has been rightly criticised in 
the sense that the rules at issue did in fact restrict the access of athletes to the 
employment market in another Member State, since those who had not been selected 
to participate in a particular tournament were clearly hindered from pursuing their 
profession39, an opinion that was shared by the Advocate-General4o. 
Apart from the fact that Deliege raised questions as to when an indistinctly 
applicable measure hinders access to the employment market, it is surprising that the 
Court did not confirm that the applicable rules were not caught by the restriction in 
Article 49, after having established that access was not affected. Instead, it went on 
to state that a limitation of the number of participants in a tournament was inherent in 
the conduct of an international sports event and pointed out that it was up to the 
sports federations to establish appropriate selection rules 41. Thus, the Court left it 
open whether these considerations should have merely supported the fact that free 
movement was not restricted by the rules at issue, or whether Article 49 of the Treaty 
applied in principle, but the selection rules were justified. 
37 Bosman, at pars 106. 
38 Deliege, at para 61. 
39 See van den Bogaert, S., "The Court of Justice on the Tatami: Ippon, Waza-Ari or Koka", (2000) 
ELRev, p. 561. 
40 See AG Cosmas in Delfege, at para 66. 
41 Deliege, at paras 64 - 67. 
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Taking into account the market access test, one would have assumed that a non- 
discriminatory rule, deemed not to affect the access to the employment market in 
another Member State, would be outwith the scope of the provisions on free 
movement, which would have rendered any further arguments unnecessary. 
However, had the Court been of the opinion that the measures were capable of 
impeding free movement, the next logical step would have been to examine the 
selection rules under the Bosman justificatory test. In the absence of such 
considerations, it has to be assumed that the Court did not mean to move away from 
the market access approach, but simply intended to emphasise that even if access had 
been restricted, the selection rules would have been accepted under Article 49(l) by 
reason of their sporting necessity. 
3.2.3.2. A "Rule of Reason" for Measures Necessary for Sporting 
Competition? 
Apart from the rather confusing application of the market access test, the decision in 
Deliege is significant as it implies that measures necessary for the organisation of a 
sport do not fall foul of Article 39(1). Considering that Articles 39 and 49 shall 
protect the worker or provider of services and not limit their economic activities, it 
certainly makes sense to accept sporting rules without which sporting competition 
could not exist in the first place, even if the measures constitute an obstacle to free 
movement. However, a "rule of reason" for such essential sporting rules has to be 
construed narrowly. Accordingly, it must not be interpreted to include other rules or 
practices, simply based on the fact that they serve a sporting interest. Thus, in 
principle only those sporting rules that are a conditio sine qua non for the existence 
of a sport or the organisation of sporting competition may be accepted. 
In connection with the selection rules at issue in the Deliege case, this means 
that they should only have been justified under Article 49(1) by reason of their 
sporting necessity if judo competitions would not have been possible without them. It 
is evident that for organisational reasons, certain selection rules are required in order 
to stage an international judo tournament. Having said that, it is almost impossible to 
draw the line between selection rules considered indispensable for the functioning of 
sporting competition and those which go beyond what is necessary. In other words, 
how is it to be determined if selection rules are too restrictive, taking into account 
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that it could always be argued that the organisation of a tournament would still be 
possible if one or two athletes more were allowed to participate. Also, it has been 
submitted in the context of the Deliege selection rules that there would have been 
less restrictive methods available in order to keep the number of participants down, 
the main point of criticism being that there was a limitation on the number of athletes 
from one country and the selection was made by the national federation42. A system 
whereby athletes are chosen purely according to their sporting performance would 
certainly be a more objective method to restrict the number of participants in a 
tournament, particularly as the national federation was not bound to nominate the 
best judoka. 
However, the Court, having established that selection rules were necessary in 
principle, did not assess the proportionality of the provisions at issue, but merely 
observed that "it naturally falls to the bodies concerned [... ] to lay down appropriate 
rules and to make their selections in accordance with them", arguing that the 
delegation of such a task to the national federations was appropriate as they had the 
necessary knowledge and experience43. Although the Court did not explicitly refer to 
freedom of association, it still acknowledged the sports bodies' right to self- 
regulation, deciding it was best left to them to choose appropriate selection rules. 
It definitely has to be welcomed that the Court respected the sports 
associations' legal autonomy, paying attention to freedom of association, even 
though it was not expressly mentioned in the judgment. However, the decision in 
Deliege has raised more questions in this respect than it answered. Firstly, the Court 
should have expanded on the sporting necessity argument, establishing when a rule is 
deemed to be inherent in the conduct of a particular sport or sporting competition. 
Moreover, one may wonder whether the fact that the selection rules were not 
assessed under the proportionality test indicates that whenever certain sporting rules 
are necessary for the functioning of sporting competition, it will be left to the sports 
42 See for example van den Bogaert, S., op. cit supra note 39, p. 562, who, having argued that the 
selection measures in fact restricted the access to the labour market, points out that the provisions 
were breaching Article 49, as they did not satisfy a proportionality test, suggesting that a system 
based on a combination of world ranking, pre-qualifying rounds and wild cards would have 
ensured that the best athletes are enabled to participate in a competition, instead of limiting the 
number of participants from one country and leaving the decision entirely up the national 
association. 
43 Deliege, at paras 67 - 68. 
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bodies to decide how the legitimate aim is achieved, provided the adopted rules are 
objective and non-discriminatory. Although selection rules as such are certainly 
necessary to stage a sporting competition, strictly speaking, the Court should have 
examined whether a less restrictive selection system would have been available in 
the particular case, as only measures that are absolutely necessary for the existence 
of a sport should fall outside the scope of the provisions on free movement. 
Having said that, there is always the possibility of justification under the 
Bosman "rule of reason". It has to be remembered that the rationale behind the 
justification of rules necessary for the existence of sporting competition is that 
without them, there would be no free movement for athletes. In contrast to the 
extremely strict sporting necessity test, which simply ensures that there is sporting 
competition in the first place, the Bosman "rule of reason" takes into account 
sporting considerations such as how sport functions best. In this context it has been 
called for that the sports bodies should not only be able to justify restrictive measures 
under the public interest, but that, as part of the basic right of freedom of association, 
they should be able to invoke their right to self-regulation 44 . This means that those 
who govern a sport should be given the competence to decide how their sport and 
sporting competitions should be organised, as long as the rules adopted are fair and 
equal. Such an interpretation would provide the Court with a legal base for letting 
sports associations adopt the selection rules they consider best for the functioning of 
their sport, enabling them to make the choice between a system, which ensures that 
athletes from different federations are represented, and a selection process purely 
based on sporting ability. 
Admittedly, the differentiation between rules deemed to be a conditio sine 
qua non for the existence of a sport and measures which ensure the proper 
functioning of sporting competition and thus should be assessed under the Bosman 
"rule of reason", is not very practicable. In many cases the Court will not have the 
necessary inside knowledge to judge which rules are strictly necessary for 
organisational reasons and which measures are put in place to ensure that sport 
44 See Röthel, A., "Anmerkung zu den EUGH Urteilen Deliege und Lehtonen", (2000) 12 EuZW, p. 
380; Gramlich, L., "Grundfreiheiten contra Grundrechte im Gemeinschaftsrecht", (1996) 19 DÖV, 
p. 810. 
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functions the best way possible45. In practice, a distinction between rules which are 
justified because they are necessary for the functioning of sport and rules being 
subject to the Bosman "rule of reason" is of relevance insofar, as discriminatory rules 
are only accepted under Article 39(1) by reason of their sporting necessity and may 
not be justified under the Bosman justificatory test. 
3.2.3.3. The Bosman "Rule of Reason" in Case law - Lehtonen 
Shortly after Deliege, the Court ruled on another case involving sporting measures, 
this time regarding transfer regulations adopted by the Belgian Basketball 
Federation. Having established that the provisions at issue constituted an obstacle to 
the free movement of workers46, the Court in Lehtonen went on to apply the "rule of 
reason" introduced in Bosman, considering whether the restriction could be justified 
on non-economic grounds, concerning only sport as such47. In this context, the Court 
recognised the aim of ensuring the regularity of sporting competitions as being 
legitimate48, but ultimately left it to the national Court to decide whether the transfer 
rules were necessary to achieve the end pursued. 
In contrast to selection rules, which are necessary to organise a tournament, 
transfer rules usually cannot be argued to be vital for the existence of a sport, as 
sporting competition would be possible without them. However, although basketball 
could probably exist without a transfer system, the Bosman "rule of reason" approach 
enables the Court to take into account that such rules are beneficial for the proper 
functioning sporting competition and to justify them on sporting grounds. The 
decisions in Deliege and Lehtonen show that the difference between rules which are 
a conditio sine qua non for. the functioning of a sport and measures ensuring the 
"proper" functioning of sporting competition is often only marginal. The relevance 
of the distinction for indistinctly applicable measures is mainly methodological; 
however, it shows the importance of Bosman, opening up the possibility to justify 
as Also, as pointed out by Weatherill, "there will always be arguments where the margin lies between 
rules necessary for the running of a sport and more intrusive rules which are the subject of legal 
scrutiny. Patterns of litigation reveal that typically sports bodies claim a much wider sphere of 
necessary organisational autonomy than is judged appropriate by individual sportsmen and - 
woman and by the Commission", see Weatherill, S., "Anti-Doping Rules and EC Law", (2005) 
26(7) ECLR, p. 421. 
°G Lehtonen, at para 49. 
47 Ibid, at para 52. 
48 Ibid, at pars 53. 
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non-discriminatory rules which are not strictly necessary for the functioning of 
sporting competition, but which follow a legitimate sporting interest. 
3.2.3.4. Changing the Goalposts - Meca-Medina49 
The Court of First Instance's decision in Meca-Medina primarily deals with 
competition law, rather than the provisions on free movement; however, it is highly 
significant for the definition of the scope of Article 39, as the Court tackles the 
question under which circumstances sporting rules are considered to have an 
economic dimension. 
The case involved two professional swimmers who had been banned for 
doping under the anti-doping rules by the International Olympic Committee (IOC). 
Having appealed against the decision at the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), 
which reduced the ban from four to two years, the athletes subsequently lodged a 
complaint at the European Commission, claiming that the rules adopted by the IOC 
regarding the definition of doping, the threshold for defining a presence of a banned 
substance in the body as doping and recourse to the CAS restricted competition 
within the meaning of Articles 81 and 82. Since the Commission rejected the 
complaint, the two swimmers brought an action before the Court of First Instance. 
The Court, referring to paragraph 8 of the Walrave judgment, held that the 
prohibitions enacted by the provisions on free movement "do not affect purely 
sporting rules, that is to say rules concerning questions of purely sporting interest 
and, as such having nothing to do with economic activity"50. It continued to state that 
anti-doping regulations, like the rules on the composition of national teams or the 
selection rules at issue in Deliege, constituted purely sporting rules which, by their 
nature, fell outside the scope of Articles 39 and 4951. Having established that the 
campaign against doping did not pursue any economic objective52, the Court 
submitted "it must also be made clear that sport is essentially a gratuitous and not an 
economic act, even when the athlete performs it in the course of professional sport. 
In other words, the prohibition of doping and the anti-doping legislation concern 
49 Case T-313/02 Meca-Medina & Majcen v. Commission [2004] 3 CMLR 60. 
50 Ibid, at para 41. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid, at para 44. 
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exclusively, even when the sporting action is performed by a professional, a non- 
economic aspect of that sporting action, which constitutes its very essence"53 
The Court rejected the applicants' argument that the anti-doping legislation at 
issue could not be purely sporting if it had economic repercussions for them, stating 
that such an interpretation was at odds with existing case law54. In support of this 
view the Court explained that "it is precisely because sporting rules have economic 
repercussions for professional sportsmen and sportswomen and because those rules 
are considered to be excessive by some of those professionals that the dispute arises 
and that the question is raised whether those rules are purely sporting in nature (like 
the rules which gave rise to Walrave, Deliege and Dona) or whether they cover the 
economic aspect of sporting activity (like the rules which gave rise to Bosman, 
Lehtonen and Kolpak)"55. 
In respect of the argument that the limit was fixed at too low a level, the 
Court expanded that even if the anti-doping rules were excessive in nature, this 
"would not result in them ceasing to be purely sporting rules [... ], provided they 
remain limited to their proper object, which is the campaign against doping and the 
safeguarding of the spirit of fair play"56. Furthermore, it was pointed out that even if 
it was proved that the IOC acted exclusively on the basis of purely economic, as 
opposed to social, interests, there was "every reason to believe that it fixed the limit 
at the level best supported by the scientific evidence"57 . 
Although the result reached by the Court of First Instance, insofar as the anti- 
doping regulations at issue were held to be in accordance with EC law, has to be 
welcomed, the argumentation submitted is open to criticism58. First of all, as already 
argued above59, it is doubtful whether the decisions in Walrave and Dona can be 
interpreted to state a general exemption for purely sporting rules, rather than merely 
concerning rules on the composition of teams. This is supported by the decision in 
53 Ibid, at pars 45. 
54 Ibid, at pars 52. 
55 Ibid, at pars 53. 
36 Ibid, at pars 55. 
57 Ibid, at para 58. 
58 See in particular, Weatherill, S., op. cit. supra note 45, pp. 416 - 421; Schroeder, W., "Sportliche 
und wirtschaftliche Dimension des Sportverbandsrechts", (2005) 1 SpuRt, pp. 20 - 24; Gregory, 
J., "From Rio to Meca: another step on the winding road of competition law and sport", (2005) 
64(1) CLJ, pp. 51-54. 
59 See point 3.2.2 above. 
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Deliege, where the Court, having referred to the exemption stated in Dona, 
concluded that the selection rules at issue did not relate to events between national 
teams and therefore the rules could be covered by the Treaty60. Moreover, had the 
Court in Deliege adopted the same argumentation as the Court of First Instance in 
Meca-Medina, it would have considered the selection rules not to be restrictive 
owing to their purely sporting nature and not, as it did, because of their sporting 
necessity. 
The attempt to establish a category of "purely sporting" rules to which the 
Treaty does not apply is not only artificial, but forgets that what is relevant under EC 
law is the effect a certain measure causes and not its objective61. Thus, it denies that 
usually rules regulating professional sport have economic repercussions62 and 
therefore principally come under the scope of EC law. The Court's submission that 
"sport is essentially a gratuitous and not an economic act, even when the athlete 
performs it in the course of professional sport", ultimately stands in contrast to 
previous case law establishing that sport is subject to Community law in so far it 
constitutes an economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 of the Treaty. 
Whether or not anti-doping regulations may be motivated by purely sporting reasons, 
the context in which they are applied is the organisation of professional sporting 
competitions, which undoubtedly constitutes an economic activity. Moreover, as 
pointed out above63, to exclude rules from the scope of the Treaty by reason of their 
sporting nature opens up a dangerous path. To introduce an exception based on the 
motivation behind the adoption of a rule gives rise to legal uncertainty, as it generally 
will be very difficult to assess whether a rule has been motivated by reasons purely 
relating to sport or whether economic considerations may have been involved. This is 
demonstrated by the fact that the Court spends several paragraphs on the question 
whether the IOC might have followed economic interests and if it did, whether this 
would be relevant in the particular case. 
60 Deliege, at paras 43-44. 
61 See also Schroeder, W., op. cit. supra note 58, p. 24; Gregory, J., op. cit. supra note 58, p. 53. 
62 See also Weatherill, S., op. cit. supra note 45, p. 421, who points out that "the denial that such 
[sporting] practices carry economic consequences is ill-founded" and calls the attempt to find the 
purely sporting rule which is devoid of economic context an "unachievable quest". 
63 See point 3.2.2 above. 
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Instead of trying to justify the rules at issue because of their sporting nature, it would 
have been easier and more consistent with Community law principles to accept them 
by reason of their sporting necessity. In practice, anti-doping measures restrict 
athletes' economic activity in so far as they prevent them from participating in 
sporting competitions in cases of established use of performance enhancing 
substances. However, sporting competition could not function without anti-doping 
legislation, which ensures a comparability of results and as such is inherent in the 
organisation of sport. Thus, such legislation, if applied in an objective manner, does 
not fall foul Articles 39 or 49. 
As far as the claim by the applicants that the rules at issue were excessive is 
concerned, it is submitted that there are no less restrictive means available 
successfully to combat doping than setting a certain limit for particular substances 
found in the body. Although it might be argued that sporting competition would still 
be possible if the limit set by the IOC was increased, one has to agree with the Court 
that it may be assumed that the IOC fixed the limit best supported by scientific 
evidence. Even though the Court in principle ought to assess the proportionality of a 
measure, it has to be considered that it would be very complicated to judge whether 
the adopted limit is supported by scientific evidenceM. Ultimately, as pointed out by 
the Commission, it should be left to the sports associations and sports scientists to 
choose the approach they feel is suited best efficiently to combat doping, as long as 
the anti-doping measures are clear, transparent, objective and non-discriminatory65. 
64 However, as pointed out by Weatherill, the Court of First Instance's statement that excessive rules 
would escape the application of the Treaty provided they remain limited to their proper objective 
is "contradictory in the sense that an excessive rule would by definition not be so limited", see 
Weatherill, S., op. cit. supra note 45, p. 417. 
63 Case COMP/38158 Meca-Medina & Majcen, rejection of complaint of 1 August 2002, at para 50. 
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3.3. PERSONAL SCOPE OF ARTICLE 39 
3.3.1. Footballers as Workers 
Fundamentally, the freedom of workers under Article 39 applies to persons working 
as paid employees, as opposed to service providers who are self-employed and 
consequently fall within the scope of Article 49 of the Treaty. The notion of 
"worker" has a Community meaning and may not be interpreted according to 
national law66. Hence, the ultimate authority to define its meaning and scope lies 
with the European Court of Justice, which ensures that the Member States cannot 
interpret the term in the light of their national laws and eliminate at will the 
protection conferred upon workers by the Treaty67. According to the Court, the 
concept of worker "must be defined with objective criteria which distinguish the 
employment relationship by reference to the rights and duties of the persons 
concerned"68. Since the definition of worker determines the scope of one of the 
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, the Court has interpreted it quite 
broadly. Generally, a person will qualify as worker in the sense of Article 39 when 
he or she performs services for and under the direction of another person for a certain 
period of time, in return for which the person receives remuneration 69 
In respect of professional football players, the Court in Bosman has readily 
assumed their status as workers within the meaning of Article 39, without going into 
detail as to whether a professional footballer indeed provides a service under the 
direction of another person. However, the classification of professional football 
players as workers has been criticised by some writers who claim that high-class 
athletes with astronomic wages cannot be deemed workers, but should rather come 
under the scope of Article 49 of the Treaty70. It is argued that certain players have 
achieved such a star-status through activities on and off the pitch, that they can 
66 See Case 75/63 Hoekstra (nee Unger) v. Bestuur der Bedrüfsvereniging voor Detailhandel en 
Ambachten [1964] ECR 177, p. 184; Lehtonen, at para 45. 
67 Hoekstra, p. 184. 
68 Lehtonen, at para 45. 
69 Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum v. Land Baden-Württemberg [1986] ECR 2121, at paras 16 and 17. 
70 See for example Fischer, U., "Die Spitzensportler des Mannschaftssports - Arbeitnehmer? ", 
(1997) 6 SpuRt , p. 181. 
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basically dictate the terms of their contracts and consequently do not work under the 
direction of another person. Such personalities with an international reputation within 
their sport usually receive a high income from advertising deals, which makes them 
economically independent from the, equally substantial, wages from their clubs7i. 
The fact that these sportsmen have to train at a settled time and place is considered to 
be a necessity for any sporting activity, rather than an indication that they have to 
follow the directions of an employer. 
Although there certainly are some superstars in football who may have more 
freedom than others when it comes to times of training or the negotiations of a new 
contract, this cannot change the fact that football players are workers within the 
meaning of Article 39. Generally, a club may not only stipulate when and how often 
a player has to come to training, but also impose substantial fines in case he does not 
comply with club rules, even if they relate to actions in his spare time. No matter 
how "big" a player is, if he consistently does not follow the instructions of the 
manager, he will eventually not be playing in competitive matches and therefore lose 
his star-status. Apart from that, for the qualification as a worker in a Community law 
sense, it does not matter whether a player has an income besides the wages from his 
club. What counts is that a professional footballer will have entered a contract of 
employment with a club for which he receives remuneration and the terms of which 
he has to respect. 
3.3.2. Application of Article 39 according to Nationality 
3.3.2.1. EU Citizens 
Following the wording of Article 39(2), free movement is guaranteed to "workers of 
the Member States", leaving it open whether only nationals from the Member States 
are covered or whether the provision also includes non-EC nationals resident and 
working within the Community72. Although it has been suggested that the founders 
71 Evidently, the example of David Beckham comes to mind: additionally to his £ 100,000 a week 
salary from Real Madrid and his multi-million advertising deals with companies including 
Vodafone, Pepsi, Adidas and Police sunglasses, he has recently concluded a£ 40 million record- 
breaking deal with Gillette, making him the highest paid British advertising star of all time. 72 See Burrows, F., Free Movement in European Community Law (Claredon Press, Oxford, 1987), p. 
124. 
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of the Treaty "intended to establish a common policy for all workers within the 
Community, irrespective of their nationality"73, secondary legislation passed to 
implement Article 39 of the Treaty such as Regulation 1612/68, refers to nationals of 
the Member States only. Hence, the provisions on the free movement of workers 
only apply to EU citizens74. In this context, it has to be kept in mind that the concept 
of Union citizenship under Article 17 of the Treaty is linked to a person being a 
national of a Member State, a question which is determined solely by the applicable 
national laws. 
3.3.2.2. EU Citizens from the New Member States 
When it comes to free movement, citizens from the new Member States do not yet 
enjoy the full rights of EU-citizens. Instead, the acts relating to the accession of the 
new Member States restrict the access of workers from those countries to the 
employment market in the old Member States for a transitional period75. Having said 
that, the Court has held in the past that transitional agreements, being derogations 
from the principle of free movement, should be interpreted narrowly and therefore do 
not authorize old Member States to impose new restrictions on workers from new 
Member States76. Moreover, despite the fact that the old Member States* may 
maintain existing restrictions, they may not maintain such restrictions with regard to 
workers from the new Member States who have been employed in the old Member 
States prior to the date of accession77. As a result, these workers and their families 
may fully rely on the rights granted by the provisions of Regulations 1612/68 and 
1251/7078. Free movement should be established by 2009; however, the possibility 
exists for an old Member State to ask the Commission for authorisation to continue 
73 Plender, R., "Competence, European Community Law and Nationals of Non-Member States", 
(1990) 39 ICLQ, p. 599. 
74 However, as will be examined below, citizens from the new Member States do not yet have the 
full rights under Article 39. 
75 Acts on the accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the 
Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the 
Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic to the European Union, OJ 
2003 L 326; it is important to note that the transitional agreements that have been introduced do 
not apply to Cyprus and Malta and only concern workers. Also, the new Member States may 
impose reciprocal restrictions on workers from the EU-15 Member States. 
76 Case 77/82 Peskeloglou v. Bundesanstalt firArbeit [1983] ECR 1085. 
77 Case 9/88 Lopes da Veiga v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1989] ECR 2989, at para 11; Case C- 
279/89 Commission v. United Kingdom [1992] I-5785, at para 35. 
78 Case C-279/89 Commission v. United Kingdom [1992] I-5785, at para 38. 
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to apply national measures for a further two years, provided it is experiencing serious 
disturbances on its labour market. 
3.3.2.3. Family Members of EU Citizens 
A number of non-EU nationals have rights as family members of an EU citizen who 
is himself a migrant within the European Union. According to Article 11 of 
Regulation 1612/6879, the spouse of a Union citizen working in another Member 
State and their children who are either under the age of 21 or dependent on him, have 
the right to take up any activity as employees throughout the territory of that 
particular Member State, irrespective of their own nationality80. However, the 
worker's family does not have an independent right to work and the rights bestowed 
upon them by Regulation 1612/68 are conditional on the right of residence of the 
worker. 
3.3.2.4. Association Agreements 
Whereas the movement of Community workers is regulated by Article 39 of the 
Treaty, the rights of non-EU nationals who do not fall under the scope of Regulation 
1612/68 are determined by international agreements between the Community and 
third countries. Under Article 310, in connection with Article 281 of the Treaty that 
provides it (unlike the European Union) with legal personality, the Community is 
empowered to conclude agreements with third countries "establishing an association 
involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedure". 
The provisions of such association agreements form an integral part of the 
Community legal order and therefore the authority of interpretation lies with the 
Court. 
Generally, international agreements are only binding upon the contracting 
countries or international organisations and do not develop a direct effect on 
79 It should be noted that Regulation 1612/68 will be amended by Council Directive 2004/38/EC on 
the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States, OJ 2004 L 158, amended by OJ 2004 L 229/35 and OJ 2005 
L 197/34. The Directive, which must be implemented by the Member States by 30 April 2006, 
merges into a single instrument the existing legislation on the matter. 
8° Article 2(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC will extend this right to the partner with whom the worker 
has contracted a registered partnership, provided that such registered partnerships are treated as 
equivalent to marriage in the host Member State, direct descendants of the spouse or partner under 
21 or who are dependents and dependent direct relatives of the worker, his or her spouse or partner 
in the ascending line. 
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individuals. However, in respect of agreements between the Community and third 
countries, the Court has held that a provision in an international agreement has direct 
effect when, "having regard to its wording and to the purpose and nature of the 
agreement itself, the provision contains a clear and precise obligation which is not 
subject, in its implementations or effects, to the adoption of any subsequent 
measure"81. Thus, whether an agreement that grants workers from an associated state 
certain rights within the Community can be invoked before the national courts in the 
Member States, always depends on the wording and content of the particular article 
in question82. 
3.3.2.4.1 EEA Nationals 
The movement of EEA nationals within the Community is regulated by the 
Agreement on a European Economic Area that came into force on 1 January 199483. 
Originally, the EEA Agreement was ratified by five EFTA countries, but after the 
accessions of Austria, Sweden and Finland to the European Union in 1995, the scope 
of the Agreement has been limited, on the EFTA side, to Norway, Liechtenstein and 
Iceland. According to Article 28 of the Agreement, workers from these EFTA 
countries have the right to free movement within the European Union. Even though 
the wording of Article 28 of the Agreement is identical to the provisions of Article 
39 of the Treaty, it is a separate agreement on free movement between the 
Community and the EFTA and not just an. extension of the scope of Article 39. In 
substance, the right effectively corresponds to the provisions on the free movement 
of workers in the Treaty and with the exception of the movement and residence 
rights of Article 18, EEA citizens in principle have the full rights of Union citizens84. 
Besides, Article 6 of the Agreement states that the provisions of the Agreement, in so 
far as they are identical in substance to corresponding rules of the EC Treaty, shall be 
interpreted in conformity with relevant rulings of the European Court of Justice, even 
81 See, in particular, Case 12/86 Demirel v. Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd [1987] ECR 3719, at para 14; 
Case C-262/96 Sürül v. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit [1999] ECR 1-2685, at para 60; Case C-162/00 
Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v. Beata Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer [2002] ECR I-1049, at para 19. 
82 See in contrast Gutmann, R., "Schach, Sport und Europäischer Gerichtshof', (1997) 2 SpuRt, 
p. 39, who considers association agreements to be directly effective as such, without taking into 
account the wording of the particular provisions. 
83 In this context, it should be noted that Liechtenstein joined the EEA on I May 1995. 
84 See Peers, S., "Towards Equality: Actual and Potential Rights of Third-Country Nationals in the 
European Union", (1996) 33 CMLR, p. 16. 
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if they have been decided before the conclusion of the Agreement. Hence, the 
principles developed by the Court in its decisions in Walrave and Dona apply also to 
cases involving the free movement of EEA citizens. Furthermore, Article 7 of the 
Agreement grants family members of workers from an EEA state the same right of 
access to the employment market in the host Member State as family members of EU 
citizens. 
3.3.2.4.2 Swiss Nationals 
Despite being an EFTA ' member, Switzerland did not participate in the EEA 
Agreement, following a rejection of EEA membership by referendum. However, 
owing to the recent EC-Swiss Agreement on Free Movement of Persons, which came 
into force on 1 June 200285, Swiss nationals have rights similar to workers from the 
EEA, most importantly the right to take up employment in any EU Member State. 
Even though there is no case law on the matter yet, it is widely accepted that the 
agreement bestows directly effective rights to Swiss nationals86. 
3.3.2.4.3 Europe Agreements (EAs) 
In the case of a number of Eastern European countries the Community has concluded 
so-called Europe Agreements, seeking to create an appropriate framework for the 
progressive integration of these states. In each of the ten Europe Agreements, 
identically worded provisions have been inserted which prohibit any discrimination 
concerning working conditions, remuneration or dismissal of workers from the 
associated countries legally employed in the territory of a Member State87. Moreover, 
subject to minor exceptions, the legally resident spouse and children of a worker 
legally employed in the territory of a Member State have access to the labour market 
85 OJ 2002 L 114/6. 
86 Hedemann-Robinson, M., "An Overview of Recent Legal Development at Community Level in 
Relation to Third Country Nationals Resident Within the European Union, in Particular Reference 
to the Case Law of the European Court of Justice", (2001) 28 CMLR, p. 539. 
87 See Article 38(1) of the Europe Agreement with Bulgaria, OJ 1994 L 358/3; Article 38(1) of the 
Europe Agreement with the Czech Republic, OJ 1994 L 360/2; Article 36(1) of the Europe 
Agreement with Estonia, OJ 1998 L 68/3; Article 37(1) of the Europe Agreement with Hungary, 
OJ 1993 L 347/2; Article 37(1) of the Europe Agreement with Latvia, OJ 1998 L 26/3; Article 
37(1) of the Europe Agreement with Lithuania, OJ 1998 L 51/3; Article 37(1) of the Europe 
Agreement with Poland, OJ 1993 L 348/184; Article 38(1) of the Europe Agreement with 
Romania, OJ 1994 L 357/2; Article 38(1) of the Europe Agreement with Slovakia, OJ 1994 L 
359/2; Article 38(1) of the Europe Agreement with Slovenia, OJ 1999 L 51/3. 
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of that Member State, during the period of the worker's authorised stay of 
employment88. 
In its judgment in Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer, the Court held that the anti- 
discrimination provisions protecting nationals from countries associated by Europe 
Agreements89 are capable of having direct effect, which means that workers from a 
contracting state are entitled to rely on it before national courts of the host Member 
State90. Moreover, it has been confirmed in Kolpak, a case concerning nationality 
restrictions in German handball, that they are horizontally directly effective and 
apply to rules laid down by private parties such as sporting associations91. 
Following the accession of the majority of EA-associated countries to the 
European Union, the scope of the Europe Agreements is now limited to Bulgaria and 
Romania. 
3.3.2.4.4 Turkey Association Agreement92 
In contrast to the European Agreements, the Ankara Agreement does not confer any 
directly effective rights upon Turkish workers, but provides for the installation of a 
Council of Association, made up of representatives of the Member States, the EC and 
Turkey93. The Council of Association shall issue decisions in order to provide 
Turkish workers with certain rights on the employment market in the Community. 
Owing to political disagreements94, the Council of Association has so far only 
issued two decisions concerning the movement of Turkish workers in the 
88 It should be noted that the question of the definition of the notion of spouse and, probably more 
controversially, children is determined by the national laws in the different Member States, as is 
the issue when they are deemed to be legally resident, see the Joint Declaration attached to the 
Europe Agreements. 
89 The particular case concerned Article 37(1) of the Europe Agreement with Poland. 
90 See Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer, at para 30; confirmed recently in Case C-438/00 Deutscher 
Handballbund eV v. Maros Kolpak, [2003] ECR 1-4135, at para 30 with regard to Article 38(1) of 
the Europe agreement with Slovakia. 
91 The Court, by analogy with its reasoning in Bosman, stated that a restriction of the scope to acts of 
public authority would result in an inequality in the application of the rules governing the 
movement of EA workers, see Kolpak, at paras 32 - 37. 92 "Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and 
Turkey", signed in Ankara on 12th September 1963, concluded on behalf of the Community by 
Council Decision 64/732/EEC of 23 December 1963 (English version published in OJ 1973 C 
113/1, hereinafter referred to as "the Ankara Agreement"). 
93 See Article 22 of the Ankara Agreement. 
94 See Hailbronner, K., "Third Country Nationals and EC Law" in Rosas, A. & Esko, A. (eds), A 
citizens' Europe (SAGE Publications, London, 1995), p. 190. 
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Community95. Both decisions, which have been held to be directly effective96, grant a 
Turkish worker free access to any paid employment of his or her choice in the host 
Member State, if he or she has been in legal employment in the same Member State 
for a certain period of time, which in the more recent provision is set at a limit of 
four years97. Moreover, Article 10 of Decision 1/80 guarantees Turkish workers non- 
discrimination "as regards remuneration and other conditions of work". Thus, it 
emerges that Turkish workers, in addition to the rights granted to workers from EA 
countries, have an, albeit limited, right to employment access. 
In respect of persons related to a Turkish worker, Article 7 of Decision 1/80 
grants family members who have been authorised to join him or her under the laws 
of the Member States, free access to employment in the host Member State after five 
years98. 
3.3.2.4.5 Other Association Agreements 
Apart from the Europe Agreements and the Association Agreement with Turkey, the 
Community has concluded association agreements with many other states: the 
Maghreb Co-operation Agreements (MCAs) with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia99, 
the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements (EMAs) with Moroccoloo, Tunisialol, and 
Israel102, the Partnership and Co-operation Agreements (PCAs) with Russia 103 




Turkmenistan11° and Armenia", Azerbaijan' 12, Georgia' 13. Apart from that, the 
95 Decision No 2/76 of 20 December 1976 and Decision No 1/80 of 19 September 1980. 
96 Case C-192/89 S. Z. Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1990] ECR 3497, at para 19. 
97 Third indent of Article 6(1) of Decision No 1/80 of 19 September 1980. 
98 It should be noted that Article 7 does not contain a definition of the term "family members". It has 
been suggested that the notion used in Decision 1/80 should be interpreted by analogy with Article 
10 of Regulation 1612/68, see Peers, S., op. cit., p. 25. 
99 All three OJ 1987, L 263 - 265. 10° OJ 2000 L 70/2. 
101 OJ 1998 L 132/14. 
102 OJ 2000 L 147/3. 
103 OJ 1997 L 327. 
104 OJ 1998 L 049/3. 
105 OJ 1999 L 196/3. 
106 OJ 1999 L 96. 
107 OJ 1998 L 181/3. 
108 Signed March 1995; not yet in force. 
109 OJ 1999 L 229. 
10 Signed May 1998; not yet in force. 
"' OJ 1999 L 239. 
112 OJ 1999 L 246. 
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Community has established special relations with a number of African, Caribbean 
and Pacific states under the Lome Conventions 
114, now replaced by the Cotonou 
Agreements 1 5. 
Most of these agreements confer upon workers from associated countries the 
right not to be discriminated against nationals of the host Member State as regards 
working conditions. The MCAs with Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, for example, 
include a non-discrimination clause in Article 40, which does not allow workers 
legally employed in a Member State to be put at a disadvantage compared to 
nationals and was held directly effective by the Court 116. Similarly, the Cotonou 
Agreement also contains a clause ensuring equal treatment with regards to "working 
conditions, remuneration and dismissal"' 17, which is considered to be of direct 
effect"8. Regarding the PCA with Russia, the European Court of Justice has recently 
confirmed in Simutenkov119 that the findings in Kolpak are also applicable to Russian 
athletes'20 . 
It should be noted that the wording in the other PCAs is slightly different: 
whereas the Russia PCA states that the Community and its Member States "shall 
ensure" equal treatment as regards working conditions, remuneration and dismissal, 
the other PCAs merely require that the Community and its Member States "shall 
endeavour to ensure" such equal treatment121. Obviously, this non-discrimination 
obligation is less strongly formulated and it remains to be seen whether the Court 
will consider the provisions capable of having direct effect. Even less protection is 
offered by the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements, which do not address the issue of 
equal treatment for migrant workers at all122. 
113 OJ 1999 L 205. 
1 14 OJ 1991 L 229/3. 
Its Signed 23.6.2000, OJ 2000 L 317, came into force on 1 April 2003, OJ 2003 L 83/69. 
116 Case C-18/90 Office nationale de 1'emploi v. Bahia Kziber [1991] 1-199, at p. 225. 
117 Article 13(3). 
'is See Hedemann-Robinson, M., op. cit. supra note 86, p. 578. 
119 Case C-265/03 Igor Simuntenkov v. Ministerio de Educacidn y Cultura [2005] ECR 1-2579. 
120 See also the earlier case of Valeri Karpin, a Russian footballer who was playing for Celta Vigo; 
there a Spanish Court ruled in view of the PCA with Russia that the player was to be treated the 
same as a Spanish national when it comes to the application of nationality restrictions, see the case 
commentary in (2001) 1 Spurt, p. 12. 
121 See Article 23 of the agreement with Belarus, Moldova, Russia; Article 19 of the agreement with 
Kirgistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan; Article 20 of the agreement with Azerbaijan and Georgia; 
Article 18 of the Agreement with Turkmenistan and Article 24 of the agreement with the Ukraine. 
. Z2 See Hedemann-Robinson, M., op. cit. supra note 86, p. 569. 
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3.3.3. Discrimination against Athletes from Associated 
Countries 
3.3.3.1. Nationality Restrictions 
Most association agreements protect nationals from contracting countries from 
discrimination regarding the conditions of employment. Thus, once a worker is 
legally employed within the territory of a Member State he or she has to be treated 
equally to the nationals of the host country. However, with the exception of EEA, 
Swiss and, to a limited extent, Turkish nationals, the majority of workers do not have 
the right to access the labour market in the Member States. Consequently, such 
workers can only be protected from nationality restrictions in sport if such a practice 
is considered to affect the conditions of employment, rather than the access to the 
employment market. 
In respect of nationality restrictions in football, the Court in Bosman pointed 
out that such measures did not concern the employment of foreign players, on which 
there was no restriction, but put a limit on the extent to which clubs are allowed to 
field them in official matches 123. The Court concluded that the participation in 
matches was the essential purpose of a professional player's activity and that rules 
restricting that participation obviously affected the chances of employment 124. This 
paragraph has been interpreted in such a way that a limitation on the usage of certain 
players in a game constituted a restriction to employment access rather than a 
disadvantage in working conditions 125. However, the majority of commentators and 
the European Court of Justice in Kolpak concluded from Bosman that nationality 
restrictions in sport related to working conditions, inasmuch as they directly affect 
participation in official matches 126. Thus, the Court held that players from associated 
123 Bosman, at pars 120. 
124 Ibid. 
125 See the decision VJK Schmierstadt v. Deutscher Ringerbund of LG Frankfurt a. M. of 28.07.1997, 
case no. 2-14 0 305/97, in agreement see the case commentary from Kahlenberg, H. in (1997) 5 
SpuRt, p. 171; see also the case of TTC Zugbrücke Grenzau v. Deutscher Tischtennis Bund, LG 
Frankfurt a. M. of 26.11.1997, case no. 2-14 0 254/97, where the appeal of a Polish player against 
nationality restrictions in German table tennis was rejected. 
126 See Kolpak, at paras 45-46; confirmed in Simuntenkov, at para 37; see also Gutmann, R., op. cit. 
supra note 82, p. 40; Gramlich, L., "Zweierlei Maß für Ausländer im (Liga-) Sport ?- Inländer- 
Gleichbehandlung und Völker- und Europarecht", (1998) 2 SpuRt, p. 64 who argues that the 
Court's statement in Bosman merely signified that nationality restrictions also affected the access 
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countries, although lawfully employed in a Member State, were at a disadvantage 
compared to players from EEA countries, as they had only limited opportunity to 
participate in certain matches127. 
Hence, when assessing nationality clauses in sport under EC law, a 
distinction has to be made between restrictions on the number of players from 
associated countries a club is able to sign on the one hand and rules that restrict the 
number of such players a club may field at a time on the other. Whereas it is possible 
to restrict the access of players from associated countries to the labour market, once a 
player is lawfully employed by a club, he has the same right to play as an EU 
128 national. 
3.3.3.2. Transfer Restrictions 
The Court has not had the chance yet to rule on the issue of transfer regulations 
concerning players from associated countries. In respect of transfer fees for out-of- 
contract players, all players transferring between two clubs from different EEA 
Member States are allowed to move freely since the Pt April 1999129. However, this 
does not apply to domestic transfers 130, which means that players from associated 
countries may still be discriminated in this respect. Apart from that, the requirement 
of a transfer fee at the end of a player's contract relates to access to the labour 
market, rather than the conditions of employment. Firstly, the transfer fee is due at a 
point when the player is not actually employed by his former club any more; thus, it 
does not affect the working conditions of a player. Secondly, the effect of such a fee 
is to hinder the player from finding a new club, which means it constitutes an 
obstacle to the access to new employment. Although transfer fees for out-of-contract 
players have generally been abolished on a national level by now, it should be noted 
to the labour market, which did not necessarily exclude them from having a negative effect on the 
conditions of employment. 
127 Kolpak, at paras 46 - 51. 128 See also the decision of the Cour Administrative d'Appel, Nancy, which considered nationality 
restrictions in French basketball in breach of Article 37 of the Association Agreement with Poland, 
refusing a request to refer a preliminary question to the ECJ under reference to the acte clair 
doctrine, Case Lilia Malaja, judgment of 1 of Febrary 2000, Bangaly, Revue Francaise de Droit 
Administratif, 2000, p. 693. 
129 See FIFA Circular No 616 of 4 June 1997. 
130 The FIFA Circular No 616 neither relates to transfers to or from third countries. Since Article 39 
only applies to the movement of workers within the Community, such transfers are not covered, 
but could be affected by the rules on competition law. 
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that restrictions regarding domestic moves may be relevant in respect of Turkish 
nationals who have a right to access the employment market in their host Member 
State after having worked there for four years. 
As commonly known, after the publication of the FIFA Circular No 616 and 
the abolition of transfer fees for out-of-contract players moving within the EEA, the 
Commission initiated proceedings in relation to the payment of transfer fees for 
players still in contract. However, whereas Bosman concerned access to employment 
in another Member State, one could argue that the requirement of mid-contract 
transfer fees relates to the conditions of employment. 
According to Article 7(1) of Regulation 1612/68, working conditions concern 
in particular remuneration and dismissal. It has been argued that the notion has to be 
interpreted broadly, including all governmental and contractual provisions regulating 
the legal status of employees131 As will be explained below, the objection against the 
1997 Regulations is based on the fact that players had no opportunity to terminate the 
contractual relationship before its expiry and move on to another engagement. It 
could be argued that equal treatment as regards to working conditions also relates to 
national laws granting the right unilaterally to terminate an employment contract. 
Having said that, even if a player from an associated country had the same right to 
terminate his contract as a domestic player, he still does not have the right to access 
the employment market in the host Member State. Hence, the 1997 Regulations 
would not have put a burden on him, considering that in case of the termination of 
his employment, he would not have been able to enjoy the right to free movement in 
any case. 
3.4. DOMESTIC TRANSFERS 
Evidently, the provisions on free movement cover transfers of EU citizens between 
clubs in two different Member States. In contrast, it is a matter of dispute if or when 
Article 39 also affects domestic moves. In Bosman, for example, the Court once 
again pointed out that the provisions on free movement of persons cannot be applied 
to "situations which are wholly internal to a Member State, in other words where 
131 See Scheuer, A. in Lenz, 0. (ed), "Kommentar zum EU und EG Vertrag" (3rd edn., 
Bundesanzeiger Verlag, Köln, 2003), p. 564. 
117 
there 'is no factor connecting them to any of the situations envisaged by Community 
laws132. However, in relation to domestic transfers of football players, it is still 
unclear in which cases a situation is deemed to be wholly internal and under what 
circumstances a strong enough Community law link has been established. 
Having said that, the question whether domestic transfers are covered by 
Article 39 is mainly of academic interest, as the national associations sooner or later 
tend to adapt their transfer rules to changes made to the international transfer 
regulations resulting from the influence of Community law. Furthermore, it should 
be noted that transfers within a Member State may be affected by competition law, 
an issue which will be examined later on. 
3.4.1. Transfers of Nationals within their Member State 
At first sight, the scenario of a player moving from one club in his country of origin 
to another seems to lack any factor connecting it to EC law and Article 39 does not 
apply 133. However, taking into account the Court's decision in Singh134 and the fact 
that in recent times the Court has interpreted the concept of "wholly internal 
situation" more and more narrowly 135, one may wonder whether the case of a player 
returning home after having exercised his right to free movement in another Member 
State, would still be deemed "wholly internal" by the Court. 
After the Bosman case, many national football associations, such as the 
English FA did not abolish fees for domestic transfers at first. Hence, in contrast to 
the situation in Singh, a footballer who returns home from a Member State where 
such transfer rules are still in place has not enjoyed more rights abroad than he has in 
his Member State of origin. However, even in the opposite case, whereby a player 
moves from a Member States where domestic transfer fees have been abolished back 
to his home country where such fees are still in place, it is doubtful whether 
132 Bosman, at pars 89. 
133 See Weatherill, S., "European Football Law", op. cit. supra note 13, p. 375; Fischer, H., "EG- 
Freizügigkeit und bezahlter Sport, Inhalt und Auswirkungen des Bosman-Urteils des EuGH", 
(1996) 2 SpuRt, p. 37; Kranz, A., "The Bosman Case: The Relationship between European Union 
Law and the Transfer System in European Football", (1999) 5 Colum. J. Eur. L, p. 451. 
134 Case C- 370/90, R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh, ex parte Secretary of the 
State for the Home Department [1992] ECR 1-4265. 
135 See for example Case C-60/00 Mary Carpenter v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2002] ECR 1-6279. 
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Article 39 applies. The hypothetical possibility that the same player might want to 
transfer to another club in his native state one day and would subsequently be subject 
to the payment of a domestic transfer fee cannot suffice to bring the scenario under 
the scope of Article 39. Apart from that, domestic transfer restrictions do not 
preclude or deter a national from leaving his home country in order to exercise his 
right to free movement in the sense that he would receive beneficial treatment if he 
had stayed at home, rather than moving abroad136; the opposite is the case. Thus, it is 
submitted that the domestic transfer of a player in his home Member State, who has 
exercised his right to free movement in the past, should be considered as wholly 
internal, taking into account that his situation has not changed by his engagement 
abroad. 
Moreover, even if such a player was considered to be protected by the Treaty, 
one may wonder whether the Community law link established by the fact that a 
player has been working in another Member State is strong enough to protect a 
player who has exercised his right to free movement a long time ago or who has only 
been abroad for a short period. For example, in January 2002 the German 
international Fredi Bobic moved from Borussia Dortmund to Bolton Wanderers, only 
to return to the German club Hannover 96 after six months. A year later, Bobic 
transferred from Hannover to Herta BSC Berlin. Considering that Fredi Bobic played 
in England for only six months, it is questionable whether this short stay established 
a strong enough cross-border link to bring his move from Hannover to Herta BSC 
under the scope of Article 39. This becomes even more evident if it is assumed that 
he did not transfer one year after having left Bolton, but after three or four years. It is 
further doubtful whether the fact that a player has exercised his right to free 
movement at one point in his career should automatically has the consequence that a 
later domestic transfer does not constitute a wholly internal situation. This is 
demonstrated by the case of Martin Hiden, an Austrian player who moved from 
Rapid Wien in January 1998 to Leeds United. After an unsuccessful stay in England, 
Hiden went back to his home country in July 2000 to play for Austria Wien, which 
he left three years later to return to Rapid. 
136 In this context see Case C-18/95 F. C. Terhoeve v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst 
ParticulierenlOndernemingen Buitenland [1999] ECR 1-345. 
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Taking into account the mentioned examples, it appears that in some cases where 
players who have been engaged abroad move between two clubs in their Member 
State of origin, the link to Community law seems rather weak. However, it would 
prove to be very difficult to introduce a criterion establishing when a player is still 
protected by Article 39 and when the situation is treated as being wholly internal. 
These considerations show that a broad interpretation of what situations are deemed 
to have a Community law dimension often results in rather arbitrary distinctions and 
although it is understandable that the Court wishes to extend the protection offered 
by Article 39 as far as possible, one may wonder whether a differentiation between 
nationals of the same Member State, purely based on the question whether a person 
has been exercising his right to free movement in the past, really makes sense. 
3.4.2. EU Foreigner Moving Within Host Member State 
Taking the example of Edwin Van der Sar, a Dutch national who moved from 
Fulham to Manchester United at the beginning of season 2005/06, it is debatable 
whether the fact that Van der Sar has already exercised his right to free movement by 
taking up employment in Britain constitutes a strong enough link to bring the transfer 
under the scope of Article 39. The majority of scholars take the view that the 
scenario of an EU citizen moving between two clubs in another Member State does 
not constitute a wholly internal situation and Article 39 applies 137. However, it could 
be argued that such a case should be treated analogously to the Court's case law in 
Keck. Before analysing whether domestic transfer rules are in fact comparable to 
selling arrangements, it is necessary to establish whether the Court's case law on 
Article 28 may in principle be invoked in connection with the provisions on free 
movement of workers' 38. 
In Bosman, the Court dismissed an application of Keck to the transfer system at 
issue, arguing that the transfer rules prevented the access of EU foreigners to the 
137 See Grisenthwaite, M., "The Bosman Judgment: after the Dust has Settled", (1996) 7(5) 
I. C. C. L. R., p. 204; Arens, W., "Der Fall Bosman - Bewertung und Folgerungen aus der Sicht des 
nationalen Rechts" (1996) 2 SpuRt, p. 43; Weatherill, S., "European Football Law", op. cit. supra 
note 13, p. 375. 
138 In favour, for example, Streinz, R., "Europarecht" (4`h edn., C. F. Müller Verlag, Heidelberg, 
1999), at para 681, who stresses that a limitation of scope as introduced in Keck regarding Article 
28 should equally apply to national rules having the same effect on cross-border and domestic 
situations under Article 39 of the Treaty. 
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labour market in another Member State. Still, the Court did not reject the application 
of the principles in Keck to Article 39 as such. Besides, in Alpine Investments139 the 
Court seemed to be prepared to allow an analogy to Keck case law in connection with 
the freedom of services. However, as in. Bosman, the Court ultimately considered that 
measure at issue had to be distinguished from the selling arrangements in Keck, 
arguing that it was directly preventing market access. The decisions in Alpine 
Investment and Bosman imply that, in principle, the findings in Keck are also valid 
for cases involving the free movement of workers in the sense that measures not 
affecting access to the market in another Member State may not be covered by 
Article 39. Moreover, in Graf, the Court held that "in order to be capable of 
constituting such, an obstacle [to free movement], they [indistinctly applicable 
measures] must affect access of workers to the labour market' 9140 which suggests that 
rules not affecting market access escape the application of the provisions on the free 
movement of workers. 
In contrast to the Court, which has never examined to what extent Keck could 
be relevant as regards to Article 39, the issue was touched upon in the opinions of 
several Advocates-General. Advocate-General Lenz, for example, suggested in 
Bosman that by analogy with the case law on Article 28, a distinction might be 
drawn between measures regulating access to occupational activity and measures 
which are directed more to the exercise of that activity'41. In contrast, Advocate- 
General Albers rejected the idea of applying Keck in connection with the provisions 
on the free movement of workers 142. According to the Advocate-General, selling 
arrangements affect trade in goods only very indirectly, as they are not product 
related and do not necessarily affect those who import or export a product, but only 
the subsequent sale to the final customer. Thus, rules on the exercise of a profession 
were submitted to be much closer to product-related requirements than to the rules on 
selling arrangements, since rules on exercise, like product-related rules, must be 
complied with directly by a citizen of the Union who wishes to assert the freedom 
139 Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments BVv. Minister van Financien [1995] ECR I-1141. 
140 Ibid, at para 23. 
141 AG Lenz in Bosman, at para 205. 
142 AG Albers in Lehtonen, at paras 46-50, for a more detailed analysis see Albers, S., "Vom 
Diskriminierungs- zum Benachteiligungsverbot" in Tomandl, T. (ed), Der Einfluß europäischen 
Rechts auf das Arbeitsrecht (Wilhelm Braumüller Verlag, Vienna, 2001). 
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under Article 39143 Moreover, the Advocate-General took the view that there was no 
reason to introduce a restriction of the scope of Article 39 by analogy with the Keck 
case law, as the freedom of movement for workers is already limited by the fact that 
it may be relied on only in cross-border situations. 
The most extensive analysis on the application of Article 39 to non- 
discriminatory rules with reference to the Keck case law was undertaken by 
Advocate-General Fennelly in Graf 44. Having pointed out that the motivation which 
led to the adoption of the distinction between product rules and selling arrangements 
was to establish the circumstances in which market access was affected 145, the 
Advocate-General tried to transmit the principles in Keck to Article 39 of the Treaty. 
He thereby differentiated between two kinds of non-discriminatory national rules 
with which workers from other Member States have to comply 146. Firstly, measures 
restricting free movement by directly affecting access to the employment market 
such as national provisions which require certain skills or qualifications and, like 
product related requirements, tend to subject migrant workers to a dual regulatory 
regime or rules as in Kraus which are sufficiently closely bound up with market 
access to be subjected to a similar regime. Secondly, national regulations that limit 
commercial freedom, but do not result from a formal condition of market 
participation and as such do not affect access to the employment market. In reference 
to the opinions of the Advocates-General Lenz and Albers, Advocate-General 
Fennelly considered his analysis to be in agreement with Advocate-General Lenz's 
proposed distinction between rules regarding market access and rules merely 
governing the exercise of an economic activity and pointed out that the apparent 
disagreement with Advocate-General Albers stemmed from a different understanding 
of what is meant by rules governing the exercise of an economic activity147. This 
143 See also Kranz, A., op. cit supra note 133, p. 445, who argues that "measures directed at traders 
and not at goods cannot be seen to hinder the circulation of goods, whereas regulations concerning 
workers could have an adverse impact on their free movement, rendering the application of Keck 
to Article 48 unrealistic". 
144 Case C-190/98 Volker Graf v. Filzmoser Maschinenbau GmbH [2000] ECR I-493. 
145 AG Fennelly in Graf, at para 19. 
146 Ibid, at paras 31- 33. 
147 Obviously, AG Albers considered national measures requiring certain skills or qualifications as 
affecting the exercise of an occupation, rather than governing access to the employment market 
and therefore argued against the adoption of the distinction suggested by AG Lenz in Bosman, see 
AG Albers in Lehtonen, at para 48. 
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view has been agreed with by Advocate-General Albers himself, who considered 
Advocate-General Fennelly's opinion not to stand in contradiction to his own 148 
Applying the findings of Advocate-General Fennelly to the case of domestic 
transfer regulations, it emerges that measures requiring the payment of a fee if a 
player is moving between two clubs in the same Member State cannot be classified 
as formal barriers to market access. In contrast to the scenario in Bosman, in such a 
situation the player is already working in the host Member State and the transfer 
rules do not prevent him from accessing the labour market in another Member State, 
but impede him in his efforts to move on to a new engagement in the same Member 
State. The rules governing domestic transfers of footballers are indistinctly 
applicable and do not put foreign players at a disadvantage, since generally more 
nationals will move within their country of origin than players from other Member 
States. Furthermore, they do not require foreign players to comply with conditions 
they would not be subject to in their home Member State and as such are more 
closely related to selling arrangements than to product rules. Taking into account that 
domestic transfer rules apply exclusively to the territory of a Member State and do 
not restrict cross-border movement, it is submitted that they do not fall within the 
scope of the provisions on free movement 149. As Advocate-General Fennelly put it: 
"In the normal case, the migrant worker must take the national employment market 
as he finds it" 50, which, in the case of a football player moving domestically in 
another Member State, means that once he has gained access to the employment 
market, he is subject to indistinctly applicable measures limiting his commercial 
activity in the host Member State. 
3.4.2.1. The Problem of Reverse Discrimination 
Considering the fact that Article 39 generally does not apply to domestic moves of 
players within their home Member State, it is possible to envisage a scenario 
whereby a club would have to pay a transfer fee for a national player coming from a 
148 Albers, S. in Tomandl, T. (ed), op. cit. supra note 142, p. 10. 
149 See also Fischer, H., op. cit. supra note 133, p. 37; in a circulation paper, published on the internet 
after the Bosman case, the Commission effectively came to the same conclusion, albeit without 
referring to Keck, simply stating that in cases of EU foreigners moving within a Member State 
"there is neither indirect discrimination against a Community player nor any restriction on the free 
movement of persons" see www. europa. eu. int/conu-n/sport/keyjiles/circlb_Bosman_en. html. 
150 AG Fennelly in Graf, at para 32. 
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team in the same Member State, but could engage a player from another Member 
State for free. Hence, in such a situation a club looking for a new striker is more 
likely to employ an EU foreigner than a domestic player. The disadvantage national 
players may be placed at in comparison to players from other Member States by the 
application of the provisions on free movement becomes even more clear if it is 
assumed, contrary to the view proposed above, that the transfer of an EU foreigner 
moving within a Member State is covered by Article 39. In this case a national player 
and an EU foreigner moving between the same two clubs within a Member State 
might be treated differently, depending on their nationality: whereas the former is 
protected by the Treaty, the latter is not. 
The effect caused by the application of Article 39 that national workers 
cannot invoke rights in their Member State of origin, which workers from other 
Member States could claim there, is generally referred to as "reverse discrimination". 
The European Court of Justice, taking into account that the provisions on free 
movement may not be relied upon in a so-called "wholly internal" situation, has so 
far accepted that as a result of the application of EC law, persons from another 
Member State could be put at an advantage compared to nationals from the host 
Member State'51. However, as the example of Morson and Jhanjan1S2 shows, the 
"internal situation" approach sometimes leads to distinctions which might be 
considered as rather arbitrary. Be that as it may, cases involving reverse 
discrimination of nationals against EU foreigners are generally thought to be outwith 
the scope of the Treaty'53 and it is left to the national laws of the Member States to 
t51 See for example Case 175/78 R. v. Saunders [1979] ECR 1129, involving a British national trying 
to challenge an order which excluded her from certain parts of her own country. The Court, having 
established that there was no factor connecting the case "to any of the situations envisaged by 
Community law" held that Ms. Saunders could not rely on Article 48 (now 39); Joined Cases C- 
29-35/94 Criminal proceedings against Jean-Luis Aubertin and others [1995] ECR 1-301 
regarding a French regulation requiring French nationals to hold a diploma in order to operate a 
hairdressing salon, whereas hairdressers from other Member States could operate a salon in France 
without being subject to such a requirement 
152 Cases 35 & 36/82 Morson and Jhanjan v. Netherlands [1982] ECR 3723, where two Dutch 
nationals working in the Netherlands were not allowed to bring their Surinamese parents into the 
country to reside with them, as this was considered to be a wholly internal situation. However, had 
they been nationals from any other Member State working in the Netherlands, they would have 
been covered by Article 10 of Regulation 1612/68. 
153 See Albers, S. in Tomandl, T. (ed. ), op. cit. supra note 142, p. 13; Streinz, R., Europarecht, op. cit. 
supra note 138, at para 685; Vahrenwald, A., "Am I So Round with You as You with Me? The 
Bosman Case Before the European Court of Justice", (1996) 7(4) EntLRev, p. 154; Hilf, M. & 
Pache, E., "Das Bosman Urteil des EUGH", (1996) 18 NJW p. 1174. 
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ensure that their nationals are not discriminated as regards to workers from other 
Member Stateslsa. 
Recently, attempts have been made to find a legal base in Community law 
which would provide protection for nationals subject to reverse discrimination. In 
this context, the concept of Union citizenship has been argued to contain a general 
prohibition of discrimination which does not allow the Member States to put their 
own nationals at a disadvantage to EU foreigners'55. So far the Court has not 
recognised claims by EU citizens trying to rely on Article 18 against their Member 
States of origin and has adhered to the internal situation concept, pointing out that a 
purely hypothetical prospect of exercising one's right to free movement does not 
establish a sufficient connection with Community law to justify the application of 
Article 39156 
However, the Court has now breathed new life into the concept of Union 
citizenship, stressing that it "is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of 
the Member States, enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to 
enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such 
exceptions as are expressly provided for"157. Moreover, in an earlier decision, it was 
stated that "Article 8(2) [now 17] of the Treaty attaches to the status of citizen of the 
Union the rights and duties laid down by the Treaty, including the right, laid down in 
Article 6 [now 12] of the Treaty, not to suffer discrimination on grounds of 
nationality within the scope of application ratione materiae of the Treatys158. The 
decisions in Grzelczyk and Martinez Sala clarified that Union citizens lawfully 
residing in another Member State may claim the same rights as nationals in the host 
Member States, irrespective of their classification as workers. Nevertheless, it may 
be doubted whether the Treaty articles on the Union citizenship in connection with 
Article 12 offer protection for Union citizens being subject to reverse discrimination. 
The Court has emphasised in Martinez Sala that the non-discrimination principle is 
154 See Case C-132/93 Steen II [1994] ECR 1-2715, at para 10 and the opinion of AG Darmon, who 
mentioned the German Gleicheitsgrundsatz embodied in Artikel 3 Grundgesetz in this respect. 
iss See Borchardt, K., "Der sozialrechtliche Gehalt der Unionsbürgerschaft", (2000) 29 NJW, p. 2059. 
156 Case 180/83 Hans Moser v. Land Baden-Württemberg [1984] ECR 2539, at para 18; Case C- 
299/95 Friedrich Kremzow v. Republik Österreich [1997] ECR 1-2629, at para 16. 
157 Case C-184/99 Grzelcyk v. Centre public d'aide sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR 
1-6193, at pars 31. 
158 Case C-85/96 Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR 1-269 1, at para 62. 
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limited by the scope of application ratione materiae of the Treaty and although such 
a restriction of scope was not expressly mentioned in Grzelczyk, it is interesting to 
note that in a later case, the Court referred to the paragraph in Grzelczyk cited above, 
but inserted the words "within the scope ratione materiae of the Treaty"159. As the 
Treaty does not cover "wholly internal situations", it is evident that Articles 12 and 
18 do not apply to situations whereby EU nationals, as a result of the application of 
EC law, cannot claim the same rights in their home country as migrant workers from 
other Member States. This is underlined by the fact that both Article 12 and 18 refer 
to the scope of application of the Treaty16°. It has been suggested that the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights will provide general protection from discrimination 
irrespective of a cross-border context 161; however, it should be noted that again, 
Article 21 of the Charter (Article 11-81(2) Constitutional Treaty) guarantees the right 
to non-discrimination on grounds of nationality only "within the scope of application 
of the Treaty". 
Returning to the issue of domestic transfer fees, it is clear that the case of a 
player moving between two clubs in his Member State of origin is not covered by the 
provisions on free movement (at least if he has never exercised his right to free 
movement) and that he cannot invoke EC law to combat a possible discrimination as 
regards players from other Member States. Having said that, one could envisage 
problems arising from the fact that some clubs might be trying to circumvent the 
requirement of a transfer fee for domestic players by "parking" them for a short 
period of time at a partner-club in another Member State, before taking them back 
without having to pay a fee162. However, the whole issue of different treatment of 
domestic and cross-border transfers in relation to the provisions on free movement 
has lost in relevance, as the domestic transfer system has come under scrutiny from 
the Commission under the competition law rules. 
15' Case C-224/98 D'Hoop v. Office nationale de 1'emploi [2002] ECR I-6191, at para 28. 
160 See also Albers, S. in Tomandl, T. (ed), op. cit. supra note 142, p. 15. 
161 Scheuer, A. in Lenz, O. (ed), op. cit. supra note 131, p. 562. 
162 For a more detailed explanation of the matter see Weatherill, S., "Comment to the Bosman Case", 
(1996) CMLR, p. 1020. 
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4. THE 1997 FIFA 
ARTICLE 39 
REGULATIONS UNDER 
4.1.. ARTICLE 12(4) - OBSTACLE TO FREE MOVEMENT? 
When analysing the 1997 FIFA Regulations, it may be difficult at first to understand 
the Community officials' reservations against the football transfer system at the time. 
Why should a club that is interested in a particular player employed by another club 
not be allowed to buy out the remainder of the player's contract, provided that all 
three parties involved come to an understanding? However, it was not so much the 
above mentioned scenario where both parties mutually agree to end the employment 
contract that attracted the attention of the Commission, but the fact that the 1997 
FIFA Regulations did not allow a player to move without the consent of his club. 
Article 12(4) provided that a player could not transfer to another club unless the three 
parties - the club he was leaving, the player himself and the club he was joining - all 
concurred. Moreover, in Circular No 616 from the 0 of June 1997, which set out 
certain decisions of the FIFA Executive Committee on the status of players, FIFA 
expressly stated that the unilateral termination of a contract by a player was to be 
regarded as a breach of Article 12(1) of the 1997 Regulations. This meant that a 
player who had breached the contract with his club would not have been granted a 
licence by the association in question and thus would not have been eligible to play 
for any other club. 
It has already been pointed out that rules laid down by sports bodies are 
subject to the application of EC law in general and the Treaty freedoms in particular. 
Furthermore, it has been established that indistinctly applicable measures such as the 
transfer regulations at issue may fall within the scope of Article 39 of the Treaty if 
access to the employment market in another Member State is restricted. A rule that 
does not allow a player to terminate the employment contract with his current club in 
order to play for a club in another Member State undoubtedly affects his access to the 
employment market. Thus, such a restriction would presumably be infringing the 
provisions on free movement, unless it can be justified under the "rule of reason" test 
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introduced in Bosman. However, such an application of Article 39 would have the 
consequence that any national law allowing employment contracts that cannot be 
unilaterally terminated at any time would be deemed to restrict free movement. 
Considering the fact that if employees were able to leave their job whenever they 
wanted, the European economy would be in turmoil, it is doubtful whether Article 39 
can be interpreted to include an absolute prohibition of binding employment 
contracts. 
The Community does not have the competence to rule on employment law 
matters such as the maximum length of employment contracts or sanctions imposed 
on an employee for breach of contract. Thus, it has been argued that the question 
whether a player was allowed to terminate his contract prematurely to leave for 
another club should be determined by national employment laws and did not fall 
within the scope of the provisions on free movement 163. Obviously, if the legal 
assessment of football transfer rules would be left exclusively to the national courts, 
the transfer system would be treated differently in each Member State. As a 
consequence, players in one Member State would be allowed to leave after, for 
example, four years, while others would have to wait for five, depending on the 
applicable national employment laws. Although this would cause major difficulties 
with regard to the application of the transfer system and legal certainty, it has been 
pointed out that such a state of affairs would have to be regretted, but cannot be of 
Community concerniM. 
However, what if a Member State allowed the conclusion of employment 
contracts binding the employee for a duration of ten years, or even indefinitely? 
Considering the restriction put on a worker thereby, it has to be assumed that such a 
provision would be in breach of Article 39 and could not be justified by public policy 
reasons. It has already been mentioned that a certain stability of employment 
contracts is necessary for a working economy, which means that national legislation 
preventing an employee from unilaterally terminating his contract for a given length 
of time falls outside the scope of Article 39. The question is when such legislation is 
restricting an employee's right to free movement to an extent that it may not be 
163 Klingmüller, A. & Wichert, J., "Die Zulässigkeit von Ablösesummen für vertraglich gebundene 
Profifußballspieler", (2001) 1 SpuRt, p. 4. 
164 Ibid. 
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justified any more? Although it will be very difficult to define the maximum period 
of time after which a worker's right to free movement prevails over the public 
interest in the stability of contracts, it is important to point out that overly restrictive 
provisions of the Member States may breach Article 39165. Thus, the determination 
of the maximum length of employment contracts cannot be exclusively left to the 
Member States, but may have a Community law dimension. 
Even if it is assumed that the national laws in the Member States concerning 
the maximum length of employment contracts are not unnecessarily restrictive and 
players would have had the possibility to challenge the 1997 Regulations before the 
national courts, this does not mean that the provisions on free movement do not 
apply. Community competence in free movement matters exists parallel to the 
Member States' competence regarding employment law. Thus, measures adopted by 
private parties such as FIFA may be assessed under Article 39, as well as national 
employment law. 
It has already been established that the 1997 Regulations restricted free 
movement in the sense that they did not give a player the possibility to take up 
employment in another Member State whilst under contract with another club. Since 
a certain restriction is the very essence of any contract, it is evident that measures 
ensuring that contracts are honoured are not necessarily infringing the provisions on 
free movement. However, what brought the 1997 Regulations under the scope of the 
prohibition laid out in Article 39(1), is the fact that the football governing bodies 
limited player movement to an extent that could not be justified by an interest in 
contract stability. The burden put on the player becomes obvious when it is 
considered that national employment laws, which reflect the compromise adopted by 
the Member States as regards the conflict of interests between employers and 
employees, do not generally allow the conclusion of irrevocable long-term contracts, 
but provide for a maximum duration. Additionally, workers under contract can not 
usually be prevented from taking up employment with another company, but will 
have to pay compensation for breach of contract. In Germany, for example, 
265 See also Commission Case IV/36.583 SETCA -FCTB/FIFA, rejection of complaint of 28 May 
2002, at para 18, where the Commission states that national legislation imposing obligations in the 
case of breach of contract does not infringe Community law, as long as they do not create a 
disproportionate restriction on free movement. 
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employees such as footballers may be bound up to five years after the expiry of 
which they are given the possibility to resign, even if the duration of the contract was 
agreed to be longer 166 An employee may even leave before that, but his employer 
will be eligible for compensation . for loss incurred as a result of the 
breach of 
contract'67. Thus, the conclusion of a contract between an employee and an employer 
cannot be made dependant on the approval of the former employer, even if the 
employee has breached his old contract. In some countries, the employer and 
employee may agree on a non-competition clause, which prohibits the employee 
from working for a competitor for a given length of time after the termination of the 
employment contract. However, such a restriction generally has to be limited in time 
and scope. In Austria, for example, it may only apply for a year after the termination 
of the employment relationship, is restricted to direct competitors of the former 
employer and may not put an excessive burden on the employee'68. As the restriction 
put on players by Article 12(4) applies indefinitely and is not limited to direct 
competitors of the old club, it is evident that it could not be interpreted as a valid and 
enforceable non-competition clause under Austrian law. 
Taking English law as an example, it emerges that, although courts will not 
order the performance of a contract for personal services, a court may by injunction 
prevent the breach of the negative obligation not to work for a rival employer. In 
Warner Bros Inc v. Nelsont69, the actress Bette Davis was successfully prevented 
from breaching her contract with Warner Brother, which effectively meant she could 
either honour the contract or work in another line of business. In contrast, the court 
refused to grant an injunction in the case of long-term agreements, such as a five- 
year management contract with a pop group170 or a two-year management contract 
with a boxer 171. In the latter case, the court pointed out that the longer the term for 
which an injunction was sought, the less readily will the injunction be granted, 
166 § 624 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil Code). 
167 See Klingmüller, A. & Wichert, J., op. cit. supra note 163, p. 3; for a closer examination of the 
damages a club may receive in case of a breach of contract by the player under German law, see 
Büsing, J. & Schmülling, M., "Ersatzansprüche eines Profifußballvereins nach fristloser 
Kündigung eines vertragsbrüchigen Lizenzspielers", (2001) 2 SpuRt, pp. 52 - 55. 168 § 36 Angestelltengesetz (Law on Salaried Employees). 
169 Warner Bros Inc v. Nelson [1936] 3 All ER 160. 
170 Page One Records Ltd v. Britton [1967] 3 All ER 822. 
171 Warren v. Mendy [1989] 3 All ER 103. 
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concluding that a two year period in the context of the comparatively short 
professional life of a boxer was too long, as it would effectively result in the boxer 
having to return to the plaintiff's management or give up boxing. In relation to other 
sports cases, the decision in Warren v. Mendy has given rise to the view that an 
injunction will not be granted if the athlete was hindered from practicing his sport for 
anything other than a short duration'72. Although it is unclear where the court would 
draw the line between short- and long-term contracts, there can be no doubt that a 
rule generally prohibiting a player to leave his current employer for another club is in 
breach of English law, as it may prevent a player from practicing his trade for a very 
long time. 
Considering that, the 1997 Regulations evidently constituted an obstacle to 
free movement because they did not allow a player to terminate his contract 
prematurely, which is emphasised by the fact that he would probably have been able 
to do so under applicable national law. However, it has been argued that professional 
football is different from other economic activities in the sense that there is a special 
requirement for contract stability. Since indistinctly applicable measures affecting 
access to the employment market in other Member States may be justified on non- 
economic grounds purely relating to sport, it is necessary to assess whether the 1997 
Regulations could have been justified for sporting reasons. 
4.1.1. Justification under the Bosman "Rule of Reason"? 
So far the Court has recognised the aims of maintaining a balance between clubs by 
preserving a certain degree of equality and uncertainty as to results and of 
encouraging the recruitment and training of young players173 and the objective of 
ensuring the regularity of sporting competitions 174 as possible reasons to justify a 
restrictive sporting rule, provided the adopted measure is suitable to achieve the 
desired end and does not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose. 
The three main arguments brought forward in defence of the 1997 
Regulations were: firstly, that the rules were needed to ensure a stability of contracts, 
172 See McCutcheon, P., "Negative enforcement of employment contracts in the sports industries", 
(1997) Legal Studies, pp. 73-74. 
173 Bosman, at para 106. 
174 Lehtonen, at para 53. 
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guaranteeing the proper functioning of sporting competition, secondly, that the 
transfer regulations were necessary to retain a competitive balance between clubs and 
thirdly, that the transfer fees were needed to encourage youth development. In view 
of the mentioned case law, these objectives have to be considered as being legitimate 
under Article 39(1) of the Treaty. However, the 1997 transfer rules would only have 
escaped the application of Article 39(1) if they were suitable to achieve the proposed 
aims and fulfilled the requirement of proportionality. Since the goals of achieving a 
competitive balance and encouraging youth development are closely linked, they 
shall be assessed together, before moving on to the more extensive subject of 
contract stability. 
4.1.1.1. Competitive Balance/Youth Development 
After Bosman, many clubs offered their promising young players long-term contracts 
to make sure they would not leave "on a Bosman" and the teams would be able to 
receive a transfer fee. It was believed that like this, small clubs could not only 
recover the costs involved in training youngsters, but were offered the chance to 
generate substantial income from transfer fees in case one of their young prospects 
turned out to be a success. Thus, it was argued that a lot of smaller clubs, especially 
in the lower divisions, relied on the transfer funds from the sale of their youth players 
and without this income would not only give up their involvement in youth 
development, but would face bankruptcy. 
The argument that transfer regulations were indispensable for a sporting 
equilibrium as well as youth development had already been raised in connection with 
the transfer system at issue in Bosman. The Court'at the time acknowledged the need 
for a certain equality and uncertainty of outcome in football, but considered the 
transfer rules at issue an inadequate means of maintaining a financial and 
competitive balance 175. In this context the Court pointed out that the transfer system 
neither precluded the richest clubs from securing the services of the best players, nor 
prevented the availability of financial resources from being a decisive factor in 
competitive sport and thus, was not suitable to achieve the desired end176. As regards 
the aim of giving clubs an incentive to invest in youth development, the Court 
175 Bosman, at para 106. 
176 Ibid, at para 107. 
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admitted that the prospect of receiving transfer fees was indeed likely to encourage 
clubs to seek new talent and train young players. However, the Court pointed out 
that, owing to the difficulties in predicting a young player's sporting future, for the 
clubs the prospect of receiving such fees was too uncertain and thus, could not be a 
decisive factor in recruiting youngsters'77. Moreover, the transfer fees were criticised 
for being unrelated to the actual costs incurred by clubs for the training of young 
players. 
Despite the fact that the 1997 FIFA Regulations did not provide for transfer 
fees for out-of-contract players any more, they effectively achieved the same result 
as the pre-Bosman system, the only difference being that the clubs received the 
transfer fees through mid-contract transfers. Admittedly, players could theoretically 
refuse to enter into long-term contracts, however, few players would have the 
necessary star-status to negotiate such terms. Hence, the Court's reasoning in 
Bosman is also applicable to the 1997 transfer system. In particular, taking into 
account the transfer activity at the time178, the Court's argument that transfer fees do 
not prevent the rich clubs from recruiting the best players proved to be equally true 
for the post-Bosman system. Apart from that, the uncertainty of receiving a transfer 
fee also remained in the new system. Thus, it seems unlikely that the Court - had it 
had the chance to assess the 1997 Regulations - would have considered them to be 
justified. 
However, it should be pointed out that economic research suggests that long- 
term contracts do in fact enhance competitive balance and encourage clubs to invest 
in the training of young players179. Having said that, even if this proposition is 
acknowledged to be true, a provision impeding free movement will only fall under 
177 Ibid, at para 108. 
178 The £ 48 million world record move of Zinedine Zidane from Juventus to Real Madrid in 2001 
and the £ 37 million transfer of Luis Figo from Barcelona to Real Madrid in 2000 have already 
been mentioned. 
179 See Feess, E. & Mühlheusser, G., "The impact of transfer fees on professional sports: an Analysis 
of the New Transfer System for European Football" (2003) 105(1) The Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics, p. 139; Antonioni, P. & Cubbin, J., "The Bosman ruling and the emergence of a single 
market in soccer talent", (2000) 9(2) European Journal of Law'and Economics, pp. 157 - 173; in 
contrast see "Time for a New Approach: The International Transfer System", a FIFPRO Report to 
the European Commission, 9.2.2001, available at www. fifpronet. com, in which it is argued that 
the 1997 transfer system widened, rather than narrowed the increasing gap between rich and poor 
clubs and as a result, the investment in training and development programs has mainly been 
present in the big clubs. 
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the "rule of reason" if it does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve a legitimate 
aim. As will be demonstrated below, the burden put on players by irrevocable long- 
term contracts is such that very convincing arguments would be needed to defend 
such a transfer system for sporting reasons. Although the aims of retaining a sporting 
equilibrium and of encouraging investment in youth development must be considered 
as legitimate, it is doubtful whether long-term contracts could be proved to be the 
only and best way, to achieve the objectives in question. On the other hand, the 
alternative suggested by Advocate-General Lenz and the Court in Bosman - re- 
distribution measures - is not universally accepted by economists as a suitable means 
to achieve the desired objectives180. This leaves the unsatisfactory verdict that in 
order to give a final judgment on the question whether the 1997 Regulations were in 
fact necessary to ensure a competitive balance between clubs and to encourage the 
recruitment of young players or whether there would have been less restrictive means 
available, more extensive economic research and empirical evidence would be 
required. In any case, it could be argued that the 2001 Regulations are an example 
that the aims in question can be secured by a less restrictive transfer system. 
4.1.1.2. Stability of Contracts 
The second and more important argument in favour of the 1997 Regulations is that 
long-term contracts are needed to ensure that contractual obligations are honoured 
and players cannot leave their clubs at a ny given time. As pointed out above, it is 
undoubtedly necessary in the public interest to introduce measures guaranteeing that 
employment contracts are respected and employees may not leave whenever it 
pleases them. This is particularly important in the world of football, where each 
player has a special position in the team and a club can only be run successfully if the 
manager has the opportunity to work with a set team over a certain length of time. 
Also, it is important for clubs to be able to plan their recruitment policy in order to 
make sensible additions to the team, taking into account eventual strengths or 
weaknesses in particular positions. Considering this, it cannot be denied that an 
absolute prohibition on football players from breaching their contracts is probably 
the most suitable method to ensure that contractual responsibilities are respected and 
180 The issue of re-distribution measures as a means to ensure sporting balance will be examined more 
closely below under point 5.1.1.1. 
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clubs know exactly how long a particular player will be available to play for the 
team. 
However, although a certain stability of employment contracts is undeniably 
a basic requirement in any economy, it is doubtful whether a strict refusal to grant a 
player the possibility unilaterally to terminate his contract before its expiry does not 
go beyond what is necessary to ensure the clubs' interest in retaining their players. 
Not only in football, but in any business, a company needs to build a team of workers 
and the security that employees cannot quit at any time. In an ordinary working 
environment, though, it would be considered unacceptable if employees were under 
no circumstances allowed unilaterally to terminate their contracts and take up a more 
lucrative offer. Even a manager at top level, a highly skilled position that can be 
crucial for a company's success, cannot be bound by his contract infinitely. 
Moreover, football managers, which arguably are more significant for a club's 
success than a single player, are able to breach their contracts and move to another 
club, albeit the old employer will be eligible for compensation. Thus, although a 
club's interest in hindering a player from moving on to another engagement at any 
given time is undoubtedly justified, to refuse a player any opportunity to terminate a 
contract prematurely goes too far, particularly when the burden put on players by 
such a system is considered. 
Long-term contracts without the option of unilateral termination put players 
at a disadvantage in many ways. To start with, in many cases players would after a 
few years only receive a fraction of the salary they could have earned if they had had 
the possibility to offer their services on the open market: especially players who had 
signed long-term contracts at a young age and on low wages, and did not have the 
chance to have their earnings adjusted according to their rising market value, unless 
they could move to another club prepared to pay a substantial transfer fee first. 
However, not only financial considerations, but also sporting concerns can trigger a 
player's desire to switch clubs. Taking into account that a player who does not have 
the chance to play first team football will automatically experience a decrease in 
market value, the necessity for a player regularly to take part in competitive matches 
becomes obvious. Thus, a player that had fallen out of favour with his manager and 
lost his place in the team would have desperately tried to engineer a move to a club 
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promising him a chance of first team football. Apart from sporting and financial 
considerations, it has to be considered that a long-term commitment to a particular 
club will also have a major impact on a player's personal life with respect to his 
choice of residence or way of living. Keeping in mind that many managers nowadays 
control their players' eating and social habits, the fact that a footballer could not 
move to another club aquires an even different dimension. Moreover, it is important 
to point out that the professional career of an average football player lasts between 
fifteen to twenty years at most. Consequently, a player that committed himself to a 
club for six years (a time span which was by no means a rarity after Bosman), would 
have been bound for a third of his total career, which undoubtedly intensified the 
restrictions put on players. 
There have been claims, though, that long-term contracts did not constitute a 
disproportionate obstacle to the free movement, as footballers in principle had the 
opportunity to move, provided another club paid the requested transfer fee. Apart 
from the fact that this still left a player dependent on the consent of his club, even if 
the current club agreed to a transfer, at top level the transfer fees were often set at 
enormous amounts which few suitably wealthy clubs in Europe were able to afford. 
This had the additional effect that top-class players who wanted to leave their clubs 
did not have a real choice as to which club they moved to, but were restricted to 
negotiate with the few clubs that did have the means to pay the requested fee. A 
similar problem could be experienced in countries such as Spain, where transfer fees 
would not be negotiated between the clubs, but were determined by a minimum 
release clause included in a player's contract. Although in this particular scenario the 
player could leave without the agreement of his club as soon as another club was 
willing to pay the set fee, in most cases the situation for the particular player was by 
no means different, as transfer fees would often be set at an unrealistically high level. 
However, it has to be taken into account that players would also profit from having 
the security of a long-term contract. The 1997 Regulations did not only prohibit a 
player from moving without the consent of his current club, but also provided that a 
club could not simply terminate a player's contract. Hence, a player with 
deteriorating form or a chronic injury would have a guaranteed income until the end 
of his contract. 
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Although long-term contracts may also have advantages for the players, the 
downside of being bound by a contract with no chance of premature termination 
undoubtedly weighs heavier. Taking into account all the circumstances, it emerges 
that the 1997 FIFA regulations were indeed disproportionate, as the interest of the 
clubs to keep their players and be able to plan their employment policy could not 
outweigh the burden imposed on the players. Moreover, the clubs' interest could 
have been secured by the less restrictive measure of putting an obligation on players 
to compensate clubs for the loss incurred through a breach of contract. Hence, 
although contractual stability is undoubtedly essential in football, it is the fact that 
the FIFA transfer rules did not even allow players who had already fulfilled several 
years of their contracts to transfer to another club that brings the 1997 Regulations 
under the scope of the provisions on the free movement. 
It is necessary to emphasise, though, that this does not mean that footballers 
should be allowed to leave their clubs at any time. On the contrary, contracts should 
bave, to be honoured for a certain period of time, but the longer the employment 
relationship lasts, the club's interest in contractual stability will be less and less 
justified. The main difficulty hereby is to determine exactly the point in time when 
the player's right to free movement takes precedence over the club's concerns and he 
should be allowed to leave. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the rationale behind long-term 
engagements of particular players only partially reflected the clubs' interest in the 
stability of contracts. The fact that clubs only started to sign players on a long-term 
basis after the Court's decision in Bosman, shows clearly that the practice was used 
in order to circumvent the effects of the decision's. In such cases where clubs would 
extend a player's contract for another four or five years, just to sell him a few weeks 
later for a substantial transfer fee, long term contracts were simply used as a means 
to compensate the clubs for the loss of income from transfer fees for out-of-contract 
players. This system of teams buying out the remainder of players' contracts was 
considered a legitimate way to regulate the movement of players after Bosman had 
See also Caiger, A. & O'Leary, 3., "The End of the Affair: The Anelka Doctrine - The Problem of 
Contract Stability in English Professional Football" in Caiger, A. & Gardiner, S. (eds. ), 
Professional Sport in the EU: Regulation and Re-regulation (T. M. C. Asser Press, The Hague, 
2000), p. 204; Weatherill, S, op. cit. supra note 162, p. 1028. 
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forced a change to the old system, whilst ensuring that clubs could still receive 
substantial transfer fees. Thus, even under the altered transfer rules footballers were 
not able to move freely and it could be argued that the new practice of binding 
players on a long-term basis constituted a blatant circumvention of Bosman, which 
infringed Community law. In the majority of cases, such contracts were concluded 
with the single purpose of receiving a transfer fee and the number of players that 
actually left "on a Bosman" was negligible in comparison to mid-contract 
transfers 182. However, it is striking that many legal scholars at the time seemed to 
agree with this system and did not detect any discrepancies with Community law183. 
4.1.2. Exemption under Article 39(3)? 
Having established that the 1997 transfer rules infringed Article 39(1), one may 
wonder whether they would have been open to an exception under Article 39(3) of 
the Treaty. However, taking into account that Article 39(3) was originally addressed 
to measures adopted by the Member States, the question whether private parties such 
as the international football associations should be able to invoke the justifications 
under Article 39(3) has been a matter of discussion ever since the direct horizontal 
effect of the provisions on free movement was confirmed. 
In Bosman, the Court held that "there is nothing to preclude individuals from 
relying on justifications on grounds of public policy, public security or public 
healths184. Even though the Court has acknowledged that the grounds of justification 
under Article 39(3) are available to private parties, it is questionable whether this 
grants sports bodies a suitable instrument to defend their internal rules. For example, 
one may wonder to what extent private organisations may actually invoke public 
182 In this context see Caiger, A. & O'Leary, J., "Towards a Paradigm Shift in Professional Football: 
The Changing Contours of Business Relationships in English Football", (1999) 7(2) SLJ, p. 48, 
citing a Chief Executive of a Premiership club: "We now negotiate much longer contracts 5 years 
plus. We try to get as many players as possible on 5 years. We used to have 2/3 year contracts - 
but if we pay more than £ 200 K for a player we insist on a minimum of four years. The economics 
don't work on short-term contracts. [... ] If players do not sign a new contract within 18 months of 
the expiry of their own contract we will sell them. We have longer contracts to preserve transfer 
fees". 
183 See for example Arens, W., op. cit supra note 137, p. 40; Gebhardt, D. Modelle für die Reform 
des Transfersystems für Berufsfußballspieler aus rechtlicher und tatsächlicher Sicht (Peter Lang 
Verlag, Frankfurt a. M., 2000), p. 86; Hilf, M. & Pache, E., op. cit. supra note 153, p. 1175; 
Grisenthwaite, M., op. cit., p. 204. 
ýý Bosman, at para 86. 
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interest considerations185. In contrast to public authorities, which serve the public 
interest, private associations are founded in order to pursue the private interests of a 
group of individuals. Thus, it is unclear to what extent restrictive rules by private 
parties have to follow the public interest or whether they may be justified by the 
private interest of the group of individuals they represent. To take sports bodies as an 
example, it is widely acknowledged that professional sport has special cultural and 
social characteristics, the preservation of which lie in the public interest. Thus, as 
long as sporting rules are implemented to secure these special sporting features, they 
should be in the public interest. 
On the other hand, it is imaginable that sports bodies may adopt rules that 
serve sporting interests, but are not necessarily covered by the public interest. Thus, 
it is questionable whether such measures would be eligible for justification under 
Article 39(3). In this context, it has been suggested that, following the direct 
horizontal effect of the provisions on free movement, the grounds for justification 
under Article 39(3) ought to be widened to accommodate legitimate private interests. 
In particular, it has been called for that the basic right of association shall be taken 
into account' 86. Accordingly, associations should be able to defend internal rules 
which serve their common interest and may invoke the right to give themselves an 
internal structure and to regulate their own affairs. 
Lacking conclusive case law on the matter, it is unclear how far the Court is 
prepared to go in accepting private interests as a reason for justification under 
Article 39(3). Having said that, provided a private restriction is covered by the 
freedom of association, it could always be argued that the undisturbed exercise of the 
basic right of association as such is in the public interest. On the other hand, 
considering the fact that the Court has been reluctant so far to pay attention to the 
basic right of association, it is doubtful whether measures of a private organisation 
would be excepted under Article 39(3), if they do not have at least some sort of 
iss Zuleeg, M., "Der Sport im Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht", in Will, M. (ed), Sportrecht in 
Europa, (C. F. Müller Juristischer Verlag GmbH, Heidelberg, 1993); see also Weatherill, S., 
"European Football Law", op. cit. supra note 13, p. 353, who points out that there was some risk 
that allowing private parties to invoke notions of public interest, security and health may cause 
their over-stretching. 
186 See Streinz, R. in Tettinger, P. (ed. ), Sport im Schnittfeld von europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht 
und nationalem Recht, (Richard Boorberg Verlag, Stuttgart, 2001), p. 47; Streinz, R. & Leible, S., 
op. cit. supra note 5, p. 463. 
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public interest background apart from the fact that they pursue the particular 
association's objectives. 
4.1.2.1. The 1997 Regulations under Article 39(3) 
Analysing relevant case law, it is evident that the Court has introduced the 
justification test in Bosman as a "rule of reason" in analogy with Cassis de Dijon, 
rather than an extension of the scope of Article 39(3). Consequently, a provision that 
does not pass the "rule of reason" test could theoretically still be justified on grounds 
of public policy, public security or public health. 
However, considering that the first test involves an examination as to whether 
the measure is justified by pressing reasons of public interests, followed by 
proportionality considerations, it is highly unlikely that an indistinctly applicable rule 
which does not meet the conditions of the initial test, will then be justified under 
Article 39(3). The case of the 1997 FIFA transfer rules is no different and despite the 
fact that Article 12(4) might well have been justified under public policy 
considerations, it would again have failed the proportionality test. 
4.1.3. Freedom of Association 
It has already been established above that sports associations are protected by the 
basic-right of freedom of association 187. This human right may only be limited by 
Community law if it is necessary for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others and as long as the restriction does not go any further than is necessary to 
address the legitimate aim pursued. As part of their freedom of association, sports 
bodies such as FIFA are entitled to establish rules to protect the concerns of the 
particular sport. Hence, a provision that prohibits the unilateral termination of a 
footballer's contract might be covered by FIFA's right to freedom of association, as 
long as it is necessary in the interest of the sport of football. 
The 1997 Regulations have been put into place in order to ensure a stability 
of contracts, to establish a sporting balance between clubs and to encourage the 
recruitment of young players, all goals which pursue a sporting interest in so far as 
they shall guarantee the proper functioning of sporting competition. As such they are 
187 See point 1.33.3 above. 
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covered by the basic right of freedom of association. Leaving aside the question 
whether the 1997 Regulations were indeed suitable to achieve these aims, which has 
been discussed above188, according to Article 11(2) of the ECHR, FIFA's regulatory 
power may still be limited by Community law if such a limitation is necessary to 
protect the workers' right to free movement and satisfies the proportionality test. A 
correct evaluation of the basic right of association requires a balancing of the 
conflicting interests, i. e. the football associations' interest in regulating their sport 
against the players' right to free movement. However, if the "rule of reason" test is 
applied as proposed above' 89, it already takes account of the sports' associations right 
to self-regulation as it allows sports bodies to adopt measures following a sporting 
interest. The fact that the "rule of reason" provides for a proportionality test does not 
prevent a proper adherence to the right of association. If the sporting interest could 
be ensured by less restrictive measures, the required balancing approach will 
generally have the effect that the interest of the athlete in free movement prevails. 
Hence, considering that, as has been demonstrated above, a less restrictive regime 
would have been available to ensure contract stability, the football governing bodies' 
right of association may not prevent the application of the provisions on free 
movement in this respect. 
4.2. INDIVIDUAL CONTRACTS - PACTA SUNT 
SERVANDA? 
Usually, transfer restrictions are imposed by measures of sporting bodies regulating 
the movement of players in a collective manner. However, assuming that there were 
no transfer regulations in place, does this mean that players could be bound by 
employment contracts indefinitely? In other words: could a player, who has 
committed himself to a, say, seven year contract, rely on Article 39 to escape his 
contractual obligation? In general, the Member States' labour legislation prevents 
employees from being bound by employment contracts for an excessive period of 
time; still, as a matter of interest, it is worthwhile to examine the issue from a 
188 See point 4.1.1.1 above. 
189 See point 3.2.3.2 above. 
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Community law perspective, assuming there are national labour laws allowing 
irrevocable long-term employment contracts. Moreover, such considerations could 
be relevant in connection with individual release clauses, providing that a certain 
player may only transfer to another club if such club pays a particular transfer fee. 
Whereas the Court applied Article 39 to rules by private parties, regulating 
working conditions collectively, as early as the seventies, the question whether the 
provisions on the free movement of persons also extend to individual contracts 
between private parties has been highly disputed. However, in its decision in 
Angonese, the European Court of Justice confirmed, "the prohibition on grounds of 
nationality laid down in Article 48 [now 39] of the Treaty must be regarded as 
applying to private persons"190Thus, Article 39 not only applies to collective rules 
regulating player movement, but may also concern individual contracts between 
clubs and players. Having said that, it is unclear whether the application of Article 39 
to individual contracts relates exclusively to discriminatory clauses191, or whether 
indistinctly applicable rules hindering an EU national from taking up employment in 
another Member State are also covered. Evidently, only if the latter is the case, could 
the proposed scenario theoretically come under the scope of Article 39(1) of the 
Treaty. 
It has already been identified in what sense long-term contracts restrict a 
player's right to free movement. However, since players, with the help of their 
agents, are able to negotiate the terms of their contracts, it is arguable that it is the 
player's own decision whether he agrees to stay with a club for seven years and 
should consequently be bound by it. Looking at the concept of Article 39 of the 
Treaty, it is not clear whether it is in fact possible for a worker contractually to waive 
his right to free movement. If Article 39 is understood as a tool of internal market 
policy that requires the removal of any obstacles to free movement within the 
Community, the right to free movement is not at the disposal of the individual 
worker. However, the functioning of the common market is already ensured by the 
competition rules, which shall prevent a distortion of competition and do only give 
limited rights to private parties. In contrast, Article 39 was originally intended to give 
190 Angonese, at para 36. 
191 In this sense see Randelzhofer, A. in Grabitz, E. & Hilf, M., Das Recht der Europäischen Union 
(C. H. Beck, München, 2003), p. 47. 
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each individual EU citizen the right to take up work in another Member State and to 
provide him with a remedy to appeal against discriminating measures by the host 
Member State. Although this concept has been extended by the Court to indistinctly 
applicable measures and agreements between private parties, the freedom of 
movement still remains an individual right guaranteed to the worker. Consequently, 
the protection by the right to free movement can in principle be waived by 
concluding an employment contract committing a person to a particular company for 
a limited period of time19z 
However, where a worker enters into an agreement with a party, having an 
unfair advantage in negotiation power, the protection of Article 39 should not be 
withdrawn. An 18-year-old player desperate for the chance to play for a major club, 
for example, will usually have no choice but to accept the terms of contract dictated 
by the club, even if he has to commit himself for six or seven years on a low wage. 
Of course it could be argued that the club offering an undeveloped young prospect a 
chance is also taking a risk that may not pay off, but this cannot detract from the fact 
that the player is put under a disproportionate restriction. In contrast, a top-class 
player earning ten thousands of pounds a week has the possibility to choose which 
club he wants to play for and will be able to negotiate the best deal possible. Such a 
player does not need protection under Article 39 of the Treaty and once he concludes 
an agreement with a club, should be bound by it. The same applies in those scenarios 
where player and club agree on a minimum release clause, which is then introduced 
in the employment contract. Where a player has equal negotiation power, he is in a 
position to dictate the maximum transfer sum fixed in his contract. If a buy-out 
clause features a transfer fee that is absolutely unrealistic in respect of the market 
value of a player, though, it may be suspected that the player was pressured into the 
agreement and therefore should be protected by EC law. 
4.2.1. Justification under Article 39(3)? 
Having identified the difficulties private associations are faced with when trying to 
rely on the grounds for justification set out in Article 39(3), it is evident that it will 
192 See also Klingmüller, "Die Zulässigkeit von Ablösesummen für vertraglich gebundene 
Profifußballspieler", (2001) 1 SpuRt, p. 4. 
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be even harder for a single employer to invoke public interest considerations to 
defend his measures. In this sense, it has been argued that the use of the exceptions 
under Article 39(3) should be restricted to private parties such as FIFA, which have 
been granted powers of self-regulation as a result of delegation by public authorities 
and regulate the conditions of employment in a collective manner within a particular 
sector193 However, once rules by single employers are considered to fall within the 
scope of Article 39(1), it is only fair that the derogations under Article 39(3) should 
be open to them. Having said that, it is difficult to imagine a scenario whereby it 
could be successfully argued that a restrictive measure by an individual employer 
was justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. 
For example, the Basque club Athletico Bilbao has for political and historical 
reasons adopted a policy of exclusively employing native Basque players. At first 
sight, this scenario is reminiscent of the situation in Angonese, where a private 
employer introduced a language requirement, which effectively favoured workers 
from a certain region. Thus, it seems impossible to provide a valid legal argument 
that explains why such a blatant case of nationality discrimination should be justified 
with regard to the public interest. However, unlike in the case of any ordinary 
company, Bilbao's fans identify themselves with their club and would be devastated 
if its recruitment policy changed. That this situation has to be differentiated from 
cases like Angonese is also underlined by the fact that for Bilbao, which restrain 
themselves to a very small pool of possible employees, this actually means an 
economic and sporting disadvantage in respect to other clubs. This illustrates that 
such recruitment decisions are solely based on cultural and historical, rather than 
economic considerations, which should be acknowledged. Other examples are 
imaginable: What if a club announces that it will exclusively take on domestic 
players to strengthen the development of the national team? As such a practice is 
undoubtedly discriminatory and therefore may not escape the application of Article 
39(1) under the Bosman "rule of reason", one may wonder whether such special 
sporting interests may be accommodated under Article 39(3). Considering the 
wording of Article 39(3), it seems unlikely that such discriminatory measures could 
193 See Fernandez Martin, "Re-defining Obstacles to the Free Movement of Workers", (1996) 21(4) 
ELRev, p. 325; Kranz, A., op. cit. supra note 133, p. 450. 
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be justified under the public interest. Having said that, it seems unsatisfactory that 
clubs should not be able to follow a certain recruitment policy in the sporting interest 
or for cultural reasons. Also, it is submitted that in contrast to other private parties 
like FIFA, which regulate sporting activity in a collective manner, private employers 
should be able to enjoy a wider discretion when it comes to the implementation of 
such restrictive practices. In any case, although it has to be welcomed that the public 
interest exceptions under Article 39(3) are now available to private employers, one 
may wonder whether they in fact sufficiently reflect the interests of the parties 
concerned. 
Returning to the case at hand, it suffices to refer to the explanations put 
forward under point 4.1.2 above, stating that the burden put on players by transfer 
regulations not allowing the unilateral termination of long-term contracts is 
excessive. The same rationale applies to the scenario whereby no transfer regulations 
exist and players were forced into such contracts, which means the restriction 
imposed thereby may not be justified under Article 39(3) of the Treaty. 
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5. EC COMPETITION LAW 
When assessing the application of Community law to sport, it becomes evident that 
sporting rules not only fall within the scope of the provisions on free movement, but 
may also be caught by the prohibitions set out in Articles 81(1) and 82 of the Treaty. 
However, whereas it is settled case law that measures established by sports bodies 
are subject to the application of Article 39, the Court has repeatedly passed on the 
chance to assess sporting rules under the provisions on competition law'. In Bosman, 
for example, the Court took the view that it was unnecessary to consider Articles 81 
and 82 of the Treaty, since the sporting rules in question had already been held as 
infringing the right to free movement2. Similarly, it refused to address the issue of 
competition law in Deliege and Lehtonen, claiming that the national court in question 
had not provided sufficient information to enable the Court to define the relevant 
markets3. Hence, when examining the application of EC competition law to sport, 
official guidance can merely be deducted from Commission documents or statements 
of Community officials, rather than case law. In this sense, one can only hope that 
sooner rather than later the Court will have the opportunity to define its approach to 
sporting matters under Articles 81 und 82 of the Treaty, removing the existing legal 
uncertainty in the area4. 
' The only time where a sports case exclusively relating to a question of competition law rather than 
free movement reached the Court, the parties settled out of court and the case was removed from 
the register after the Advocate-General had delivered her opinion. It is interesting to note that the 
opinion was available on the EU website for a short period of time and was removed without being 
officially reported, see Case C-264/98 Tibor Balog v Royal Charleroi Sporting Club ASBL, 
removed from the register, opinion of AG Stix-Hackl, delivered on 29 March 2001. 
2 Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Association and Others v. Bosman 
and Others [1995] ECR I-4921, at para 138. 
3 Cases C-51/96 & 191/97 Christelle Deliege v. Ligue Francophone de Jud9 et Disciplines 
Associees ASBL [2000] ECR 1-2549, at para 36 and Case C-176/96 Jyri Lehtonen v. Federation 
Royale Belge des Societe de Basketball ASBL [2000] ECR I-2681, at pars 28. 
° It has already been mentioned that the Court of First Instance has tackled the issue of sporting 
rules under EC competition law in Case T-313/02 Meca-Medina & Majcen v. Commission [2004] 
3 CMLR 60; since Mr. Meca-Medina and Mr. Majcen have appealed against the judgment (see OJ 
2005 C 57/16), the Court will most likely address the competition law issue this time, and as 
expressed by Weatherill, "it is to be hoped that it [the appeal] will be used as a springboard to a 
clearer analysis of the limits of EC law and, in particular, that the CFI's disdain for orthodox 
competition law analysis as a means to deal with sporting practices will be set aside", see 
Weatherill, S., "Anti-Doping Rules and EC Law", (2005) 26(7) ECLR, p. 416. 
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5.1. THE APPLICATION OF COMPETITION LAW TO SPORT 
The competition rules generally apply to all sectors of economy except where the 
Treaty itself provides otherwise5. Despite the fact that professional sport undoubtedly 
constitutes an economic activity, it has to be differentiated from other industries in so 
far as it is of great social and cultural significance in European society. Having said 
that, the social characteristics of sport cannot override the fact that professional sport 
is a major player in the European economy and as such should not be automatically 
exempted from the application of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty6. 
In reaction to demands by scholars and the European Parliament, the 
Commission has repeatedly acknowledged the need to protect-the social and cultural 
benefits of sport and has shown willingness to take into account the particular 
characteristics of sport when assessing sporting rules under EC competition law7. 
Although the motives for granting sport a special status in competition law are 
certainly laudable, the Commission has so far struggled to provide a convincing legal 
base for such privileged treatment. However, as will be demonstrated below, the 
decision in Wouters8 gives reason to believe that the Court has moved away from a 
strictly market-orientated approach and will be more willing in future to take into 
account non-economic considerations when assessing a restrictive agreement under 
EC competition law. 
As it does, for example, for: agriculture, Articles 36 and 37 of the EC Treaty; national security, 
Article 296; and in the past, coal and steel, see Article 305(1), establishing that provisions of the 
EC Treaty shall not affect provisions of the ECSC Treaty, which had its own competition rules 
(Articles 65 and 66). 
6 See Commission press release IP/99/133, "Commission debates application of its competition 
rules to sport", 24.2.1999; EP Resolution on the role of the European Union in the field of sport, 
A4-0197/97, OJ C 200/252,30.6.1997, point J; Schellhaaß H. & Enderle, G., "Sportlicher versus 
ökonomischer Wettbewerb", Arbeitspapiere das Instituts für Rundfunkökonomie and der 
Universität zu Köln, Issue No. 95/98, June 1998, p. 11; Speech Schaub, A., "EC Competition 
Policy and its Implications for the Sports Sector", World Sports Forum, St Moritz, 8.3.1998. 
See Commission press release IP/99/918, "Helsinki Report on Sport: The Commission favours a 
new approach", 12.1.1999; Commission press release IP/99/133, op. cit.; Speech Pons, J. -F., 
"Sport and European Competition Law", Fordham Corporate Law Institute, Twenty-sixth Annual 
Conference on International Antitrust Law & Policy (1999), p. 6. 
$ Case C-309/99 Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Avocaten [2002] ECR I- 
1577. % 
147 
5.1.1. The "Peculiar Economics" of Professional Team 
Sports 
Apart from the social dimension of sport, sports organisations have always claimed 
that the special economic structure of professional team sports warrants an 
exemption from the application of the competition rules. Thus, the question whether 
the sports industry has characteristics different from other markets has been the 
subject of animated debates between economists around the globe since the 1950s9. 
Unlike the textbook firm in economic theory, operating independently from other 
competitors with the ultimate goal to drive rival firms out of the market in order to 
acquire monopoly status, a sports team depends on its competitors and has a vital 
interest in their survival. No club is able to produce a valuable good on its own, 
which means that without co-operation between the clubs in a league there is no 
competition at all: sporting competition needs a certain degree of organisation, which 
requires the competitors in a league to establish basic rules for the operation of the 
league, such as a fixture list. 
5.1.1.1. The Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis 
Apart from organisational matters, the most "peculiar" phenomenon in professional 
team sports, enhancing the need for co-operation, is described by the "uncertainty of 
outcome" hypothesis, according to which spectators prefer closer to less balanced 
contests. Thus, it is argued that the domination of a single club or a few big teams 
would reduce the overall consumer interest in the sport, thereby negatively affecting 
the dominant team(s) in the long run. It is the acceptance of this concept that has led 
sports regulatory bodies to introduce anti-competitive practices such as re- 
distribution mechanisms or restrictions on the labour market, in order to ensure a 
sporting balance between the clubs and prevent a few dominant teams from gaining 
too much market power. However, despite the fact the "uncertainty of outcome" 
hypothesis is almost universally accepted by economists10, there have been concerns 
9 See for example Rottenberg, S., "The Baseball Players' Labour Market" (1956) 64 Journal of 
Political Economy, pp. 242 - 258; Neale, W., "The Peculiar Economics of Professional Sports" 
(1964) 78 Quaterly Journal of Economics, pp. 1-14. 
10 See for example Quirk J. & Fort R., Pay Dirt: The Business of Professional Team Sports (2"d edn, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997), p. 243; Morrow, S., The new Business of Football- 
148 
over the lack of conclusive empirical evidence to support the concept". Furthermore, 
the theory has been criticised as an "overworked hypothesis in explaining the 
demand for professional team sports"12, in so far as there has been evidence of long- 
run domination in sports, which has developed into a traditionally acceptable form of 
competition. This has been the case in Scottish football where the importance of 
competition and sporting balance is less prominent owing to the historical dominance 
of the so-called "Old Firm", Celtic and Rangers 13. 
Although there might be doubts as regards the uncertainty of outcome 
hypothesis, in most professional team sports the governing bodies have accepted the 
need to ensure a sporting equilibrium and introduced measures to achieve a certain 
sporting and financial balance between clubs. Evidently, the role of such bodies like 
the football associations in managing the collective interests of all clubs is in direct 
conflict with the interests of the most successful clubs, which pursue the objective of 
maximising their individual profit and which, without restrictions, would be more 
profitable. A typical example for this conflict of interests is the collective selling of 
football broadcasting rights: this practice works in favour of smaller clubs in a 
league, receiving a bigger share of television revenues in comparison to a situation 
where broadcasting rights are sold individually. However, the joint selling of 
broadcasting rights is usually objected to by the bigger clubs, which could be 
Accountability and Finance in Football, (Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 1999), p. 8; Haan, M., 
Koning, R. & van Witteloostuijn, A., "Market Forces in European Soccer", University of 
Groningen Research Institute, Research Report No 02F18 (2002), available at 
www. ub. rug. nl/eldoc/som/f/02F18. pdf, p. 2; see also AG Lenz in Bosman, at para 227, where the 
AG stressed the special economics of the football market: "Football is played by two teams 
meeting each other and testing their strength against each other. Each club thus needs the other one 
in order to be successful. For that reason each club has an interest in the health of the other clubs. 
The clubs in a professional league thus do not have the aim of excluding their competitors from 
the market. Therein lies [... ] a significant difference from the competitive relationship between 
undertakings in other markets. It is likewise correct that the economic success of a league depends 
not least on the existence of a certain balance between its clubs. If the league is dominated by one 
overmighty club, experience shows that lack of interest will spread". 
See Cairns J., Jennet, N. & Sloane, P., "The Economics of Professional Team Sports: A Survey of 
Theory and Evidence", (1986) 13 Journal of Economic Studies, p. 5; see also Gratton, C., "The 
Peculiar Economics of English Football" in Garland, J., Malcolm D. & Rowe M. (eds), The Future 
of Football: Challenges for the Twenty-First Century (Frank Cass Publishers, London, 2000), 
p. 28. 
12 So Downward, P. & Dawson, A., The Economics of Professional Team Sports (Routledge, 
London, New York, 2000), p. 149. 
13 For further expertise on the Scottish dimension, see Morrow, S., op. cit. supra note 10, pp. 25 - 
27, who points out that "Scottish football fords itself in a very unusual position whereby the 
financial and footballing success of these two clubs [Celtic and Rangers] seems to invalidate 
conventional economic theory on sporting competition". 
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generating a lot more income if they were allowed to market the rights to their games 
individually and did not have to support the weaker teams. 
When examining the practices with which sporting authorities are trying to 
establish a sporting equilibrium, it is possible to detect differences not only between 
certain sports, but also in respect of team sports on either side of the Atlantic. 
Whereas in US pXofess1onal team sports player drafts, wage caps and gate revenue 
sharing are the most commonly used mechanisms, in Europe the collective marketing 
of broadcasting rights and transfer systems are the preferred methods to ensure an 
uncertainty of results. All of these measures have been critically analysed by 
economists as regards their suitability to achieve competitive balance and league 
quality. However, the majority of the research produced has handed a blow to the 
sports bodies' arguments that certain restrictive practices are necessary tools to keep 
a sporting balance in the league. It has been established, for example, that the 
introduction of free agency in American baseball and basketball did not have a 
negative impact on the competitive balance in those leagues 14. Similarly, the football 
transfer system at issue in the Bosman case was widely considered a rather 
ineffective mechanism for achieving competitive balance 15. 
In this context, Advocate-General Lenz argued that less restrictive means, in 
particular re-distribution measures, were available to the footballing bodies in order 
to ensure an uncertainty of results 16. However, there is disagreement amongst 
economists as to whether revenue sharing does in fact achieve competitive balance17, 
or whether it actually reduces it18. The reason behind this difference of opinion lies in 
14 See Quirk J. & Fort, R., op. cit. supra note 10, p. 293; in favour of a system of free agency see also 
Ross, S., "Restraints on Player Competition that Facilitate Competitive Balance and Player 
Development and their Legality in the United States and in Europe" in Jeanrenaud, C. & Kesenne, 
S. (eds), Competition in European Sports after the Bosman Case: Competition Policy in 
Professional Sports (Standaad, Antwerp, 1999), p. 96. 
15 See Kesenne S., "Player Market Regulation and Competitive Balance in a Win Maximizing 
Scenario" in Jeanrenaud C. & Kesenne S. (eds), op. cit. supra note 14, p. 129; Ross, S. op. cit. 
supra note 14, p. 100. 
16 AG Lenz in Bosman, at para 270. 
17 See Kesenne, S., "Revenue Sharing and Competitive Balance in Professional Team Sports", 
(2000) 1(1) Journal of Sports Economics, pp. 56 - 65; Schellhaaß & Enderle, op. cit. supra note 6, 
p. 7. 
is See Feess, E. & Stähler, F., "Revenue Sharing in Professional Sports Leagues" (2002), p. 1, 
available at http: //gemini. econ. umd. edu/cgi-bin/conference/download. cgi? db name=IIPF59& 
paper_id=87; see also Lewis, A., Bell, A., Chilvers, C. et al. (eds. ), Sport: Law and Practice 
(Butterworths, London, 2002), where it is pointed out that a re-distribution system that takes away 
too much money from the big clubs destroys the incentive to suceed. 
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the fact that most economic models of professional team sports are based on the 
hypothesis that clubs are profit maximisers19, implying that the ultimate goal of the 
team or respectively its owner(s) is to make as much money as possible. Whereas 
this generally applies to the highly commercialised American market, economists 
have questioned the relevance of the profit maximisation assumption for European 
professional team sports20. Thus, it has been argued that European clubs are in fact 
win-maximisers, as they are not purely profit-orientated, but their main object is to 
produce playing success21. Hence, whether football authorities should be allowed to 
use revenue sharing mechanisms under EC competition law ultimately depends on 
the question whether football is in fact an industry different to other markets in the 
sense that football clubs, unlike other firms, rate sporting success higher than 
financial profit. The conflict over revenue sharing practices makes clear that, when 
examining measures imposed as a means to ensure a certain uncertainty of outcome, 
a thorough economic analysis is needed to establish whether the adopted restraints 
are suitable to protect the league's interest in a competitive balance effectively. 
5.1.1.2. Teams Sports -A Natural Monopoly 
Professional sports leagues not only differ from other markets owing to the 
requirement of an uncertainty of outcome, but also in so far as they constitute what is 
commonly referred to as a "natural" monopoly. A natural monopoly presupposes a 
market with substantial barriers to entry where a single seller is supplying the entire 
market with a unique product and leaves the customer without the possibility of 
substitution 22. The market for football satisfies these criteria: Firstly, professional 
football in Europe is exclusively organised by FIFA or associations belonging to 
19 See for example, Neale, W., op. cit. supra note 9, pp. 1- 14; also Feess, E. & Stähler, F., op. cit. 
supra note 18, who dismiss the notion that anything can stop clubs from becoming ordinary firms 
as being "naive", p. 10. 
20 See Kesenne, S. in Jeanrenaud, C. & Kesenne S. (eds), op. cit. supra note 14, p. 117; Sloane, P., 
"The Economics of Professional Football: the Football Club as a Utility Maximiser" (1971) 2(17) 
Scottish Journal of Political Economy, pp. 121 - 146; Foster, K., "Can Sport be Regulated by 
Europe?: An Analysis of Alternative Models", in Caiger, A. & Gardiner, S. (eds), Professional 
Sport in the EU: Regulation and Re-regulation, (T. M. C. Asser Press, The Hague, Netherlands, 
2000), p. 57. 
21 It remains to be seen whether Malcolm Glazier's take-over of Manchester United marks the start 
of US conditions being introduced in European team sports, i. e. a shift from a win-orientated club 
management to a predominantly profit-orientated management to return the owners' investments. 
u See Foster, K., "How Can Sport be Regulated" in Greenfield, S. & Osborn, G. (eds), Law and 
Sport in Contemporary Society (Frank Cass, London, 2000), p. 270. 
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FIFA. Secondly, for a real fan, there are no substitutes for football. Most supporters 
would not even switch allegiances from one club to another, let alone watch ruby or 
cricket because of an advance in ticket prices. Although there may be consumers 
who would be happy to watch another sport instead if the price for receiving 
coverage of football games increased, the only available alternative for the majority 
of football fans would be to give up sport altogether. Finally, a single league can 
deliver the product (the sport in question) at a lower cost than a multiplicity of 
leagues, with the result that generally there is only one league per sport per nation 23 - 
Furthermore, considering the enormous expense involved in the organisation of team 
sports, it emerges that it is virtually impossible to establish a rival football league. 
It has been submitted that the rules on competition apply to free markets only 
and therefore alternative forms of regulation are needed on markets with a natural 
monopoly24. However, the fact that the football industry qualifies as a natural 
monopoly means that consumers in fact require even more protection by competition 
law, as the failure of the normal market mechanisms give the football associations 
and the clubs an opportunity to abuse their market power. This has been illustrated, 
for example, by cases of price fixing for replica football kits in England, whereby ten 
businesses, including the English FA and Manchester United, have been fined a total 
of £ 18.6 million by the Office of Fair Trading25. 
5.1.2. EC Competition Law - Room for a Sporting Exception? 
Despite the fact the Commission has explicitly recognised the peculiar economics of 
sport, as well as its social significance, it nevertheless rejected the idea of a total 
exemption of the sport sector from the application of competition law26. Considering 
23 See Downward, P. & Dawson, A., op. cit. supra note 12, p. 21; this has been particularly evident 
in the US, where there have been repeated attempts to establish rival baseball leagues, all of which 
failed after a short period of time. 
24 See Foster, K. in Greenfield, S. & in Osborn, G. (eds), op. cit. supra note 22, p. 272, who states 
that "A natural monopoly is the antithesis of the free market. Regulation via competition law is 
inappropriate". 
25 Decision of the OFT No. CA98/06/2003 from 1.8.2003, an appeal against the decision has been 
dismissed by the Competition Appeal Tribunal, see Coulter, A., "Anti-Competitive Agreements: 
Football Replica Kits - Price Fixing, ECLR (2005) 26(2), N32-33. 26 See Speech Monti, M., "Competition and the Rules of the Game", Conference on Governance in 
Sport, Brussels, 26.2.01, SPEECH/01/84; Speech Schaub, A., "Sports and Competition: 
Broadcasting Rights of Sports Events", Jornada dia de la competencia, Madrid, 26.2.02; Report 
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the substantial economic potential of the sports industry, it would definitely go too 
far to remove the whole sector from the scope of competition law and one has to 
agree with the statement of a Commission official, stressing that "a general 
exemption from the competition rules for the sports sector is unnecessary, 
undesirable and unjustified"27. Still, there have been attempts to construe a "sporting 
exception" in EC competition law, argued to embrace rules which are of sporting 
interest only and measures necessary for the organisation of sport itself 8. It has 
already been established above that genuine "rules of the game" are not covered by 
the Treaty, since they do not affect economic activity. However, one should be wary 
of allowing exceptions to competition law in cases where sporting measures have an 
economic impact, even if it is only incidental. Those in favour of a sporting 
exception claim that rules necessary to ensure an uncertainty of results, distribution 
measures adopted to encourage the development of young players, selection rules for 
international tournaments, rules establishing fixed transfer periods29 and anti-doping 
regulations do not fall within the scope of the Treaty30. The sporting exception in EC 
competition law is said to be an "autonomous principle, which has its affinities with, 
but is independent of, the `rule of reason "'31 
The Commission has confirmed in the past that provisions inherent to a sport 
and/or necessary for its organisation do not fall within the scope of Articles 81 and 
82 of the Treaty, provided they are applied in an objective, transparent and non- 
discriminatory manner32. However, the fact that the Commission has acknowledged 
that certain sporting measures may not come under the scope of Article 81 of the 
Treaty offers no conclusive proof that there exists such a thing as a sporting 
from the Commission to the European Council with a view to safeguard current sports structures 
and maintaining the social function of sport within the Community framework ("The Helsinki 
Report on sport"), Brussels, 10.12.1999, COM (1999) 644 final, p. 8; Commission press release 
IP/99/133, op. cit.; Speech Van Miert, K., "Sport et concurrence: Devdloppements recents et 
action de la Commission", Forum Europeen du Sport, Luxembourg, 27.11.97. 
27 Speech Schaub, A., World Sports Forum, St Moritz, op. cit. supra note 26. 
Z$ See Beloff, M., "The Sporting Exception in EC Competition Law" (1999) European Current Law, 
at xvi; Lewis, A., Bell, A., Chilvers, C. et al. (eds. ), op. cit. supra note 18, at para B2.56. 
29 See Beloff, M., op. cit. supra note 28, at xvi. 
30 Lewis, A., Bell, A., Chilvers, C. et al. (eds. ), op. cit. supra note 18, at paras B2.56 - B2.60. 31 Beloff, M., op. cit. supra note 28, at xvi. 
32 See for example, Speech Monti, M., op. cit. supra note 26; Speech Schaub, A., Jornada dia de la 
competencia, Madrid, op. cit. supra note 26; Speech van Miert, K., op. cit. supra note 26; Speech 
Pons, J: F., op. cit. supra note 26, p. 6; Commission press release IP/99/133, op. cit. supra note 26; 
Helsinki Report on Sport, op. cit. supra note 26, p. 8. 
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exception in EC competition law. Besides, the rationale behind an exception for rules 
without which a sport could not exist on one hand and a general exemption for rules 
purely motivated by sporting considerations on the other is fundamentally different. 
Whereas it will be demonstrated below that an exemption for rules vital for the 
existence of a sport is consistent with EC competition law, an exemption for rules 
adopted by sports bodies by reason of their sporting nature is not. Once a sporting 
measure has a restrictive effect on competition, it is principally caught by the Treaty 
and may only be justified according to the rules of competition law33. It seems 
unsatisfactory, to say the least, that sporting measures which might have a 
considerable economic impact should be capable of being exempted from 
competition law without any further examination, simply because they were 
motivated by non-economic considerations. In this context, it should also be 
considered what repercussions for other industries it would have once the Pandora's 
Box of a sporting exception to EC competition law was opened, considering the 
number of businesses claiming to pursue purely social or cultural interests. 
Moreover, as pointed out by the Commission, it is not always easy to identify 
the intrinsic sporting nature of certain rules, either because they might have 
significant economic consequences or because the rule, originally established for 
purely sporting reasons, has taken on more of an economic character as a result of 
the economic activities associated with the sport 34. The difficulties involved in the 
construction of an exception to provisions of the Treaty, based on the sporting nature 
of certain rules, have already been highlighted in connection with the articles on free 
movement. The concept *of a sporting exception in EC competition law only confuses 
matters and also stands in contrast to the Court's decisions regarding free movement, 
33 See also the Court of Arbitration for Sport Case 98/200 AEK Athens and Slavia Prague v. UEFA, 
at paras E. 114 - E. 116, where the CAS held that rules regarding the prohibition of common 
ownership of football clubs in Europe did not fall within any "sporting exception", given their 
economic nature. In this context the Court pointed out that the scope of such an exception to EC 
competition law would have to be construed so narrowly that in practice no sporting rule would 
ever fall within such an exception. 
34 "Draft/Preliminary Guidelines on the Application of the Competition Rules to Sport", Competition 
Memorandum of 15.2.1999, unpublished, p. 29; see also speech Pons, J. -F., op. cit. supra note 26, 
p. 7. 
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where an exception for sporting rules by reason of their sporting nature cannot be 
identified either 3s 
5.1.3. The "Rule of Reason" in EC Competition Law 
Having established that there is no room for a sporting exception in EC competition 
law, one may wonder whether any sporting rule restricting competition necessarily 
infringes EC competition law. It is evident that if Article 81(1) was taken literally, 
almost all contractual arrangements containing restrictive clauses would come within 
the scope of the prohibition and, unless they were exempted under Article 81(3), 
would be void. In order to render the prohibition in Article 81(1) more flexible, there 
have been calls for the introduction of a "rule of reason" in EC competition law. The 
"rule of reason" doctrine has its origins in US antitrust law, which does not provide 
for a mechanism in the form of Article 81(3) of the Treaty. Hence, US courts have 
introduced a balancing approach, whereby the anti-competitive effects of an 
agreement that contains no per se restriction are weighed against its positive effects 
on competition. The question whether the "rule of reason" has a place in EC 
competition law has been a matter of discussion throughout the years. Thereby, many 
scholars have emphasised the differences between US and EC competition law, 
arguing that in order to prevent confusion, the use of the notion "rule of reason" 
should be avoided in an EC law context36. Undoubtedly, the two systems are so 
different that the adoption of US terminology in Community law should be treated 
with the utmost caution. In EC competition law, an agreement between undertakings 
that restricts competition is generally caught under Article 81(1) with the 
consequence that, unless it satisfies the criteria for exemption set out in Article 81(3), 
it is void. Thus, unlike the so-called "rule of reason" approach in US antitrust law, 
the wording of Article 81(1) does not allow the balancing of anti- and pro- 
35 However, see the decision of the Court of First Instance in Meca-Medina. The stated exception for 
rules purely motivated by sporting considerations from the provisions on free movement, as well 
as competition law has already been criticised, see point 3.2.3.4 above. The judgment will be 
further examined under point 5.1.4.1. 
36 See for example Goyder, D., EC Competition Law (4`h edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2003), p. 117; Whish, R., Competition Law (5th edn., Lexis Nexis UK, London, 2003), p. 102; on 
the other hand see the opinion of AG Roemer in Case 56/65 Societe Technique Miniere v. 
Maschinenbau Ulm [1966] ECR 235, at p. 257, who suggested the use of the notion "Yule of 
reason" in EC competition law. 
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competitive effects, as restrictive agreements can only be justified if they satisfy the 
conditions of Article 81(3). Moreover, in contrast to the US system, any agreement 
which falls under the prohibition of Article 81(1) may be exempted under Article 
81(3) of the Treaty, even if it includes per se or (as the Commission refers to them) 
"hardcore" restraints on competition37. If the pro- and anticompetitive effects of an 
agreement were already evaluated under Article 81(1) of the Treaty, Article 81(3) 
would be deprived of its function, amounting to a factual amendment of the Treaty, 
without following the necessary procedures38. Consequently, the concept of a "rule 
of reason" as applied in US antitrust law cannot be adopted in EC competition law, 
as this would constitute a breach of the Treaty. 
On the other hand, when analysing relevant case law of the Court of Justice, 
one can find several examples whereby the Court has considered agreements 
containing restrictions not to be caught by the prohibition in Article 81(1). The first 
in a series of such decisions was Societe Technique Miniere v. Maschinenbau Ulm, 
in which the Court established that agreements restricting competition were 
compatible with Article 81(1) of the Treaty, if, taking all the circumstances in the 
particular case into account, it was apparent that without those restrictions the 
competition to be protected would not be possible at all. In the particular case, which 
involved a clause in a distribution contract granting the distributor the exclusive right 
to supply a certain area, the Court held that the agreement did not fall foul Article 
81(1), arguing that "it may be doubted whether there is an interference with 
competition if the said agreement seems really necessary for the penetration of a new 
area by an undertaking"39. Taking into account the main rationale behind the 
37 See Case T-17/93 Matra Hachette v. Commission [1994] ECR 11-595, at para 85, "no anti- 
competitive practice can exist which, whatever the extent of its effect on a given market, cannot be 
exempted". 
38 See Manzini, P. "The European Rule of Reason - Crossing the Sea of Doubt", (2002) 23(8) 
ECLR, p. 395; Schaub, A., Speech at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute New York, 25th Annual 
Conference: International Antitrust Law and Policy, "EC Competition System - Proposals for 
Reform"; "White paper on modernisation of the rules implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC 
Treaty", OJ 1999 C 132/1; see also Case T-112/99 Metropole Television (M6) and Others v. 
Commission [2001] ECR 11-2459, at para 74 where the CFI submitted that "Article 85(3) [now 
81(3)] of the Treaty would lose much of its effectiveness if such an examination [the weighing of 
pro- and anti-competitive aspects of a restriction] had to be carried out already under Article 85(1) 
[now 81(1)] of the Treaty", confirmed in Case T-65/98 Van den Bergh Foods Ltd v. Commission 
[2003] ECR II-4653, at para 107. 
39 Case 56/65 Case 56/65 Societe Technique Miniere v. Maschinenbau Ulm [1966] ECR 235, at p. 
250. 
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existence of competition law, the preservation of a competitive market, it seems 
logical that agreements without which the relevant trade would not take place at all, 
should not be caught by the prohibition in Article 81(1), despite their restrictive 
nature. Hence, the decision in Societe Technique Miniere did not involve a balancing 
of pro- against anticompetitive effects, but simply recognised that, owing to market 
imperfections, restrictive practices may be necessary for the existence of agreements 
that are in principle beneficial for the market. This approach implies an acceptance 
that in certain cases perfect competition may not be achievable and competition law 
therefore aims for workable competition, a view that was confirmed in Metro 140. 
Only two weeks after the decision in Societe Technique Miniere, the Court 
assessed a similar distribution agreement, but considered it as infringing EC 
competition law. The reason for the different treatment of the two cases stemmed 
from the fact that in Consten & Grundig41 the distributor was granted absolute 
territorial protection, whereas the agreement in Societe Technique Miniere allowed 
parallel importation and re-exportation, thereby offering a lesser degree of 
exclusivity. Comparing the two cases, it emerges that the Court took the view that an 
agreement such as the clause in Consten & Grundig, which had as its very object the 
distortion of competition, could be condemned under Article 81(1) without requiring 
any further analysis of the market circumstances42. It follows that in EC competition 
law there also exists a concept of per se restrictions, in so far as agreements, which 
have the very object of distorting competition, fall foul of Article 81(1) in any case, 
making it impossible to remove such agreements from the scope of Article 81(1), 
even if they are necessary to establish competition43. However, it is important to keep 
in mind that in contrast to the situation in US antitrust law, even agreements which 
40 Case 26/76 Metro SB Großmärkte v. Commission (No 1) [1977] ECR 1875, at para 20; see Lane, 
R., EC Competition Law (Pearson Education Limited, Harlow, 2001), at p. 98. 41 See Cases C-56&58/64 Etablissements Consten SA & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission 
[1966] ECR 299. 
42 Ibid, at p. 342, "for the purpose of applying Article 85(1) [now 81(1)], there is no need to take 
account of the concrete effects of an agreement once it appears that it has as its object the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition". 
43 See Case T-148/89 Trefilunion SA v. Commission [1995] ECR 11-1063, at para 109, where the 
Court of First Instance pointed out that "the fact that the infringement of Article 85(1) [now 81(1)] 
of the Treaty [... ] is a clear one necessarily precludes the application of a rule of reason, assuming 
such a rule to be applicable in Community competition law, since in that case it must be regarded 
as an infringement per se of the competition rules"; see also Case C-235/92 Montecatini SpA v. 
Commission [1999] ECR 1-4539, at para 133. 
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have the object of distorting competition may still be allowed, provided they satisfy 
the conditions set out in Article 81(3). 
Analysing subsequent case law of the European Court of Justice and the 
Court of First Instance, it becomes clear that agreements restricting competition will 
usually only fall outwith the prohibition in Article 81(1) if they are not hardcore anti- 
competitive, pursue a legitimate objective compatible with competition law aims and 
the restraint is ancillary to the existence of the agreement and proportionate to the 
end pursued. Thus, restrictive practices were held to fall outside the scope of 
Article 81(1) in Nungesser44, where the Court agreed that without the grant of an 
exclusive open licence, a trader might be deterred from accepting the risk of 
marketing a new product, in Pronuptia45, where restrictive provisions in a 
franchising agreement were held to be indispensable for such agreements to function 
and in Remfa46, where the Court took the view that non-competition clauses included 
in the sale of an undertaking were necessary to the transfer of an undertaking. 
Similarly, the Court has found that certain restrictive rules of an agricultural co- 
operative, such as the prohibition on members joining competing co-operatives, did 
not fall foul of Article 81(1) as long as they were necessary to ensure that the co- 
operative functioned properly47. 
The case for the existence of a "rule of reason" in EC competition law has not 
only been based on the aforementioned case law, but also on other decisions in which 
the Court has undertaken an extensive legal and economic analysis when assessing 
an agreement under Article 81(1). In this context, the Court has repeatedly stressed 
that "account should be taken of the actual conditions in which it functions, in 
particular the economic context in which the undertakings operate, the products or 
services covered by the agreement and the actual structure of the market 
concerned"48. However, such an analysis of the nature and economic context of a 
44 Case C-258/78 L. C. NungesserKG and Kurt Eisele v. Commission [1982] ECR 2015. 
45 Case C-161/84 Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronoptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgallis [1986] ECR 
353. 
46 Case C- 42/84 Remia BV and Verenigde Bedryven Nutricia NVv. Commission [1985] ECR 2545. 
47 Case C-250/92 Gettrup-Klirr v. Dansk Landbrugs Grovvareselskab [1994] ECR 1-5641, at paras 
34-35. 
48 Cases T-374 etc/94 European Night Services v. Commission [1998] ECR II-3141, at para 136, in 
the same sense, see Gettrup-Klim, at para 31 and Case C-399/93 H. G. Oude Luttikhuis and Others 
v. Verenigde Cooperatieve Melkindustrie Coberco BA [1995] ECR 1-4515, at para 10. 
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restrictive agreement does not necessarily mean that the Court has adopted a 
balancing approach, weighing up the pro- and anti-competitive effects. This has been 
confirmed by the Court of First Instance in Metropole Television (M6)49, where the 
Court took the view that previous case law could not "be interpreted as establishing 
the existence of a rule of reason in Community competition law", but was rather 
"part of a broader trend in the case law according to which it is not necessary to hold, 
wholly abstractly and without drawing any distinction, that any agreement restricting 
the freedom of action of one or more of the parties is necessarily caught by the 
prohibition laid down in Article 85(1) [now 81(1)] of the Treaty"50. The Court of 
First Instance also pointed out that an approach whereby account is taken of the legal 
and economic context of a restrictive practice, "does not mean that it is necessary to 
weigh the pro- and anti-competitive effects of an agreement when determining 
whether the prohibition laid down in Article 85(1) [now 81(1)] applies"51. It is 
interesting to note, though, that the Court of First Instance allowed a balancing 
approach under Article 81(3)52. This stands in contrast to case law by the Court of 
Justice, which has always interpreted Article 81(3) quite narrowly, only accepting 
agreements which strictly fulfil the four conditions for exemption. 
In this context, it should be stressed that there exists a general disagreement 
between the Court of First Instance and the Court of Justice regarding the existence 
and scope of a "rule of reason" in EC competition law. Whereas the latter, albeit not 
explicitly referring to a "rule of reason", has made clear that under certain 
circumstances, a restrictive agreement may escape the application of Article 81(1), 
the Court of First Instance has repeated the Metropole Television formula and 
emphasised that "the existence of such a rule [of reason] in Community competition 
law is not accepted"53. It is very interesting that the Court of First Instance still has a 
different view on what the concept entails, insofar as it refers to a "weighing of pro 
and anti-competitive effects", which has nothing to do with the Court of Justice's 
approach under Article 81(1). Particularly after the Court's decision in Wouters, 
which stretched the scope of a "rule of reason" even further, one would have 
49 Case T-1 12/99 Metropole Television (M6) and Others v. Commission [2001] ECR 11-2459. 
so Ibid, at para 76. 
51 Ibid, at pars 77. 
52 Ibid, at pars 74. 
53 Van den Bergh Foods, at para 106. 
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expected the Court of First Instance finally to come round to the idea that there exists 
a concept in EC competition law which accepts certain restrictive measures under 
Article 81 (1). 
In summary, the concept of a "rule of reason"54 in EC competition law, as 
applied by the Court of Justice, entails that a restrictive practice will usually only 
escape the prohibition set out in Article 81(1) if, after a thorough analysis of the legal 
and economic context, the restriction of competition is considered to be necessary for 
the establishment of an agreement capable of encouraging competition on the 
market, is not hardcore anti-competitive and fulfils the criteria of proportionality. 
Such an interpretation of existing case law would therefore not disclose a trend to 
follow the US "rule of reason" approach, but merely constitutes a necessary 
limitation of the scope of EC competition law in the sense that it allows certain 
restrictions without which a legitimate agreement could not function in the first 
place55. As pointed out by Whish: "The fact that the ECJ has handed down 
reasonable judgments does not mean that it has adopted a rule of reason in the sense 
in which that expression is used in the US"56 
Taking into account the aforementioned case law on the matter, it emerges 
that the decisive factor determining whether a restrictive agreement falls outside the 
scope of Article 81(1) is the question whether, from a market orientated point of 
view, the restriction is a conditio sine qua non for the establishment of the 
agreement, which, in principle, enhances competition or whether the agreement is 
necessary to establish competition in the first place. Thus, non-economic 
considerations such as public interest or social concerns could originally not be taken 
into account when judging whether a restrictive agreement escapes the application of 
Article 81(1). 
sa Although it would probably be better to avoid the term in an EC law context, it is used in the 
absence of a more appropriate alternative. 
55 See also Fleischer, H., "Absprachen im Profisport und Artikel 85 EGV", (1996) 6 WuW, p. 480; 
Weiß, W., "Transfersysteme und Ausländerklauseln unter dem Licht des EG-Kartellrechts", 
(1998) 3 SpuRt, p. 99. 
56 Whish, R., op. cit. supra note 36, p. 102. 
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5.1.3.1. Wouters - Emergence of a New "Rule of Reason"? 
In Wouters, the Court has accepted a rule by the Bar of the Netherlands prohibiting 
multi-disciplinary partnerships of members of the Bar and accountants as being 
"necessary in order to ensure the proper practice of the legal profession"57, thereby 
citing public interest considerations. Having established that the provision at issue 
was liable to limit production and technical development within the meaning of 
Article 85 (now Article 81) (1) (b) the Treaty58, the Court held that: 
"Not every agreement between undertakings or every decision of an association of 
undertakings which restricts the freedom of action of the parties or of one of them 
necessarily falls within the prohibition laid down in Article 85(1) [now Article 81(1)] 
of the Treaty. For the purposes of application of that provision to a particular case, 
account must first of all be taken of the overall context in which the decision of the 
association of undertakings was taken or produces its effects. More particularly, 
account must be taken of its objectives, which are here connected with the need to 
make rules relating to organisation, qualifications, professional ethics, supervision and 
liability, in order to ensure that the ultimate consumers of legal services and the sound 
administration of justice are provided with the necessary guarantees in relation to 
integrity and experience (see, to that effect, Case C-3/95 Reisebüro Broede [1996] 
ECR 1-6511, paragraph 38). It has then to be considered whether the consequential 
effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives" (.. ) 
a national regulation such as the 1993 Regulation adopted by a body such as the Bar of 
the Netherlands does not infringe Article 85(1) [now Article 81(1)] of the Treaty, 
since that body could reasonably have considered that that regulation, despite the 
effects restrictive of competition that are inherent in it, is necessary for the proper 
practice of the legal profession, as organised in the Member State concerned"60 
After having analysed the nature and context of the restrictive practice at issue, the 
Court concluded that the Netherlands Bar was entitled to adopt a rule ensuring the 
independence of legal services and the observance of strict professional secrecy61. 
Thus, in contrast to previous case law, the Court held the restrictive agreement to be 
57 Wouters, at Para 107. 
58 Ibid, at pars 90. 
59 Ibid, at para 97. 
60 Ibid, at Para 110. 
61 Ibid, at para 105. 
161 
outside the scope of Article 81(1), not because it was necessary for the proper 
functioning of the Bar of the Netherlands, but owing to public interest 
considerations. The Advocate-General, on the other hand, took the view that when 
judging whether a restrictive agreement escaped the application of Article 81(1), the 
assessment should be limited to exclusively competitive objectives. Thus, Advocate- 
General Leger rejected the submission that the agreement at issue was not caught by 
the prohibition in Article 81(1) because it was necessary to protect the independence 
of legal services and the interest of clients, arguing that such reasoning would 
amount to "introducing into the provisions of Article 85(1) considerations which are 
linked to the pursuit of a public-interest objectives62. However, it is interesting to 
note that the Advocate-General, having dismissed the relevance of the public interest 
. in respect of the prohibition set out in Article 81(1) of the Treaty, thought it possible 
to take account of social concerns and considerations connected with the pursuit of 
the public interest under Article 81(3) of the Treaty63. 
The Court's decision in Wouters clearly added fuel to the discussion 
surrounding the status of the "rule of reason" concept in EC competition law. 
Bearing in mind the wording of Article 81(1), there seems to be little room to 
consider public interest objectives when judging whether a restrictive agreement is 
caught by the rules on competition. In this sense, up until Wouters, the Court has 
limited its evaluation of restrictive agreements to economic considerations". Having 
said that, one may wonder why the Court took the provisions at issue in Wouters as 
an occasion to change its interpretation of the "rule of reason" in EC competition 
law, paying attention to public interest considerations. 
Analysing the role served by EC competition law in a Community context, it 
is evident that its primary objectives are mainly market orientated. Articles 81 and 82 
were included in the Treaty in order to prevent distortion of the market caused by 
large aggregations of economic power, whether in the form of monopolies or of 
cartels and to enhance market efficiency. Besides, EC competition law was intended 
to help the creation of a single European market and arguably even as a means to 
62 AG Leger in Wouters, at paras 104 - 105. 63 Ibid, at para 113. 
64 It could be argued that Metro I, where the Court took account of the consumer interest, constituted 
the exception to the rule; still, in contrast to other public interest considerations, consumer interest 
is an aim principally recognised in EC competition law, though under Article 81(3). 
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protect consumers. All these objectives with maybe the exception of the last are 
strictly economically motivated and have no relation to public interest concerns. 
Hence, it does not come as a surprise that Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty were 
worded in a manner that does not take into account any considerations which are not 
market related. Initially, this lack of possibilities to pay attention to social concerns 
or the public interest did not cause any problems, as the rules on competition were 
usually applied to the kind of agreements they had been intended to regulate, that is 
those of an exclusively economic character. However, as competition law found its 
way into a growing number of economic activities, it became evident that in some 
areas, the traditional competition law instruments did not fit the circumstances65. 
Particularly in cases where an industry was not only guided by the forces of supply 
and demand, but fulfilled a role in the public interest, tensions were unavoidable as 
the competition rules were simply not equipped to deal with practices which may 
have been restricting competition, but were inherent in the pursuit of social or public 
interest objectives. Especially in recent years, competition law has progressively 
advanced into subject matters to which it was originally not intended to apply, such 
as collective bargaining66, culture67 and of course, sport, in the case of which the 
Court has on several occasions conveniently passed on the chance to apply the 
competition rules68. The regulations at issue in Wouters, intended to ensure the 
proper practice of the legal profession in the Netherlands, are another example of a 
restrictive practice where competition law and social concerns do not sit together 
easily. Considering that, it does not seem satisfactory that in such cases, the public 
policy aspect of an agreement should be ignored completely and practices, which 
have a positive effect on society overall, are deemed to be illegal owing to the 
competition rules. The Court in Wouters has recognised this dilemma and closed the 
legislative hole in Article 81 by taking into account public interest concerns. 
65 See also Lewis, A., Bell, A., Chilvers, C. et at. (eds. ), op. cit. supra note 18, p. 346 who point out 
that "the competition rules of the EC Treaty were drafted with more orthodox industries in mind 
than sport". 
66 Case C-67/96 Albany International BVv. Stichring Bedrspensioenfonds Textielindustrie [1999] 
ECR 1-5751. 
67 Cases COMP/34.657 Sammelrevers and COMP/35.245 - 35.251 Einzelreverse concerning German 
and Austrian book price fixing agreements. 
68 However, see the recent judgment of the Court of First Instance in Meca-Medina, which has 
touched on the issue of sport in competition law, but for already mentioned reasons probably does 
not represent the Court of Justice's approach. 
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Although this approach is not supported by the wording in Article 81, it is not as far- 
fetched as it probably seems. First of all, it is universally acknowledged that EC 
competition law is aware of imperfections in the market and consequently does not 
aim for perfect, but workable competition. However, obstacles to perfect competition 
may not only be caused by market structure, but can be the result of special 
characteristics of the goods that are traded. Thus, where a good or service fulfils a 
task in the public interest, it cannot be marketed like any other goods without losing 
its beneficial effect on society. To take the German and Austrian book price cartels 
as an example69: if it is a public policy goal that consumers should be encouraged to 
buy "elevating" literature, prices cannot be determined solely by supply and demand, 
as readers could not afford to buy such publications70. The regulation at issue in 
Wouters is another example where the special character of the product in question, 
legal services in the Netherlands, required that they were marketed in a certain way 
to ensure the public interest. Similarly, social concerns should be taken into account 
when assessing sporting regulations that support youth development or the grassroots 
level. 
The European Court of Justice is no stranger to adopting a "rule of reason" 
approach in cases where the wording of the Treaty does not allow enough room for 
exceptions. In this sense, some writers71 have identified an analogy between Wouters 
and the Court's decision in Cassis de Dijon72. Indeed, one can detect a number of 
parallels between the two cases. First of all, both Treaty articles concerned have the 
objective of protecting the Common Market, albeit with the difference that Article 28 
is primarily addressed to the Member States, whereas Article 81 regulates the market 
conduct of private undertakings. Also, in contrast to Article 81(3), Article 30 allows 
69 See Lamping, A. & Ludwigs, M., "Die kartellrechtliche Bedeutung des Buches als Wirtschafts- 
und Kulturgut nach europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht: Sind Bücher anders? " (1999) 40 ZfRV, p. 
56. 
70 It should be noted, though, that the amended "Sammelrevers" was not issued a negative clearance 
owing to the cultural significance of books, but because the new system was restricted to the 
German market and allowed cross-border selling of German books and as such was deemed not to 
affect trade between Member States; see Commission press release IP/02/461, "Commission 
accepts undertaking in competition regarding German book price fixing", 22.3.02. 
71 See for example O'Loughlin, R., "EC Competition Law and Free Movement Rules: An 
Examination of the Parallels and their Furtherance by the ECJ Wouters Decision", (2003) 2 ECLR, 
p. 68; see also Lamping, A. & Ludwigs, M., op. cit. supra note 69, p. 57, who developed the idea 
of an analogous interpretation of Articles 81 and 28 even before Wouters. 
72 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649. 
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exemptions based on the public interest; however, more importantly, both articles 
have an exhaustive list of justifications, which have consistently been interpreted 
narrowly by the Court. Having said that, the main parallel between Cassis de Dijon 
and Wouters lies in the fact that in both cases the Court adopted a "rule of reason" 
approach whereby restrictions on the free movement of goods, and respectively on 
the free market, were held to fall outside the scope of the initial prohibition. By 
introducing the concept of mandatory requirements, the Court has significantly 
restricted the scope of Article 28 as the Dassonville73 principle was considered too 
broad. Moreover, the list of mandatory requirements has been progressively extended 
throughout the years. By analogy with Cassis de Dijon, the Court in Wouters has 
introduced a necessary limitation to the scope of Article 81(1), in the sense that 
restrictive practices which are justified by the public interest may escape its 
application. The fact that the obstacle to trade was established by a private 
association, rather than a Member State is thereby irrelevant. However, as with 
Cassis de Dijon, only those restrictive practices that are strictly necessary for the 
achievement of the legitimate aim in question will escape the prohibition established 
in Article 81(1) of the Treaty74. 
5.1.4. The Application of the "Rule of Reason" to Sporting 
Measures 
In the last few years, the Commission, through official publications and speeches by 
Community officials, has established certain guidelines regarding its approach to the 
subject of competition law and sport. First of all, it confirmed that provisions 
inherent to a sport and/or necessary for its organisation, do not fall within the scope 
of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, provided they are applied in an objective, 
transparent and non-discriminatory manner75. Secondly, owing to the special 
economic characteristics of sport, the Commission has acknowledged the need for 
73 See Case 8/74 Procureur du Rot v. Dassonville [1974] ECR 837. 
74 Wouters, at para 97. 
75 See for example, Speech Monti, M., op. cit. supra note 26; Speech Schaub, A., Jornada dia de la 
competencia, Madrid, op. cit. supra note 26; Speech van Miert, K., op. cit. supra note 26; Speech 
Pons, J: F., op. cit supra note 26., p. 6; Commission press release IP/99/133, op. cit. supra note 26; 
Helsinki Report on Sport, op. cit. supra note 26, p. 8. 
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rules which are strictly necessary to maintain a reasonable degree of uncertainty as to 
results, including measures preserving a certain equality in sporting competitions. In 
this context it is interesting to note that the Commission seems to have deflected 
from its initial point of view that such rules were restricting competition, but eligible 
for an exemption under Article 81(3), to considering them to be outside the scope of 
the provisions on competition76. Taking into account existing case law concerning 
sporting rules and decision-making practice of the Commission, it is evident that 
there exists a "rule of reason" for sport in EC competition law. However, sporting 
rules have usually been dealt with on a case-by-case basis, which is why it is quite 
difficult to predict when a sporting rule will escape the scope of the prohibition in 
Article 81(1) of the Treaty. Moreover, having established that Wouters marks the 
beginning of a new "rule of reason", it has to be. examined in what sense this 
influences the application of EC competition law to sport. Considering the repeatedly 
mentioned social, cultural and educational characteristics of sports, the acceptance of 
public interest objectives under Article 81(1) could undoubtedly provide sports 
associations with an effective weapon in their fight against the application of EC 
competition law to sporting matters. However, although professional sport may have 
a positive effect on society to a certain extent, this does not mean that any restrictive 
measure which benefits a particular sport necessarily serves the public interest. The 
Court has made it clear that apart from an assessment of the overall context of a 
restrictive practice, account must be taken of its objectives", which means that only 
sporting rules which have been adopted in order to pursue a public interest objective 
will fall outside the scope of Article 81(1). However, as with the "rule of reason" 
approach under Article 39(1), it could be argued that the protection of freedom of 
association is in the public interest as such, which means that proportionate measures 
that are in the interest of sport may be accepted under the Wouters case law. Such an 
interpretation, according to which sporting interest protected by the right of 
association must be taken account of under the "rule of reason", would also ensure 
that this basic right is paid the necessary attention, making a separate balancing test 
generally unnecessary. Apart from that, the Court in Wouters has also taken into 
76 See the contrast between Commission press release IP/99/133 and the Helsinki Report on Sport, 
p. 8, (both from 1999) on one side, and Monti's speech from 26.2.01 on the other. 77 Wouters, at para 97. 
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account the consumer interest in its analysis under Article 81(1), which leaves the 
question whether any rule that is necessary to improve the product football from a 
supporter's point of view, will escape the application of Article 81(1) of the Treaty. 
Evidently, the limitations of the Wouters "rule of reason" are still unclear, but one 
would assume that the Court is going to interpret the concept narrowly, not only 
when determining if a restriction is in the public interest, but also whether it is 
proportionate. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that measures which have the 
very object of distorting competition will not be open to justification under the "rule 
of reason". 
When the application of competition law to sporting matters is examined, it is 
possible to distinguish between different categories of sporting rules. Firstly, those 
which are necessary for the organisation of sport and as such would already have 
been accepted under the pre-Wouters case law and secondly, restrictive practices 
which may be justified by reason of public interest considerations under Wouters. 
Thus, parallels between the competition rules and the provisions on free movement 
emerge. In both cases restrictive measures may be accepted provided they are 
inherent to the existence of sporting competition, as without them, neither 
competition nor free movement would be possible in the first place. More 
importantly, the Court has adopted a "rule of reason" approach in Bosman, as well as 
Wouters, opening up the possibility for restrictive sporting rules to be justified by 
sporting considerations. 
5.1.4.1. Rules Necessary for the Organisation of Sport 
The Court has repeatedly recognised that restrictive agreements which are necessary 
to have competition in the first place, respectively anti-competitive elements inherent 
in the existence of a legitimate agreement are not caught by the prohibition in 
Article 81(1). Thus, sporting rules which are inherent to a sport do not fall within the 
scope of Article 81(1), even if they have a certain economic context and restrict 
competition. However, it will be very difficult to prove that a particular rule is so 
vital that without it, sporting competition could not function at all. In order to 
determine whether a particular sporting rule is necessary for the organisation of a 
sport, the special economic circumstances and the fact that sporting competition 
works differently from competition in any other market, have to be taken into 
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account. If one takes the selection rules in Deliege as an example, it becomes clear 
that the rules in question undoubtedly constituted a restriction of competition by 
limiting the number of athletes allowed to participate in international tournaments 
and preventing other judokas from competing78. However; without 'a restriction on 
the number of athletes, it would be impossible for organisational reasons to stage an 
international judo competition. Although it has been argued that less restrictive 
measures would have been available in the particular case79, selection rules, in 
principle, are not caught by the prohibition in Article 81(1), as they are necessary for 
the organisation of sports tournaments80. 
Accordingly, provisions limiting the number of clubs allowed to participate in 
international competitions such as the UEFA Cup or the UEFA Champions League 
would also have to be considered as being legitimate in EC competition law. 
Similarly, the system of relegation and promotion is inherent in the organisation of 
European team sports, in particular as the US alternative of closed sports leagues 
constitutes a greater restriction to competition than a limitation on the number of 
teams promoted to a higher league each season. 
Another example for a rule that was deemed to be necessary for the 
organisation of a sport is the so-called Mouscron case, where the Commission 
rejected a complaint regarding the "home and away" rule in the UEFA Cup81. The 
UEFA regulation, according to which participating teams are not permitted to play 
their home matches on another club's ground, was considered a necessary part of the 
organisation of sporting competitions and as such fell outside the scope of Article 
81(1). 
In the ENIC case, a UEFA rule prohibiting two clubs under common control 
from participating in the same competition was accepted as being necessary to ensure 
78 It should be noted that judokas are not considered to be workers, but providers of services, which 
means they are likely to be treated as undertakings in EC competition law. 
79 See point 3.2.3.1 above. 
8° See Speech Monti, M., op. cit. supra note 26, where Commissioner Monti expressed the opinion 
that the selection rules at issue in the Deliege case did not infringe Article 81(1), as they were 
necessary for the organisation of judo. 
$1 See Commission press release IP/99/965, "Limits to application of Treaty competition rules to 
sport: Commission gives clear signal", 9.12.1999 
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the integrity of sporting competition82. Hereby it is interesting to note that before 
assessing whether the agreement constituted a restriction of competition, the 
Commission cited relevant passages from the Court's decision in the Wouters case83. 
The Commission subsequently stressed that the sporting rule at issue was "inherent 
in the pursuit of the very existence of credible pan European football competitions", 
as without it, consumers would sooner or later lose faith in the fairness and honesty 
of the competition84. Hence, the rule on the integrity of UEFA club competitions was 
considered an essential tool to keep the consumers' interest in the competition, 
ensuring its marketability. Despite the fact that the Commission seemingly applied 
the Wouters case law, arguing that the possible negative effects of the rule at issue 
were "inherent in it for the pursuit of an objective such as the integrity of pan 
European football competitions"85, it is interesting that the Commission in fact 
examined, whether from a purely market orientated angle, the UEFA rule was 
necessary to ensure the very existence of sporting competition, rather than invoking 
public interest considerations. However, the fact that Wouters was considered 
important enough to cite almost full paragraphs of the decision implies that the 
acceptance of public interest considerations in Wouters may be used as a reason to 
defend sporting rules pursuing legitimate sporting aims. 
A rather confusing example of the application of competition law to sporting 
measures is the already mentioned case of the anti-doping legislation at issue in 
Meca-Medina. The Commission, when confronted with the subject, established first 
of all that the rules did not have the object of restricting competition, as they were 
purely intended to combat doping86. Having pointed out that anti-doping measures 
could have the effect of limiting athletes' economic activities, the Commission went 
on to state that such a limitation not necessarily restricted competition in the sense of 
Article 81, as it could be inherent to the organisation and proper functioning of 
82 See Commission Case COMP/37806 ENIC/UEFA, rejection of complaint of 25 June 2002, at 
para 42; prior to that, the same rule had been the subject of a decision by the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport, Case 98/200 AEK Athens and Slavia Prague v. UEFA, where it was considered 
necessary to maintain the integrity of sporting competition; having lost before the CAS, ENIC 
subsequently filed a complaint with the Commission. 
83 Case COMP/37.806 ENICIUEFA, rejection of complaint of 25 June 2002, at para 31, citing paras 
97 and 110 of Wouters. 
84 Ibid, at p. 10. 
85 Ibid, at p. 11. 
86 Case COMP/38.158 Meca-Medina & Majcen, rejection of complaint of 1 August 2002, at para 41. 
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sporting competition87. In support of this argument, the Commission cited the same 
two paragraphs of Wouters as it had done in the ENIC case and concluded that anti- 
doping rules were necessary to ensure an equality of chances for athletes, their health 
and the integrity and objectivity of sporting competition, as well as the ethical values 
of sport88. In respect of the applicants' argument that the fact that the rules at issue 
defined doping in an objective, rather - than a subjective manner (that is to say 
depending on whether forbidden substances are present in an athletes body and not 
whether it can be proven that an athlete took them intentionally or negligibly) meant 
they were excessive, the Commission took the view that such an approach was 
necessary to ensure that doping was combated efficiently89. Also, the Commission 
stated that, provided that anti-doping legislation was clear, transparent, objective, 
justified and non-discriminatory, it would leave it to the sports governing bodies and 
sports scientists to choose the approach they felt was best suited90. Considering the 
rules at issue as justified, reasonable and equal, the Commission made clear that anti- 
doping measures were necessary for the proper functioning of sporting competition 
and the fight against doping and that the limitation of the economic freedom of 
athletes resulting from the application of these rules did not go beyond of what was 
necessary to achieve the objective91. Concerning the threshold for defining the 
presence of a banned substance in the body, the Commission established that such a 
practice was closely linked to the proper functioning of sporting competition and that 
the sports governing bodies and sports scientists were best suited to determine under 
which conditions doping may influence results, putting the equality of athletes' 
chances at risk92. 
Analysing the reasoning behind the Commission's decision, it would appear 
that the anti-doping legislation was considered to fall outside the scope of the 
prohibition set out in Article 81 by reason of its necessity to ensure the functioning of 
sporting competition, guaranteeing the comparability of results. Having said that, it 
seems peculiar that at the hearing before the Court of First Instance, the Commission 
87 Ibid, at Para 42. 
88 Ibid, at Para 45. 
89 Ibid, at Para 52. 
90 Ibid, at Para 50. 
91, Ibid, at Para 55. 
92 Ibid, at Para 60. 
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stated that the disputed decision was based on "Walrave, Dona and Deliege and 
therefore on the purely sporting nature of the anti-doping legislation at issue"93. It 
added, "whilst it examined that legislation, albeit purely sporting, under competition 
law [... ] it did so `in the alternative' or more `for the sake of completeness"'94. It is 
interesting to note that Commission officials pointed out at the time that the rationale 
behind the decision had been the criteria defined by the Court in Wouters95. 
Moreover, in the official press release, the Commission was said to believe that "the 
anti-doping rules in question are closely linked to the smooth functioning of sport, 
that they are necessary for the fight against doping to be effective and that their 
restrictive effects do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve this objective" and 
that the measures were accordingly not caught by the prohibition under Articles 81 
and 82 of the Treaty96. Considering that no reference to the "purely sporting 
nature"97 of the anti-doping regulations was made in either the Commission decision 
or the press release, it is very odd that the Commission claimed to have considered 
the rules at issue as "sporting legislation"98, which, as such, escaped the rules on 
competition. If the Commission had thought that the sporting nature of the anti- 
doping rules had the effect that an analysis under competition law was unnecessary, 
why did it spend several pages on examining the Wouters case law, repeatedly 
emphasising that the measures were not caught by the Treaty because they were 
"inherent to the organisation and proper functioning of sporting competition"99 -just 
"for the sake of completeness"? 
Having already stated the inconsistencies in the approach adopted by the 
Court of First Instanceloo, it is a lot more appropriate to argue that anti-doping rules 
do not come under the prohibition set out in Articles 81 and 82 by reason of their 
93 Meca-Medina, at para 62. 
94 Ibid. 
95 See Dussart-Lefret, C. & Sottong-Micas, C., "Deux nouvelles decisions clarifiant les regles 
sportives qui echappent aux regles de concurrence", (2002) 3 Competition Policy Newsletter, 
p. 47. 
96 Commission press release, IP/02/1211, "Commission rejects complaint against International 
Olympic Committee by swimmers banned from competitions for doping", 9.8.2002. 
97 See Meca-Medina, at para 62. 
98 Ibid, at para 66. 
99 Case COMP/38158 Meca-Medina & Majcen, rejection of complaint of 1 August 2002, at para 42, 
similarly, see also paras 44 and 55. 
100 See point 3.2.3.4 above. 
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sporting necessity1°'. It is evident that fair and equal sporting competition cannot 
exist without such legislation and thus, it would most likely have been accepted even 
before Wouters. However, when considering whether anti-doping legislation is 
excessive, Wouters arguably leaves sports bodies a wider margin when choosing the 
method they consider best to combat doping - provided it is non-discriminatory and 
objective. Having said that, there is no reason to suggest that the approach adopted 
by the IOC went beyond what is necessary to guarantee an equality of results and 
thus, the existence of sporting competition. 
When the above examples of sporting rules deemed vital for sporting 
competition are analysed, it emerges that it may sometimes be almost impossible to 
differentiate measures without which a sport could not exist and those which fall 
under the Wouters "rule of reason". Apart from the fact that the Community 
institutions and national courts will often lack the inside knowledge to judge whether 
the chosen means are proportionate, it would also be very complicated to assess the 
exact impact of a rule. In practice, the distinction is methodological, as effectively 
the result remains the same, irrespective of the fact whether a sporting measure 
escapes the Treaty by reason of its sporting necessity or under the Wouters case law. 
5.1.4.2. Measures Ensuring a Sporting Equilibrium 
As previously mentioned, the Commission has repeatedly recognised the objective of 
maintaining a competitive balance in order to ensure an uncertainty of results as 
being legitimate in EC competition law102. However, from a strictly market 
orientated point of view, it could be argued that restrictive measures adopted by 
sports bodies in order to achieve a sporting balance are actually not strictly necessary 
for the functioning of professional team sports. 
If it is assumed that the domination of a few teams over a lengthy period of 
time leads to a loss in profit for the dominating clubs, resulting from diminished 
spectators' interest, it becomes clear that a certain competitive balance will benefit 
the stronger teams in the long run. Hence, just before the point where the bigger 
'o' See also Weatherill, S., "Anti-Doping Rules and EC Law", (2005) 26(7) ECLR, p. 419, who points 
out that "there could be no true sport without anti-doping controls, so automatically to treat 
suspensions of offenders as restrictions within the meaning of Arts 49 and 81 EC would be out-of- 
context formalism at its worst". 
102 See for example, Speech Monti, M., op. cit. supra note 26. 
172 
teams would incur losses is reached, the dominating clubs would provide their 
smaller competitors with enough funds to ensure a competition that is balanced 
enough to keep the fans' interest. If balancing measures were only applied at a point 
when the league is already that unequal that the strongest clubs have lost profit, it is 
evident that a number of smaller clubs would have vanished in the process, resulting 
in a league with a smaller number of teams. Considering the number of clubs around 
Europe which are threatened with bankruptcy or have gone into liquidation, it is 
evident that the market forces are already at work and the balancing measures of the 
football governing bodies are not sufficient to keep all the clubs in the game. Strictly 
speaking it is not an objective in competition law artificially to keep producers in the 
market that would not survive in an unrestricted market. If one takes the Scottish 
Premier League (SPL) as an example, it could be argued that without the existence of 
balancing methods, the market could not sustain twelve clubs and in the long run 
probably not more than five teams would remain at the highest level: two Glasgow 
clubs, and one each in Edinburgh, Dundee and Aberdeen. In the case of any other 
industry, restrictive measures could not be justified with the argument that they were 
necessary to ensure the number of competitors in the market, even if it was in the 
interest of the consumer. For the SPL that would mean that if the market is too small 
for twelve clubs, but worked perfectly with five competitors, then so be it. 
Considering the social and cultural importance of football, on the other hand, 
one may wonder once again whether football is in fact different to other markets. 
Apart from the fact that football clubs fulfil very important tasks in supporting the 
grassroots level and investing time and money in youth players, it is undeniable that 
the existence of a football club has a beneficial impact especially in small towns and 
rural communities, giving them a sense of belonging and community spirit. The 
example demonstrates the existing tension between sport and Article 81, suggesting 
that the strictly economically orientated competition law is too inflexible to deal with 
certain areas such as the sports industry where not only economic, but social interests 
are at stake. This underlines the importance of the Wouters decision, which accepts 
the public interest as a legitimate goal under the "rule of reason" concept in EC 
competition law. Despite the fact that the Commission has acknowledged the need 
for a competitive balance even before Wouters, it has to be stressed that the two main 
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objectives behind the introduction of balancing methods are the survival of 
competitors which would not survive in the market otherwise on one hand and the 
consumer interest in exciting sporting competition on the other, both goals which 
originally could not be taken into account when assessing an agreement under Article 
81(1). Considering this, it becomes clear that only after Wouters, there is now a 
legitimate legal base for the recognition of the requirement for a sporting balance 
under Article 81(1) of the Treaty 103. 
Having established that a professional sports league requires some degree of 
sporting balance, one may wonder what degree of balance between teams is 
necessary for the league to function and at what point balancing measures are 
distorting the market. For example, how would the Commission react in the unlikely 
event that the Scottish Football Association decided to make the SPL more attractive 
by redistributing the available television revenues in such a way that the two 
dominant teams Celtic and Rangers would not receive any funds, although games 
involving a team from the "Old Firm" generate the highest level of interest by far? 
Undeniably, the SPL suffers from a distinct competitive imbalance; however, taking 
into account that the league is still functioning, despite the fact that ten out of twelve 
teams have practically no chance of ever winning the championship, it emerges that 
there have to be limits as to what degree of intervention by the sports bodies in order 
to establish a sporting balance is acceptable. Moreover, the mechanism through 
which revenue is redistributed within the league has to be proportionate and must not 
go beyond what is necessary to achieve the required sporting balance. In this context, 
for example, the Commission has decided that the joint selling of television rights for 
the UEFA Champions League through UEFA was not necessary in terms of Article 
81(1) to stage a football league, as a re-distribution of revenue could be undertaken 
in other ways without being linked to a joint selling arrangement104. 
103 It should be pointed out, though, that measures necessary to ensure a sporting balance should have 
been eligible for exemption under 81(3), as they improve the production of the sporting good and 
are in the consumer interest. 
104 Commission Decision 2003/778 Joint Selling of the Commercial Rights of the UEFA Champions 
League, OJ 2003 L'291/25, at para 131, however, the agreement was eventually exempted under 
Article 81(3). 
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5.1.4.3. Transfer Restrictions 
Transfer regulations are usually argued to be necessary for the proper functioning of 
sporting competition in so far as players are prohibited from moving between clubs 
at any given time. If there was no restriction on player movement at all, theoretically 
the composition of a team could completely change from one Saturday to the other, 
depending on the forces of supply and demand. It is evident that under such 
circumstances, sporting competition would lose any purpose and a certain 
consistency as regards team composition is necessary to keep fans interested. 
However, again the question is how much restriction is needed for the market to 
function - if the maximum duration of contracts was only one year and footballers 
could move freely at the end of each season, for example, would sporting 
competition not be possible? '05 
Another possibility to regulate player movement are transfer windows, which 
have principally been accepted as being necessary for creating and guaranteeing a 
competition between clubs by Advocate-General Albers in the Lehtonen case106. 
Although transfer windows may not always be strictly necessary for the very 
existence of sporting competition, they will usually be justified as a means to 
preserve the regularity and proper functioning of a league under the Wouters case 
law, as long as they are proportionate and do not go beyond of what is strictly 
necessary to ensure the legitimate goal. 
5.1.4.4. Youth Development and Grassroots Sector 
One of the main arguments for the preservation of the football transfer system has 
always been that through the transfer fees clubs receive for the sale of young players, 
particularly small clubs are encouraged to invest time and effort in youth 
development. Apart from the question whether this really is the case, one may 
wonder to what extent the support of the youth sector is a legitimate goal in EC 
competition law. 
First of all, it has to be examined whether the encouragement of youth 
development may fall outside the scope of Article 81(1) by reason of its sporting 
105 The issue of transfer restriction ensuring a stability of contracts will be dealt with in depth in 
connection with the legal assessment of the 1997 Regulations, see point 6 below. 
106 AG Albers in Lehtonen, at para 106. 
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necessity. Although it could be argued that without youth development the supply of 
players would stop in the long run, the comparison with the US model shows that 
theoretically, a professional sports league can work without a financial link between 
professional and youth sectors. Furthermore, the recruitment of new, young players 
is also in the interest of the clubs, which means that in the absence of measures 
encouraging youth development, teams would maybe invest less money in the 
education of young players, but enough to keep the league going. 
Having said that, the main rationale behind the introduction of measures 
encouraging youth development lies in the social significance of youth sport. 
Besides, it is evident the appearance of new and exciting young players certainly 
makes professional sport a lot more interesting for the consumer. Again, the Wouters 
case law comes to the rescue, as under a purely economically orientated "rule of 
reason" approach such measures could probably have not been recognised because 
they are not strictly necessary for the functioning of the professional sector107. 
The same argument comes into play in respect of restrictive practices that 
have the aim of supporting the grassroots level. In theory, amateur and professional 
sport are not interlinked to such a degree that the distribution of funds to the 
grassroots level could be claimed to be necessary for the functioning of professional 
sport. The fear that small clubs working at grassroots level could not survive without 
receiving a reward for investing in youth development cannot be used as an argument 
that such payments are inherent in the existence of football. As mentioned above, 
under a strictly market orientated approach, the aim of keeping competitors in the 
market which would not survive otherwise cannot be recognised. However, apart 
from their beneficial impact on the local community in general, the very existence of 
small clubs is of social interest owing to their involvement in the education of 
youngsters. Thus, only if social and public interest concerns may be taken into 
account when assessing a restrictive agreement under Article 81(l) of the Treaty, 
may such measures escape the scope of the competition rules. 
107 However, see AG Stix-Hackl in Balog, at paras 107 -111, who, having cited the Court's case law 
on ancillary restraints, pointed out that the aim of encouraging the training of young players had 
been recognised in Bosman and went on to consider the suitability of the transfer rules at issue to 
achieve the desired end. Although case law on free movement might be of some significance in 
competition law, the mere fact that the Court has acknowledged these sporting aims in Bosman 
cannot provide a sufficient legal base to take them into consideration under Article 81(1). 
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5.1.5. The Application of Competition Law to Labour 
Relations 
In reference to the fact that footballers are classified as workers in the sense of 
Article 39, there have been arguments that as a consequence, the provisions of 
competition law were not applicable to them1°8. Similarly, the European football 
association UEFA claimed in the proceedings to the Bosman case that the transfer 
system at issue was directly related to the employment relationship between club and 
footballer and as such fell outside the scope of EC competition law109. Supporters of 
this view generally cite a Commission statement from 1990, establishing that the 
Commission does not intend to apply the competition rules to employment related 
issues110. It has to be pointed out, though, that the Commission has in fact examined 
collective labour agreements under competition law in the pasts 11. 
EC competition law is applicable to restrictive agreements between 
undertakings. According to the Court, an undertaking is an "entity engaged in an 
economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it 
is financed"112. An individual will qualify as undertaking if and insofar he or she 
engages in economic or commercial activity in his/her own right' 13. The application 
of the competition rules to individuals has so far been confirmed for self-employed 
professionals such as lawyers 114, property agentsi ts, opera singers 116 and also 
108 See for example Scholz, R. & Aulehner, J., "Die `3+2'-Regel und die Transferbestimmungen des 
Fußballsports im Lichte des europäischen Gemeinschaftsrechts", (1996) 2 Spurt, p. 47; see also 
Gleiss, A. & Hirsch, M., Kommentar zum EG-Kartellrecht (Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft, 
Heidelberg, 1993), point 20 to Article 20. 
109 UEFA in Bosman, opinion AG Lenz, at para 271, claiming that the Bosman case was in fact a 
"concealed wage dispute". 
"o Written answer to question No 777/89, OJ 1990 C 328, p. 3. 
11, Commission Decision 86/507 Irish Banks' Standing Committee, OJ 1986 L 295/28, regarding an 
agreement on the opening hours of banks, concluded between an association of Irish banks and the 
Trade Union of Banks' employees. 
112 Case C-41/90 Klaus Häfner and Fritz Elser v. Macrotron [1991] ECR 1-1979, para 2016; Case C- 
244/94 Federation Francaise des Societes d'Assurance v. Ministere de 1'Agriculture et de la 
Peche [1995] ECR I-4013, at para 4028; Case C-67/96 Albany International BV v. Stichting 
Bedryfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie [1999] ECR I-5751, at para 5886. 
113 Bellamy, C. & Child, G., Common Market Law of Competition (5`h edn, Sweet and Maxwell, 
London, 2001), at para 2-006; Lane, R., op. cit. supra note 40, p. 34; Goyder, D., op. cit. supra 
note 36, p. 87, who states that private individuals engaged in any form of business, commerce or 
profession can be undertakings. 
114 Case C-309/99 Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Avocaten [2002] ECR I- 
1577. 
115 Decision 95/188 Coapi, OJ 1995 L 122/37. 
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swimmers117. However, employees have been held not to qualify as undertakings in 
the sense of the Treaty, owing to the fact that they are not participating in the market 
as independent actors, but form an economic unit with their employer' 18. As a 
consequence, football players, who have been classified as workers in the sense of 
Article 39, would most likely not be considered undertakings and therefore fall 
outside the scope of the provisions on competition law119. However, agreements in 
the field of sport which are examined under competition law are generally not 
concluded between individual footballers, or even between club and player, but exist 
between clubs, respectively in the form of decisions by the football associations, 20. 
The transfer rules, for example, are drawn up by the national and international 
football associations and even though they concern employment matters, the question 
whether such provisions are caught by competition law is not related to the fact that 
the individual player cannot be classified as an undertaking. The matter might be 
different, however, in cases where transfer clauses are enclosed in the individual 
contract between player and club. As pointed out in connection with the free 
movement of workers, sometimes club and player agree on a maximum transfer fee 
with a combined release clause when concluding the employment contract. 
Moreover, what if a player signs a long-term deal and decides to waive contractually 
any right that he might have under national employment laws to leave prematurely? 
Although an individual employment contract between club and player is not subject 
to the application of the provisions on competition law as a football player does not 
qualify as an undertaking, the situation might look different if all clubs in a league 
offer their players contracts with the same conditions, thereby giving rise to 
suspicions that a concerted practice between employers is in place. 
116 Decision 78/516 RailUnitel, OJ 1978 L 157/39. 
7 Case COMP/38158 Meca-Medina & Majcen, rejection of complaint of 1 August 2002, at para 42. 
"$ See Case C-40 etcJ73 Cooperative Vereniging "Sulker Unie" v. Commission [1975] ECR 1663; 
Case C-22/98 Criminal Proceedings against Jean Claude Becu [1999] ECR 1-5665; AG Jacobs in 
Albany, at para 217. 
119 However, as pointed out in the context of the concept of worker in Article 39, some players have 
such a super-star status, including individual sponsorship deals, etc that it could be argued that 
they operate independently on the market and would thus qualify as undertakings. 
120 The question whether football clubs qualify as undertakings, and thus whether sporting rules 
established by football associations can be classed as decisions between an association of 
undertakings, will be tackled under point 6.1 below. 
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Thus, when the relationship between competition and employment law is 
examined, it emerges that the simple fact that employees cannot be classified as 
undertakings, does not remove all employment related agreements from the scope of 
competition law. Thus, a general exemption for employment matters is unjustified, 
particularly when it is taken into account that no evidence for such a restriction of 
scope can be found in the Treaty, a view that is supported by the majority of 
writers 121. 
5.1.5.1. Collective Labour Agreements 
Despite the fact that employment issues are not exempted from competition law as 
such, it is a common belief that collective bargaining agreements, owing to their 
social, as opposed to economic purpose, should escape the application of Articles 81 
and 82 of the Treaty 122. Evidently, this would open up a possibility for the football 
industry to protect the transfer system from competition law, by including transfer 
regulations in a collective bargaining agreement between the clubs as employers' 
representatives on one side and the player's union on the other. 
In contrast to the situation in the US123, collective bargaining agreements are 
not automatically exempted from the application of EC competition law. However, 
despite the fact that collective agreements restrict competition between employees, 
they are actively encouraged by Community legislation 124, as they prevent employers 
from offering less than minimum wages and working conditions. Since the Treaty 
makes no reference to collective bargaining agreements, the question whether they 
should be exempted from competition law had to be resolved by means of 
121 See for example Weiß, W., op. cit. supra note 55, p. 97, Fleischer, H., op. cit. supra note 55, p. 
484 and AG Lenz in Bosman, at para 273. 
'u Dutch, French and Swedish Government in Case C-67/96 Albany International BV v. Stichting 
Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie [19991 ECR 1-5751, see opinion of AG Jacobs, at para 113; 
Weiß, W., op. cit. supra note 55, p. 97; Fischer, U., "Die Angst des Fußballs vor dem EG- 
Wettbewerbskommissar oder Tarifautonomie vs. Kartellrecht - Ein Spielbericht", (2002) 4 EuZW, 
p. 97; see also Fikentscher, A., "Kartellrecht im Sport - 
Ökonomische und Rechtsvergleichende 
Betrachtungen", (1995) 4 SpuRt, p. 151, in respect of the German perspective. 
123 Collective bargaining agreements are exempted from US antitrust law under the so-called "non- 
statutory labour exemption" case law developed in the 1960s, see Amalgamated Meat Cutters V. 
Jewel Tea Co, 381 US 676 (1965), in relation to collective agreements in sport, see Mackey v. 
NFL, 543 F. 2d 606 (8`h Cir. 1976); for further discussion on the subject see Corcoran, K., "When 
does the Buzzer sound?: The nonstatutory Labour exemption in professional Sports", (1994) 
Columbia Law Review, pp. 1045-1075. 
124 For example Articles 4,6,17(3) and 18(1) of Council Directive 93/104/EC of 23 November 1993, 
OJ 1993 L 307/18. 
179 
interpretation. In this context Advocate-General Jacobs has pointed out that the 
Treaty should be read in such a way that neither the competition provisions, nor the 
rules encouraging collective agreements are emptied of their content and neither rule 
takes precedence over the other 125. Considering the nature and importance of 
collective labour agreements and the effect they have on competition, he proposed a 
limited antitrust immunity. Accordingly, three conditions have to be met for a 
collective agreement to be automatically exempted from Article 81 of the Treaty' 
26 : 
First, the agreement must be made within the formal framework of collective 
bargaining between both sides of industry. Secondly, the agreement has to be 
concluded in good faith and should not be used as a cover for a serious restriction of 
competition between employers. Finally, the immunity only extends to agreements 
regarding core subjects of collective bargaining such as wages and working 
conditions and agreements which do not directly affect third parties. The Court of 
Justice followed the Advocate-General's opinion, pointing out that 
"the social policy objective pursued by such [collective labour] agreements would be 
seriously undermined if management and labour were subject to Article 85(1) [now 
81(1)] of the Treaty when seeking jointly to adopt measures to improve conditions of 
work and employment" and confirming that "agreements concluded in the context of 
collective negotiations between management and labour in pursuit of such objectives 
must, by virtue of their nature and purpose, be regarded as falling outside the scope of 
127 Article 85(1) [now 81(1)] of the Treatys. 
A collective agreement regulating the football transfer system, would therefore 
escape the application of Article 81(1) only if it included the players' union and 
could not be drawn up by the club's representatives or the football associations 
alone. However, taking into account that the exemption from EC competition law 
only relates to collective agreements concerning working conditions, an agreement 
including provisions on the transfer of professional football players would go too far, 
as it does not merely regulate wages and working conditions, but the access to work. 
The transfer rules can hinder a player's move from one club to the other and thus go 
125 AG Jacobs in Albany, at para 179. 
126 AG Jacobs in Albany, at para 191. 
127 Albany, at paras 59-60. 
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beyond the core, subjects of collective bargaining, which means that even if there was 
a collective agreement on the regulation of player movement, it would not be 
immune from the application of competition law. 
Since a collective agreement concerning the regulation of player transfers 
would not automatically escape the provisions on competition law, the next step 
would be to judge on its compatibility with Article 81. Hence, it is necessary to 
determine whether it could be classified as an agreement between undertakings. 
Although employers undoubtedly qualify as undertakings, it has been a matter of 
dispute whether the same applies to trade unions. Since employees are not 
undertakings, unions usually do not qualify as an association of undertakings, at least 
when they are involved in collective bargaining128. On the other hand, trade unions 
may be categorised as undertakings when they engage in an economic activity that is 
attributable to them. However, when bargaining with employers on behalf of the 
employees of .a particular sector, 
they merely act as agent for the employees in 
question and not in their own right 129. Even though trade unions do not qualify as 
undertakings, a collective bargaining agreement might still fall within the scope of 
Article 81, as it presumes an agreement on the employer's side to negotiate jointly 
and to be bound by the result of the bargaining 130. When an undertaking takes part in 
collective bargaining on working conditions, it is engaged in an economic activity, as 
its ability to conclude an optimal collective agreement with its employees will 
undoubtedly affect its economic success' 31. This means that even if clubs and 
128 See AG Jacobs in Albany, at para 218; Lane, R., op. cit. supra note 40, p. 36; Bellamy, C. & Child, 
G., op. cit. supra note 113, at para 2-008; it should be noted that the situation is different for trade 
unions representing persons constituting undertakings themselves, in which case they may be 
considered associations of undertakings, see Commission Decision 2003/600 French Beef, OJ 
2003 L 209/12, at para 109, concerning trade unions representing farmers; however, the 
Commission has recognised that work performed by these organisations such as information, 
advice and protection of their members' interests may be covered by the trade union freedom, 
protected by Article 12(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; at the same time, the 
Commission has pointed out that trade unions step outside those terms of reference when they 
assist in the conclusion and implementation of agreements breaching competition law, ibid, at para 
112. 
129 AG Jacobs in Albany, at pars 227 ; Bellamy, C. & Child, G., op. cit. supra note 113, para 2-008; 
Lane, R., op. cit. supra note 40, p. 36. 
130 See also Commission Decision 86/507 Irish Banks' Standing Committee, OJ 1986 L 295/28, 
where it was argued that a collective agreement between Irish banks and the Trade Union of 
Banks' employees qualified as an agreement in the sense of Article 81, as it implied an agreement 
between the parties on whose behalf the collective agreement was made. 
131 See AG Jacobs in Albany, at para 233. 
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players' associations managed to conclude a collective agreement on the conditions 
of player transfer between clubs, it would not be treated differently under 
competition law than an agreement solely between clubs. Hence, the conclusion of a 
collective agreement on the matter cannot be used to circumvent the rules on 
competition law or result in any special treatment. 
5.1.6. The Geographical Scope of EC Competition Law 
The question to what extent a state or a group of states may apply their laws to 
conduct carried out in the territory of another sovereign state has always been a 
controversial issue in international law. In respect of competition law, extraterritorial 
application was developed by US courts, which adopted the "effect doctrine". 
According to this concept, jurisdiction over the economic conduct of companies 
located in third countries is based on the fact that the activities of those companies 
outside the US would have an effect on the economic situation within 132. The 
European Court of Justice, on the other hand, initially based the application of the 
EC competition rules to anti-competitive conduct occurring outwith the Community 
on the economic entity doctrine. According to the Court, in cases where a company 
located outside the territory of the European Union was in direct control of its 
subsidiary within the Community, the market behaviour of the latter may be 
attributed to the parent undertaking 133. However, the economic entity doctrine did not 
provide the Community with jurisdiction over undertakings which did not have 
subsidiaries within its territory. In order to deal with anti-competitive behaviour of 
undertakings with no economic links to companies within the Community, the Court 
adopted the "implementation doctrine", according to which EC competition law may 
be applied to restrictive agreements concluded by undertakings located outside the 
EU, provided that the agreements were implemented inside the Community13a. 
Without going into detail as to whether later case law implies that Community law 
has recognised an effects doctrine comparable to the American approach135, it is 
132 See for example United States V. Aluminium Company ofAmerica (Alcoa) 148 F 2"d 416(2 nI Circ 
1945). 
133 See Case 48/69 ICI v. Commission (Dyestuffs) [1972] ECR 619. 
134 Cases C-89 etc. /85,4hlström v. Commission (Woodpulp) [1988] ECR 5193, at paras 16 - 18. 135 See Case T-102/96 Gencor v. Commission [1999] ECR 11-753. 
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evident that only because an undertaking is based outside the Community this does 
not automatically remove it from the scope of EC competition law. 
With regard to sporting rules, the issue of the extraterritorial application of 
the Community competition rules has arisen in particular in the context of football. 
Thus, one argument used against the application of EC competition law to the FIFA 
transfer regulations was based on the fact that FIFA, as well as UEFA are private 
associations with their seats, and management, in Switzerland. Considering that the 
national football associations in the Member States are all part of FIFA and UEFA 
and as such bound by their decisions, though, it is arguable that sporting rules 
adopted by the international football associations are subject to the application of EC 
competition law under the economic entity doctrine 136 However, even if the 
existence of the necessary economic link between the national football associations 
and FIFA, respectively UEFA is denied, sporting rules established by the 
international football associations would be caught by EC competition law as soon as 
they are implemented inside the Community. Thus, the fact that the two international 
football associations FIFA and UEFA are based in Switzerland cannot remove the 
transfer regulations from the scope of EC competition law. 
136 See Lane, R., op. cit. supra note 40, p. 285. 
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6. THE 1997 
ARTICLE 81 
FIFA REGULATIONS UNDER 
6.1. UNDERTAKINGS/ASSOCIATIONS OF UNDERTAKINGS 
It has repeatedly been stated that the 1997 transfer regulations were adopted by 
FIFA, the international football association. Thus, before judging whether these rules 
did in fact restrict competition, it is necessary to assess whether they are a result of 
an agreement between undertakings or an association of undertakings. The notions of 
"undertakings" and "associations of undertakings" are not defined in the Treaty. As 
mentioned above, the Court has defined an undertaking as "any entity engaged in an 
economic activity, regardless of its legal status and the way in which it is 
137 
. Since every 
football club is a member of a national association and financed' 
every national association is a member of FIFA, it makes sense to start at the bottom 
of the pyramid, assessing whether the clubs may be classified as undertakings, before 
deciding whether FIFA is an undertaking in its own right. 
In Bosman, the football federations claimed that football clubs did not qualify 
as undertakings; it was argued that the economic activity of most football clubs was 
negligible, as they operated at a loss 138. Moreover, it was submitted that "in most 
cases" teams did not have the intention of making profit and the only rationale 
behind economic ambitions of football clubs was sporting and not financial 
success139 Unsurprisingly, both arguments were rejected by the Court. Considering 
the financial resources of football clubs and the economic value of transfer fees and 
broadcasting rights, it is hardly disputable that football clubs are engaged in an 
economic activity. Many of the major clubs are quoted on the stock exchange and 
earn millions through the sale of merchandise or gate receipts. Furthermore, it does 
137 Case C-41/90 Klaus Häfner and Fritz Elser v. Macrotron [1991] ECR 1-1979, at para 21. 
138 This might be true for a lot of lower league clubs, but not for the majority of clubs playing in the 
top divisions. According to Deloitte & Touche, Premiership clubs reported operating profits of 
£ 149 million in 2003/04, another record high (up £ 25 million on the previous record) with only 
four clubs making losses at the operating level. However, taking the English Football League in 
total, in 2002/03 the 92 clubs reported a record pre-tax loss of £ 204 million. 
139 Bosman, at para 70 and 72, in favour of this argument, Scholz, R. & Aulehner, J., op. cit. supra 
note 108, p. 44. 
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not matter for what reasons an undertaking is economically active - otherwise, not 
only charities, but also companies in other lines of business could claim that they 
were not interested in financial success, but pursue a higher cause and thus, did not 
qualify as undertakings. The concept of undertaking in EC competition law does not 
require an intention to make profit140, which means that football clubs are 
undoubtedly to be regarded as undertakings'41. 
National and international football associations may consequently be 
qualified as associations of undertakings, or as associations of associations of 
undertakings respectively. The fact that also a large number of amateur clubs belong 
to those associations makes no difference, as long as the associations are at least 
formed by economically active clubs 142. However, in so far as they themselves 
engage in economic activity, such as the marketing of broadcasting rights or the 
conclusion of sponsoring agreements, football associations are undertakings in their 
own right, a fact that has also been confirmed by case law'43 and decision-making 
practice of the Commission' 44. Thus, FIFA's argument brought forward in Balog that 
it was a grouping of national associations and did not itself pursue economic 
objectives145, was rejected by Advocate-General Stix-Hackl, pointing out that it is 
irrelevant whether an undertaking pursues a social or sporting goal, provided that 
some activities of the association are of an economic nature'46. 
140 Joined Cases 209/78 to 215/78 and 218/78 Van Landewyck and Others v. Commission [1980] ECR 
3125, at pars 88. 
141 See also the recent decision in Case T-193/02 Laurent Piau v. Commission [2005] 5 CMLR, p. 2, 
at para 69; AG Lenz in Bosman, at para 255; AG Stix-Hackl in Balog, at paras 45 - 55; Decision 
2003/778 Joint Selling of the Commercial Rights of the UEFA Champions League, OJ 2003 L 
291/25, at para 106; Weiß, W., op. cit. supra note 55, p. 98; Fleischer, H., op. cit. supra note 55, p. 
474. 
142 See Piau v. Commission, at para 70; AG Lenz in Bosman, at para 256; AG Stix-Hackl in Balog, at 
para 61; See also Case COMP/36.583 SETCA-FGTB/FIFA, rejection of complaint of 28 May 
2002, at para 30. 
143 See Piau v. Commission, at para 71; Case T-46/92 Scottish Football Association v. Commission 
[1994] ECR 11-1039, where the Court of First Instance did not even question the fact that football 
associations are undertakings. 
144 Decision 92/521 "Distribution of package tours during the 1990 World Cup", OJ 1992 L 326/31, 
at para 49; Decision 2003/778 Joint Selling of the Commercial Rights of the UEFA Champions 
League, OJ 2003 L 291/25, at para 106. 
las See AG Stix-Hackl in Balog, at para 37. 
146 See AG Stix-Hackl in Balog, at para 58. 
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6.1.1. The "Single Entity" Theory 
Despite the fact that there is a general consensus over the fact that football clubs are 
undertakings for the purpose of EC competition law, conflicting views still exist. 
These are mainly based on a concept developed by the American economist Walter 
Neale in the 1960s, the so-called "single entity" theory 147. This hypothesis, which has 
been evoked in a number of antitrust proceedings against American sports leagues 148 0 
relies on the already examined "peculiar economics of sport", in particular on the 
fact that no club is able to produce a marketable good on its own and thus all clubs in 
a league are required to work together. The special dynamics in professional team 
sports have given rise to the argument that, owing to the economic dependency 
between clubs, the league was to be regarded as a single entity. Hence, sporting rules 
such as the transfer system are claimed to be internal decisions within one 
undertaking to which competition law does not apply. 
It is an acknowledged principle in EC competition law that in certain 
circumstances legally distinct firms may be regarded as a single unit because of the 
close economic links between them. According to the Court, this is the case with 
agreements between parent and subsidiary, where both firms are part of one 
economic unit "within which the subsidiary has no real freedom to determine its 
course of action on the market"149. However, when analysing the economic relations 
between clubs in a football league, it becomes clear that although there is a certain 
dependency between teams, each club is effectively economically independent. This 
is illustrated by the fact that each club makes its own investment decisions, acts 
individually on the transfer market and carries its own financial risk. Although a 
league format requires a certain degree of co-operation between clubs, such as the 
setting up of a fixture list and may even involve the collective marketing of 
broadcasting rights, it cannot be denied that clubs compete against each other 
147 See Neale, W., op. cit. supra note 9, pp. 1-14; in favour of the single-entity approach see Scholz, 
R. & Aulehner, J., op. cit. supra note 108, p. 47; against, Fleischer, H., op. cit. supra note 55, 
p. 477 - 478. 148 See Fleischer, H., op. cit. supra note 55, p. 477. 
149 See Case T-102/92 Viho v. Commission [1995] ECR IM 7, at para 16. 
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economically, as well as on a sporting level and do not constitute a single economic 
unit150 
6.2. AGREEMENTS BETWEEN UNDERTAKINGS 
Having established that football clubs, as well as national and international football 
associations qualify as undertakings, respectively associations of undertakings, it is 
necessary to consider whether the transfer rules are based on agreements between 
undertakings or decisions of associations of undertakings. Taking into account that 
national transfer regulations are determined by the rules of the relevant association, 
while FIFA's transfer rules are issued by its executive committee'51, it seems obvious 
that they are based on a decision of an association of undertakings, the clubsts2. 
There have been claims, though, that the transfer system merely reflects the will of 
the members of the associations and thus should be classed as an agreement between 
clubs, rather than a decision of the national or international football association 153. 
However, as pointed out by Advocate-General Lenz, Article 81 applies in the same 
way to both forms of co-ordination, which means that the distinction is of purely 
academic relevance 154 
150 In contrast see the US case Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F 3rd 3d 47 (1' Circ 2002). The 
decision concerned the US Major Soccer League which, when it was formed in 1995, was 
organised in such a way that investors purchased shares of the league as a whole with the right to 
manage a particular team in return for an annual management fee. All assets, including the teams, 
intellectual property, player contracts, etc. are owned by the league and not by the individual 
clubs; investors share profits and losses in proportion with their investment. The centralised 
employment scheme was challenged by several players who argued that the league's single entity 
structure was a "sham" and violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. However, the District Judge in 
question dismissed the action with the argument that the US soccer league constituted a single 
entity and as such was incapable of committing a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, a 
decision which was upheld by the Court of Appeal. For a deeper discussion of the case see Wright, 
P. "Major league Soccer: Antitrust, the Single Entity, and the Heightened Demand for a Labor 
Movement in the New Professional Soccer League", (2000) 10 Seton Hall J. Sports L., pp. 357- 
387. 
15, See in particular FIFA Circular No 616 of 4 June 1997, point 2, which reflected a decision of the 
FIFA Executive Committee, stating that in case of the unilateral termination of a contract by a 
player, the player in question would not be eligible to play for another club. 
152 See also Piau v. Commission, at para 75, where the Court of First Instance confirmed that 
regulations concerning the activity of players' agents issued by FIFA's executive committee 
constitute a decision by an association of undertakings within the meaning of Article 81(1). 
153 See the Belgian Football Association URBSFA in Bosman, opinion AG Lenz, at para 258. 
154 AG Lenz in Bosman, at para 258; see also AG Stix-Hackl in Balog, at para 67. 
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Another issue, brought up by the Italian government in the proceedings to the Balog 
case, is the fact that in some countries, regulations of sporting associations may be 
attributed to the state'55. As pointed out by Advocate-General Stix-Hackl, such 
measures may also be covered by Community law, but would have to be examined in 
's6 the light of Article 10 in conjunction with Article 81 of the Treaty. 
6.3. RELEVANT MARKET 
In any case of an alleged infringement of Articles 81 or 82, it is necessary to analyse 
the relevant market before assessing the situation under the competition rules. Only 
after the market is defined precisely, is it possible to determine whether an agreement 
between undertakings distorts competition and/or whether an undertaking occupies a 
dominant position. The relevant market is defined by two different elements: the 
product market, which "comprises all those products and/or services which are 
regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the 
products' characteristics, their prices and their intended use" and the geographical 
market, which is "the area in which the undertakings concerned are involved in the 
supply and demand of products or services, in which the conditions of competition 
are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be distinguished from neighbouring 
areas because the conditions of competition are appreciably different in those 
areas"1s7 
When the given definition of the relevant product market is analysed, it is 
evident that the most significant factor is demand substitutability. Thus, in order to 
determine the relevant market, the Commission applies the so-called SSNIP test. 
SSNIP stands for "small but significant and non-transitory increase in price", 
defining the relevant market as the narrowest range of products in relation to which a 
text-book monopolist would be able to institute a SSNIP without experiencing a loss 
of sales through demand substitution that would make the price increase 
unprofitable. 
iss See AG Stix-Hackl in Balog, at paras 69 -71. 156 See AG Stix-Hackl in Balog, at para 71. 
157 Commission Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market for the Purpose of Community 
Competition Law, OJ 1997 C 327/5. 
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In football, it is particularly difficult to differentiate between specific markets and 
sub-markets. One of the most peculiar features of the football market is the enormous 
brand loyalty of fans. In contrast to other products such as washing powder or tooth 
paste, where a small increase in price may induce a customer to buy another brand, a 
football supporter will not switch allegiances if his club puts ticket prices up, even 
where there was another team situated in the same area. Besides, the different 
markets are closely interlinked, which, in connection with the lack of empirical 
evidence, makes the definition of the relevant market even more complicated. The 
biggest difference to other markets, however, stems from the fact that there is no 
such thing as a homogenous product football, but that each football game is a unique 
product which arguably constitutes a market on its own. 
6.3.1. Football vs. Other Sports 
Before analysing the various markets and sub-markets existing in a particular sport 
such as football, it is necessary to determine whether there actually is a separate 
demand for the sport in question, or whether the market in fact includes all sports. 
Leaving aside the question of what differentiation can be made within the football 
market, there can be no doubt that football cannot be substituted with other sports 
from a consumer's point of view. For example, it can be assumed that a football fan 
would not switch to cricket, following a small increase in ticket prices, the same way 
a subscriber to Sky Television would not cancel his football package after a SSNIP 
in order to watch rugby. It has already been established that football is a natural 
monopoly, meaning that there is no satisfactory substitute for supporters. Despite the 
fact that there may be a few consumers who are interested in sport as such and would 
probably be happy to follow another sport, if they thought football was becoming too 
expensive, for most fans the only alternative to football is no football. This is 
underlined by the importance that football and in particular a certain club has in 
many supporters' lives. People who travel up and down the country each Saturday to 
see their team play, who follow the games on television and who buy the new away 
strip every second season, do not suddenly develop an interest in rugby, cricket or 
any other sport. However, the same applies to consumers who do not have "their" 
team, but simply enjoy football as such. For football supporters, the television 
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coverage of Formula one or Tennis is not a satisfactory alternative'58, which is an 
indication that the football market is independent from other sports. 
When trying to define the relevant market at issue, though, it becomes evident 
that it is in fact not possible to refer to "the football market", but that there are 
different sub-markets within the football "industry"159. These different markets are 
all connected with each other and restrictions on an upstream market may affect the 
downstream markets; however, for the purpose of competition law it is necessary to 
differentiate between them 160. 
6.3.2. The Market for Football Contests 
This is the market where the actual good is produced: a football match between two 
teams161. As already explained, the market for team sports requires the competitors, 
the two teams involved in the sporting contest, to work together in order to produce a 
marketable good. However, although there are certain games that would undoubtedly 
attract a lot of consumer interest even if they were played independently from an 
ongoing competition 162, football matches are usually organised as part of a league or 
tournament. 
When the organisation of professional football in Europe is analysed, it 
emerges that there are three levels of competition: domestic club football, 
international club football and international football between different nations, each 
of which is further subdivided into different competitions. In domestic club football 
there are the different divisions of the league on one hand and the cup (in some 
countries such as England and Scotland there are even two cups a year) on the other. 
In contrast to American team sports, football leagues in Europe work with a system 
of relegation and promotion, which means that the various divisions are interlinked 
158 See for example the Commission Decision 2000/400 Eurovision, OJ 2000 L 151/18, at para 42, 
where it was established that for at least the football World Cup, viewing behaviour was not 
influenced by the transmission of the Olympics or the Wimbledon fmals. 
159 See "Ibe Balance between the Game and the Money", Study commissioned by the Netherland's 
Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport (Sports Directorate), Appendix in Caiger, A. & Gardiner, S. 
(eds), op. cit. supra note 20, p. 312. 
160 See AG Stix-Hackl in Balog, at para 76. 
161 See also AG Stix-Hack! in Balog, at para 78. 
162 Examples are the Old Firm derby or the annual "friendly" between Scotland and England, which 
was abandoned in 1989. Owing to the history and nature of those pairings, the games would be 
marketable even if they were held outwith a league or an international tournament. 
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to a certain extent. Furthermore, in European club football there are also international 
competitions taking place in addition to the national leagues, the Champions League, 
the UEFA Cup and the Super Cup, which consists of only a single game, played 
between the winner of the Champions League and the winner of the UEFA Cup 163. it 
is important to note that the different sporting competitions are connected, as one 
team may participate in several competitions at the same time and the same players 
play football on different levels, with their club and also on an international level. 
Moreover, teams that have been competing in the first division in one year may be in 
the second division the year after. Similarly, the competitors in international football 
change from one year/event to the other, depending on whether a club or nation has 
managed to qualify. 
In contrast to other markets where undertakings work independently on the 
production level and only compete when it comes to selling the product to the 
consumers, in football, sporting competition is a prerequisite for the production of a 
marketable good, which is then exploited economically by the clubs or the 
association. Hence, the contest market is characterised by sporting and not economic 
competition between teams, which means that it does not in fact constitute a market 
for the purpose of competition law, but merely is the place where the good is 
produced. As previously mentioned, the quality of the product football depends on 
the sporting balance between the competitors. Additionally, the attraction of the 
sporting contest will also vary according to the sporting quality of the teams 
involved. Thus, an unequal game between two Premier League clubs may generate 
more interest from a supporter's point of view than an evenly balanced match 
between two sides from the third division. 
The product football can be marketed in various ways. Football can be sold in 
the form of broadcasting rights or through the sale of tickets to the stadium. 
Additionally, teams engage in, the marketing of merchandise, conclude sponsoring 
agreements and even sell advertising space for their stadiums. To make things even 
more complicated, it is debatable whether each of these forms of exploitation 
163 For the sake of completeness it should be noted that there are also fairly unimportant competitions 
such as the Intertoto Cup, the winner of which will be granted a place in the UEFA Cup or 
domestic competitions on a lower league level which from an economic point of view only play a 
minor role in football. 
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actually form an individual market, or whether they are interchangeable. It has 
always been a heavily discussed subject, for example, whether for a fan, the 
experience of following a football match in the stadium can be substituted for 
watching a live game on television. Despite the fact that a lot of supporters still go to 
see their team in the stadium even if the game is transmitted on television, clubs have 
often argued that the extensive coverage of football on television has a negative 
influence on stadium attendances. Taking into account that the football experience of 
watching a game at home will be completely different from being part of a noisy 
crowd in the stadium, it would seem that there is no substitutability between live 
football and television coverage for a football fan. However, considering the 
incessantly growing ticket prices particularly in Britain, it can only be assumed that 
there will come a point where fans are not prepared to pay inflated prices any more 
and decide to follow the game at home. 
Once it has been established that football can be marketed in different ways, 
it becomes clear that the relevant product market will vary between the methods of 
exploitation, depending on the preferences of the participants in each market. 
Whereas from a company's point of view, sponsoring rights for Celtic or Rangers 
might be interchangeable, the average Celtic fan would rather give up football than 
purchasing a Rangers season ticket, even if Celtic's was significantly more 
expensive. Thus, the next step is to analyse the different exploitation markets, trying 
to define existing sub-markets according to demand substitutability. 
6.3.3. Market for Broadcasting Rights 
In recent years, the market for broadcasting rights has become more and more 
important from an economic point of viewtM. For broadcasters, football rights form a 
market separate from other sports broadcasting rights, owing to the fact that football 
is very popular with viewers and there is little substitutability with other sports16s 
Especially Pay-TV and Pay-per-view broadcasters are willing to pay substantial 
sums for sports rights, as sport is the main drive for new viewers to subscribe. 
164 According to 2005 Annual Report of Football Finance by Deloitte & Touche, broadcasting 
remains the largest revenue source for Premiership clubs in 2003/04 at 45% of total revenue. 
165 See Commission Decision 2003/778 Joint Selling of the Commercial Rights of the UEFA 
Champions League", OJ 2003 L 291/25, at para 77. 
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However, in many leagues within Europe, broadcasting rights are sold collectively 
by the national association or the league itself. In this case, the market in football 
broadcasting rights constitutes a suppliers' market whereby the producers - the 
individual clubs - form a cartel which has monopoly status. The practice of collective 
marketing of broadcasting rights has recently been accepted by the Commission 
which, albeit considering a joint selling agreement of the' commercial rights of the 
UEFA Champions League as restricting competition, has granted UEFA an 
exemption under Article 81(3) of the Treaty166 
Without going into too much detail, it is important to note that the football 
broadcasting market is divided into sub-markets, according to the preferences of the 
viewers. First of all, it can be assumed that from a consumer's point of view there is 
little substitutability between premier league football and lower leagues167 or 
between Champions League football and the less prestigious UEFA Cup. Besides, 
there most definitely is a separate market for international football, such as the 
European Championships or the World Cup, which may even be further divided, 
depending on the stages of a tournament (qualification, group stage, final). Apart 
from that, football broadcasting rights can also be distinguished according to the type 
of rights, as full live coverage of a sport event is a separate market from deferred 
transmission or coverage of extracts (highlights) 168 and the type of transmission, i. e. 
television, radio, internet. 
6.3.4. The Market for Sponsoring 
The sponsoring of well-known sports teams or individual sportsmen and 
sportswomen is an important way for businesses to raise their profile by profiting 
from the exposure of the sponsored party169 Additionally, considering its global 
'66 Ibid. 
167 According to market studies, English Premier League football matches do not substitute to other 
sport events when broadcast on the same day, see Commission Decision 2000/400 Eurovision, OJ 
2000 L 151/18, footnote 11. 
168 See Temple Lang, "Media, Multimedia and EC Antitrust Law", Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 
Twenty-fourth Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law & Policy (1997), p. 20, 
available at http: //ec. europa. eu/conun/competition/speeches/text/sp l 997_070_en. html. 
169 However, sponsors may also run the risk of losing business if the sponsored party is subject to 
negative publicity; this has been shown by the example of Manchester United where thousands of 
disappointed fans have cancelled their Vodafone contracts as a sign of protest over the take-over 
by Malcolm Glazier; together with Manchester United's recent lack of sporting success, this might 
193 
popularity, football offers an ideal opportunity for certain brands to break into new 
markets and expand into other countries. In this market, it has to be distinguished 
between the sponsoring of particular teams170 and deals which are concluded with 
individual players. Furthermore, there also is a market for the sponsoring of certain 
football events, such as the World Cup or the national premier league. 
The significance of sponsoring in modem football is best illustrated by the 
fact that in some countries, stadiums are actually named after the sponsor, whereas in 
others, the sponsor even forms an integral part to the club's name 171. In respect of the 
sponsoring of individuals, the immense popularity of top-class athletes is used by 
various companies as an important tool to promote their products and can help 
undertakings to achieve a market presence in countries where their brand was only 
little known before. Another aspect of sponsoring is agreements between sporting 
associations and suppliers of sporting equipment. The Commission has approved of 
such an exclusive sponsoring agreement involving the Danish Tennis Federation and 
a tennis ball supplier under the condition that such contracts are of limited duration 
and the selection of sponsors is transparent, open and non-discriminatory '72. The 
economic relevance of these sponsoring agreements has just recently been 
demonstrated in the case of an agreement between UEFA and Adidas, guaranteeing 
the sports equipment company the exclusive right to supply the official ball for the 
European Championships 2004. According to an Adidas press release, the "Roteiro" 
was sold six million times in the first two weeks of the European Championships at 
the substantial price of E 110 apiece 173. Furthermore, Adidas has already secured the 
have contributed to Vodafone's decision prematurely to cancel its sponsorship deal after the 
2005/06 season, see "Vodafone steigt 2006 bei Manchester als Hauptsponsor aus", Der Standard, 
23.11.2005. 
170 The most common way being shirt sponsoring, with German Bundesliga clubs generating a total 
of E 91.9 million, ahead of Serie A clubs (E 64.9 million) and Premiership clubs (E 62.5 million). 
Juventus Turin have the most lucrative shirt sponsorship deal with an income of E 22 million, 
ahead of Bayern Munich (E 17 million), Chelsea (E 14,5 million), Real Madrid (E 14 million) and 
Manchester United (E 13 million); source: "Teure deutsche Brüste", Der Standard, 20.10.2005. 
171 The examples of Greuter Fürth's Playmobil Stadium and the Austrian club SC Interwetten. com 
have already been mentioned. 
172 Case IV/F-1/33.055 Danish Tennis Federation, OJ 1996 C 138/6, see Commission press release 
IP/98/355, "The Commission conditionally approves sponsorship contracts between the Danish 
Tennis Federation and its tennis ball suppliers", 15.5.1998. 
173 See Szemeliker, L. "Ein wirtschaftlicher EM Sieger steht bereits fest: Adidas", Der Standard, 
26/27.6.2004. 
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right to provide the official ball for the World Cup in its home country 2006 and the 
European Championships 2008 in Austria and Switzerland. 
6.3.5. The Market for Merchandise 
Nowadays, the selling of club merchandise such as the team kit, training gear or 
underwear with an imprinted logo of the club is a very important source of income 
for teams worldwide. Supporters around Europe spend billions each year on 
merchandise in order to support their club, a fact that has been recognised and 
exploited by the clubs. Furthermore, clubs are more and more aware of the fact that 
the signing of a popular player will increase sales in club merchandise, with the 
result that a growing number of Asian players are finding their way into European 
clubs which endeavour to conquer new markets. For example, when Crystal Palace 
signed the Chinese players Fan Zhiyi and Sun Jihai in 1998, over 100 million people 
tuned in to watch their Nationwide First Division games transmitted live to the Far 
East 174. Three years later, Dundee FC bought Fan Zhiyi and shortly after the club 
was represented at Asia's biggest football exhibition in Shanghai, selling over 600 
replica kits in just a few days and receiving 40,000 entries on their newly established 
Mandarin website175. 
The importance of the market for merchandise in modem football is 
illustrated by the fact that some clubs are even prepared to sacrifice sporting interests 
for economic considerations. When Real took their team of football superstars on a 
three week tour through South-East Asia before the start of the 2003/04 season, 
which, considering the travelling involved is arguably not the best way to prepare for 
the start of a new season, they were criticised not only by fans, but also by the 
players 176. The example shows the extent to which economic considerations 
influence what should normally be a sporting decision and the lengths to which clubs 
are prepared to go in order to increase profits from merchandise. Thus, some clubs 
such as Real Madrid or Manchester United have succeeded in establishing their 
174 "Premiership trio seek Asian Cup fortune", www. soccernet. coni, 23.7.2003. 
175 Mccabe, A., "You'll never wok alone", Daily Record, 25.5.2002. 
176 In particular Zinedine Zidane dissaproved of Real Madrid's Asia tour, which involved four 
matches in five days, criticising that "after each match, we went to bed late, we got up early and 
headed for the airport. In these conditions, it was impossible to do real pre-season training. It was 
more a matter of recuperation", see "Zidane slams Asia tour", The Daily Star, 20.8.2003. 
195 
brands in countries where most people buying their team kit would struggle to 
explain even basic rules of the game of football. 
The need for legal control on the market for merchandise has also been 
demonstrated by the already mentioned case of price-fixing of football replica shirts 
in England177. The danger of market distortion in the market for football merchandise 
is enhanced by the extraordinary brand loyalty of football supporters. An AC Milan 
fan is interested only in his team's shirt and is not going to buy an Inter kit instead, 
even if the club has put up prices. Furthermore, in contrast to other consumers who 
are not particularly interested in the economic welfare of their preferred retailer, 
football fans buy merchandise in order to support the club and make more funds 
available for the team. This means that those consumers are particularly vulnerable 
when it comes to distorting practices of the clubs, as they can neither switch to 
another alternative, nor do they want to boycott the club, as this would weaken its 
sporting success. 
6.3.6. The Market for Stadium Advertising 
Despite the fact that compared to the other exploitation markets, the market for 
stadium advertising is of minor importance, it should still be mentioned for 
completeness' sake. Owing to the growing number of televised games, stadium 
advertising is of interest not only for local advertisers, but also for companies 
operating nation-wide. Moreover, taking into account that European games are 
shown throughout the Union, the geographical market for stadium advertising may 
even comprise more than one country. During the 2004 European Championships, 
for example, viewers in and outside Europe were subjected to stadium advertising by 
international companies such as McDonalds, Coca-Cola or Mastercard. Evidently, in 
the case of the World Cup, which is broadcast all over the globe, the geographical 
market for stadium advertising becomes even wider. It is important to note, though, 
that the product market for stadium advertising may be divided, depending on the 
nature of football competition, like the league division a club participates in or the 
attractiveness of a tournament from the viewers' point of view. 
177 Decision of the OFT No. CA98/06/2003 from 1.8.2003. 
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6.3.7. The Market for Match Tickets 
The market for tickets to a football match falls between the exploitation and the 
contest market, as the selling of match tickets is not only a method of marketing, but 
also an essential component of organising the competition. It is very difficult to 
define the relevant product market, as arguably each game may constitute a separate 
market, depending on the opponents. For example, for an Arsenal fan, a ticket to an 
Arsenal game is not substitutable with a ticket to a match involving two other teams. 
Furthermore, it is evident that for the same supporter, to watch Arsenal vs. Charlton 
is not a satisfying alternative to a match between the Gunners and arch rivals 
Tottenham. Even for a football fan who does not have allegiances to a certain club, 
different matches are not necessarily interchangeable, as any neutral football lover 
would prefer to see an Old Firm game rather than a match between Dunfermline and 
Livingston. The difficulties involved in determining fan preferences regarding 
different football matches have already been touched upon in the context of the 
market for broadcasting rights. Moreover, it has already been mentioned that the sale 
of match tickets may be influenced by the fact that a game is transmitted live on 
television. Evidently, empirical evidence would be needed to establish exactly the 
relevant product markets. 
Concerning international football competitions, the Commission, referring to 
the unique nature of the World Cup, has considered entry tickets to the World Cup 
finals to form a separate product market from the ticket market for any other football 
competition 178. Similarly, it may be assumed that tickets for ' the European 
Championships, the UEFA Champions League and the UEFA Cup constitute 
separate markets, which might be further divided according to the different stages of 
the relevant competition. 
As regards the geographic market for football tickets, it is submitted that the 
market for domestic competitions is national, owing to fan interests and travelling 
distances. In view of the widespread demand for tickets throughout the EEA, the 
geographic market for World Cup tickets was considered to comprise at least all 
178 Decision 2000/12 1998 Football World Cup, OJ 2000 L 5/64, at para 68. 
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countries within the EEA179, which equally applies to the European Championships. 
In contrast, the geographic market for entry tickets to international club competitions, 
with maybe the exception of the finals, will depend on the opponents involved. 
6.3.8. The Market for Players 
It is evident that in order to produce a football game, one needs first and foremost 
players. Although there are many other people part of a club, i. e. the manager, the 
coaches, the physiotherapists, the groundsmen, etc., the players constitute the most 
important production factors for producing the good - the sporting contest. However, 
there have been objections to the fact that human beings who do not qualify as 
undertakings themselves may be assumed to form a market for the purpose of EC 
competition law'80. As pointed out by Advocate-General Stix-Hackl in her opinion to 
the Balog case, though, the significance of the production factor (human beings) has 
not only been recognised in connection with football, but also plays an important role 
in the service sector'81. Furthermore, the Court has already recognised that human 
labour too can be the subject of economic activity 182. Thus, the market in football 
players constitutes a market in sources of supply, upstream of the market where the 
sporting contest is produced. On this market each club tries to buy the best possible 
players for the available funds, however, the fact that clubs both buy and sell players 
at the same time, means that clubs have to be careful about letting players move to 
clubs which stand in direct sporting competition to them. 
When the structure of the market for football players is analysed, one may 
wonder to what extent professional footballers are interchangeable from the clubs' 
point of view. In this context players have been compared to artists, whose talents 
and performances are so individual that they are generally not substitutable against 
each other' 83. However, despite the fact that players have different skills and playing 
styles, the demand for footballers is not so narrow that if a club is unable to purchase 
179 Aid, at para 77. 
180 See the submission of FIFA in Balog, opinion AG Stix-Hackl, at para 73. 
18, AG Stix-Hackl in Balog, at para 85. 
182 See Case C-41/90 Klaus Häfner and Fritz Elser v. Macrotron [1991] ECR 1-1979, at para 21. 
183 See the submission of the Italian Government in Balog, opinion AG Stix-Hackl, at para 89. 
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a particular player, it will not engage another one184. In general, whenever a club is 
looking to buy a new player, there will be an understanding between board and 
manager as to which position needs to be strengthened and how much money is 
available. Apart from price and position, what clubs are generally only interested in 
when buying a new player is the question whether he is actually any good, which 
will usually be reflected in the transfer fee. Hence, if a particular player is not 
available, the club will simply engage another one who meets the required criteria. 
Considering that, it is necessary to outline whether the market for football players is 
further divided according to market value and position of players. 
6.3.8.1. Quality/Market Value 
At the beginning of the 2004/05 season Real Madrid were looking to buy yet another 
forward to strengthen their already impressive strike force. Evidently, Real did not 
consider engaging a lower-league player, but wanted another famous high-quality 
footballer, which led to the signing of Liverpool's Michael Owen. This example 
shows that in some cases there is in fact only limited substitutability between football 
players, as for Real Madrid, only a striker of international pedigree would have fitted 
the bill. On the other hand, when Rapid Wien planned to buy a new forward, they 
certainly did not consider joining the race for Wayne Rooney. Even in those cases 
where a high-quality player moves at the end of his contract, the chances for a small 
club to engage such a player are very low, considering the high wage demands and 
signing-on fees. Thus, it could be argued that there are separate markets for 
expensive, high-quality footballers and cheaper, less prolific players. However, while 
small clubs with limited budgets will usually not participate in the transfer of high- 
profile players, it is not uncommon for the big European clubs to look for new talent 
in the lower leagues. Despite the fact that the player in question will often not be 
granted a place in the first team at the beginning, there is undoubtedly evidence of 
interaction between the leagues, which makes it impossible to separate the market 
depending on market value/quality of players. This is underlined by the fact that in 
individual cases, some clubs, having missed out on their high-profile transfer target, 
have been known to go for a relatively unknown player for a smaller transfer fee. 
184 AG Stix-Hackl in Balog, at para 90. 
199 
6.3.8.2. Position 
Whereas it is usually possible for a club to engage a less expensive player, it is more 
difficult to imagine a scenario whereby a club needs a striker and ends up employing 
a defender instead. Moreover, taking into account the ongoing specialisation of 
individual players, footballers can not only be divided into goalkeeper, defender, 
midfielder and striker, but there are further subdivisions. Depending on the tactics 
and style of play, a team will require different kinds of players with special skills. 
Thus, are there different markets for wingers, centre-halfs, attacking/defending 
midfielders, etc.? Considering their playing advantage on the left wing and the fact 
that there is a notorious shortage of such players within the game, one could even 
argue that left-footed players form their own market. However, when the different 
kinds of players and their interchangeability within a football team are analysed, it 
emerges that there is only one truly specialist position in the team: the goalkeeper. 
Individuals playing in this position are so specialised that they cannot be used in any 
other function. Vice versa, it is virtually impossible to use a field-player in goal' 85 
This is underlined by the fact that they fulfil a unique purpose in the game and even 
train separately from the rest of the team. Although it is true that a striker needs 
different skills from a defender and there is usually little interchangeability between 
them, there are players whose game is so versatile that they can play in both 
positions. Furthermore, it is possible to retrain a player from being a centre-forward 
to playing as a defensive midfielder, but it is very rare that a field-player will 
suddenly be used as a goalkeeper. 
6.3.8.3. Nationality 
Apart from the issue whether there are separate markets for different types of 
players, it is further questionable whether the market is divided according to the 
nationality of footballers. After the Bosman case, nationality restrictions for EEA 
players have been abolished and, additionally, all EEA citizens have been given the 
right to move freely at the end of their contracts. Thus, from a club's point of view, 
185 This was cruelly experienced by Aberdeen in the 2000 Scottish Cup Final against Rangers. After 
their goalkeeper Jim Leighton was carried off with a broken jaw in the first few minutes of play, 
striker Robbie Winters had to play in goal as no substitute goalkeeper was available, and Aberdeen 
went on to lose 4-0. 
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there is no difference whether it employs a German, Spanish or Icelandic player. In 
respect of non-EEA players, the situation may be more difficult, depending on the 
individual circumstances of the player. If a non-EEA player who is at the end of his 
contract is moving within the EEA, for example, a club will not have to pay a 
transfer fee. However, nationality restrictions may still apply, a factor which may 
well influence the decision of a club whether a particular player should be bought. 
Also, under the 1997 FIFA Regulations, in the case of non-EEA players transferring 
from a club outside the EEA to a team within the EEA, the old club could still 
demand a fee from the buying club, even if the player's contract had expired. 
Considering the number of non-EEA footballers playing within the EU at the time, 
though, it seems as if the clubs did not differentiate between EEA/non-EEA players, 
but chose according to ability, price and position. Moreover, the number of players 
transferring from outside the EEA at the end of their contracts was quite small 
compared to the number of transfers in total and there is no evidence of a major 
increase now that FIFA has abolished transfer fees for out-of-contract players 
worldwide. Thus, there is no separate market for third country football players'86. 
6.3.8.4. Out of Contract/Mid-Contract 
Taking into account the requirement of a transfer fee for players still in contract 
under the 1997 FIFA Regulations, one may wonder whether there was a separate 
market for out-of-contract players who could move freely and thus, were less 
expensive for a club to acquire. As pointed out above, though, players moving "on a 
Bosman" would often be even more expensive than players still in contract with 
another club, owing to increased wage demands and signing-on fees. Additionally, it 
has already been demonstrated that for the purpose of EC competition law, players 
cannot be differentiated according to price, since rich clubs regularly buy cheap 
players. 
In summary, it has to be emphasised that for the purpose of EC competition law, 
there is no market for football as such, but it is possible to identify several sub- 
markets within the football industry. The relevant market for the transfer rules is 
thereby the market for football players, i. e. the acquisition market, formed by the 
186 See also AG Stix-Hackt in Balog, at para 88. 
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supply of and demand for football players by the individual clubs. Before it is 
examined whether the 1997 FIFA Regulations constituted a breach of EC 
competition law, though, it is necessary to determine the relevant geographical 
market for football players. 
6.3.9. Geographical Market 
As a result of the abolition of nationality restrictions in European club football for 
EEA players, footballers are nowadays moving between clubs all over Europe and 
there are no indications of any major differences between national markets in 
countries within the EEA. Also, despite the fact that there are still nationality 
restrictions in place for third country players who are transferring from outside the 
EEA, the number of players from South America, Eastern Europe and Africa is 
constantly on the rise. The last few years have even witnessed the arrival of some 
Asian players in European football. Furthermore, in modem times, language barriers 
seem to become less and less important and also smaller clubs regularly recruit 
players from abroad. For a lot of clubs it is cheaper to engage foreigners who are 
already the finished article, rather than having to invest in the development of their 
own youth players. On the other hand, cultural differences, which can make it 
difficult for a player to settle in an alien country, together with the fact that players 
from outwith the territory governed by UEFA often have to travel significant 
distances at times inconvenient for the club in order to fulfil their international 
duties, may hold clubs back from signing non-European players. Furthermore, before 
the coming into force of the 2001 FIFA Regulations, clubs still had to pay a transfer 
fee for out-of-contract players coming from a club located outside the EEA and thus, 
if they had the choice presumably would have preferred to sign a player transferring 
from within the European Economic Area. However, taking into account the number 
of South American, Asian and African athletes playing in leagues throughout the 
EEA, it can be assumed that the geographical market for football players is global, 
comprising the territory of all the associations in which the FIFA transfer regulations 
are applied' 87. 
187 See also AG Stix-Hackt in Balog, at para 93. 
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6.4. REMAINING RESTRICTIONS FOR OUT-OF-CONTRACT 
PLAYERS 
As is commonly known, the Court's decision in the Bosman case only applied to 
transfers of out-of-contract players from EEA countries between two Member States 
within the EEA. Thus, when assessing the 1997 FIFA Regulations under Article 
81(1) of the Treaty, it is necessary to differentiate between two possibly restrictive 
practices: the transfer rules regulating the movement of those out-of-contract players 
for whom a club could still demand a transfer fee - applicable to transfers of third 
country nationals, to transfers from a club outside the EEA to a club within and vice- 
versa, and to domestic transfers - and transfer rules concerning mid-contract 
transfers. However, it is important to note that non-EEA nationals moving between 
two associations within the EEA were eventually given equal treatment with EEA 
citizens from 1 April 1999, albeit five years later than initially intended' 88. 
Only a short period aller the Bosman case, players tried to challenge the 
remaining requirements for transfer fees for out-of-contract players. One of the first 
of these cases involved the Scottish international John Collins who transferred from 
Celtic to AS Monaco at the end of the 1995/96 season. Despite the fact that Collins' 
contract had expired, Celtic requested AS Monaco to pay a transfer fee, arguing that 
since the principality of Monaco was not a Member State of the EEA, the Bosman 
ruling did not apply. AS Monaco on the other hand, took the view that as a member 
of the French football association, playing in the French first division, it should be 
treated in the same way as a French club and was thus covered by the provisions on 
the free movement of workers. The Commission, having been approached by FIFA 
about the issue, confirmed that the principality of Monaco was not part of the 
Community for the purpose of the free movement of workers. However, taking into 
account that AS Monaco played in the French league, the Commission considered 
that the Bosman ruling was applicable to the transfer, as it would retain "a 
sufficiently close link with the Community"189. Thus, FIFA ruled in favour of AS 
188 See point I of FIFA Circular No 616. 
189 See answer to the written question E-1290/97 by Bill Miller (PSE) from 11.4.1997, OJ 1997 C 
319/247; the transfer was also subject to proceedings before the Court of Arbitration for Sport, 
Case 98/201 Celtic v. UEFA, which came to the same conclusion. However, this view was by no 
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Monaco, arguing, "because the transfer took place between two clubs of national 
. associations both located in EU territory [... ] no compensation 
is due"190 
Shortly after the dispute around John Collins' transfer to AS Monaco, the 
scenario of a player moving from a club in a third country to a team within the EU 
gave rise to a complaint to the Commission. Massimo Lombardo, a Swiss national 
playing with Grasshoppers Zürich received an offer from the Italian club Perugia. As 
Grasshoppers requested a transfer fee, Perugia complained to the Commission, 
arguing that the requirement of a transfer fee infringed Article 81 of the Treaty. As a 
result of the investigation by the Commission, the football authorities were asked to 
propose an alternative to the existing transfer system; however, it was only when the 
2001 transfer regulations came into force that all out-of-contract players were given 
the right to free transfer. 
The cases of John Collins and Massimo Lombardo demonstrate some of the 
difficulties caused by the unequal treatment of transfers between two Member States 
and moves from within the EEA to a club located in a third country. However, fees 
for players whose contracts had expired were not only criticised in relation to third- 
country transfers, but also in the case of domestic transfers'91. From a footballing 
point of view, the differentiation between domestic and third-country transfers on the 
one hand and trans-EEA moves on the other seemed rather arbitrary and so it was no 
surprise when the remaining transfer fees for out-of-contract players were finally 
challenged before the European Court of Justice under the competition rules. 
In 1998 a request for a preliminary ruling was made by a Belgian court 
regarding the transfer of the Hungarian player Tibor Balog. Despite the fact that the 
case was eventually removed from the register after the parties agreed on an out-of- 
court settlement, it is worth mentioning, particularly as Advocate-General Stix-Hackl 
means universally accepted, see for example Spink, P., "Post-Bosman Legal Issues", (1997) 42(3) 
Journal of the Law Society of Scotland, p. 109, who stressed that "it seems hardly necessary to 
reiterate that Monaco cannot be considered part of the EC for the purposes of football, or that AS 
Monaco can be considered French by virtue of the league in which they play". 
190 Ibid, p. 108. 
191 See for example the case of Chris Honor, who, despite interest from various English lower league 
clubs, failed to find a new employer after his contract with the Scottish club Airdrie FC had run 
out at the end of the 1994/95 season, as Airdrie asked for a transfer fee of £200,000. Airdrie 
eventually agreed to a free transfer in 1995, by which point it was too late, as Honor had acquired 
a petrol station and committed himself to non-league football, see Spink, P., "Blowing the Whistle 
on Football's Domestic Transfer Fee", (1999) Juridical Review, p. 74. 
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had the chance to deliver her opinion. Mr. Balog had been playing for the Belgian 
club Charleroi since 1993 until the expiry of his contract in June 1997. After he had 
turned down the offer of a new contract and several deals with other clubs fell 
through owing to the substantial transfer fee requested by Charleroi, Balog was 
finally engaged by an Israeli club for the 1997/98 season. Since the move was limited 
to one season after which Balog was supposed to return to Charleroi, the Belgian 
club did not seek a transfer fee. In April 1998 the player asked Charleroi to 
acknowledge that the club did not have the right to demand a transfer fee from a 
possible future employer, which the club refused. After Balog did not accept another 
offer of a contract, he brought proceedings for interim relief in the Charleroi 
Tribunal de premiere instance, seeking an order requiring the club to abstain from 
any request for a transfer fee from a future employer. The Belgian court referred the 
following question to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: 
"Is it compatible with Article 85 [now 81] of the Treaty of Rome and/or with Article 
53 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area for a football club established in 
the territory of a Member State of the European Union to claim, on the basis of the 
rules and circulars of the national and international federations (URBSFA, UEFA, 
FIFA), payment of a"transfer sum" on the occasion of the engagement of one of its 
former players, a professional footballer of non-Community nationality who has 
reached the end of his contract, by a new employer established in the same Member 
State, in another Member State of the European Union or the European Economic 
Area, or in a non-member country? "' 92 
The question referred to the Court makes clear that the Balog case concerned only 
transfers where fees could still be demanded for players whose contracts had expired: 
moves (of EEA-foreigners) between clubs in different Member States, transfers to 
clubs outwith the territory of the EEA and domestic transferst93. In this context, it is 
important to point out that the fact that Mr. Balog was not a national of an EEA 
Member State is irrelevant for competition law purposes, which is addressed to 
undertakings, i. e. the clubs or the associations. Thus, there may be differences 
192 See AG Stix-Hackl in Balog, at para 18. 
193 The question whether the only other scenario where the former club could demand a transfer fee 
for out-of-contract players -a player moving from a club outside the EEA to a club situated in a 
Member State - would have been in breach of Article 81, will be examined below. 
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between the treatment of transfers of out-of-contract players depending on the 
location of the clubs involved in a transfer, but not according to the nationality of the 
player concerned. 
6.4.1. Restriction of Competition 
When the anticompetitive effects of an agreement between undertakings are 
analysed, it is necessary to compare the market situation including the interferences 
with competition, with a scenario without those interferences 194. The market in 
footballers was affected by the 1997 FIFA regulations in so far as, without the 
requirement of transfer fees for certain out-of-contract players, all players could have 
moved freely at the end of their contracts and clubs would have been able to engage 
any player without having to pay a transfer sum. Thus, in respect of the out-of- 
, contract players at 
issue, the transfer system reduced the choice of players available 
to the clubs and the teams were restricted in their competition to recruit players. The 
transfer rules replaced the free play of the market forces of supply and demand by a 
uniform machinery within FIFA, in so far as it qualified as a sharing of sources of 
supply within the meaning of Article 81(1)(c) of the Treaty'95. Contrary to the 
argument put forward by the football authorities in Balog, as well as Bosman, the 
transfer rules were not neutral with respect to competition, but actually contributed to 
the preservation of the existing competition situation, which is underlined by the fact 
that the fees could be demanded even though the player in question was out of 
contract'96 
As a further argument against the transfer system at issue, Advocate-General 
Stix-Hackl submitted that the requirement of transfer fees for out-of-contract players 
kept players' wages at a lower level' 97. Despite the fact that the development post- 
Bosman undoubtedly witnessed a substantial increase in players' income, it should 
be stressed that such considerations are irrelevant under Article 81 of the Treaty, as 
194 See AG Stix-Hackl in Balog, at para 101, citing Societe Technique Miniere, at p. 250. 
195 See AG Stix-Hackl in Balog, at para 98. 
196 See AG Stix-Hackl in Balog, at para 100; AG Lenz in Bosman, at para 262. 
197 See AG Stix-Hackl in Balog, at para 103. 
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footballers generally do not qualify as undertakings and the competition which is 
restricted by the transfer rules is that between clubs 198. 
6.4.1.1. Justification under the "Rule of Reason"? 
It has already been explained that under the Court's case law at the time the transfer 
rules (which arguably did not have the object of restricting competition as such) 
would have fallen outside the scope of Article 81(1), provided they were necessary to 
ensure the functioning of sporting competition'99. However, as mentioned above, in 
Bosman the Court held that the transfer system at issue was not only unsuitable to 
achieve a competitive balance, but less restrictive means such as re-distribution 
measures were available. Taking into account that both the transfer rules at issue in 
Bosman and Balog concerned transfer fees for out-of-contract players, it is evident 
that the Court's considerations in Bosman may also be applied to the transfer rules in 
Balog. Additionally, it is very difficult to argue that the remaining transfer fees for 
players whose contracts have expired were necessary for the proper functioning of 
football, after such fees had already been abolished for the vast majority of transfers. 
If European football could work without transfer fees for out-of-contract players 
moving between two Member States, it is clear that transfer fees for transfers to and 
from third countries or within one Member State were not essential for the existence 
of football competition either. 
6.4.1.2. Appreciable Effect 
Agreements between undertakings fall within the scope of Article 81(1) of the Treaty 
only if they restrict or distort competition within the common market to an 
appreciable extent200. However, according to the Court, potential effects suffice2ot, 
when foreseeable with a sufficient degree of probability of appreciable adverse 
effects202. When analysing whether an agreement causes appreciable interferences 
within the common market, the Court usually assesses the market structure and 
198 See also AG Lenz in Bosman, at para 263. 
199 As Wouters was decided after Balog, the judgment is not relevant in this context. 
200 See for example Societe Technique Miniere, p. 250; Case 5/69 Völk v. Vervaecke [1969] ECR 
295. 
201 Case C-19/77 Miller International Schallplatten GmbH v. Commission [1978] ECR 131, at para 
15. 
202 Case 99/79 Lancome v. Etos [1980] ECR 2522, at para 23. 
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market shares of the undertakings involved and the quantitative effects of the 
agreement on competition within the common market. Having said that, the threshold 
of appreciability is very low203. In the case of the football transfer rules, the fact that 
the agreement involves all the undertakings acting on the market suggests that 
competition is affected to an appreciable extent. Furthermore, although transfers to 
which the requirement of a transfer fee for out-of-contract players still applied at the 
time constituted a fairly small part of the overall transfer activity, the significant 
number of third-country nationals playing within the European Union implies that 
competition was distorted appreciably204. In those cases where national associations 
still provided for domestic transfer fees for players whose contracts had expired, the 
interference had an appreciable effect at least on the market in the particular Member 
State; however, there have been disputes about whether domestic transfer fees affect 
trade between Member States. 
6.4.1.3. Effect on Trade between Member States 
In order for Article 81(1) to apply, an agreement between undertakings must have an 
effect on trade between Member States. The intention behind this requirement is to 
define the boundary between "the areas respectively covered by Community law and 
national law"205. Thus, a restrictive agreement, which only affects trade within a 
single Member State, will not be caught by Article 81(1), neither will an agreement 
which affects trade between a Member State and one or more non-Member States206. 
The Court has laid the threshold for an agreement to have an effect on trade between 
Member States fairly low in the past, holding the requirement to be satisfied when it 
203 In Miller, a combined market share of five percent was considered enough to affect the market to 
an appreciable extent; the Commission has issued guidelines regarding its approach to agreements 
of minor importance, see Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance which do not Appreciably 
Restrict Competition under Article 81(1) (de minimis) OJ 2001 C 368/13, establishing that the 
Commission will not start proceedings in cases covered by the Notice. Agreements between 
undertakings whose aggregate market share does not exceed ten percent on markets where the 
parties are actual or potential competitors, respectively fifteen percent for cases where the parties 
are not competitiors on the relevant markets, do not appreciably restrict competition. A five 
percent threshold applies to vertical cases, in which competition may be restricted by the 
cumulative effect of agreements; however, individual suppliers or distributors with a marker share 
not exceeding five percent are generally not considered to contribute significantly to a cumulative 
foreclosure effect. Apart from that, the Notice also contains a list of hardcore restrictions, in case 
of which it does not apply. 
204 See also AG Stix-Hackl in Balog, at para 121. 
205 Consten & Grundig, at p. 341. 
206 See Lane, R., op. cit. supra note 40, p. 68. 
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is possible to "foresee with a sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a set of 
objective factors of law or of fact that the agreement in ' question may have an 
influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between 
Member Statess207. The concept of trade is interpreted broadly in EC competition 
law and has been held to relate to the placement of employees208, which means that 
the supply of and demand for professional football players is included209. Moreover, 
in EC competition law proof that an agreement had an actual impact on trade is not 
required, as long as it was capable of having that effect210, which means that even a 
potential effect suffices. 
Whereas it is evident that trade between Member States will be affected by 
transfers between two clubs located in different Member States 211 , there have 
been 
doubts as to whether this will be the case with regard to domestic transfers or 
transfers to or from a third country. A transfer system that enables a club to demand a 
transfer fee for an out-of-contract player moving within a Member State, affects trade 
between Member States in so far as clubs will obviously try to sell their out-of- 
contract players to a club in the same country. On the other hand, clubs looking to 
buy a player whose contract has expired will try to acquire a player from a club in 
another Member State in order to avoid having to pay a transfer fee. Thus, there have 
been arguments that domestic transfer rules providing for a transfer fee for out-of- 
contract players actually increased trade between Member States. However, 
according to the Court, "the fact that an agreement encourages an increase, even a 
large one, in the volume of trade between states is not sufficient to exclude the 
possibility that the agreement may `affect' such trade"212. Thus, the decisive point is 
207 Societe Technique Miniere, p. 249. 
208 See Case C-55/96 Job Centre [1997] ECR 1-7119. 
209 See AG Stix-Hackl in Balog, at para 127; see also AG Alber in Lehtonen in respect of basketball 
players. 
210 Miller, at paras 14-15. 
211 See Lenz in Bosman, at pars 261. 
212 Consten & Grundig, p. 341; see in this context Lane, R., op. cit. supra note 40, p. 69, who points 
out that in contrast to the English and French (affecter), which are both neutral, the Dutch 
(ongunstig kunnen beivloeden), the German (beeinträchtigen geeignet sind) and the Italian 
(pregiudicare) presuppose a negative effect on the market. 
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not whether trade is affected in a negative way, but whether inter-state trade flows 
would have developed differently in the absence of the agreement213 
As far as fees regarding transfers to a third country are concerned, it can be 
argued that they affect trade between Member States, as clubs will prefer to sell their 
players to a club outwith the EEA so that they can receive a transfer fee, even though 
a player's contract has expired. As a result, the sources of supply are limited as fewer 
players are available on the Community market. The requirement of transfer fees for 
players moving from a third country has the effect that clubs within the Community 
will be reluctant to buy a player from a club located outside the Community. It is 
established case law that restrictive agreements between undertakings within the 
Community and undertakings in third countries, which reduce the supply within the 
European Union of products originating outside the Community, fall within the 
scope of Article 81(1)214. 
Apart from that, as pointed out by Advocate-General Stix-Hackl, there is an 
effect on trade between Member States not only regarding the market for players, but 
also where the economic activities of the clubs and associations on the downstream 
markets are the object of trade between Member States215. Since clubs were restricted 
in their efforts to increase the marketability of their teams by improving their squads, 
the requirement for out-of-contract transfer fees evidently had an effect on inter- 
Community trade on other markets, such as the market for broadcasting rights or 
merchandise. 
For an agreement to be caught by Article 81(1), trade between Member States 
has to be affected to an appreciable extent. When determining whether trade between 
Member States is affected appreciably, the correct definition of the relevant market is 
of utmost importance, as the volume of trade affected has to be considered in 
proportion to the product and geographical market in which a product competes. If 
the relevant market is assumed to be the market for footballers, it is noticeable that 
the number of transfers of players whose contracts have expired is fairly small in 
comparison to mid-contract transfers. Moreover, the requirement for a transfer fee 
213 See Schröter, H. in Schröter, H., Jakob, T& Mederer W. (eds), Kommentar zum europäischen 
Wettbewerbsrecht (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 2003), p. 291. 
214 Case C-51/75 EMI Records v. CBS United Kingdom [1976] ECR 811. 
21$ AG Stix-Hackl in Balog, at para 129, citing Case 123/83 BNIC v. Clair [1985] ECR 391, at para 
29. 
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for out-of-contract players under the 1997 FIFA Regulations only concerned a minor 
part of such transfers, which, in the context of appreciability, should be further 
divided into domestic transfers, transfers to a club outwith the Community and 
transfers from a third country club216. Considering the fairly high number of 
domestic transfers within the Community, there can be no doubt that transfer fees for 
players moving within a Member State affect trade between Member States. As 
already mentioned in connection with the appreciability of the interferences on 
competition, the fact that a large number of third country nationals are engaged by 
clubs within the Community implies that restrictions on transfers from third countries 
have an appreciable effect on inter-state trade. The least impact on trade between 
Member States will be made by exports of players from within the Community to a 
club outwith. However, as the threshold for appreciability as applied by the 
Commission and Court lies very low, it may be assumed that the provisions on 
transfers to third countries are at least capable of affecting trade between Member 
States to an appreciable extent217. Evidently, empirical proof would be needed to 
remove any remaining doubts in this respect. 
6.4.2. Exemption under Article 81(3) 
Whenever an agreement or a decision by an association of undertakings falls foul of 
Article 81(1) of the Treaty it is void, unless it can be exempted under Article 81(3). 
When notification was a normal precondition for exemption218, sporting associations 
had been very reluctant to notify their organisational rules, such as transfer 
regulations to the Commission owing to the belief that sport was outwith the scope of 
competition law. Considering the 2001 amendments to the transfer system, an 
analysis of whether the 1997 Regulations - as far as they provided for a transfer fee 
for certain categories of out-of-contract players - may have been eligible for an 
exemption, is of academic interest only, but ought to be considered briefly. 
216 See also AG Stix-Hacld in Balog, at paras 132-137. 
217 See also AG Stix-Hackl in Balog, at pars 137. 
218 Owing to the already mentioned change in competition law - Council Regulation No 1/2003 of 16 
December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 
of the Treaty, OJ 2003 L 1/1, replacing Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February 1962, First 
regulation implementing Articles 85 (now 81) and 86 (now 82) of the Treaty, OJ 1962 13/204 - 
sports federations do not need to notify potentially restrictive measures any more and national 
competition authorities have been given the power to grant exemptions under Article 81(3). 
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For an agreement to qualify for an exemption under Article 81(3), it has to fulfil four 
different conditions. It is established case law that these criteria are cumulative, 
which means that if only one is not satisfied, the agreement cannot be exempted. 
Moreover, it has to be emphasised that in the past, the Court has interpreted the scope 
of Article 81(3) quite narrowly. In contrast, the Court of First Instance has expressed 
the opinion that it was possible to recognise considerations connected with the 
pursuit of the public interest in order to grant an exemption under Article 81(3) of the 
Treaty'19. Similarly, in a decision concerning the joint selling of football television 
rights, the Commission stated that "any need to take the specific characteristics of 
sport into account such as the possible need to protect weaker clubs through a cross- 
subsidisation of funds from the richer to the poorer clubs, or by any other means, 
must be considered under Article 81(3) of the Treatys220. Taking a closer look at 
existing case law, it is possible to detect cases whereby the Court seems to have 
allowed the consideration of public interest objectives under Article 81(3). For 
example, the Court took account of the preservation of employment221, the wide 
selection of print media222 and the consumer interest223. In his opinion to the Wouters 
case, Advocate-General Leger has interpreted this case law in the sense that "the 
wording of Article 85(3) makes it possible to take account of [... ] considerations 
connected with the pursuit of the public interest"224 . However, even though the 
Court 
may have recognised public interest concerns in isolated cases, the scope of Article 
81(3) should be limited to economic reasons225. First of all, the wording of Article 
81(3) leaves no room for a broad interpretation and also, with regard to the Wouters 
case law, public interest considerations are better taken into account under the "rule 
of reason". 
219 See Cases T-528 etcJ93 Metropole Television SA and Red Televisive Italiane SpA and Gestevision 
Telecinco SA andAntena 3 de Television v. Commission [1996] ECR 11-649, at para 118. 
220 Commission Decision 2003/778 Joint Selling of the Commercial Rights of the UEFA Champions 
League, OJ 2003 L 291/25, at para 129. 
221 Case 42/84 Remia BV and Verenigde Bedryven Nutricia NV v. Commission [1985] ECR 2545, at 
para 42. 
222 Case 243/83 Binon SA & Cie v. SA Agence et messageries de la presse [1985] ECR 2015, at para 
46. 
223 Case 26/76 Metro SB Großmärkte v. Commission (No 1) [1977] ECR 1875. 
224 AG Leger in Wouters, at para 113. 
225 See also Lamping, A. & Ludwigs, M., op. cit. supra note 69, p. 56. 
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Apart from the question whether Article 81(3) can be interpreted to allow public 
interest objectives, it has also been argued that it may include a balancing approach 
in the sense of the US "rule of reason" doctrine. For example, the Court of First 
Instance, having dismissed the existence of a "rule of reason" under Article 81(1), 
pointed out "it is only in the precise framework of that provision [Article 81(3)] that 
the pro- and anti-competitive aspects of a restriction may be weighed"226. 
Considering the differences between the US and the EC competition law systems and 
that there is no evidence for a balancing approach in the case law of the Court of 
Justice, such an interpretation stretches the scope of Article 81(3) too far227. 
Regarding the football transfer rules at issue, it becomes clear that there is no 
legal base to recognise an exemption under Article 81(3) of the Treaty. Without 
having to examine the issue any further, it is evident that the requirement of transfer 
fees for a certain category of out-of-contract players neither contributes to improving 
the production or distribution of goods, nor promotes technical or economic progress 
and certainly does not allow consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit. In 
contrast, the transfer system hinders the "distribution" of players and the only benefit 
arising from the rules at issue is attributable to the high-profile clubs, becoming even 
richer. 
6.4.3. Freedom of Association 
Leaving aside the question whether the rules at issue were suitable to achieve a 
legitimate sporting aim and as such would have been covered by the football bodies' 
freedom of association, the fact that they fell foul Article 81(1) implies that a 
limitation of the basic right would have been justified in order to protect the rights of 
others. Article 81 of the Treaty shall ensure that competition on the market works 
without distortions and protects the economic interests of competitors and 
consumers. As all the entities operating on the market, the clubs, seem to have 
supported the transfer system and consumer interests were arguably not affected by 
the restrictions on player movement, it might be' possible to take the view that an 
226 Case T-112/99 Metropole Television (M6) and Others v. Commission [2001] ECR 11-2459, at para 
74. 
227 See also Lane, R., op. cit. supra note 40, p. 100. 
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interference with the basic right of association was not necessary to protect 
individual interests in the particular case. However, just because the majority of 
clubs did not object to the transfer rules this does not automatically mean that the 
competition rules were not necessary to guarantee the rights of individual clubs. In 
those cases where clubs were prevented from buying players without having to incur 
a transfer fee, it is evident that individual interests were being violated by the transfer 
regulations, interests that Article 81 is intended to protect. The question whether 
clubs have in fact tried to challenge the system or not is thereby immaterial. 
Considering that the rules at issue only applied to a small part of transfers, it is 
submitted that any sporting interest in such rules would have been outweighed by the 
clubs' interest under Article 81. 
6.5. PLAYERS STILL IN CONTRACT 
Apart from the issue of transfer fees for out-of-contract players in the afore 
mentioned cases, which only concerned a fraction of the total numbers of transfers, 
the main objection against the 1997 FIFA Regulations under the competition rules 
stemmed from the fact that the transfer regulations did not provide players still in 
contract with any opportunity to move to another club without the consent of their 
employer. What is more, FIFA Circular No 616 from 4 of June 1997 expressly stated 
that unilateral termination by a player was regarded as a breach of Article 12 (1) of 
the 1997 Regulations, so that the national association in question was entitled to 
refuse the international transfer certificate needed for a player to be eligible to play 
for another club. As commonly known, this practice was considered as an 
infringement of Article 81(1) of the Treaty by the Commission, which started an 
investigation into the transfer system soon after the Court's decision in Bosman. 
Although FIFA, after a consultation process with the Commission, has meanwhile 
adopted new transfer regulations, it is still worthwhile to examine on what grounds 
the Commission regarded the 1997 Regulations as a breach of EC competition law 
and whether it was justified to do so. 
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6.5.1. Restriction of Competition 
It has already been established that the 1997 FIFA Regulations constitute an 
agreement between undertakings, while FIFA Circular No 616 can be classed as a 
decision of an association of undertakings (or as a decision of an association of 
associations of undertakings to be precise)228. Thus, when assessing the 1997 transfer 
system under the competition rules, it is necessary to establish whether the transfer 
regulations had the object or effect of restricting competition in the sense of 
Article 81(1). 
Despite the fact that an agreement may be infringing Article 81(1) whether it 
has the object or effect of distorting competition, it is still necessary to differentiate 
between the two concepts when assessing an agreement under EC competition law. 
As previously mentioned, an agreement which has the object of distorting 
competition may only be exempted under Article 81(3), whereas an agreement 
merely having an anti-competitive effect may still fall outside the scope of 
Article 81(1) under the so-called "rule of reason". In the legal assessment of the 1997 
Regulations under Article 39, it has already been pointed out that different reasons 
for a prohibition of the unilateral termination of contracts can be identified, the most 
significant of which is the clubs' interest in contract stability. Apart from that, the 
football bodies have always argued that the transfer system was necessary to 
redistribute funds from bigger to smaller clubs and to support youth development. 
Thus, not considering the question whether the transfer system was in fact suitable to 
achieve these aims, it can be established that the 1997 FIFA Regulations did not have 
the object as such of distorting competition229. 
Examining the effect of the 1997 Regulations, it emerges that in the absence 
of the prohibition unilaterally to terminate employment contracts, players would have 
been able to leave their club mid-contract without the consent of their employer and 
as a result, more players would have been available on the employment market. 
Thus, the 1997 transfer rules limited the choice of players available to the clubs and 
therefore restricted competition on the market for football players in so far as they 
ug See point 6.2 above. 
229 In contrast see Case IV/36.583 SETCA -FGTB/FIFA, rejection of complaint of 28 May 2002, at 
para 31, where point two of FIFA Circular No 616 was considered as having the object and effect 
of restricting competition ("... qui a pour objet et pour effet... "). 
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consisted ofsharing sources of supply within the meaning of Article 81(l)(c) of the 
Treaty230. Besides, the fact that players were still granted the possibility to transfer 
mid-contract under the condition that their present club agreed to the move, cannot 
change the anti-competitive effect of the transfer regulations, as such transfers were 
usually subject to the payment of a transfer fee. It is evident that, taking into account 
that in many cases the fees were so high that only a minority of clubs could afford to 
pay them, without the requirement of transfer fees for players still in contract, 
competition between clubs on the market for players would have been increased 
substantially. Furthermore, the transfer system replaced the regular market forces of 
supply and demand with a uniform mechanism which prevented clubs from engaging 
players, who would have been able unilaterally to terminate their contracts according 
to applicable national law, in order to raise the quality of their sporting performance, 
thereby increasing the possibility of economic success231. 
Having established that the 1997 FIFA Regulations had the effect of 
restricting competition, it should be pointed out that in theory, all contracts 
concerning trade impose restraints in some manner, "to bind, to restrain is of their 
very essences232. Although the vast majority of contracts will not affect trade 
between Member States in any case, it would still not be satisfactory if there was no 
possibility at all for certain agreements to escape the application of Article 81(1). 
This problem has already been mentioned in connection with the "rule of reason" 
concept, providing that restraints necessary for the establishment of a legitimate 
agreement and restrictive agreements conditio sine qua non for the very existence of 
competition are not affected by competition law. Thus, in context of the transfer rules 
at issue, it has to be established whether the 1997 FIFA Regulations were inherent to 
the existence of sporting competition, or whether they did go beyond what was 
necessary to guarantee the functioning of the market. 
230 See the Commission's point of view in Case IV/36.583 SETCA-FGTB/FIFA, rejection of 
complaint of 28 May 2002, at pars 31. 
231 Ibid. 
232 Chicago Board of Trade vs. US, 246 US 231 (1918). 
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6.5.1.1. Justification under the "Rule of Reason" 
As previously mentioned in connection with the application of Article 39, the 
security of employment contracts is of importance in any economy, but particularly 
so in football. Football lives from the fact that different teams are competing against 
each other and although the cases where a player would stay with one club for his 
entire career are less and less common, most fans still identify themselves with their 
team and would not be interested in a league where the composition of teams 
changed on a weekly basis. 
However, it has already been established that an absolute prohibition on 
terminating a contract unilaterally goes beyond what is necessary to guarantee the 
functioning of sporting competition. For example, whereas it is arguable that football 
could not survive if players had the opportunity to hand in two weeks' notice and 
leave for another club, it is highly unlikely that league football would cease to exist if 
a player who has signed a ten year contract with a club, was allowed to leave after 
five years. In this respect the observations made in connection with the provisions on 
free movement may be recalled, where it was demonstrated that the 1997 
Regulations were in fact not necessary to ensure the very existence of sporting 
competition. 
Apart from the stability of contract argument, the 1997 Regulations were also 
claimed to ensure sporting balance and to encourage especially smaller clubs to 
invest in youth policy. However, as pointed out above233, such considerations may 
only be taken into account since Wouters, which was issued after the 1997 
Regulations had already been replaced. In any case, it has already been stated that it 
is doubtful whether the absolute prohibition on a player from terminating his contract 
before its expiry was actually suitable and/or proportionate to achieve the afore 
mentioned goals. 
6.5.2. Effect on Trade between Member States 
Since the 1997 Regulations undoubtedly affected competition appreciably, which is 
demonstrated by the fact that the system applied to all transfers within the European 
233 See points 5.1.4.2 and 5.1.4.4 above. 
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Union and to the great majority of players, only exempting those who were entitled 
to a free transfer as a result of Bosman, the next step is to examine whether the 
system also had an appreciable effect on trade between Member States. In contrast to 
the rules concerning transfer fees for out-of-contract players, the 1997 regulations 
applied to players worldwide, irrespective of their nationality or the league in which 
they played. Thus, when the effect on trade between Member States is analysed, the 
system should be looked at as a whole and it is not necessary to differentiate between 
different transfer directions. Evidently, the general prohibition on unilaterally 
terminating employment contracts interfered with trade flows between the Member 
States, as no player under contract could leave for another club without the consent 
of his current employer. In the absence of such a restriction, players could have 
moved more easily and transfer activity within the Community market would have 
been increased. Moreover, taking into account the fact that even after April 1999, 
when all out-of-contract players moving between two clubs in different Member 
States were given the right to a free transfer, only a minority of players were 
available on the transfer market without being subject to the payment of a transfer 
fee, it is evident that the 1997 Regulations affected trade between Member States to 
an appreciable extent. 
As regards a possible exception under Article 81(3), it could be argued that 
the 1997 Regulations were in the interest of the consumers, who generally prefer a 
stability of teams to a high fluctuation of players and even improved the product 
football by ensuring that the formation of teams could not be changed on a frequent 
basis. However, considering that the current transfer system is less restrictive in this 
respect, it is doubtful that the rules at issue were not excessive. On the other hand, 
those who claim that football has become a great deal less attractive since the 
abolition of the 1997 transfer system might disagree. Considering the question 
whether the regulations eliminated competition in respect of a substantial part of the 
player market, it could be argued that this was not the case, as clubs were free to buy 
out players' contracts. Although the requirement of the selling club's consent 
certainly restricted competition to a high extent, it cannot be denied that competition 
for players under contract still existed. 
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Concerning the footballing bodies' right to association, it is submitted that in 
principle, the sports bodies' interest in regulating player movement the way they 
consider best is protected under this basic right. However, taking into account the 
severity of the restriction on clubs, it appears that the sporting interest in team 
stability was outweighed by the clubs' interest in a more open player market. This is 
underlined by the fact that - as the example of the current transfer system shows - 
less restrictive means are available to achieve the desired end. 
219 
7. THE 1997 
ARTICLE 82 
FIFA REGULATIONS UNDER 
Generally, sporting measures are more likely to qualify as anti-competitive 
agreements in the sense of Article 81, rather than being caught by Article 82 of the 
Treaty. However, considering the organisational structure of team sports in Europe, 
regulatory measures issued by the monopolistic sports bodies have come more and 
more under scrutiny pursuant to Article 82. 
It has already been established that football clubs and associations may be 
regarded as undertakings. When it comes to transfer rules, it is evident that the 
relevant market is the (global) market for football players. Thus, it is necessary to 
establish whether the clubs and/or the associations hold a dominant position on the 
player market. This question has already been assessed by Advocate-General Lenz in 
Bosman 234. In this context, it was pointed out that according to case-law the term 
"dominant position" within the meaning of Article 86 (now Article 82) refers to a 
"position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to 
prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by affording it 
the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its 
customers and ultimately of the consumers"235. Having confirmed that it is also 
possible for several undertakings together to occupy a dominant position, Advocate- 
General Lenz went on to assess whether in the context of transfer rules the position 
of the clubs or of the associations had to be ascertained. Since only the clubs are 
actively engaged on the player market, the Advocate-General took the view that the 
various football associations could not hold a dominant position on that market. 
However, Lenz went on to state that the transfer rules were not dictated by the 
associations, but merely faithfully reflected the wishes of the clubs. Thus, referring to 
the Court of First Instance's judgment in S1V236, the Advocate-General thought it 
234 AG Lenz in Bosman, at paras 279 - 286. 235 AG Lenz in Bosman, at para 281, citing Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission [1979] 
ECR 461, at para 38; in principle, this definition is still applicable, see for example Piau v. 
Commission, at para 109. 
P6 Cases T-77/89 & T-78/89 SIV and Others v. Commission [1992] ECR 11-1403, at paras 358 and 
360. 
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possible that football clubs in a professional league are united by such economic 
links that together they may have a dominant position on the player market. 
Similarly, the Court of First Instance in Piau held that from an economic 
point of view, the clubs presented themselves on the market for the services for 
players' agents as a collective entity vis-ä-vis their competitors, their trading partners 
and consumers and thus held a dominant position237. As regards FIFA's role on the 
market, the court stated that since it constitutes an emanation of the clubs as a 
second-level association formed by those clubs, FIFA could be regarded as acting on 
behalf of the clubs. So far, the rationale behind this view seems to correspond to 
Advocate-General Lenz' opinion. However, somewhat confusingly, the Court of 
First Instance added in apparent contradiction to Lenz' approach (and the 
Commission's view in the case at issue), that the fact that FIFA was not an actor on 
the market for players' agents services did not prevent it from holding a collective 
dominant position on the market238. Thus, the court argued: "The fact that FIFA is 
not itself an economic operator that buys players' agents' services on the market in 
question and that its involvement stems from rule-making activity, which it has 
assumed the power to exercise in respect of the economic activity of players' agents, 
is irrelevant as regards the application of Article 82, since FIFA is the emanation of 
the national associations and the clubs, the actual buyers of the services of players' 
agents, and it therefore operates on this market through its members. " 
Analysing the Court of First Instance's argumentation, it is not entirely clear 
where the court is going. Did it intend to follow Lenz' view that it is the clubs that 
hold a dominant position, since they are acting on the market (and are effectively 
responsible for the rules adopted by FIFA); or, is FIFA itself having a dominant 
position, acting on the market through the clubs. Admittedly, both views are two 
sides of the same coin: whereas in the first case it is assumed that the clubs act on the 
market themselves, but on the regulatory field through FIFA, in the second case it is 
the other way round. This illustrates the difficulties involved when assessing sporting 
rules under Article 82, which stem from the fact that whereas the actual, measure is 
adopted by the governing body, FIFA, it is the clubs that are effectively acting on the 
237 Piau v. Commission, at para 113, citing Joined Cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P Compagnie 
maritime beige transports and Others v. Commission [2000] ECR 1-1365, at para 44. 
238 Piau v. Commission, at paras 115 -116. 
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respective markets. Be that as it may, taking into account the described views in Piau 
and in Lenz' opinion in Bosman, it becomes clear that both are proceeding on the 
prerogative that (depending on the view, either on the regulatory field or on the 
actual market) one is acting on behalf of the other. 
However, although it is true that all clubs are members of their respective 
national association, which is a member of FIFA, it is doubtful whether FIFA's 
actions necessarily reflect the clubs' wishes. This is underlined by the fact that the 
international associations generally have the overall sporting interest in mind, 
whereas the clubs are concentrating on their own benefit. Also, in some cases such as 
the already mentioned rules on the release of players for international duty, FIFA 
follows an objective, which is in direct conflict with the clubs' interests. Considering 
this, it is submitted that rather than trying artificially to construe a model whereby 
clubs are held to be responsible for measures adopted by the regulatory body (or the 
regulatory body for the clubs' actions on the market), it is necessary to separate 
FIFA's regulatory activity from the clubs' market activity. Hence, it emerges that as 
far as transfer rules are concerned, in contrast to the view adopted in Piau that the 
clubs and associations "appear to be linked in the long term as to their conduct by 
rules that they accept"239, clubs do actually have no choice but to adhere to FIFA's 
rules, which from the clubs' point of view constitute "legislation" akin to national 
laws. This means that clubs are actually not able to abuse a possible dominant 
position, since such an abuse presupposes that clubs actually have a choice as regards 
their activity on the market. On the other hand, as pointed out by Lenz in Bosman 
and the Commission in Piau, for FIFA it is impossible to hold a dominant position 
on a market on which it is not economically active. The court's view that FIFA is 
acting on the market through its members, the clubs, is therefore not acceptable as 
the clubs are acting independently on the market for players or on the market for 
players' agents services. The mere fact that they are (indirectly) members of FIFA 
cannot change that. 
Again it emerges that EC competition law lacks the necessary instruments to 
deal with the special case of sport, where private bodies lay down rules regulating 
economic activities connected to that sport. This becomes particularly evident when 
239 Piau v. Commission, at para 114. 
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the recent case concerning FIFA's rules on the release of players for international 
duty is considered. Considering that the international football bodies generate 
substantial profits by staging international tournaments240, it seems highly unfair that 
clubs should not be compensated for injuries their players have incurred whilst on 
international duty241. Thus, it is evident that FIFA uses its status as regulatory body 
to maximise its profits generated through economic activity. However, considering 
that FIFA is abusing its regulatory power and not its market power as the sole 
organiser of worldwide football tournaments, Article 82 does not seem applicable. 
Returning to the issue of transfer rules, according to Advocate-General Lenz 
such measures do not concern the clubs' market power against competitors, 
customers or consumers, but affect only the relationship between clubs and players. 
Thus, an abuse of a dominant position could not be established. Taking into account 
that clubs are the only buyers and sellers on the player market, it is evident that there 
are no other participants on this market. Also, consumers are not affected by 
restrictions on the market for football players. Hence, apart from the fact that clubs 
cannot be held responsible for the transfer rules, it is impossible for clubs to abuse a 
dominant position on a market where they are the only participants. 
240 Bosman lawyer Jean Luis Dupont who is representing SC Charleroi claims that the World Cup 
brings FIFA a profit of E 2.5 billion, see Kahl, H, "Fall Charleroi: Das Gespenst eines neuen 
Bosman-Urteils vor der Fußball-WM", available at www. rsw. beck. de. 
241 For example, in September 2005, Zinedine Zidane incurred an injury whilst playing for France in a 
World Cup Qualification game against Ireland and was unable to play for one month. As a result 
Real Madrid lost E2 million ("Zizou" costs Real E 70,000 a day), for which they never received 
any compensation. 
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8. THE 2001 AND 2005 FIFA TRANSFER 
REGULATIONS 
8.1. THE PATH TO THE 2001 COMPROMISE BETWEEN 
FIFA AND COMMISSION 
For many members of the footballing world, unsurprising as it may have been from a 
legal perspective, the Bosman judgment came as a shock, not knowing that from their 
point of view, matters would only go from bad to worse. Soon after national and 
international associations, as well as clubs and fans throughout Europe had finally 
come to terms with the changes caused by the Court's decision, the Commission, far 
from considering the conclusion of the 1997 transfer regulations as an ending point 
to its proceedings concerning the football transfer system, decided to continue the 
investigations, making the issue of long-term contracts the main focus point. After a 
number of disputed high-profile transfersl, the European Commission threatened to 
open legal proceedings against FIFA if the transfer system was not amended shortly. 
This marked the beginning of a long and complicated negotiation process between 
the football authorities and the Community which lasted until 5 March 2001, the day 
the new transfer system was agreed upon. 
Apart from the fact that FIFA only reacted very slowly to the Commission's 
call for an amended transfer system, the emerging rift between the "football family", 
FIFA, UEFA and FIFPro, the European players' union, rendered negotiations 
particularly difficult2. Moreover, political intervention, sometimes at the highest 
Namely Ronaldo's transfer from Barcelona to Inter in summer 1997 and Nicolas Anelka's move 
from Arsenal to Real Madrid which was overshadowed by Anelka's threat that he would challenge 
the transfer rules under English contract law if Arsenal did not release him; for a closer discussion 
on the issue see Caiger, A. & O'Leary, J., "The End of the Affair: The Anelka Doctrine - The 
Problem of Contract Stability in English Professional Football" in Caiger, A. and Gardiner, S. 
(eds), Professional Sport in the EU: Regulation and Re-regulation (T. M. C. Asser Press, The 
Hague, 2000), pp. 197-215. 
2 See Conn, D., "Big Stick Ready as 'the Football Family' Squabbles", The Independent, 2.11.2000; 
in particular, FIFA president Blatter's suggestion that players disagreeing with their manager's 
tactics should be allowed to leave after giving two months' notice outraged UEFA officials. 
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level, did not make things easier3. However, finally, a compromise was reached in 
March 2001 after several years of negotiations. Although the player's Union was 
unhappy with the compromise and started legal proceedings before the Court of First 
Instance4, the new transfer rules were adopted on 5 July 2001. Subsequently, FlFpro 
settled with FIFA, securing its representation on the new Dispute Resolution 
Chamber5. Following the adoption of the new transfer system, the Commission 
officially closed its investigations, rejecting two complaints which focused on the 
provision set out in the 1997 Regulations hindering players from terminating 
contracts prematurely6. 
FIFA has meanwhile revised the 2001 transfer regulations and put a new 
regime in place which came into force on 1 July 20057. The current system widely 
corresponds to the regulations adopted in 2001, but has ironed out a few irregularities 
contained in the preceding system. The 2005 system is outlined below; where the 
2001 Regulations differed from the current transfer rules, the relevant changes are 
highlighted. 
8.2.2001 AND 2005 REGULATIONS - KEY POINTS 
Player Registration 
  Transfer Windows8 
Transfers are limited to two registration periods per year, set by the respective 
national association. After criticism regarding the fact that unemployed players 
3 For example, the fact that Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder found time in their busy schedules to 
issue a joint press release, hoping that "the Commission will take into account the special situation 
that exists in professional soccer" suggests that some might have preferred a political solution, see 
Press Release No 425/00 of the German Government, 10.9.2000, available at 
www. eng. bundesregierung. de/top/dokumente/pressemitteilung/ix_17866. htm. 
4 Collet, M., "Players and officials divided over transfers", www. soccernet. com, news, 17.2.2001. 
S See "Players' group settles with FIFA over transfer plan", www. soccernet. coni, news, 31.8.2001. 
6 See Commission press release IP/02/824, "Commission closes investigation into FIFA regulations 
on international football transfers", 5.6.2002; the rejection letter of the Commission to the 
complainants SETCA-FBTG (Syndicat des employes, techniciens et cadres de la Federation 
Generale des travailleurs de Belgique) and Sports et Libertes of 28.5.2002 is available on the 
European Commission's website. 
7 Decision of the FIFA Executive Committee of 18/19 December 2004. 
8 Article 6 of the 2005 Regulations; see also Article 2 of the Regulations governing the Application 
of the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players, hereinafter referred to as 2001 
Application Regulations. 
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were forced to wait until the next transfer window before they could sign for a 
new club, the 2005 Regulations now provide for an exception for such players. 
The first transfer window normally lasts from the end of the season until the start 
of the new season. Under the 2005 system, the maximum permissible duration of 
the first transfer period has been extended from six to eight weeks. 
The second transfer window opens approximately in the middle of the season and 
should last for no longer than four weeks. The original limitation on registrations 
for strictly sport related reasons has now been abandoned. More significantly, the 
restriction that a player may only be transferred once in a single season has been 
loosened and players may now be registered for a maximum of three clubs during 
one season, albeit only being eligible to play in official matches for two of 
themlo. 
Protection of Minors 
  Restrictions on Transfers of Minors 
The 2001 Regulations permitted transfers of minors under the condition that (a) 
the family of the player moved for reasons not related to football or (b) in the 
case of transfers within the EEA, the new club guaranteed suitable arrangements 
for their sports training and academic education". For this purpose, it was 
planned to establish and enforce a code of conduct 12. Additionally, the 2001 
transfer system generally prohibited international transfers of non-EEA players 
under the age of 18 to a club within the EEA, unless the player moved for reasons 
not linked to football 13 
The rules on the protection of minors. have been simplified and are now 
condensed in one Article; the reference to the code of conduct has been replaced 
by actual standards. According to Article 19(1) of the 2005 Regulations, 
9 Article 5(2) of the FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players of 5 March 2001, 
hereinafter referred to as 2001 Regulations. 
10 Article 5(3) of the 2005 Regulations. 
II Article 12 of the 2001 Regulations. 
12 Article 3 of the 2001 Application Regulations. 
13 Article 4(1) of the 2001 Application Regulations in combination with Article 12(1)(a) of the 2001 
Regulations; this contradicts the provision mentioned earlier that minors were allowed to move 
within the EEA if clubs cared for their training and education; outside the EEA, transfers of 
minors not moving for family reasons were prohibited irrespective of a player's nationality, see 
Article 4(2) of the 2001 Application Regulations. 
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international transfers of players under the age of 18 are only permitted if one of 
the following conditions is satisfied14: 
(a) the player's parents are moving for reasons not linked to football; 
(b) the transfer takes place within the EEA and the player is aged between 16 and 
18. In this case, the new club must fulfil the following minimum obligations: 
(i) it shall provide the player with an adequate football education and/or 
training in line with the highest national standards, (ii) it shall guarantee the 
player an academic and/or school and/or vocational education and/or training, 
in addition to his football education and/or training, which will allow the 
player to pursue a career other than football should he cease playing 
professional football, (iii) it shall make all necessary arrangements to ensure 
that the player is looked after in the best possible way (optimum living 
standards with a guest family or in club accommodation, appointment of a 
mentor at the club etc. ) and (iv) it shall on registration of such player, provide 
the relevant association with proof that it is complying with the 
aforementioned obligations. 
(c) the player lives no further than 50km from a national border, and the club for 
which the player wishes to be registered in the neighbouring association is 
also within 50km of that border. In such cases, the player must continue to 
live at home. 
  Maximum Duration of Contracts 
Players under the age of 18 may only sign contracts for a duration of up to three 
years15 . 
Training Compensation for Young Players 
Training compensation shall be payable as a general rule until the end of the season 
of a player's 23d birthday for training incurred up to the age of 21, unless it is 
16 evident that the player has already completed his training before the age of 23. In 
this case, training compensation shall be based on the years between 12 and the 
completion of training. However, compensation for training is not due for transfers 
14 Article 19(2) of the 2005 Regulations. 
15 Article 18(2) of the 2005 Regulations; see also Article 35 of the 2001 Regulations. 
16 Article 1 of Annex 4 to the 2005 Regulations; see also Article 13 of the 2001 Regulations. 
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of amateurs or from professional to amateur status, if a club has unilaterally 
terminated a player's contract without just cause and if a player is transferred to a 
category four club17. 
When a player is registering as professional for the first time, the new club must pay 
training compensation to every club for which the player was registered from the age 
of 12 and which has contributed to his training based on the actual period of training. 
In the case of subsequent transfers, training compensation will only be paid to the 
18 club a player is leaving. 
  Calculation 19: 
In order to calculate the compensation for training and education costs, clubs are 
divided into four categories20. The training costs per category are calculated by 
multiplying the amount needed to train one player21 by an average player factor, 
which is the ratio between the number of players who need to be trained to 
produce one professional player22. 
As a general rule, training compensation is calculated on the basis of the costs 
which the new club would have incurred, had it trained the player itself 3. Thus, 
compensation is calculated by taking the training costs of the new club multiplied 
17 Article 2 of Annex 4 to the 2005 Regulations; see also Point 3 of the Annex to the Principles for 
Amendment in connection with Article 7(4)(c) of the 2001 Application Regulations. 
18 Article 3 of Annex 4 to the 2005 Regulations; in contrast see Article 5(4) of the 2001 Application 
Regulations, according to which in case of subsequent transfers a certain percentage of the training 
compensation was distributed among all the training clubs. 
Training compensation is regulated by Annex 4 to the 2005 Regulations; in respect of the 2001 
system, Articles 16-18 of the 2001 Regulations provided that training compensation was to be 
calculated as set out in the 2001 Application Regulations. 
20 Article 4 of Annex 4 to the 2005 Regulations provides that the national associations are to divide 
their clubs into a maximum of four categories in accordance with the clubs' financial investment 
in training players; similar Article 6(4) of the 2001 Application Regulations in respect of national 
associations in the EEA; in respect of other national associations, Article 6(2) categorised clubs 
depending on their position in the national league system and the national association to which 
they belonged, albeit leaving it open to the national association to suggest otherwise. 
21 These costs are established by FIFA and are published on www. fifa. com; in UEFA's jurisdiction 
the training costs for a category 1 club are E 90,000, for a category 2 club E 60,000, for a 
category 3 club E 30,000 and for a category 4 club E 10,000. 
22 Article 4 of Annex 4 to the 2005 Regulations; see also Article 6(3) of the 2001 Application 
Regulations. 
2' Article 5(1) of Annex 4 to the 2005 Regulations; similar Article 7(3) of the 2001 Application 
Regulations, according to which compensation was based on the training costs in the country in 
which the new club was situated; however, the applicable category of club was determined by the 
old club. 
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by either (i) the total of training years, where a player is registered as professional 
for the first time or (ii) the number of years of training with the former club24. 
However, for players moving from one association to another inside the territory 
of the EEA, the amount of training compensation is established as follows: (a) if 
the player moves from a lower to a higher category club, the calculation shall be 
based on the average of the training costs of the two clubs and (b) if the player 
moves from a higher to a lower category club, the calculation is based on the 
training costs of the lower category club25. Also, if a club within the EEA does 
not offer a player a new contract, it is not entitled to training compensation, 
unless it can justify that it is entitled to such compensation 26. 
To ensure that training costs for very young players are not set at unreasonably 
high levels, the training costs for players for the seasons between their 12`h and 
15`h birthdays shall be based on the training and education costs for category four 
clubs27. 
Solidarity Mechanism28 
For every mid-contract transfer of a player, five percent of any compensation paid to 
the former club29 will be redistributed to the clubs involved in the training and 
education of the player over the years. This solidarity contribution will then be 
divided between the training clubs according to the number of years a player was 
registered with a club and his age at the time the training was provided. 
24 Article 5(2) of Annex 4 to the 2005 Regulations; similar to the 2001 Application Regulations. 
25 Article 6(1) of Annex 4 to the 2005 Regulations; see also Article 7(4) of the 2001 Application 
Regulations. 
26 Article 6(3) of Annex 4 to the 2005 Regulations; slightly different from Article 7(3) of the 2001 
Application Regulations, according to which in such a case the fact that the former club did not 
offer the player a new contract, "shall be taken into account in determining the training 
compensation". 
27 Article 5(3) of Annex 4 to the 2005 Regulations; see also Article 7(2) of the 2001 Application 
Regulations. 
28 Article I of Annex 5 to the 2005 Regulations; see also Article 10 of the 2001 Application 
Regulations. 




  Duration of Contracts 
Since the minimum contract length of one year established in the 2001 
Regulations30 was heavily criticised, the current transfer rules allow for shorter 
contracts. Still, contracts must have a minimum duration from their entry into 
force to the end of the season. The maximum duration of five years remained 
unchanged31. Contracts of any other length shall only be permitted if consistent 
with national laws. 
  Respect for Contracts 
In principle, a contract between a professional and a club may only be terminated 
on expiry of the term of the contract or by mutual agreement32. However, the 
2005 Regulations additionally provide for the following cases: (a) termination for 
just cause, (b) termination for sporting just cause and (c) termination without 
cause. 
Termination for just cause33 
A contract may be terminated by either party without consequences of any kind 
(either payment of compensation or imposition of sporting sanctions) in the case 
of just cause. The 2005 Regulations do not further determine under which 
circumstances a contract may be determined for just cause; however, it may be 
assumed that the notion "just cause" is to be interpreted in accordance with the 
applicable national labour laws. 
Termination for sporting just cause34 
An established professional who has, in the course of a season, appeared in less 
than 10% of the official matches in which his club has been involved, may 
terminate his contract prematurely on the grounds of sporting just cause. The 
30 Article 4(2) of the 2001 Regulations. 
31 Article 18(2) of the 2005 Regulations. 
32 Article 13 of the 2005 Regulations. 
33 Article 14 of the 2005 Regulations; a equivalent reference is missing in the 2001 Regulations. 
34 Article 15 of the 2005 Regulations; Article 24 of the 2001 Regulations. 
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existence of such sporting just cause will be established on a case-by-case basis35. 
In such a case, sporting sanctions shall not be imposed, though compensation 
may be payable. Whether compensation is payable and the amount of any such 
compensation shall be determined pursuant to the FIFA dispute resolution 
procedures. Having said that, a professional may only terminate his contract for 
sporting just cause in the 15 days following the last official match of the season. 
Termination without cause36 
The 2001 Regulations have finally opened up the possibility for players 
unilaterally to terminate their contracts37. However, in all cases where a party 
breaches a contract without just cause, compensation shall be payable. Unless 
otherwise provided for in the contract, compensation for breach of contract will 
be calculated with due respect to applicable national law, the specificity of sport 
and will take into account all relevant objective criteria such as remuneration and 
other benefits under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the remaining 
length of the existing contract, fees or expenses incurred by the former club 
(amortised over the term of the contract) and whether the breach occurs during a 
protected period38. The amount of compensation may be stipulated in the contract 
or agreed between the parties39. The player and his new club are jointly and 
severally liable for the payment of the compensation for breach of contractao 
35 Article 12 of the 2001 Application Regulations clarified in this context that all relevant 
circumstances, such as injury, suspension, field position and age of the player and his reasonable 
expectations on the basis of his past career should be taken into account. 
36 Articles 16 and 17 of the 2005 Regulations; Articles 21,22 and 23 of the 2001 Regulations. 
37 However, it should be noted that contracts may not be unilaterally terminated during the season, 
see Article 16 of the 2005 Regulations and Article 21(2)(a) of the 2001 Regulations. 
38 The protected period is defined by the 2005 Regulations as follows: (a) if the contract was 
concluded prior to the 28`h birthday of the player, a period of three seasons or three years, 
whichever comes first, following the entry into force of the contract or (b) if the contract was 
concluded after the 28th birthday of the player, a period of two seasons or two years, whichever 
comes first, following the entry into force of the contract; the respective provision (Article 21) in 
the 2001 Regulations was worded slightly differently, as the protected period was defined 
exclusively as the first three/two years (as opposed to seasons) of the contract. 
39 This possibility was not provided in the 2001 Regulations; however, in some countries such as 
Spain it has been and still is common practice to have respective provisions on compensation 
included in player's contracts. 
40 A equivalent provision is missing in the 2001 Regulations; Article 22 merely stated that 
"compensation for breach of contract (whether by the player or the club)" shall be calculated 
according to the afore mentioned principles. 
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  Sporting Sanctions 
In addition to the obligation to pay compensation, sporting sanctions will be 
imposed on a player found to be in breach of contract during the protected 
period41. The player will be suspended for the first four months of the beginning 
of the next season of the new club42. In the case of "aggravating circumstances", 
the sanctions may be imposed for up to six months43. 
A club signing a player who has unilaterally terminated his contract during a 
protected period is assumed to have induced the breach and will be prohibited 
from registering any new players for two registration periods". In addition, 
pursuant to Article 17(5) of the 2005 Regulations, any person subject to the FIFA 
statutes and regulations (club officials, agents, players) who acts in a manner 
designed to induce a breach of contract shall be sanctioned45. 
Dispute Resolution 
In order to deal with any disputes connected with the international transfer of 
players, in particular arguments over compensation, sporting just cause and mid- 
contract breaches, a dispute resolution and arbitration system was established by the 
2001 Regulations. Originally, parties to a dispute had the choice to submit their case 
to different institutions: An independent mediator, the Dispute Resolution Chamber 
and the Football Arbitration Tribunal. The independent mediator46, which has now 
been abolished, was intended to provide a low cost, speedy and informal resolution 
to any dispute47. In case no such solution was found within a month, either party 
al However, disciplinary measures may be imposed outside the protected period for failure to give 
due notice of termination, which is deemed to be within fifteen days following the last match of 
the season, see Article 17(3) of the 2005 Regulations and Article 23(1)(b) of the 2001 Regulations. 
42 Article 23(1)(a) of the 2001 Regulations. 
43 Article 23(1)(c) of the 2001 Regulations named failure to give notice or recurrent breach as such 
aggravating circumstances. 
44 Article 17(4) of the 2005 Regulations; Article 23(2)(d) of the 2001 Regulations went even further 
in this respect, providing additionally that where appropriate clubs inducing a breach may also be 
subject to fines, deduction of points or exclusion from competitions, irrespective of whether such 
breach incurred during a protected period. 
as It should be noted that such sanctions may also be imposed if a breach occurs outside the protected 
period; although the 2001 Regulations do not mention the possibility of sanctioning club officials, 
they also established that sanctions could be imposed on agents, see Article 23(3). 
46 See the Principles for the amendment of FIFA rules regarding international transfers, point 6, 
available at www. fifa. com. 
a' However, according to Article 42(1)(a) of the 2001 Regulations, such mediation was not a 
precondition to formal dispute resolution mechanisms nor did it have suspensive effect. 
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could bring the case before the newly created FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber. 
Against decisions of the Dispute Resolution Chamber either party could appeal to the 
Football Arbitration Tribunal. 
Whereas the Football Arbitration Tribunal has also been abandoned, the 2005 
Regulations have kept the Dispute Resolution Chamber. Additionally, a Player's 
Status Committee was established. However, what is more important, in contrast to 
the previous transfer regulations, the 2001 and 2005 Regulations leave parties to a 
dispute the option of seeking redress before a civil court48. 
8.3. THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE 2001 "AGREEMENT" 
BETWEEN FIFA AND THE COMMISSION 
Before analysing the 2001 and 2005 FIFA transfer system in the light of the EC 
Treaty, the legal status of the compromise between FIFA and the Commission ought 
to be examined. In particular, one may wonder whether the Commission's 
participation in the drafting of the 2001 Regulations (which have only been slightly 
amended by the 2005 Regulations) means that the transfer system is safe from being 
challenged under the provisions of the Treaty. 
After the Commission and the football governing bodies had finalised the 
negotiations over the football transfer system, the Commission announced in a press 
release that the outcome had been "formalised" in an exchange of letters between 
FIFA President Blatter and EU Commissioner Monti with the effect that the 
Commission would close its investigation on the matter49. However, does the fact 
that football has reached what has been called "a legally ambiguous compromise"so 
with the European Commission signify that the matter is now closed? If one 
remembers back to the proceedings in Bosman, it becomes clear that this is not the 
case. There the Court, responding to FIFA's argument that the "3+2 rule" on foreign 
players had been worked out with and "approved" by the Commission, pointed out 
48 It is interesting to note that while Article 42(1) of the 2001 Regulations stated that the provisions 
on dispute resolution applied "without prejudice to the right of any player or club to seek redress 
before a civil court in disputes between clubs and players", Article 22 of the 2005 Regulations 
only allows players or clubs to refer matters to national courts for "employment-related disputes". 
49 Commission press release IP1021824, op. cit. supra note 6. 
50 Weatherill, S., "Fair Play Please: Recent Developments in the Application of EC Law to Sport", 
(2003) 40 CMLR, p. 68. 
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that "except where such powers are expressly conferred upon it, the Commission 
may not give guarantees concerning the compatibility of specific practices with the 
Treaty (see also Joined Cases 142/80 and 143/80 Amministrazione delle Finanze 
dello Stato v Essevi and Salengo [1981] ECR 1413, paragraph 16)"51. Or as 
Advocate-General Lenz put it: "The Commission is neither entitled nor in a position 
to amend the scope or meaning of the provisions of the EC Treaty by its actions. It is 
for the Court of Justice alone to give binding interpretations of those provisionss52. 
Thus, it is evident that from football's point of view, the danger is far from over and 
that any player unhappy with the current transfer rules would theoretically be able to 
challenge them before the European Court of Justice. 
Having said that, special issues concerning legitimate expectations of the 
companies concerned may be relevant under the rules on competition law. Thus, it 
has been argued that the Commission itself is, to some extent, bound by the exchange 
of letters with FIFA in the sense that the "agreement" raises legitimate expectations 
on the football governing body's side53. In this context, it has been submitted that the 
compromise has the appearance of a contract between the Commission, acting on 
behalf of the Community, and FIFA, which can be qualified as a decision in the 
meaning of Article 3(1) of Regulation 17, with the effect that it could be challenged 
under Article 23054. Although the Commission has confirmed that it closed its 
investigations into the football transfer system", it may still monitor the 
implementation and application of the compromise and in case of non-compliance or 
new facts re-open the case and continue formal proceedings56. Apart from that, the 
Commission cannot settle a case if the agreement in question infringes EC 
competition law. 
51 Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Association and Others v. Bosman 
and Others [1995] ECR 1-4921, at para 136. 
52 AG Lenz in Bosman, at para 148. 
53 See Egger, A. and Stix-Hackl, C., "Sports and Competition Law: A Never-ending Story ? ", (2002) 
2 CMLR, p. 91; see also Streinz, R. "Der Fall Bosman: Bilanz und neue Fragen", (2005) ZeuP, p. 
352. 
54 Streinz, R. , op. cit. supra note 53, p. 
352. 
55 See Commission press release IP/02/824, op. cit. supra note 6. 
$6 Egger, A. and Stix-Hackl, op. cit supra note 53, p. 91. 
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9. THE 2001 AND 2005 FIFA REGULATIONS 
UNDER ARTICLE 39 
It has repeatedly been mentioned that with its decision in' Bosman, the Court has 
introduced a "rule of reason" test in the analysis of a practice under Article 39(1) of 
the Treaty, thereby accepting that restrictive sporting measures may escape the 
prohibition in Article 39(1), provided they. pursue a legitimate aim compatible with 
the Treaty and are justified by pressing reasons of public interest57. Hence, when 
examining the transfer rules in the light of Article 39(1), it will be necessary to 
establish whether the FIFA regulations constitute an impediment to the free 
movement of workers and if so, whether they may be justified under the Bosman 
justificatory test.. 
9.1. TRANSFER WINDOWS 
Evidently, transfer windows have the effect of preventing a player from leaving his 
club to take up employment in another Member State outside the designated transfer 
periods. Similarly, a provision that restricts the number of possible transfers of a 
particular player in a season restricts free movement. However, it has been submitted 
by scholars that both measures are compatible with Article 39 of the Treaty. 58 
Provisions restricting transfer activity such as transfer windows or a 
limitation of transfers in one season per player are introduced in order to guarantee a 
certain stability of teams. It has already been demonstrated that there is a special 
requirement in football that. the composition of a team is ensured over a certain 
period of time. Not only do managers need time to form a team and train the different 
individuals to play together, but fans identify themselves with a team to a certain 
extent and would not be interested in a league whereby footballers move from one 
club to another on a frequent basis. If the composition of the teams in a league 
57 Bosman, at para 104. 
58 See Weatherill, S., op. cit. supra note 50, p. 70; Lewis, A., Bell, A., Chilvers, C. et al. (eds. ), 
Sport: Law and Practice (Butterworths, London, 2002), at para E 2.54; generally, even the original 
restriction in the 2001 Regulations that prohibited players from moving more than once in a season 
was accepted. 
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changed constantly, sporting competition would be pointless, as the different results 
would not be comparable. Besides, transfer windows serve the purpose of 
maintaining a degree of sporting balance in the sense that they shall protect small 
teams from bigger, richer clubs poaching their best players at any time during the 
season. 
The aim of ensuring a stability of team composition to safeguard the 
functioning and regularity of sporting competition may be taken into account when 
assessing a restrictive practice under Article 39(1). This has been confirmed in 
Lehtonen59, where the Court recognised the need to impose transfer deadlines in 
order to guarantee the comparability of results. Having stated that the provisions in 
question were liable to limit the free movement of players who wish to pursue their 
activity in another Member State, as they prevented transfers of foreign players after 
a specific date60, the Court acknowledged that the setting of transfer deadlines may 
meet the objective of ensuring the regularity of sporting competitions 61. In this 
context the Court held that "late transfers might be liable to change substantially the 
sporting strength of one or other team in the course of the championship, thus calling 
into question the comparability of results between the teams taking part in that 
championship, and consequently the proper functioning of the championship as a 
whole"62. 
Despite the fact that transfer windows are definitely suitable to guarantee the 
comparability of results by restricting transfer activity to two periods a season, it 
might be argued that the introduction of transfer deadlines would be less restrictive, 
as players may move throughout the season, up until a fixed date. However, why 
should the need to ensure that results are comparable be more prominent at the later 
stages of a league competition? To put it differently, if teams changed constantly 
during the first two thirds of a season, would the credibility and regularity of sporting 
competition not be in danger? 
Having said that, it should be mentioned that there have been claims that an 
active transfer market was in fact one of the most valuable assets of the football 
59 Case C-176/96 Jyri Lehtonen and Others v. Federation Royale Belge des Societes de Basket-ball 
ASBL (FRBSB) [2000] ECR I-2681. 
60 Ibid, at para 49. 
61 Ibid, at pars 53. 
62 Ibid, at pars 54. 
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industry, as media exposure in the form of press speculations relating to transfer 
activity fuelled interest in the game and enhanced the profile of its players63. The 
same scholars have argued that an unrestricted transfer market would not result in 
significantly higher transfer activity, as footballers, considering the personal 
upheaval and domestic disruption, were unlikely to change clubs on a regular basisM. 
Admittedly, players would probably not move from club to club every other week if 
the transfer market was left unfettered; however, it cannot be denied that transfer 
activity would increase substantially, in particular as players are now able 
unilaterally to terminate their contracts after either three or two years without 
incurring sporting sanctions. Thus, the introduction of fixed transfer periods and the 
limitation of player movement to three transfers a season must be seen in a wider 
context as one part of the modified transfer system. Before the adoption of the 2001 
FIFA regulations, players under long-term contracts were severely restricted in their 
movement, making it very unlikely that a player would move more than once during 
a season. Having established a system whereby players are able to change teams 
more easily and thus more often, transfer windows and a restriction on the number of 
times a player may move in one season shall prevent the composition of teams from 
altering too frequently over the course of the championship. Although the 
introduction of transfer windows might not be strictly necessary for the very 
existence of league football, it may be justified as a means to guarantee a certain 
team stability, a comparability of results and a degree of sporting balance, ensuring 
the proper functioning of sporting competition. Considering the fact that players are 
still able to move during two transfer periods a season, the restriction does not seem 
disproportionate. Moreover, taking into account that subject to certain exceptions, the 
transfer periods have been harmonised for football leagues around Europe (the first 
transfer window opens on 1 January until 31 January, the second from the end of the 
season until 31 August), transfers between clubs in different Member States are not 
overly restricted, but probably even facilitated owing to the existence of one common 
system. 
63 Morris, P., Morrow, S. & Spink, P., "The New Transfer System in Professional Soccer: An 
Interdisciplinary Study", (2000/2001) CIL, p. 274. 
64 Ibid. 
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Despite the fact that transfer windows have been submitted to be in the interest of the 
clubs, it should be added that their introduction into European football has not been 
universally welcomed. Especially smaller clubs which cannot afford to sustain large 
squads have criticised that they will not be able to bring in new players outside the 
65. transfer periods at times where the existing team plays badly or is hit by injury 
Additionally, there have been claims that clubs suffering from financial difficulties 
need to be able to liquidate their assets and sell players at any time66. Although these 
arguments may prove that transfer windows are in fact not suitable to achieve a 
sporting balance between clubs, transfer periods may still be justified on other 
grounds. Apart from that, it is evident that under Article 39 only the interests of the 
players, but not the clubs in a less restrictive system may be taken into account. 
Thus, it is up to the football governing bodies to introduce more flexibility into the 
system if they consider it necessary to do so67. 
9.2. TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS FOR MINORS 
At first sight, the condition that players under the age of 18 moving within the EEA 
are only allowed to transfer to a team outwith their home country if suitable 
arrangements are guaranteed for their sporting training and academic education by 
their new club, seems to infringe their right to free movement, as clubs incur 
additional costs and may thus be more reluctant to sign such players. However, it 
could be argued that restrictive measures providing a stable environment for the 
training and education of young players are in the public interest and therefore do not 
fall foul Article 39(1) of the Treaty. At a time where the commercialisation of 
football has reached an all-time high, especially young players should be protected 
from employers who are only interested in profit and are not willing to invest time 
and money in young players' education and training. More importantly, considering 
the fact that the vast majority of under-age players fail to make the grade in 
65 See Broadly, I. "SFL admit worries over windows", www. soccernet. com, 9.6.2002, where Scottish 
League Secretary Peter Donald expresses concerns that some clubs in Scotland may be unable to 
fulfil their fixtures owing to a lack of available players. 
66 Ibid. 
67 This has happened with respect to players whose contract has expired prior to the end of a 
registration period, who may now be registered outside that registration period. 
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professional football, the significance of a proper academic education for young 
players becomes evident. Thus, the requirement for clubs to provide players under 
the age of 18 with an adequate sporting and academic education constitutes an 
obstacle to the free movement of under-age players, but can be justified by public 
interest considerations. Since there are no less restrictive means available to achieve 
the legitimate aim of ensuring the welfare of young players, it is submitted that the 
measure at issue does not come under the scope of the prohibition laid down in 
Article 39(1) of the Treaty. 
9.3. TRAINING COMPENSATION FOR PLAYERS UNDER 24 
Unsurprisingly, the question of training compensation for young players was, and 
still is, one of the most debated issues in connection with the new FIFA transfer 
regulations. The re-introduction of transfer fees for out-of-contract players seems to 
stand in sharp contrast to the Court's decision in the Bosman case and does not sit 
easily with Article 39 of the Treaty. The argument brought forward by international 
football officials for the requirement of a training compensation for under-24s is that 
in order to promote player talent and stimulate competition in football, clubs should 
have the necessary financial and sporting incentives to invest in training and educate 
young players. Furthermore it is submitted that clubs which are involved in the 
training and education process should be rewarded for their contribution. However, 
opponents of the new scheme object to the re-introduction of transfer fees for out-of- 
contract players under the age of 24, stressing that it restricts young players' right to 
68 free movement. 
It has been repeatedly mentioned that the aims of encouraging the training of 
young players and of sustaining a larger number of clubs than would survive under 
normal market conditions by supporting smaller, less wealthy clubs have been 
acknowledged under EC law. The ready acceptance by the Court and the 
Commission of the need to encourage and reward the training efforts of clubs has 
been criticised by Weatherill, stating that on this point the special status of sport was 
68 See "Time for a New Approach: The International Transfer System", FIFPRO Report to the 
European Commission, 9.2.2001, available at www. fifpronet. com, point 4.1; Morris, P., Morrow, 
S. & Spink, P., op. cit. supra note 63, p. 268. 
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exaggerated69. He compares the situation in football to other industries, asking, 
"where is the reason for supposing that a football club is any less likely to train 
young employees because they might subsequently quit the company than a bank or 
a University would be"70. Despite acknowledging that "a transfer system doubtless 
encourages a higher level of investment in training than would otherwise occur"71, 
Weatherill does not support the argument that small clubs require protection from 
wealthier clubs poaching their youth players without compensating them for their 
efforts. 
The main difference between football and other industries lies in the fact that 
a club taking on a youngster cannot be sure that he will turn into a successful player 
who justifies the expenses spent on his training. Admittedly, a bank which trains a 
young employee does not have the certainty either that he or she will become a 
valuable addition to its workforce, but taking into account that only a handful of 
young prospects turn out to have the necessary talent to play football professionally, 
it is evident that the drop out rate in football is extensively higher than in other 
sectors72. Thus, clubs often spend great sums on the training of youngsters without 
receiving any reward, which makes it tempting to buy cheap foreigners or already 
established players who have passed their peak. Considering that, it becomes evident 
that investment in the development of young players needs to be encouraged. 
Moreover, since the majority of work at grassroots and youth level is done by 
lower league clubs, it has been proposed that especially these clubs benefit from 
training compensations, resulting in a re-distribution of funds from richer to less 
wealthy clubs. Additionally, compensation payments are also claimed to be 
necessary for the survival of smaller clubs, as funds generated by the sale of youth 
players are their main source of income. 
69 Weatherill, S., op. cit. supra note 50, p. 71, similarly Morris, P., Morrow, S. & Spink, P., op. cit. 
supra note 63, p. 266. 
70 Morris, P., Morrow, S. & Spink, P., op. cit. supra note 63, p. 266. 
71 Ibid. 
72 See for example the Scottish Parliament Official Report of the European Committee from 
19.9.2000 on the inquiry into football transfer fees and the position of the European Commission, 
in particular the submissions by Lex Gold, representing the Scottish Premier League and David 
Thomson, representing the Scottish Football League, who claim that the success rate is on average 
one out of twenty players, available at 
http: //www. scottish. parliament. uk/business/committees/historic/europe/reports-00/eur00-05- 
02. htm#annexB. 
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However, the assumption that the newly introduced training compensation payments 
do in fact encourage the training of young players and distribute funds to smaller 
clubs is not universally acknowledged. Thus, before the introduction of the 2001 
Regulations economists criticised that the proposed transfer system "would only 
enhance the windfall profits of clubs that have not invested in a talent's education, 
whereas the long-term utilities of talents and the incentives to invest in a talent's 
educatiön are discouraged"73. Having said that, it appears that ultimately more 
economic research and empirical evidence would be needed to assess whether the 
rules on training compensation are indeed suitable to achieve the proposed aims. 
Be that as it may, in his extensive analysis of the subject, Advocate-General 
Lenz took the view that training compensation for young players was an adequate 
means to preserve the sporting equilibrium, distributing funds from richer to less 
wealthy clubs and to encourage youth development. Thus, the Advocate-General 
considered training compensation for young players as being acceptable under 
Article 39 of the Treaty, albeit subject to two conditions: firstly, the fees would have 
to reflect the actual amount spent on the player's training (a point which will be 
discussed later on), and secondly, they should be limited to a player's first change of 
clubs74. Regarding the latter condition, it has been argued that in view of the 
increased mobility of young players in the game, the 2001 (and 2005) Regulations, 
giving each club involved in a player's training the possibility to profit from its 
investment in his education and development, constitutes a more appropriate solution 
than the Advocate-General's proposal75. Taking into account that these days many 
players have moved clubs two or three times before reaching the age of 21, it 
certainly makes sense that not only the first, but all clubs which have contributed to a 
player's development should be able to benefit. Thus, once the rationale behind the 
transfer fee is acknowledged, there is no reason to restrict payments to the first move, 
73 Feess, E. & Mühlheusser, G. "The impact of transfer fee systems on professional football: an 
analysis of the European Commission's new suggestions", 5.12.2001, available at 
http: //www. rwth-aachen. de/vwll/forschung/Sje3. ps; similar also Terviä, M. "Transfer Fees and 
Development of Talent", 14.2.2004, available at 
http: //faculty. haas. berkeley. edu/marko/TransferFees. pdf. 
74 See AG Lenz in Bosman, at para 239. 
75 See Morris, P., Morrow, S. & Spink, P., op. cit. supra note 63, p. 267. 
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in fact, it would seem highly unfair to reward the first, but not the other clubs which 
have invested in a player's training. 
Admittedly, one could raise the argument that there are less restrictive means 
such as re-distribution measures available to preserve a sporting equilibrium and 
encourage youth development76. However, as already mentioned, there exists 
contradictory economic research as to whether the re-distribution of funds does in 
fact promote a sporting equilibrium77. Additionally, there have been claims that 
rewarding small clubs for their mere existence discourages them from investing in 
the training of youngsters7g. Owing to the distinct lack of empirical evidence, the 
matter remains unsolved and must be left to economic debate. In any case, one 
cannot easily dismiss the opinion of Advocate-General Lenz who pointed out that 
"the argument that a club should be compensated for the training work it has done, 
and that the big, rich clubs should not be enabled to enjoy the fruits of that work 
without making any contribution of their own, does indeed [... ] have some 
weight"79. 
Although training compensation for young players may be recognised under 
Community law as a tool to encourage the investment in the development of young 
players, it should be noted that such payments might not be accepted under the 
applicable national laws. In Austria, for example, employees may be contractually 
bound for a maximum period of five years if the employer has provided the worker 
with special training or education, which increases the employee's marketability on 
the employment market. If the employee decides to leave before the agreed period of 
time, the employer is entitled to training compensation, depending on how long the 
employee has worked for him. The training compensation provided for by the 2001 
Regulations was considered to fall foul Austrian employment law, as the requirement 
to pay the compensation was (and still is) unlimited in time and does not decrease in 
76 See Morris, P., Morrow, S. & Spink, P., op. cit. supra note 63, p. 268. 
77 In agreement see Kesenne, S., "Revenue Sharing and Competitive Balance in Professional Team 
Sports", (2000) 1(1) Journal of Sports Economics, pp. 56 - 65; SchellhaaB & Enderle, "Sportlicher 
versus ökonomischer Wettbewerb", Arbeitspapiere das Instituts für Rundfunkökonomie and der 
Universität zu Köln, Issue No. 95/98, June 1998, p. 7; in contrast see Feess, E. & Stähler, F., 
"Revenue Sharing in Professional Sports Leagues" (2002), p. 1, available at 
http: //gemini. econ. umd. edu/cgi-bin/conference/download. cgi? db name=IIPF59&paper id=87. 
78 Feess, E. & Stähler, F., op. cit. supra note 77. 
79 See AG Lenz in Bosman, at para 239. 
242 
relation to the time the employee has worked for the employer, but in contrast 
increases80. Moreover, under Austrian law, minors may only enter such a contractual 
obligation subject to judicial consent, which obviously poses a major problem in 
connection with the FIFA regulations. The fact that the requirement to pay training 
compensation does not result from an agreement between employer and employee, 
but is provided for by the FIFA transfer rules cannot change the fact that the payment 
is in breach of Austrian law, as such an arrangement constitutes a circumvention of 
laws imposed to guarantee the protection of employees. 
9.3.1. The Age Cut-Off Point 
Another point that has been heavily discussed in relation to the training 
compensation system is the cut-off point at the age of 21/23, a borderline that has 
been criticised as being "arbitrary" and "artificial"81. The difficulty in trying'to 
establish a system compensating clubs for their investment in the training of young 
players lies in the fact that each player develops at his own pace and it is almost 
impossible to define an age at which the training process of a typical footballer is 
finished. Some players, like Wayne Rooney, who holds the record of being the 
youngest footballer ever to have played for England (at an age of 17 years and 111 
days) and, despite his tender age of 18 was one of the most prominent players of the 
2004 European Championships, already play football at the highest level at a very 
young age, whereas others require more training and reach their peak at a later stage 
of their playing career. Arguably, the training process never stops as players need to 
train and develop their skills throughout their careers, probably even more so when 
they become older and their stamina decreases. Thus, it has been submitted that there 
was "nothing in substance, quality or significance to differentiate between training 
that takes place before age 21 and that which takes place after"82. The 2001 and 2005 
Regulations state that the training and education period of a player generally expands 
from the age of 12 to the age of 23, whereby training compensation shall be payable 
up to the age of 23 for training incurred up to the age of 21, unless it is evident that a 
80 See Resch, R., "Europarechtliche Fragen zur Ausbildungsentschädigung, Transfersystem und dem 
Recht des Spielers auf Freigabe", (2004) 1 Das Recht der Arbeit, pp. 87 - 97. 81 See Morris, P., Morrow, S. & Spink, P., op. cit. supra note 63, p. 266. 
82 Ibid, p. 267. 
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player has already terminated his training before the age of 21. With the training 
period starting as early as the age of 12, not only the big clubs, but also smaller clubs 
at grass roots level will be able to profit when a player they nurtured at a young age 
turns out to become a professional. Again, this underlines the rationale behind the 
transfer system, to compensate those clubs who invest funds at youth level, at a point 
when it is often impossible to tell whether a player has the skill and determination to 
be successful at a later stage of his playing career. However, although the objective 
behind the compensation scheme may be laudable, the problem of the somewhat 
arbitrary cut-off point at the age of 21/23 remains. Having said that, despite the fact 
that there are always exceptions to the rule, it could be argued that the majority of 
players will not be playing regular first-team football before the age of 21. Moreover, 
up to this age there are still many players who, even though they might have secured 
a contract with a professional club at first, drop out because they do not have what it 
takes to make a career out of football. The difference between training an already 
established player and investing in the development of a youngster lies in the fact 
that it is more difficult to predict the potential of a player at a young age, whereas a 
club buying a 25-year old will usually be able to judge his strengths and weaknesses. 
Of course older players are more injury prone and there are a great deal of footballers 
whose potential as star players is recognisable at a very young age, but once it is 
accepted that the rationale behind the compensation scheme is to encourage clubs to 
invest in the training and education of youth, it is necessary to establish a cut-off 
point, defining when a player is deemed to be "young". The advantage of an age 
limit, at which it is assumed that a player's training process is finished, is that it is 
clear and easy to apply. On the other hand, it would probably reflect the reality of 
football better if players making regular first team appearances from an early age 
would be excluded from the compensation system. It certainly seems bizarre that a 
club selling its 20 year old star striker should be rewarded for training him despite 
the fact that the team has profited more from playing him than it has invested in the 
player's training. The transfer rules seem to have provided for this case by stating 
that players who have evidently terminated their training period before the age of 21 
will be treated differently; however, as it is not defined when a player is deemed to 
have finished his training, the rule will be difficult to apply. In any case, as pointed 
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out before there are good reasons to argue that a club investing in young players 
should be allowed to reap the benefits of a successful youth policy. 
9.3.2. The Calculation Scheme 
Apart from the question whether the introduction of compensation payments for 
under 24s principally breaches Article 39 of the Treaty, criticism has also been 
expressed in relation to the calculation scheme adopted by FIFA83. In connection 
with the introduction of the 2001 system, FIFA pointed out "since it is impossible to 
calculate the effective training costs for every single player, flat training rates should 
be set and the clubs should be categorised in accordance with their financial 
investment in the training of playerss84. This stands in contrast to Advocate-General 
Lenz' opinion, who would only accept transfer fees compensating a club for the 
training of a particular player, limited to the actual amount expended by the previous 
club (or previous clubs) for the player's training". However, if it is assumed that the 
aim of encouraging clubs to spend money on the training of young players is 
legitimate and considering the afore mentioned problem that clubs will only receive 
transfer fees for a fraction of the youngsters in whose training they have invested, a 
transfer system which refers to the overall amount a club uses for the training of 
players would not necessarily fall foul Article 39 of the Treaty, provided it adheres to 
the principles of transparency and objectivity. Moreover, taking into account the 
organisational and administrative difficulties involved in a system whereby 
compensation payments are established on a case-by-case basis for each individual 
player, a complicated process which offers room for litigation, a calculation model 
which is based on the overall financial investment of a club in the training of young 
players would be less subjective and much easier to apply 86 
However, it is submitted that the calculation scheme adopted by FIFA is open. 
to criticism. Firstly, it could be argued that while it is acceptable to determine 
training compensation on the basis of a club's overall financial investment in 
83 See news item of 1.4.2003, "Calculation of training costs is question mark in new transfer 
system", available at www. fifpro. org. 
84 Point B 1. of the Annex to the Principles for the amendment of FIFA rules regarding international 
transfers. 
85 AG Lenz in Bosman, at para 239. 
86 See also Morris, P., Morrow, S. & Spink, P., op. cit. supra note 63, p. 266. 
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training, a division of all clubs in a league into just four categories does not offer the 
necessary degree of objectivity. Moreover, training costs are set by the respective 
national association for each category and shall correspond to the amount needed to 
train one player for one year multiplied by the average "player factor", which is the 
" ratio between the number of players needed to be trained to produce one 
professional. Again, it could be argued that a rule assuming the same training costs 
per player for all clubs in a category does not satisfy the requirement of training 
compensation having to reflect the costs actually incurred. Apart from that, since the 
transfer regulations leave it entirely to the national associations to establish the 
training costs, the system lacks transparency. Another critical issue is the 
consideration of the "player factor". It has been submitted that the principal necessity 
of training compensation may be derived from the fact that the majority of young 
players will not become professionals and clubs should at least be compensated for 
the training of those players who actually make it. However, this does not 
automatically mean that the costs incurred for the training of unsuccessful players 
may be taken into account when calculating the training compensation for a young 
professional. Once again the key question is to what extent training compensation 
must reflect the actual costs for the training of a particular player. Whereas a 
restriction on the free movement of a young player resulting from the requirement to 
pay compensation for the training of the same player may be acceptable, considering 
that he actually benefited from the training, an even bigger impediment which 
derives from the reimbursement of costs which are completely unrelated to the player 
in question might go too far. On the other hand, once the need to promote youth 
development is acknowledged, arguably clubs should be rewarded for their overall 
investment in youth, not only for the training of the players that become 
professionals. Having said that, since clubs are categorised according to their overall 
spending on training, this has already been taken into account. 
The training compensation scheme adopted by FIFA is also open to criticism 
in another respect. According to Article 6(1)(a) of Annex 4 to the 2005 Regulations, 
in case of players moving within the EEA from a lower to a higher category club, the 
calculation of the training compensation shall be based on the average training costs 
of the two clubs. Thus, not only the costs of the selling club are taken into account, 
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but also the costs which the buying club would have incurred for training the player 
itself are considered. This means that the training compensation is completely 
unrelated to the selling club's training costs or overall investment in youth policy. In 
respect of players moving from a higher to a lower category club, this becomes even 
more evident, as the compensation is calculated according to the training costs of the 
buying club. It is interesting to note that for moves outside the EEA, this applies as a 
general rule, irrespective of the transfer direction. Be that as it may, it is submitted 
that the calculation of training compensation must at least have some relation to the 
funds spent on youth training by the selling club, if not to the actual costs for the 
training of a particular player. Hence, a fee that is based on the training costs of the 
buying club cannot be considered compensation for training and infringes Article 
39(1) of the Treaty, as it puts a burden on a player which has no relation to the player 
himself. 
Having said that, it could be argued that the described calculation scheme 
enhances the sporting equilibrium as it favours less wealthy clubs. Generally, bigger 
clubs will have more funds available for youth training and will thus be in a higher 
category. A lower category club buying a player pays less than a higher category 
club signing the same player. Additionally, lower category clubs receive more 
compensation if they sell a player to a club in a higher category, as the training costs 
of the latter are taken into account87. Still, if one follows the rationale of Advocate- 
General Lenz in Bosman, training compensation is only acceptable if it is indeed a 
compensation for costs incurred by training clubs and not as a measure of re- 
distribution. Whereas it might be possible to argue that such compensation may be 
calculated on the basis of the overall funds spent on training by a particular club in 
order to promote the investment in youth development, there are less restrictive 
means available to achieve a re-distribution of funds. Moreover, it should be 
mentioned that the current calculation scheme has been criticised in the sense that it 
87 Considering that in the case of players moving from a higher to a lower category club, the 
compensation is based on the costs of the buying club, it is not understandable why FIFA decided 
that in the reverse case, in the EEA the compensation should be based on the average training costs 
of both clubs. From an EC law point of view, it is either acceptable that training compensation is 
based on the costs of the buying club or it is considered to infringe Community law, in which case 
it would not be necessary to apply special rules for the EEA, as the first case would cause a 
problem anyway. 
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is argued to favour wealthier clubs and offers a risk of transferring resources to and 
not from the big clubs88. 
The general problem with any calculation scheme for training compensation 
is that it is almost impossible to achieve a satisfactory degree of objectivity, 
reflecting the actual training costs for a particular player as accurately as possible, 
whilst remaining transparent and practical to apply. It has to be considered that for a 
transfer system to work, a club buying a certain player must be able to judge the 
costs involved with the signing of such a player. The current transfer compensation 
scheme is submitted to fail both requirements: it is lacking in objectivity whilst being 
very complex and too complicated in its application. 
9.4. SOLIDARITY MECHANISM 
Re-distribution measures such as the solidarity mechanism set up by the 2001 and 
2005 Regulations have been widely accepted as being legitimate under Article 39 of 
the Treaty. The Court in Bosman, for example, dismissed the argument that the 
transfer rules at issue were necessary to ensure the aims of maintaining a competitive 
balance and encouraging youth development and, referring to the Advocate- 
General's suggestion of introducing re-distribution measures, stressed that the same 
aims could be achieved "at least as efficiently by other means which do not impede 
the free movement for workers"89. 
In principle, a re-distribution of income between clubs does not restrict the 
players' right to free movement, as it does not hinder a player moving from one club 
to another in a different Member State. Besides, the aim of preserving a sporting 
balance between clubs is acknowledged under EC law. However, it should be 
repeated at this point that re-distribution measures as a means to establish a sporting 
equilibrium or to promote youth development are not undisputed as regards their 
suitability to achieving the aims in question. In the case of the solidarity mechanism 
introduced by the 2001 Regulations the income that is re-distributed is not generated 
from gate receipts or television revenue, but from compensation fees payable on the 
88 See FIFpro Report to the Commission, op. cit. supra note 68, points 4.7. and 4.8, see also Morris, 
P., Morrow, S. & Spink, P., op. cit. supra note 63, p. 266. 
89 Bosman, at pars 110. 
248 
occasion of a player over the age of 23 moving during the course of a contract. 
Considering that, it is evident that as a pre-condition for the solidarity mechanism to 
be in accordance with the right to free movement, the compensation payments for 
breach of contract must not fall foul EC law. 
9.5. DURATION OF CONTRACTS 
The introduction of a maximum length for players' contracts of five years is certainly 
one of the most important changes to the football transfer system, as it puts an end to 
contracts binding players for a major part of their careers. Considering the fact that 
player now have the option unilaterally to terminate their contracts - albeit subject to 
compensation payments and/or sporting sanctions -a maximum contract length of 
five years does not seem excessive. This is underlined by the fact that in Member 
States like Austria or Germany the conclusion of employment contracts of up to five 
years is possible. 
However, one may wonder whether the requirement of a minimum duration 
of contracts constitutes an obstacle to the free movement of workers. Despite the fact 
that a minimum length of contract necessarily restricts a player's right to free 
movement, such a measure may be accepted under Article 39 of the Treaty, provided 
it is necessary to ensure a certain stability of teams90. If players were allowed to 
change clubs every few months, credible competition would be impossible because 
of the constant team fluctuation. Besides, managers need the assurance of having the 
same players available over a certain period of time in order seriously to build and 
work with a team. However, taking the new transfer system as a whole, it could be 
argued that team stability is sufficiently guaranteed by the introduction of transfer 
windows and a requirement for a minimum contract length is not necessary. This was 
particularly true for the 2001 Regulations, which provided for a minimum contract 
length of one year. Although this will usually not create too heavy a restriction for 
the majority of players who generally commit themselves for longer than that 
anyway, it might be of concern for a player going through a difficult patch or who is 
at the end of his career. In those cases where a club does not want to take the risk of 
90 In contrast see Morris, P., Morrow, S. & Spink, P., op. cit. supra note 63, p. 269. 
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offering a player a one-year contract because he is too old or out of form, but would 
be willing to take him on for a few months, giving the player the chance to prove 
himself, such a restriction could mean the difference between playing or having to 
quit football. Thus, while the requirement of a minimum contract length of one year 
may be legitimate where no other measures ensuring a stability of contracts are put 
into place, it constituted a disproportionate restriction on free movement in 
connection with the afore mentioned limitations on transfer activity introduced by the 
2001 Regulations. Having said that, this has been remedied by the 2005 Regulations, 
which now allow for shorter contracts, albeit still providing for a minimum period 
expanding from the coming into force of a contract until the end of the season. Be 
that as it may, it should be kept in mind that the minimum and maximum duration of 
contracts is subject to national law, which obviously limits the application of this 
provision. 
As a matter of interest, it should be added that according to economic 
research the more legal freedom the parties have when negotiating a contract, the 
better for the football market, arguing that the pre-Bosman system did in fact 
promote the competitive balance between clubs to a higher extent than the 2001 
transfer regulations9'. However, even if it is assumed that the most restrictive system 
in terms of player movement would achieve the most balanced football market and 
offered the most incentives for clubs to invest in the training of young players, it has 
to be remembered that Article 39 is first and foremost a tool to ensure the free 
movement of workers and only justifies restrictive measures if they are absolutely 
necessary to achieve a legitimate aim. Although the aim of maintaining a competitive 
balance between clubs has been accepted under the provision on free movement, it 
cannot outweigh the interest of the players. As Weatherill emphasised: "the whole 
point of the Bosman ruling [... ] is that the interests of the clubs cannot be expressed 
by imposing burdens on the shoulders of the playerss92. 
91 Feess, E. & Mühlheusser, G. "Transfer fee regulations in European football", (2003) 47(4) 
European Economic Review, pp. 645 - 668. 92 Weatherill, S., "Do sporting associations make law or are they merely subject to it 7", (1999) 13 
Amicus Curiae, p. 27. 
250 
9.6. RESPECT FOR CONTRACTS 
When analysing the 2001 and 2005 transfer system in respect of measures ensuring 
contract stability, it appears that two different tools have been put into place in order 
to keep players from terminating their contracts prematurely. Firstly, in any case of a 
unilateral breach of contract, compensation shall be payable and secondly, if a player 
moves to a new club during the protected period without his former club's consent, 
sport sanctions will be imposed. 
9.6.1. Compensation for Breach of Contract 
Evidently, a requirement to compensate the former club for breach of contract 
whenever a contract is terminated unilaterally by a player restricts the free movement 
of workers. However, it has already been explained that a certain stability of 
contracts constitutes a pre-condition for the proper functioning of sporting 
competition, a goal which is recognised under Article 39 of the Treaty. Although it 
may not be a common legal requirement for an employee to be obliged to 
compensate his employer in case of a unilateral termination of contract, the practice 
is not unheard of when it comes to highly skilled employees such as top-managers. In 
football such compensation payments are needed to ensure that contracts are 
respected. Footballers are not only highly skilled and well paid employees, but are 
part of a team. Each player has a special role within that team and as a consequence 
footballers are not as easily replaced as for example shopping assistants. Besides, in 
order to find a replacement, clubs often have to pay transfer fees or are forced to 
engage a player on substantially higher wages. Thus, restrictions such as a 
requirement to pay compensation for breach of contract when a worker terminates a 
fixed-term contract can be found in the national laws of most Member States. As 
pointed out by Welch in respect of English contract law: "the argument that 
footballers are subject to constraints not suffered by other employees has been 
overstated" since "it is by no means only those employed in football or other 
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professional sports who find themselves bound by contracts from which they would 
like to secure release"93 
In view of the special situation in football, one could argue that the stability 
of contracts is of even bigger importance compared to other industries, which is why 
restrictive measures to ensure that contracts are being honoured should be tolerated 
to a greater extent. Having said that, compensation payments for breach of contract 
will only be in compliance with Article 39 of the Treaty if they reflect the true 
financial disadvantage of a club caused by the premature departure of a player and 
satisfy the principle of proportionality. 
Compensation for breach of contract shall be calculated with regard to 
objective criteria, such as remuneration, length of time remaining on the existing 
contract, amount of expense incurred by the old club (amortised over the length of 
contract) and whether the breach occurs during the "protected period". Additionally, 
it is stressed that compensation shall be calculated "with due consideration for the 
law of the country concerned". Unlike the traditional transfer fees, the compensation 
scheme pays attention to the individual circumstances of the case in question, 
reflecting the loss incurred by a specific club. Moreover, the interest of the player is 
taken into account by reducing the due compensation according to the length of time 
remaining on his contract. The calculation criteria used and the fact that reference is 
made to the applicable national law shows that the requirement for players to 
compensate their old club for loss incurred as a result of a breach of contract does not 
constitute a hidden transfer system, but endeavours to preserve a certain stability of 
contracts, choosing means proportionate to the aim in question. 
9.6.2. Sporting Sanctions 
Whilst compensation payments for breach of contract, in particular as they are 
provided for by the national laws of the Member States, are generally accepted, the 
imposition of sporting sanctions in order to ensure that contracts are respected is 
highly disputed. 
93 Welch, R. "From Self-Regulation to Bosman - There and Back Again", (2001) 4(4) SLB, p. 15. 
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Evidently, a suspension imposed by the game's governing authorities severely 
restricts a player's right to free movement, as it makes it impossible for him to 
practice his trade. Thus, sporting sanctions are only permissible if they are absolutely 
necessary to achieve a legitimate aim and there are no less restrictive means 
available. In this context, it has been submitted that collective action by the sport's 
governing bodies designed to encourage observance of an individual contract rather 
than leaving the matter to applicable national law goes beyond what is acceptable 
under EC law94. Moreover, scholars have criticised that there is no precedent in the 
employment laws of the Member States which would allow the imposition of 
additional sanctions besides damages for breach of contract, especially in so far as 
they result in an absolute ban on an employee working in his profession95. 
According to the 2001 and 2005 Regulations, a player who breaches his 
contract during a protected period may be banned for four (under aggravating 
circumstances for six) months, starting with the beginning of the new season. 
Additionally, sanctions such as a prohibition on registering new players for a year 
may be imposed on clubs registering contract breakers. While these measures 
undoubtedly constitute a two-fold restriction on the free movement of players in the 
sense that not only the footballers who unilaterally terminate their contracts will not 
be eligible to play for their new clubs, but also clubs which sign them are punished, it 
is evident that they were put into place in order to ensure that contracts are respected. 
As has already been repeatedly stated, the aim of achieving a certain stability of 
contracts must be recognised under Article 39 of the Treaty. However, one may 
wonder whether the appliance of sporting sanctions unreasonably restricts a player's 
right to free movement. The national laws of the Member States usually recognise 
certain post-contract restrictions such as a prohibition on taking up employment with 
competitors under certain circumstances, depending on the duration of the ban and 
the position of the worker; however sanctions for breach of contract imposed by 
94 Weatherill, S., op. cit. supra note 50, p. 70. 
95 Morris, P., Morrow, S. & Spink, P., op. cit. supra note 63, p. 272; however, as far as English law 
is concerned, it was mentioned above that English courts have granted injunctions in relation to 
contractual commitments of up to 20 weeks, which implies that the sporting sanctions provided for 
by the 2001 Regulations might not be considered disproportionate in English law, see Warner 
Bros Inc v. Nelson [1936] 3 All ER 160. 
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private parties which make it impossible for a worker to practice his trade after 
leaving his employer do only exist in sport. 
In this context, it should be emphasised again that there exists a special need 
for contract stability in team sports. Apart from that, nowadays the majority of 
footballers have agents negotiating their contracts for them, which means that the 
players know what they let themselves in for. Considering the legal principle of 
pacta sunt servanda players should in principle be bound by their contracts and 
punished for a breach of the contractual obligation. Moreover, taking into account 
the incredible sums clubs have been prepared to pay for certain players in the past, it 
becomes evident that a financial penalty alone cannot ensure that contracts are 
honoured. Thus, although the career of the average footballer is fairly short, a 
protected period of either three or two years and a possible ban for either four or six 
months at most does not seem disproportionate96. Similarly, the imposition of 
sporting sanctions on clubs seeking to register a player who has breached his contract 
during the protected period is legitimate as clubs will usually know whether a player 
has left without the consent of his former club and the practice of poaching players 
may only be effectively combated by punishing the new club, as well as the player. 
However, as always, the sanctions must not go beyond of what is necessary to 
achieve the aim of ensuring the stability of contracts, which may be of particular 
concern in those cases where sporting sanctions such as a ban on signing new players 
are imposed97. 
See also the Commission's point of view in Case IV/36.583 SETCA-FGTB/FIFA, rejection of 
complaint of 28 May 2002, p. 12, "Si un joueur pouvait rompre unilateralement son contrat des la 
premiere annee et titre transfere ä la fm de la saison vers un autre club, sans aucune sanction autre 
gtie la compensation fmanciere, son club d'origine n'aurait pas de possibilitC de construire 
convenablement son equipe. Les sanctions visent donc ä demotiver les joueurs de rompre 
unilateralement leurs contrats pendent les deux premieres annees pour permettre 1'existence 
d'equipes stables. En raison des specificites du secteur en cause la duree de la periode protegee et 
des sanctions semble We proportionnee aux objectifs legitimes qu'elles visent a atteindre". 
97 This was particularly critical in respect of the 2001 Regulations which provided for the possibility 
to impose sporting sanctions such as the deduction of points or even the exclusion from a 
competition on clubs buying players who had unilaterally terminated their contracts. That the rules 
on illicit poaching of players are highly disputed was recently shown by the case of Ashley Cole 
who was approached by Chelsea whilst still under contract with Arsenal. As Arsenal had not given 
its consent to contract negotiations with the player, Chelsea was fined £ 450,000, its manager Jose 
Mourinho £ 300,000 and Ashley Cole £ 150,000. Ashley Cole's lawyer announced that he would 
appeal against the fine and threatened to go to the European Court of Justice if necessary. 
Although Ashley Cole has meanwhile signed a new contract with Arsenal, the matter is far from 
settled, since it seems only a question of time until a similar situation arises in a cross-border 
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Finally, it should be noted that there are exceptions to the principle that in the case of 
a unilateral termination of contract by the player financial and/or sporting sanctions 
will be imposed. Where a player leaves before the expiry of his contract for a "just 
cause" or "sporting just cause", he will not be punished for breach of contract. 
However, while the notion of "sporting just cause" is defined, the transfer regulations 
give no indication of what a "just cause" might constitute at all. In the absence of an 
explanation, it may be assumed that the term "just cause" refers to circumstances 
under which an employment contract may be terminated under national law. Such an 
interpretation would make sense in so far as a player who leaves a club for reasons 
recognised as being legitimate under national labour law should not be sanctioned by 
the football authorities for breach of contract. 
As regards to the notion of "sporting just causes", the transfer rules establish 
that a player who has been fielded in less than ten percent of the matches played by 
his club may not be bound by his contract. However, the existence of such a sporting 
just cause shall be established on a case-by-case basis, giving due consideration to 
the player's circumstances98. As a matter of interest it should be mentioned that the 
2001 Regulations merely mentioned the 10% rule as an example, leaving room for 
other sporting just causes. This led to rumours that FIFA would allow a player to 
walk out on his club if he did not agree with the tactics used by the manager". 
Considering the upheaval caused by the ambiguity of the definition of "sporting just 
cause", it is not surprising that the provision has now been limited to the described 
10% rule. 
context and a club or player will invoke the provisions on free movement to appeal against a fine 
imposed for illicit contract negotiations. 
98 Article 15 of the 2005 Regulations; Article 12 of the Application of the 2001 Regulations 
established in this context that the particular circumstances of the player, such as injury, 
suspension, field position, position in the team (e. g. reserve goal keeper), age and reasonable 
expectations on the basis of his past career must be considered. 
'`' See Mcauley, D. "They think it's all over ... it might just be now: Unravelling the ramifications for 
the European Football Transfer System Post-Bosman", (2002) 23(7) ECLR, p. 338. 
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10. THE 2001 AND 2005 REGULATIONS UNDER 
ARTICLE 81 
10.1. TRANSFER WINDOWS 
A limitation on transfer activity to two fixed periods a season evidently has the effect 
of restricting competition to a certain extent. In the absence of such provisions, clubs 
would be able to bring in new players over the whole year in order to strengthen their 
team and increase its marketability. This is particularly evident in the case of smaller 
clubs which have argued to be disadvantaged by the introduction of transfer 
windows'00 and in contrast to Article 39, such concerns have to be taken into account 
under the rules on competition law. 
Still, transfer windows could be necessary for creating and guaranteeing a 
competition between clubs at all. In this sense, Advocate-General Albers compared 
the transfer restrictions in Lehtonen to the provisions at issue in Gottrup-Klim'01, 
arguing that transfer deadlines may have the effect of promoting the establishment of 
competition, as they ensure comparability of results of matches within a season 102. 
Having said that, taking into account that football used to function without such 
restrictions, it is doubtful whether transfer windows may indeed be considered a 
conditio sine qua non for the existence of sporting competition. 
However, even if without transfer windows, players would probably not 
change clubs so frequently that the product football was absolutely unmarketable, 
they might be justified under the Wouters case law as a means to ensure the proper 
functioning of sporting competition, making football more attractive for consumers. 
Although transfer activity and speculations over transfers certainly generate some 
interest in the game, it is submitted that football supporters prefer a certain stability 
of teams to frequent changes. This has become evident in the discussions 
100 See news item "Transfer window hurts teams like us: Megson", 26.8.2002, www. soccernet. com, 
citing former West Bromwich Albion manager Gary Megson, who has described transfer windows 
as "nonsense" and "unfair, as it suits all the big boys. Most of them don't make any signings 
during the season anyway". 
101 Case C-250/92 Gettrup-Klim v. Dansk Landbrugs Grovvareselskab [1994] ECR I-5641. 
102 AG Albers in Lehtonen, at paras 106-108. 
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surrounding the changes to the transfers system in recent years, whereby the fact that 
footballers have been granted the freedom to move more easily has been severely 
criticised'03 On the other hand, it should be mentioned that some scholars take the 
opposite view, claiming that transfer windows actually make football less attractive. 
Thus, it is argued that transfer periods prevent the resources (the players) from being 
allocated where and when there is a need for them, eventually leading to weaker 
teams and a subsequent loss in consumer interest104. Considering the afore mentioned 
concerns that transfer windows might indeed create an even greater disadvantage for 
smaller clubs, it appears that while the restraints put on players seem to be acceptable 
under Article 39, the distortion of competition might not be. It cannot be denied that 
smaller clubs will usually be more affected by the restriction imposed by transfer 
windows, as they do not have the means to sustain a big squad which would enable 
them to substitute injured players without having to bring in players from outside. 
Thus, fixed transfer periods might indeed increase the gap between rich and less rich 
clubs, eventually leading to a loss in consumer interest or even driving smaller clubs 
out of the marketlos In order to assess the compatibility of transfer windows with EC 
competition law, it is necessary to weigh up the need for contract stability against the 
necessity of a sporting balance, considering which aim takes precedence to ensure 
the smooth functioning of sporting competition. However, if economic research 
proves that transfer windows have a negative effect on sporting equality, the 
restriction put on small clubs will be difficult to justify. Having said that, it should be 
possible to accommodate the specific needs of less wealthy teams by allowing them 
to bring in new players outside the fixed transfer period if they are hit by an injury 
crisis. 
103 See for example McGarry, I. "The fallout from Bosman 2 will ruin the game", 16.8.2000, 
www. soccernet. com, expressing concern that changes to the 1997 Regulations, giving players the 
right to free movement, may lead to the death of "the game as we currently know it". 
104 Camatsos, S., "European Sports, the Transfer System and Competition Law: Will They Ever Find 
a Competitive Balance? ", (2005) 12 Sports Lawyers Journal, p. 170. 
105 In this sense see McAuley, D., "Windows, Caps, Footballs and the European Commission. 
Confused? You will be", (2003) 24(8) ECLR, p. 397. 
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10.2. TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS FOR MINORS 
Evidently, a rule that requires a club wanting to sign a player under the age of 18 to 
provide special arrangements for his sporting training and academic education affects 
competition between clubs. In the absence of such a requirement, clubs could buy 
and sell under 18 year olds freely with buying clubs not having to incur extra costs 
and selling clubs not being restricted in their possibilities to transfer a player to 
another club. Similarly, a prohibition on buying players from non-EEA countries, 
albeit subject to limited exceptions, undoubtedly restricts the clubs' choice on the 
player market. 
However, it has already been mentioned that the restrictions regarding EEA 
nationals have been put into place in order to ensure that they receive appropriate 
training and education. The provision preventing clubs from buying players outwith 
the EEA recognises the danger that young players, in particular from poor countries 
in Africa and South America, are being separated from their families in order to play 
in Europe, where, if they fail to make the grade, the youngsters are being left to their 
own devices. Thus, both restrictions aim to protect young players, an objective which 
may be taken into account under the Wouters case law. As the provisions adopted do 
not seem to go beyond of what is necessary to achieve the legitimate goal, it is 
submitted that they are not caught by the prohibition in Article 81(1) of the Treaty. 
10.3. TRAINING COMPENSATION FOR PLAYERS UNDER 24 
The re-introduction of transfer fees for a certain group of out-of-contract players 
undoubtedly has a restrictive effect on competition between clubs. As already 
pointed out by Advocate-General Lenz in Bosman, such rules "replace the normal 
system of supply and demand by a uniform machinery which leads to the existing 
competition being preserved and the clubs being deprived of the possibility of 
making use of chances, with respect to the engagement of players, which would be 
available to them under normal competitive conditionss106. Although the 
compensation payments introduced by the 2001 Regulations only apply to under 24 
106 AG Lenz in Bosman, at para 262. 
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years olds and at least partly reflect the expenses incured by a club for the training of 
a player, this cannot change the fact that the requirement to pay such fees for players 
whose contract has expired restricts competition between clubs in respect of a 
significant segment of the player market. 
However, as mentioned above, the training compensation fees have been 
introduced in order to encourage clubs to invest in the recruitment and training of 
young players. Considering the importance of youth football in the game and 
European society, it has been submitted that the objective of promoting youth 
development may be taken into account when examining an agreement under Article 
81(1) of the Treaty. Having said that, the concerns over the suitability of training 
compensation payments to achieve the desired aim, already mentioned in the analysis 
under Article 39, are equally significant in connection with the rules on competition. 
Thus, where such fees have no relation to the funds actually spent by a club on the 
training of young players, they are not suitable to encourage the investment in young 
players' training. As far as the aim of distributing funds from bigger to smaller clubs 
is concerned, it is submitted that there are less restrictive means available to ensure a 
sporting balance. 
10.4. SOLIDARITY MECHANISM 
Evidently, a measure requiring clubs to donate a percentage of transfer income in 
order to re-distribute funds amongst clubs distorts competition. However, solidarity 
mechanisms ensuring a certain sporting ý balance are widely recognised as being 
legitimate under Article 81(1) of the Treaty. Not only has the European Council in its 
Nice Declaration encouraged clubs to share part of the revenue from sales of 
television rights, but also Advocate-General Lenz has suggested such a measureto7. 
The Commission has recognised the need to guarantee a competitive balance 
between clubs and considered the re-distribution of revenue as an appropriate means 
to achieve this objective'08. Thus, as far as re-distribution measures are applied in a 
fair, objective and transparent manner, they are accepted under Article 81(1) as being 
107 AG Lenz in Bosman, at para 226. 
108 Decision 2003/778 Joint Selling of the Commercial Rights of the UEFA Champions League, OJ 
2003 L 291/25, at para 131. 
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necessary in order to establish a sporting equilibrium and maintain the consumers' 
interest. 
10.5. DURATION OF CONTRACTS 
Whereas the prohibition of contracts binding a player for more than five years is 
likely to promote competition, the requirement of a minimum duration of contracts 
evidently restricts competition between clubs to a certain extent. This becomes even 
more obvious when it is considered that especially small clubs often cannot afford to 
keep a large squad and might need to strengthen their team on a short-term basis. If a 
club loses their first-team, as well as the reserve goalkeeper to injury, for example, it 
is necessary for the club to be able to engage a replacement player for the rest of the 
season. However, in many cases financially weak teams do not have the funds 
available to recruit a player until the end of the season, if they only need him for a 
few months, until the injured player is fit again. This puts smaller clubs at a 
disadvantage in respect to more successful clubs, which generally have a squad big 
enough to deal with injuries, and could afford to sign a new player in any case. 
Regarding the restriction on the competition between clubs established by the 
2001 Regulations, it is submitted that a measure requiring player contracts to have a 
minimum length of one year may only be justified under special circumstances. As 
mentioned above, under the 2001 Regulations, other transfer restrictions had been 
adopted which guaranteed a sufficient degree of team stability. Considering this, a 
minimum length of contracts of one year fell foul Article 81(1); however, in the 
absence of other rules ensuring a stability of contracts, such a restriction might be 
justified. Having said that, the 2005 Regulations are less restrictive in this respect, 
establishing a minimum contract period from the entry into force of the contract until 
the end of the season. Assessing this provision individually, it does not seem overly 
to restrict competition, as it allows clubs to bring in players whenever they need to 
strengthen their squad. However, although such a rule might be justified considering 
the need for contract stability, it should be mentioned that it still affects smaller clubs 
more than richer teams which can afford to keep a player until the end of a season 
even though he is not needed any more. Moreover, this restriction is enhanced by the 
fixed transfer periods, effectively leading to a minimum contract period of six 
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months. Again, it would be necessary to establish the combined effect of these 
measures on the sporting equilibrium in order to ascertain whether the benefit of 
contract stability for the functioning of sporting competition is not outweighed by the 
burden put on smaller teams. 
10.6. RESPECT FOR CONTRACTS 
It has already been mentioned that a transfer system providing that employment 
contracts may not be unilaterally terminated at any time inevitably restricts 
competition to a certain degree. Having said that, it has also been established that the 
economy can only function if employment contracts are respected and that there is an 
enhanced need for contract stability in football, which has been recognised in EC 
competition law. 
In contrast to the 1997 Regulations, the new transfer system does not 
generally prevent a player from moving on to another club without his current 
employer's consent, but provides for an opportunity to leave before the expiry of the 
employment contract, albeit subject to the payment of compensation for breach of 
contract and/or sporting sanctions. As in the case of the mutually agreed transfer fees 
incurred by clubs under the 1997 Regulations, the requirement to pay a compensation 
for breach of contract evidently restricts competition. Similarly, the imposition of 
sporting sanctions on contract breakers undoubtedly distorts competition on the 
market for players, especially as not only players, but also the clubs that want to 
employ footballers who have unilaterally terminated their contracts may be 
sanctioned. In so far as such restrictions are necessary for the functioning of sporting 
competition and satisfy the principle of proportionality, they do not fall foul Article 
81(1) of the Treaty. It has already been stated in the assessment of the transfer 
system under Article 39 that a compensation for breach of contract in the first five 
years of the contractual relationship is legitimate and does not go beyond of what is 
necessary to guarantee that contracts are honoured. This is also applicable to the 
rules on competition, particularly as the transfer regulations refer to the principles of 
the national laws of the Member States and the restrictions on competition are 
limited in time. Again, the more complicated issue is the imposition of sporting 
sanctions, which puts a heavier restraint on competition than a compensation 
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payment, as players are not available at all for the period of the sporting ban. The 
restriction on competition is enhanced by the fact that national employment 
laws 
generally do not allow sanctions effectively hindering a worker from practising 
his 
trade. Considering the special need in football for contract stability and the fact that 
the imposition of compensation payments alone is not sufficient to ensure that 
contracts are honoured, it is submitted that sporting sanctions, provided they are 
limited in duration should be accepted under Article 81(1) of the Treaty. 
The Commission has considered the measures put in place by the 2001 
Regulations in order to guarantee a stability of contracts not to restrict competition 
appreciably by reason of their limited temporal application'09. Having said that, the 
Commission went on to state that even if it was assumed that they were capable of 
restricting competition in the sense of Article 81(1), the rules would be eligible for an 
exemption under Article 81(3) of the Treaty. Thus, it was pointed out that measures 
ensuring a stability of contracts contributed to the improvement of the production 
and distribution of sport, as they preserved the integrity of competitions. 
Additionally, the effect that the composition of teams is guaranteed for a certain 
period of time was argued to make sporting competitions more interesting for the 
consumer. Finally, the Commission pointed out that the imposition of sporting 
sanctions was necessary to achieve a stability of teams and concluded that in view of 
the specific characteristics of the sporting sector, the restrictions were proportionate 
to the legitimate aims they were intended to achieve"0 
109 See Case IV/36.583 SETCA-FGTB/FIFA, rejection of complaint of 28 May 2002, at para 55: 
"Elles semblent ne plus constituer des restrictions de consurrence sensible au titre de 1'Article 81 
paragraphe 1 du Traite, notamment en raison de sa portee limitee". 
"0 Ibid, at paras 55 - 57. 
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CONCLUSION 
1. THE APPLICATION OF EC LAW TO SPORT 
1.1 Sport takes up an important part in the lives of many EU-citizens and fulfils a 
special social, cultural, educational and recreational function in 'European 
society. However, these socio-cultural characteristics do not prevent the 
application of EC law to professional sport, which constitutes an economic 
activity in the sense of Article 2 of the Treaty. The historic development of the 
European Union's relationship to sporting matters shows a new approach to 
sports policy, moving from a purely regulatory to a more socio-cultural angle. 
Thus, the Community has finally realised the special qualities of sport, 
recognising the need to take sporting interests into account when EC law is 
applied. 
1.2 Sports governing bodies have a limited legal autonomy from Community 
intervention, based on the basic right of association. As a consequence, sports 
associations principally have the right to adopt the regulatory measures they 
consider to be in their sport's best interest. However, EC law may impose 
restrictions on the right of association, provided they are necessary for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Hence, in any case of a conflict 
between freedom of association and the free movement of workers and/or 
competition law, a balancing of rights is required. Having said that, even 
though the sports bodies' right of association has been rarely mentioned in 
existing case law under Articles 39(1) and 81(1), the fact that proportionate 
measures pursuing legitimate sporting interests are accepted seems generally 
sufficient to ensure adherence to this basic right. 
1.3 In order to protect sporting interests efficiently and to be able to allocate funds 
for sports related programmes in the budget, a reference to sport should be 
included in the Treaty. Although the introduction of an article on sport in the 
Constitutional Treaty has to be welcomed, it does not provide adequate 
protection for sporting values, considering there is no obligation for 
Community institutions to pay attention to sporting interests. 
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2. FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS 
2.1 In contrast to the approach adopted by the Court of First Instance in Meca- 
Medina, it is submitted that there is no room for a sporting exemption under 
Article 39(1). An exemption for restrictive rules based on their purely sporting 
objective, not only lacks support in previous case law, but would also set a 
dangerous precedent for other industries claiming to act in the public interest. 
2.2 When assessing sporting rules under the provisions on the free movement of 
workers, different categories of sporting measures can be identified: 
  The rules of the game such as the offside-rule, which per se do not have an 
economic dimension and therefore are not covered by the Treaty. 
  Indistinctly applicable sporting measures that do not impede access to the 
employment market in another Member State and as such are not caught by 
Article 39(1) of the Treaty. 
  Restrictive sporting measures which are accepted under Article 39(1) by 
reason of their sporting necessity such as selection rules for national teams. 
  Restrictive sporting measures which are accepted under Article 39(1) 
under the justificatory test introduced in Bosman, i. e. because they pursue a 
legitimate sporting aim such as the encouragement of youth development 
or the proper functioning of sporting competition while adhering to the 
principle of proportionality. 
  Restrictive sporting measures which are caught by the provision set out in 
Article 39(1), but may be justified under Article 39(3). 
  Restrictive sporting measures which infringe Article 39(1) and may not be 
justified under Article 39(3). 
2.3 Employed athletes such as football players originating from an "old" EU 
Member State or EFTA Member State enjoy the right to free movement 
pursuant to Article 39. Currently, sportsmen from the ten new EU Member 
States as well athletes from associated countries may not be discriminated 
against as regards to working conditions, but generally have no right to access 
the employment market in (other) Member States. Thus, while nationality 
restrictions do not apply to such players once they are legally employed in a 
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Member State, they may not invoke Article 39 to challenge transfer 
restrictions. 
2.4 Article 39 does not apply to domestic transfer rules. Firstly, a transfer of a 
player within his Member State of origin constitutes a wholly internal situation 
and as such is not caught by Article 39. Secondly, EU-foreigners moving 
within another Member State cannot rely on Article 39, as domestic transfer 
rules are non-discriminatory and do not affect access to the employment 
market. 
3. THE 1997 FIFA REGULATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 39 
3.1 The 1997 transfer regulations constituted an obstacle to the free movement of 
football players, as they contained an absolute prohibition on players 
unilaterally terminating long-term contracts. Although the rules at issue were 
argued to follow the objectives of maintaining a competitive balance, 
encouraging youth development and securing a necessary stability of contracts 
- all goals which may be recognised as being legitimate under Article 39(1) - it 
is submitted that they could not have been justified under the Rosman "rule of 
reason". Firstly, it is doubtful whether the 1997 transfer system did in fact 
enhance a sporting equilibrium or promote clubs' investment in the training of 
young players. Secondly, while the 1997 transfer rules were undoubtedly 
suitable to guarantee that contracts were honoured, the burden put on players 
outweighed the clubs' interest in contract stability. 
4. EC COMPETITION LAW 
4.1 Professional team sport is characterised by a special economic structure which 
distinguishes it from other business sectors. Firstly, the competitors need to co- 
operate in order to produce a marketable good. Secondly, consumers prefer 
closer to less balanced contests, which means that there is a requirement for a 
competitive balance between clubs; however, there is a dispute between 
economists as to which means are suitable to achieve this goal. Lastly, 
professional sports leagues constitute a "natural monopoly" which means that 
the forces of supply and demand only apply to a limited extent. 
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4.2 Despite the peculiar economics of sport, the Commission has rightly. rejected 
the idea of a total exemption of the sports business from EC competition law. 
Still, there have been attempts to construe a "sporting exemption" for rules 
following a purely sporting objective; this approach has been taken up by the 
Court of First Instance in Meca-Medina. 
4.3 In EC competition law, it is possible to identify a "rule of reason" approach 
which entails that restrictive practices may escape the prohibition set out in 
Article 81(1) if the distortion of competition is deemed to be necessary for the 
implementation of an agreement capable of encouraging competition, is not 
hardcore anti-competitive and fulfils the criteria of proportionality. However, 
until Wouters, the evaluation of restrictive agreements under the "rule of 
reason" was limited to economic considerations. 
4.4 In Wouters, the Court opened up the "rule of reason" approach, holding a 
restrictive agreement to fall outside the scope of Article 81(1) under 
consideration of the public interest. Thus, parallel to the justificatory test 
adopted in Bosman under Article 39(1), Wouters provides a possibility to take 
account of sporting aims such as the promotion of youth development under 
Article 81(1) of the Treaty. 
4.5 When the application of Article 81(1) to sporting rules is analysed, it cmergcs 
that similar to the categories identified under Article 39(1), it is possible to 
differentiate between the following kinds of sporting measures: 
  Restrictive sporting rules not having the object of distorting competition 
which escape Article 81(1) by reason of their sporting necessity such as a 
measure prohibiting two clubs under common control to participate in the 
same competition. 
  Restrictive sporting measures which are accepted under Article 81(1) 
under the Wouters "rule of reason", i. e. because they pursue a legitimate 
sporting aim such as the encouragement of youth development or the 
survival of smaller clubs while adhering to the principle of proportionality. 
  Restrictive sporting measures which are caught by the prohibition set out 
in Article 81(1), but maybe justified under Article 81(3). 
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  Restrictive sporting measures which infringe Article 81(1) and may not be 
justified under Article 81(3). 
5. THE 1997 FIFA REGULATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 81(1) 
5.1 The fact that football players are workers and may thus not be classified as 
undertakings cannot prevent the application of Article 81(1). Moreover, a 
collective bargaining agreement between clubs' representatives and a players' 
union concerning the regulation of player transfers could not escape the scope 
of EC competition law. 
5.2 Sports teams as well as national and international associations arc undertakings 
and associations (of associations) of undertakings respectively in the sense of 
EC competition law. Considering that clubs, albeit having to co-operate with 
their competitors to a certain extent, are in principle operating independently 
on the market, sports leagues in Europe do not constitute a single entity to 
which Article 81(1) does not apply. 
5.3 Football constitutes a market separate from other sports, which may be further 
divided into sub-markets according to the different avenues of marketing the 
product. The market for players constitutes a market in sources of supply, 
upstream of the market where the sporting good is produced. This market 
cannot be divided into sub-markets depending on players' market value or 
nationality; however, a separate market for goal-keepers may be identified. As 
regards the relevant geographical market, it is suggested that the market for 
football players is global. 
5.4 The remaining transfer fees for out-of-contract players imposed by the 1997 
Regulations restricted clubs in their competition to recruit players, constituting 
a sharing of sources of supply pursuant to Article 81(1)(c) of the Treaty. The 
rules at issue were not necessary for the functioning of sporting competition 
and distorted competition to an appreciable extent as well as affecting trade 
between Member States. Since the restriction could not be justified under 
Article 81(3), the requirement of transfer fees for certain out-of-contract 
players still in place after Bosman fell foul of Article 81(1). 
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5.5 The 1997 Regulations also restricted competition in the sense that players still 
in contract were not allowed to transfer without their current employer's 
consent and thus limited the choice of players available on the market. Also, 
even under consideration of the Wouters case law, the restriction would not 
have been justifiable, since the rules in question were not adequate or 
proportionate means to pursue the aims of promoting youth development and 
contract stability. Considering that competition between Member States was 
affected appreciably, the transfer restrictions imposed on players still under 
contract infringed Article 81(1). 
6. THE 2001 AND 2005 FIFA REGULATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 39 
6.1 The newly adopted transfer windows restrict free movement as they prevent 
players from taking up employment in another Member State outside the 
designated transfer periods. However, fixed transfer windows arc an adequate 
and proportionate means to achieve the legitimate aim of ensuring a certain 
stability of team competition. 
6.2 A requirement that minors may only move to another club within the EEA if 
suitable arrangements for their sporting and academic education are guaranteed 
constitutes an obstacle to free movement which can by justified by public 
interest considerations. 
6.3 The requirement for training compensation payments for under 23 year olds 
impedes these players' free movement considerably. On the other hand, clubs 
should be rewarded for their investment in the training of young players, an 
aim which should be acknowledged under Article 39(1). Apart from the fact 
that there have been doubts over the suitability of training compensation to 
encourage youth development, the calculation scheme adopted under the 2001 
and 2005 Regulations is open to criticism. 
6.4 While the introduction of a maximum contract length of five years has to be 
welcomed, the requirement of a minimum contract length restricts players' 
movement to a certain extent. In contrast to the respective provision in the 
2001 Regulations, the minimum contract length stated in the 2005 Rcgulations 
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is considered to be justified by the legitimate interest in a certain stability of 
teams. 
6.5 The requirement to compensate clubs for breach of contract is not caught by 
Article 39(1), as objective criteria are applied to assess the financial 
disadvantage for clubs. Although the burden put on players by the imposition 
of sporting sanctions for breach of contracts weighs undoubtedly heavier, the 
adopted measures are justified by the interest in contract stability. 
7. THE 2001 AND 2005 FIFA REGULATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 81 
7.1 In principle, the distortion of competition between clubs on the player market 
imposed by transfer windows may be justified in order to guarantee a necessary 
stability of teams. However, there are concerns that the adopted measures put a 
disproportionate restraint on small clubs which do not have the means to 
sustain large squads to compensate for injuries. 
7.2 Transfer restrictions for minors which require clubs to provide adequate 
sporting and academic education are justified in the light of Wouters under 
public interest considerations. 
7.3 Training compensation payments for young players restrict competition 
between clubs in respect of a significant segment of the player market. In 
principle, such measures may be justified by sporting interests, given that the 
existing concerns over their suitability to promote youth development and the 
inadequacies regarding the calculation mechanism arc removed. 
7.4 A requirement providing for a minimum length of contracts evidently has a 
restrictive effect on competition. The distortion on competition is enhanced by 
the adoption of transfer windows, leading to a partial closure of the player 
market. As mainly small clubs are affected by such restrictions, it is suggested 
to allow exceptions for clubs hit by injuries. 
7.5 Similar to the situation under Article 39(1), the requirement to compensate 
clubs for breach of contract is acceptable under Article 81(1) provided it is 
limited to actual financial disadvantage incurred by clubs. Obviously, the 
restriction imposed by sporting sanctions is more difficult to justify, but owing 
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to a certain need for contract stability in football, does not fall foul Article 
81(1) if such measures are limited in duration. 
8. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS/LIMITATIONS OF THESIS 
8.1 The recent discussions over non-solicitation rules or Charleroi's law suit for 
damages for their star striker's injury incurred during international duty show 
that the field of sport and EC law is still evolving. Since Bosman, players and 
clubs have realised that EC law provides them with effective weapons to break 
the sports bodies' regulatory monopoly and invoke their rights to free 
movement and under EC competition law. Whilst the juridification of the 
sports sector might be matter of regret for some, it should be kept in mind that 
it mainly is the result of the ongoing commercialisation of sport. 
8.2 However, since the Community has signalled its willingness to accept certain 
sporting aims under the Treaty, it will be necessary for the sports bodies to 
identify the sporting interests and special characteristics that should be 
safeguarded and to indicate how they are best protected. In this context, 
economic research will be vital to analyse the economic impact of sporting 
rules. Such research is not only important to establish whether a certain 
measure actually achieves what it is set out to do, but also to demonstrate that 
there are no other less restrictive means available. For example, if it was 
proven that re-distribution measures are in fact unsuitable to achieve a sporting 
equilibrium, more restrictive means to achieve this legitimate objective might 
be permissible. Thus, although an assessment of a sporting rule under the 
Treaty generally requires an examination of its suitability to achieve a certain 
sporting aim as well as its proportionality, it must be emphasised that legal 
analysis is necessarily restricted to legal considerations and must rely on the 
economic research available. This signifies a considerable factor of 
uncertainty, since in many cases, as for example transfer rules, economists do 
not agree on the economic repercussions of a particular rule. 
8.3 Apart from the fact that sports bodies will need to cooperate more closely with 
Community officials, they should also be prepared to defend existing 
restrictions in the field of amateur sport. Recent developments suggest that the 
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concept of a Union citizenship may also include the right to join and play for a 
certain amateur team and nationality restrictions will not be accepted. 
Moreover, it is doubtful whether transfer restrictions for amateurs are 
compatible with the principle of free movement. Although the issue of amateur 
sport in EC law is definitely worth closer examination, such an analysis lies 
outwith the scope of this thesis. 
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APPENDIX: CATEGORIES OF SPORTING RULES UNDER ARTICLES 39 
AND 81 OF THE TREATY 
1. Purely sporting rules which have no economic impact and which are outside the 
scope of the Treaty (so-called "rules of the game", e. g. off-side rule) 
2. Rules with an economic impact to which the Treaty in principal applies, but 
which fall outside the scope of the prohibitions set out in Articles 39(1) and 
81(1): 
ARTICLE 39(1) ARTICLE 81(1) 
Disctiminatory Non-discriminatory 
1. Rules not affecting 1. Rules not having the object 
access to employment of distorting the market AND 
market in another 
Member State 
2. Rules affecting 
access employment 
market in another 
Member State AND 
Rules strictly 2.1 are strictly 1.1 are strictly necessary for 
necessary for necessary for functioning of sport 
functioning of sport functioning of sport (e. g. anti-doping measures) 
(e. g. national teams) 
"Conventional" Rule of Reason "RoR' 
2.2 ensure "proper" 1.2 ensure "proper" 
functioning of sport functioning of sport 
(e. g. transfer (e. g. re-distribution 
windows) measures) 
2.3 are necessary to 1.3 are necessary to achieve 
achieve legitimate legitimate sporting aim 
sporting aim (e. g. youth policy) 
(e. g. youth policy) 
Rosman RoR Wouters RoR 
3. Rules which are in breach of Article 39(1) or 81(1), but which fulfil the 
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